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Abstract
'On Different Tracks: Institutions and Railway Regulation in Britain and Germany'
This study analyses how institutional factors impact on processes of isomorphism in 
the design of regulatory regimes. It does so through a comparative examination of 
regulatory reform in the railway domain in Britain and Germany in three time 
periods, the post-First World War and the post-Second World War periods as weU as 
the 1990s.
It is argued that pressures for isomorphism, defined as the increasing 
homogenisation of a unit with other units in its policy environment, are exerted by 
several policy environments. These pressures can be distinguished in their degree of 
domain- and paradigm-orientation. Domain-orientation consists of regulatory 
change which is based on sector-specific sources, whereas paradigm-orientation 
involves the application of supposedly universal 'policy recipes' across policy 
domains. The study questions whether three institutional factors -  the insulation of 
the regulatory space from coercive pressures, the insulation of the political- 
administrative nexus in the regulatory space and the insulation of the regulatory 
space from societal forces -  can explain why in some cases reforms are domain- 
oriented, but, in other cases, reforms are paradigm-oriented.
The comparative analysis of reform in British and German railway regulation 
provides three conclusions. First, in all cases, pressures for isomorphism emerging 
from different poHcy environments provided competing 'templates' for regulatory 
design ideas. Second, among the institutional factors, the insulation of the political- 
administrative nexus in the regulatory space was identified as the most important 
factor for explaining the orientation of the selected regulatory instruments. Third, in 
the light of the study's historical and institutional perspective, this thesis critically 
evaluates arguments proclaiming the emergence of a 'regulatory state' in 
contemporary Europe.
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Introduction
The Problematic of this Study
The study of regulation and the 'regulatory state' has enjoyed increased 
attention in contemporary public policy. The perceived failure of previous 
systems of control over economic activities and policy delivery is said to have 
led to a shift from the 'positive' or 'welfare' state towards the 'regulatory state' 
(Majone 1997). This shift has been characterised by an increased emphasis on 
competition and indirect market-correcting measures, free-standing regulatory 
bodies, changes in service delivery and an increased formality of regulatory 
relationships (Loughlin and Scott 1997: 205-7). At the same time, the public 
policy literature has shown a growing interest in institutional approaches 
towards regulation; for example, Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran (1989) have 
coined the term 'regulatory space' to emphasise the importance of inter- 
organisational relationships as well as formal and informal rules for the exercise 
of regulatory activities. The present study shares this institutional approach. It 
builds on concerns in the institutional literature with questions of institutional 
design. Most prominently. Max Weber (1972: 825-37) proposed a tendency 
towards convergent forms of bureaucracy on a legal-rational basis. DiMaggio 
and Powell (1991a) similarly stressed the phenomenon of increasing 
homogenisation of organisational forms within an organisational field. This 
study argues that regulatory reform can be conceptualised as a process of 
isomorphism. Isomorphism is defined as the constraining process which forces
one unit to become increasingly homogeneous with other units in its policy 
environment.
The thesis argues that social life is diverse and therefore does not offer one single 
dominant policy environment but numerous ones which provide different 
sources of isomorphism. These can be distinguished in the extent of their 
paradigm- or domain-orientation. Paradigm-orientation is defined by the 
application of supposedly universal 'policy recipes' across policy domains, while 
domain-orientation specifies regulatory change which is oriented at sector- 
specific sources. To explain why regulatory reforms vary in their source of 
isomorphism, three institutional factors are considered which open the 
regulatory space to various policy environments and which provide templates 
for the formulation of regulatory instruments. The institutional factors define the 
extent to which the regulatory space is insulated from other policy 
environments. First, the insulation of the regulatory space from coercive 
pressures defines the degree of integration of the regulatory space with a higher 
legal, political or economic framework which exerts pressure for 
homogenisation. Second, the insulation of the political-administrative nexus in 
the regulatory space is concerned with the internal organisation of the state. The 
third factor, the insulation of the regulatory space from societal actors, considers 
the membership of societal actors in the regulatory space.
The empirical cases of this study investigate the impact of these institutional 
factors on the extent to which isomorphic processes are domain- or paradigm- 
oriented. Contemporary and historical cases of regulatory reform in the railway 
domain in Britain and Germany provide the empirical basis for this analysis. The
railways offer an appropriate case for the study of institutional approaches, in 
particular as they represent, similar to telecommunications, energy and health, a 
'sector close to the state' i^staatsnaher Sekto^, Mayntz and Scharpf 1995a: 13-14). 
Such sectors are defined as state activities, which, while not being directly part 
of 'national sovereignty', involve a substantial amount of state involvement and 
control for political, economic and electoral reasons.
The railways have been at the forefront of regulatory development since the 
mid-1830s (Dobbin 1994: 22). The study of regulation, especially with regard to 
railways, is therefore far from a suddenly emerging policy fad, but looks back on 
a long history of debates concerning the control of economic activities (Ogus 
1994: 6-10; Craig 1994: 41-63). At the same time, the domain was exposed to the 
more contemporary themes of public sector reform in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
By examining historical and more contemporary examples of regulatory reforms, 
this study follows the recent 'historical turn' in the social sciences (McDonald 
1996). Just as old steam trains are an interesting field of study for the engineer, 
historical cases of regulatory debates and policies provide an indication of 
recurring debates in regulation and allow for an assessment of 'progress' in the 
understanding of policy instruments for the control of economic activities. At the 
same time, a comparative and historical perspective minimises the risk of 
overemphasising the extent, significance and 'newness' of contemporary 
debates. Instead it is possible to consider the potential persistence of policy 
patterns and the possibility of convergence across sectors and states.
This study aims to contribute to the institutional literature by investigating 
issues of institutional design in terms of the origins and legitimisation of
regulatory design ideas. Moreover, it is concerned with the impact of 
institutional factors on the selection of regulatory design ideas and their 
implementation. Finally, the study offers an analysis of the selection of 
regulatory instruments in both Britain and Germany and thus aims to contribute 
to the current academic debates concerning regulation and privatisation of 
industries with network characteristics and railways in particular.
The rest of this introductory chapter explores three issues. It first considers the 
background of the research. It highlights the considerable interest in the 
literature given to railway regulation and institutions. It then discusses the 
underlining methodology of this study. Finally, it presents an overview of the 
whole argument.
Background of the Research
As a 'sector close to the state', the railways have been a prime political and 
academic concern since the 19th century. Max Weber described the railways, 
together with the telegraph and the postal system, as an essential part of the 
occidental state. This view reflects the railways' crucial importance in the 19th 
century in terms of industrial, regional and even nationhood development. In 
Germany and India, the railways were crucial for military purposes, allowing 
rapid troop movements across large geographical distances. The railways were 
essential in evolving with and shaping 19th century industrial policies across 
states. For example, the 1844 Regulation of Railways Act is said to have set the 
pattern for natural monopoly regulation not only in the UK, but also in the US 
with the 1867 Interstate Commerce Act (McLean and Foster 1992: 315). The 
analysis of railway regulation has been used to highlight the dysfunctional
nature of different types of past regulatory regimes (Foster 1992) as well as to 
test various theories of regulation in order to explain the 1844 Railway 
Regulation Act (McLean and Foster 1992). The critical role of the 'railway 
interest' in shaping railway regulation, often regarded as the most powerful 
interest represented in the British Houses of Parliament until, at least, the 
beginning of the 20th century has been assessed (Alderman 1973, also Bagwell 
1965, Gourvish 1980). Furthermore, the role of railway regulation as a 
'spearhead' for the increased role of the British government in economic 
activities has been part of the 'growth of government' debate among historians of 
the 19th and early 20th century (Parris 1960, 1965; MacDonagh 1958, 1961; 
Cromwell 1966; Taylor 1972).
As has already been noted, the study of regulation has been burgeoning with 
attention increasingly paid by policy-makers to regulation as an attractive 
policy-tool. The literature on regulation has provided various explanations for 
regulatory origins and developments (see Hood 1994:19-36). These focus on the 
impact of powerful ideas, socio-economic changes, self-stimulated institutional 
growth and possible destruction as well as interest accounts. However, 
notwithstanding the wide-ranging usage of the notion of 'regulation', the term 
itself is not an uncontested concept. For example, Baldwin, Scott and Hood 
(1998: 3) have defined regulation as the 'promulgation of an authoritative set of 
rules, accompanied by some mechanism, typically a public agency, for 
monitoring and promoting compliance' - thereby broadly following Selznick's 
definition of regulation as a 'sustained and focused control exercised by a pubhc 
agency over activities that are valued by the community' (Selznick 1985: 363). 
Other approaches offer more wide-ranging definitions, broadening the
definition of regulation to all forms of deliberate state influence and, in some 
cases, even to all forms of social control (Baldwin and Cave 1999: 1-2). The 
following analysis draws on the first definition. It also utilises the term 
'regulatory regime'. The term 'regime' refers to the configuration of rules and 
their application governing the 'regulatory space' (Hancher and Moran 1989). 
Three particular issues - regarded as crucial in the regulatory literature - have 
been selected and are being examined on the extent of their domain- or 
paradigm-orientation. First, the organisational structure is said to be more 
influential in shaping the behaviour of the regulated actor than ex post 
regulatory activity; second, the allocation o f regulatory authority, its objectives, 
distribution and instruments; and, third, so-called non-commercial objectives, 
often also labelled as 'public services'.
Defining the railway domain as a 'sector close to the state' emphasises the 
importance of understanding regulation as being formulated and exercised 
inside a 'regulatory space' which unavoidably involves relations of 
interdependence and (continuous) interaction between public and private actors 
(Hall, Scott and Hood 2000: 83). Regulation represents institutional processes 
which involve complex and shifting relationships between and within 
organisations, both public and private. Widening the study of regulatory 
relationships to the 'regulatory space' reflects the difficulty of applying 
established US-approaches, in particular Stigler's well-known 'capture' 
argument, to European cases (Stigler 1971), while not disputing the view of 
regulation as a political process rather than as a functional response to perceived 
market failures. In contrast to the increasing interest in the transaction cost and 
principal-agent literature on institutional mechanisms of control, this analysis
focuses on the importance of institutional 'appropriateness' of regulatory 
instruments and, in particular, the impact of institutional factors on the selection 
of regulatory design ideas.
Despite the wide-ranging literature on the mortmain of institutions and the 
shared institutionalist assumptions of the importance of the impact of structures, 
the focus of this study, namely the institutional factors which facilitate the 
'transfer' of particular regulatory design ideas while hindering the diffusion of 
others, has received less attention. This study does not offer a comprehensive 
test of institutional approaches, for example, it does not 'test' the impact of broad 
distinctions at the macro-political level such as 'Westminster' or 'consensus' 
democracy (Lijphardt 1984; 1999), the number of veto points (Tsebelis 1995) or 
more general deductive game-theoretic actor constellations (Scharpf 1997). 
Instead, it seeks to contribute to the institutional literature by exploring the 
impact of three inductively generalised institutional factors on the selection of 
regulatory design ideas. Assessing the impact of institutional factors as 
explanations for processes of isomorphism highlights the importance of 
legitimate and persuasive policy templates rather than the mere exercise of 
economic interests. Furthermore, it stresses the importance of 'copying' and 
'imitation' in the formulation of public policies and administrative reform (Hood 
1983: 128-30; Hood 1986: 157). It therefore emphasises the importance of 
established 'symbols' in analysing how selected actors perceive situations within 
their structures.
Finally, why study historical cases of 'nationalisation' in a proclaimed period of 
privatisation? Giandomenico Majone has argued (1996a: 17-23) that failure
occurs in the regulation of both public as well as private enterprises in fairly 
similar ways, thus making them comparable. Both are open to 'capture': whereas 
in the case of regulation of private industry, regulators might be captured by 
politicians or by private industries, in the case of public ownership, enterprises 
might be captured by politicians for electoral purposes or may themselves 
'capture' ministers, departments or agencies by exploiting their informational 
advantages (Tivey 1982). Thus, similar causes for problems with public and 
private enterprises have been diagnosed concerning 'ad hoc' decision-making, 
confusion of objectives, political manipulation, lack of co-operation between 
administrators, ministries and industries as well as ineffective performance 
measures. Furthermore, given this similarity of regulatory problems, it can be 
expected that similar solutions and/or similar justifications in accordance with 
fads and fashions will be adopted in regulatory design over time.
Methodology
The nature of this study on the impact of institutional factors on forms of 
isomorphism in railway regulation in two countries is comparative and 
qualitative. It represents a case-oriented approach in aiming to explain particular 
outcomes: why reforms in some cases are domain-oriented, in other cases 
paradigm-oriented (Ragin 1987). It compares cross-nationally as well as over 
time. The goal is not only to highlight differences and explain these, but also to 
contribute to the analytical debates concerning the impact of institutional factors 
on processes of isomorphism.
Given the debated limitations of the case study, the aim is not to offer law-like 
generalisations. It is questionable whether predictive generalisations, based on
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the assumption that political life operates in a clocklike manner, are feasible at 
all, given the likely variations in observed behaviour across space and over time 
(Almond and Genco 1977). Thus, the most likely (or, at least, desired) 
achievement is the creation of 'sometimes true stories' - explanations that hold 
under specific institutional conditions (Coleman 1964: 516-9), which are 
nevertheless important for the examination of the power of the institutional 
approach as an explanatory device.
A case-oriented, qualitative approach faces the 'many variables, small N' 
problem (Lijphart 1971: 685, Coppedge 1999). This describes the inability of 
comparative policy research to isolate and systematically vary a single variable 
and the problem of having to face a multiplicity of possible explanatory 
variables with only a limited set of evidence, leading to the problem of 
'overdetermination'. One traditional means of overcoming this problem has been 
the application of John Stuart Mill's methods of 'agreement' and 'difference'. 
However, their usefulness has been questioned on grounds of the perceived 
unreasonableness of Mill's assumptions such as
'a deterministic set of forces, the existence of only one cause, the 
absence of interaction effects, confidence that all possible causes are 
measured, the absence of measurement errors, and the assumption 
that the same clean pattern would occur if data were obtained for all 
relevant cases' (Lieberson 1991: 315-6; also ibid. 1994; Little 1991: 35- 
7; but Savolainen 1994).
Following Mill's proposals (which Mill himself regarded as inapplicable to the 
social sciences), Przeworski and Teune (1970) proposed designing analysis along
the lines of 'most similar systems' or 'most different systems' (reversing Mill's 
notions). According to this line of argument, if the cases differ or agree in one 
variable or in a small set of variables only, then causal interferences can be 
derived. However, the effectiveness of such a quasi-experimental analysis 
depends on the level of detail the analysis aims to provide. Most cases encounter 
problems with the complexity facing comparative research designs, leading to 
the effect that 'most similar' or 'most different' systems designs fail to reduce 
variance sufficiently to facilitate quasi-experimental solutions (i.e. face the 
problem of control via matching in order to achieve so-called 'unit 
homogeneity') (Scharpf 1997: 23-4; King, Keohane and Verba 1994: 199-206). 
Furthermore, the difficulty in establishing laboratory-type conditions for 
empirical research is enhanced by the researcher's position as part of the 
research design and its execution which is likely to shape interviews and 
document analysis.
Given the lack of mono-causality, the recognition that combinations of factors 
explain policy outcomes and that similar outcomes are brought about by 
different circumstances, Renate Mayntz declared that qualitative research is 
primarily concerned with the 'development and elaboration of descriptive 
categories in an interactive process with the research object and the formulation 
of hypothetical explanations' (Mayntz 1985: 70 own translation). Following 
Lijphart (1971: 685) and Ragin, Berg-Schlosser and de Meur (1996: 753; see also 
Keohane, King and Verba 1994:120; Scharpf 1997: 24-5), one device to overcome 
the 'small N' problem is to concentrate on key variables, test 'single conjunctural 
perspectives', or use 'theoretical reduction'. The device of 'theoretical reduction' 
aims to decrease the number of variables by drawing on one distinct analytical
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approach only. This study utilises an institutional framework and develops a set 
of three different, though not necessarily fully exhaustive or mutually exclusive 
institutional factors for the analysis of forms of isomorphism.
This approach towards complexity allows for clarification, on an admittedly 
limited scale, of the appropriateness of particular approaches to a specific policy 
outcome. In the present study, the independent variables -  the three selected 
institutional factors -  are examined on their impact on the dependent variable -  
the domain- or paradigm-oriented isomorphism of regulatory reform. It 
therefore aims to clarify which 'institutions matter' - the insulation of the 
regulatory space from coercive pressures, the insulation of the political- 
administrative nexus and the insulation of the regulatory space from societal 
forces. If the impact of these factors is negligible, then it raises questions as to 
whether institutional factors are as crucial for understanding political life as 
advocates of institutional approaches seem to suggest (Peters 1999; 78). 
Similarly, Scharpf suggests that 'for many purposes institution-based 
information will be sufficient to derive satisfactory explanations' (Scharpf 1997: 
42). Following the analogy of a 'ladder of abstraction' (Scharpf 1997: 42, citing 
Lindenberg 1991), one should begin with institutional explanations and search 
for information on more idiosyncratic factors only when institutional accounts 
fail.
In terms of case selection, the railways offer a good case for theoretical and 
pragmatic reasons for utilising this analytical framework based on institutional 
isomorphism. In contrast, for example, to telecommunications, the railways have 
not been exposed to rapid technological change and convergence of industries,
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thus being less exposed to competitive forces in the policy domain. As already 
stated, the railways, as a 'sector close to the state', were crucial for the overall 
approach of governments towards the control of economic activities. The 
railways have been of key political and economic importance not only as direct 
employer, but also as employer in the up- and downstream industries. 
Furthermore, in particular in the UK, they provided a powerful trade union 
base, especially in the early 1920s as part of the Triple Alliance of transport 
workers, miners and railwaymen. Moreover, the railways have been and remain 
a major economic contractor for multiple industries both up- and downstream, 
often (in the past) in close relationship with the operator. After a period of 
decline which set in after the First World War due to increased inter-modal 
competition and changing industrial production away from heavy goods (thus 
reducing the 'natural' freight market for railway transport), the railways have re- 
emerged since the late 1970s as a 'political attraction' mainly for environmental 
as well as traffic congestion reasons. High-speed train developments, for 
example, were one expression of this renewed interest. Furthermore, despite the 
marginal importance of the railways to the 'average voter' in the late 20th 
century in terms of passenger market share, the railways have maintained a high 
salience in terms of popular attachment, commuter interest, media attention and 
political rhetoric. During much of the post-war period, the 'political' interest in 
the railways was reinforced by the financial decline of the railway industry and 
the consequent need to deal with large subsidy and investment requirement 
demands on budgets as well as the trade-off between 'economic' reasoning and 
'constituency pleasing' in the case of line closures.
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Six cases of regulatory change are analysed in terms of policy formulation and 
deliberation; the study is therefore not concerned with assessing outcomes in 
terms of, for example, performance standards or subsidy levels. The cases draw 
on three distinct time periods, the post-First World War and the post-Second 
World War periods as well as the 1990s. The cases selected offer examples of 
regulatory debates from the past which were directed at the very same issues as 
contemporary regulatory debates. They multiply the number of observations, 
thus providing a further means of reducing the 'small N' problem. The cases 
under examination can be counted as 'major' acts in that they substantially 
shaped the consequent development of the railways and of railway regulation. 
Besides representing the major changes to regulatory regimes in the course of 
the 20th century, these cases also provide potential examples for major, 
paradigm-oriented changes, whether via imposition after war-time defeat as in 
the case of Germany, party-political change after the Second World War as in the 
case of Britain or via Europeanisation in both countries as part of membership to 
the European Union.
The comparability of the different cases is enhanced by the fact that Britain and 
Germany are Western European states, whose railway systems have been 
exposed to similar problems at similar time periods (see Stykow 1999). In the 
selected time periods, the railways had moved beyond the peak of their power 
and sustainable viability. All cases involved choices between and within domain 
or paradigm-oriented alternatives. In all three time periods under investigation, 
academic writers have diagnosed isomorphism, a move towards a 'regulatory 
state' since the 1980s (Majone 1994), a move towards a 'public corporation model' 
following the Second World War (Robson 1960) and a move towards a similar
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regulatory distance between state and railways in the 1920s following the First 
World War (Witte 1932). Furthermore, the time periods chosen are claimed to 
represent periods of major policy shifts. The public policy literature has 
identified 'war effects' as crucial for the evolution of policies in terms of levels of 
public expenditure and taxation (Peacock and Wiseman 1961) as well as in terms 
of 'institutional sclerosis', with the absence of war-time defeat not eliminating 
the accumulation of special interest participation in public policies (Olson 1982). 
Similarly, policy shifts during the 1980s and 1990s are often claimed to represent 
a period of major policy reversals and changes to established modes of 
governance (see Hood 1994).
The empirical evidence is drawn from archival sources, publications and elite 
interviews. The historical chapters are based on public records, contemporary 
newspaper reports and on academic and semi-academic writing on these issues. 
The public archives in the UK and, to a lesser extent, in Germany, offered 
substantial material both on various reform proposals and the reform processes, 
viewed from different departmental and rail operator perspectives. In particular 
the German post-Second World War sources were difficult to uncover not only 
due to a lack of cataloguing but also by the systematic 'tidying up' by civil 
servants before the transfer of the files to the archives.^ While newspaper 
sources -  such as the Railway Gazette or the Times and press cuttings in the 
German Bundesarchive offered good accounts of the evolution of the policy 
debate, they did not offer by far the same amount of substantial information 
obtainable from current newspaper reports (in particular with 'FT Profile' as a
 ^Communication with transport expert at Bundesarchiv Koblenz.
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research resource). While it is necessary to expect a certain bias in the reporting 
of these issues, by using various sources and adding these to the evidence 
gathered from historical documents, it is possible to minimise the natural 
selection bias of historical records. This limits the inherent risk of tautology that 
the conclusions drawn are based on the conclusions of those sources from which 
this study's conclusions are derived (Lustik 1996).
Contemporary research is faced with similar problems. Newspapers (primarily 
Financial Times, Independent, Guardian, Times and Daily Telegraph (and their 
Sunday equivalents) and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Siiddeutsche 
Zeitung  and Handelsblatt) as well as specialist publications (such as Modern 
Railways and Internationales Verkehrswesen) and 'grey' literature were used. 
While they offered substantially more 'background' information than the 
historical sources, it was necessary, in particular in the case of the British press, 
to examine the potential strategic or even misleading 'leaking' of stories to 
newspapers. The most important source of information on the 'privatisation' 
stories of the 1990s were interviews with leading politicians, officials, railway 
managers, academics and journalists. A total of 35 interviews was conducted, 
interview partners were identified and selected, on the one hand, by analysing 
published sources and, on the other hand, by relying on the so-called 'snowball' 
system.
15
Number o f interviews according to country case and organisational background
Germany UK
politicians 1 5
officials 7 11
railway managers 3 (5 persons) 4 (5 persons)
academics 1 1
journalists 0 2
total 12 23
The interviews, usually lasting for approximately one hour, were semi­
structured in order to allow for a systematic comparison across sources as well 
as adjustment to the individual perspective of the interviewees. Most interviews 
were recorded and transcribed.^ Following academic custom, interviews were 
conducted with the understanding that all information used in the text should 
be completely non-attributable. Within the text, sources therefore appear only 
under their interview number. The table in the appendix provides an indication 
of the background of the interview sources and the time period of fieldwork 
research. Similar to historical documents, single interviews can be relatively 
unreliable sources of information. The information offered in interviews is
 ^In some cases, interview partners refused to be recorded. One interview was conducted 
by telephone. In these cases, a transcript of the interview notes was produced. Originally, 
a similar number of potential interviewees was approached in both countries. In the 
German case, retired officials as well as former transport politicians transferred interview 
requests to still active officials, who had already been approached and interviewed. 
However, the evidence collected during these interviews was to a large extent not 
conflicting. In the British case, the statement by lU K ll 'Have you seen [lUKl], [IUK2], 
and [IUK12]? [...] These three people will cover the ground' suggests that the interview  
sample includes key actors. In general, access to British politicians and officials was less 
difficult than in the German case.
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potentially selective. Interviewees' responses might be shaped by the 'benefit of 
hindsight', pure memory loss, as well as by organisational or individual 
positions and opinions. Again, by drawing on a number of interviews, including 
actors from various organisational backgrounds and by comparing it with the 
information gained from newspapers and other contemporary literature, it is 
possible via 'quasi-triangulation' to minimise the risk of bias.
Overview
This study aims to contribute to the established literatures on regulation and 
institutionalism. It provides an account of six cases of regulatory reform in the 
railway sector in Britain and Germany. While in both countries, the historical 
cases have received academic attention - mainly in economic history, railway 
studies and, especially in the German cases, law - the material presented here is 
based on full access to archival evidence. The 1990s cases offer a wealth of 
unpublished and interview material which also provide a critical perspective on 
established accounts on the policy process of railway privatisation and 
'Europeanisation'. The analysis of the privatisation cases ends in 1997, with only 
occasional reference, where necessary, to developments following the election of 
'new' governments in Britain and Germany in 1997 and 1998 respectively.
The following chapter introduces the institutional approach and in particular the 
distinction between paradigm- and domain-orientation as descriptive categories. 
This distinction aims to highlight the different motivations and orientations 
which guide policy formulation and which provide policy-makers with choices 
in their selection of regulatory policy instruments. Furthermore, three 
institutional factors are explored in order to assess their impact on domain- and
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paradigm- oriented isomorphism. In the conclusion (chapter nine), it is argued 
that while none of these factors can, on their own, offer a comprehensive 
explanation for change, the degree of insulation of the political-adrninistrative 
nexus is crucial for explaining the selection of regulatory design ideas, while the 
impact of 'coercive pressures' and 'societal actors' was less important as 
mechanisms for isomorphism.
Chapter begins the empirical case studies. The British 1920s case highlights 
the conflict between domain- and paradigm-oriented ideas and the success of 
domain-oriented proposals due, at first, in the case of the 1919 Ministry of 
Transport Act, to political resistance and, later, in the case of the 1921 Railways 
Act, to a reliance on corporatist decision-making patterns. Chapter /bur offers an 
account of regulatory change in the early 1920s in Germany. Here particular 
attention is paid to the exposure of the German regime to the interests of the 
Allied powers in maximising reparation payments and 'commercialising' the 
German railways. It assesses why despite the full exposure of domestic actors to 
international demands, the reforms were mainly domestic and domain-oriented.
Chapter five  discusses the British case of creating a public corporation for its 
railways. It is argued that regulation was very much at the centre of discussion 
of nationalisation policy, especially given the commercial rather than 'welfare- 
oriented' nature of socialisation policy. Chapter six considers the German post- 
Second World War reforms. In contrast to the 1920s, the Allied occupation 
powers did not play a prominent role in reform discussions. The regulatory 
debate was conducted between two competing domestic domain-oriented 
reform options based on federal lines of conflict. Chapters seven and eight
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consider the two railway privatisations during the 1990s, in particular with 
regard to themes of 'Europeanisation'. It considers the extent to which the 
national regulatory debates were purely domestic and whether experiences from 
non-domestic sources were drawn upon.
Chapter nine draws the findings of the empirical chapters together and assesses 
the strength and weaknesses of the proposed institutional framework. It also 
attempts to broaden the lessons of the case studies to wider debates concerning 
institutions. Finally, it critically assesses the contemporary debate about the 
'emergence' of the regulatory state in the light of the historical cases by 
highlighting the importance attached to regulation in the past and the similarity 
of regulatory debates.
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Chapter 2: 
Isomorphism in Regulatory Choice
Introduction
The central purpose of the study is to examine the impact of institutional factors 
on the nature of the design of regulatory regimes. Institutions, and institutional 
approaches, have been an area of burgeoning academic concern across the social 
sciences and have been identified as an appropriate way to understand and 
explain regulatory regimes given their mutual interest in control and order (see 
also Hancher and Moran 1989). Anthropological studies, for example, emphasise 
the importance of rules and norms for individual and tribal survival (Rehberg 
1994). Economists have found 'institutions' increasingly attractive as a means to 
criticise approaches which focus on individual rationality on the micro-level and 
aggregated demand and supply on the macro-level without paying much 
attention to market structures and transaction costs (North 1990). Institutions are 
said to provide the key to solving instability problems as identified in the 
literature following Arrow's Impossibility Theorem (Shepsle 1995), offering 
possibilities for both co-operation as well as coercion (Moe 1990). Nevertheless, 
the claim that 'institutions matter' in itself has little explanatory power, it is 
virtually impossible to search for an outcome which has not been affected by 
some form of 'institution'. This study aims to 'add value' to the study of 
institutions by analysing the impact of three institutional factors in the design of 
regulatory regimes, therefore seeking to specify which institutions matter for 
what kind of outcomes.
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The following proposes that institutional reform - such as regulatory regime 
change - can be understood as a process of isomorphism. Isomorphism is 
defined as a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble 
other units in its policy environment that face the same set of conditions 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991a: 66). This study claims that the nature of 
isomorphism can be differentiated in terms of domain- or paradigm orientation. 
Furthermore, the study analyses in its empirical chapters whether particular 
institutional factors can explain the extent to which reforms are either domain- 
or paradigm-oriented. Using an institutional framework allows for a better 
comparison between the two countries analysed in this study. Furthermore, it 
avoids the traditional debates in the literature on regulatory origins and 
developments which have focused on the question whether 'public' or 'private' 
interests dominate the regulatory process. By utilising institutional variables to 
explain the nature of processes of 'institutional transfer', this study takes an 
historical and sociological institutionalist approach. Such a perspective is similar 
to Stephen Vogel's study of regulatory reform in telecommunications and 
financial markets in the UK and Japan and Hancher and Moran's concept of 
'regulatory space' (S. Vogel 1996; Hancher and Moran 1989).
The next section reviews the traditional debates with regard to the 'pubhc 
interestednes' of regulation in order to highlight and discuss the utility of 
applying an institutional approach. Then the key themes in the institutional 
literature are discussed in order to develop the notion of 'isomorphism' and the 
distinction between domain- and paradigm-oriented isomorphism. Finally, three 
institutional factors, whose impact on processes of isomorphism is assessed in 
the empirical chapters, are discussed.
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Choosing regulatory instruments: 'Capture' and its limitations 
The traditional literature on regulation has been concerned with either showing 
how regulation is shaped by special, in contrast to 'public' interests, or, 
alternatively, by arguing that such 'private interest' accounts do not offer 
convincing explanatory accounts (see Hood 1994: 19-36). However, neither of 
these perspectives can make a persuasive case for explaining the particular 
attractiveness of certain regulatory design ideas. This section sketches the 
'traditional' debate between the public and private interest approaches in 
regulation and points to its limitations in not considering the origins and 
transmission mechanisms of regulatory design ideas.
The literature on 'capture' stressed the implausibility of regarding regulation as a 
'benevolent' act. The traditional welfare economics literature argued that the 
purpose of regulation was to offset perceived market failures, relying on 'a litany 
of ways in which the conditions for competitive equilibrium may fail to be 
satisfied' (Noll 1989: 1255, also Ogus 1994: 1-71; Baldwin and Cave 1999: 9-21; 
Breyer 1982:15-35). These include diagnosed natural monopoly characteristics in 
a given industry, anti-competitive practices, the need to safeguard public goods, 
the necessity to counter information asymmetries and to internalise costs from 
negative externalities such as pollution. Given substantial evidence that 
regulatory policies did not respond to 'benevolent' views (for example, see 
Mueller 1989: 235-8; Doron 1979), the dominant perspective on regulation 
stressed the dominance of 'special' interests rather than 'public spirited' ideas as
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the main explanation for regulatory instruments.^ Regulatory regimes, therefore, 
reflect the interests of a dominant coalition rather than a response to market 
problems and represent 'private' rather than 'public' interests. Such 'conspiracy' 
approaches originated in accounts of regulation which regarded market control 
as a result of an industry seeking market stabiHsation (Kolko 1965) and 'life-cycle 
theories' (Bernstein 1955). According to Bernstein, regulators, after initial 
enthusiasm, grow tired of continuous regulatory adversity and lack of political 
support and consent to a 'friendly arrangement' with the regulated industry. As 
a consequence, regulatory agencies, seemingly inevitably, become 'captured' by 
the industry.
Stigler's claim that 'as a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is 
designed and operated for its benefit' (Stigler 1971: 3) highlighted the 
importance of collective action for explaining regulatory 'failure' - due to 
asymmetrical costs and benefits of organising and sustaining collective action, 
business groups would be advantaged in offering politicians electoral 
resources.2 However, substantial electoral resources can be obtained from 
dispersed constituencies: given the desire of politician-regulators to preserve 
politically-optimal distributions of rents in terms of electoral as well as financial 
resources, regulatory regimes, while being mainly in the interest of the regulated 
industry, are arguably rather a result of coalitions than of single interests
 ^ Intellectual challenges represented by 'contestable markets' (Baumol 1977) or 
'competition for the market' (Demsetz 1968 - although Chadwick suggested such a 
scheme for the control of railway monopolies in the 19th century) further undermined the 
'benevolence' view of regulation.
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(Peltzman 1976, 1989).^ 'Capture' by a single interest thus represents a unique 
actor constellation in which the costs are highly concentrated and benefits 
widely dispersed (J.Q. Wilson 1980). Most state activities are characterised by a 
more even distribution of costs and benefits leading to different dynamics than 
predicted by Stigler (Williams 1976).'  ^ In contrast to these societal accounts, 
Barke and Riker (1982) pointed to the record of railway abandonments which 
was inconsistent with the predictions of 'industry capture' and argued that 
regulation had to be understood as a political and not as a market 'product'. 
Regulation should be regarded as the outcome of politicians' 'platform plank' 
building exercises across different constituencies or as a 'bureau-shaping'
 ^ If all groups in society faced equal transaction costs in organising collective action, 
efficient outcome would occur as inefficiencies would be competed away (Becker 1983).
 ^ Despite the parsimonious elegance of these models, the assumption of a utihty- 
maximising regulator-politician in itself is open to criticism. Regulators should be 
regarded as bureaucratic actors in their own right and not as politicians (see Hirshleifer 
1976). The difficulty of reconciling 'capture' views with the empirical reality of regulation 
in favour of dispersed constituents was also stressed by Posner (1974). Furthermore, 
Stigler's and Peltzman's models assume constant returns to scale with no externahties. 
From the outset, it is therefore assumed that any intervention in the market is inefficient. 
Evidence suggests that certain agencies in the United States were established with the 
goal of preventing capture, but then dismantled as a result of political choices rather than 
industry pressure (G. Wilson 1984).
 ^ This debate has received increasing attention given the growing importance of social 
and environmental regulation, in particular with regard to regulation inside the 
European Union. Instead of observing a 'Delaware' effect, with regulation 'racing to the 
bottom' as part of locational competition, in some areas, notably product regulation, there 
has been a so-called 'California effect', a trend towards higher regulatory standards. 
These have been explained by the 'battle of the sexes' actor constellation in these fields 
(Scharpf 1999, Liitz 1995) and by coahtions between 'baptists' (high regulation crusaders) 
and 'bootleggers' (highly regulated industries) to impose regulation on low regulated 
industries (D. Vogel 1995).
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activity by bureaucrats desiring to maximise their influence over policy content 
in times of fiscal constraint (Dunleavy 1991, Majone 1994).^
These 'conspiracy' views of regulation were challenged by attempts to 'bring the 
public interest back into regulation'. These attempts reflected a response to a 
perceived trend of 'deregulation' since the late 1970s which seemed to fly in the 
face of interest-based accounts of regulation as well as an increasing interest in 
designing institutions resilient to any form of subversion. On the one hand, the 
role of 'ideas' has been stressed (Derthick and Quirk 1985, Hood 1994: 28-9). 
These emphasise the importance of experts and policy entrepreneurs such as US 
consumer activist Ralph Nader and William Gladstone (in the 1844 Railway 
Regulation Act, according to McLean and Foster (1992)). Keeler (1984), in a 
rational choice account, also highlighted the role of 'political entrepreneurs' who, 
as vote-seekers in an environment of dissipated rents, increase public awareness 
of regulatory failure. Apparent successes of dispersed interests, such as 
environmentalists, against business interests seem to offer further evidence 
against established 'private interest' approaches. On the other hand, the 
transaction cost literature has highlighted various methods with which both 
'bureaucratic drift' and 'coalitional drift' can be inhibited. These include
 ^ In a different argument, Fiorina (1982) has highlighted the importance of legislators' 
trade off between the desire to delegate blame and the desire to claim credit for 
'successful' outcomes (ibid.: 47). Horn has extended this search calculus by highlighting 
overall legislators' decision-making and participation costs, poHcy commitment costs and 
agency costs (Horn 1995: 7-39, 46-7). The choice depends on the specific interest 
constellation, although it is questionable whether politicians, despite delegation, are able 
to evade blame after policy fiascoes.
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procedural as well as structural devices (McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1987),^ 
with which informational 'slack' can be minimised by making regulatory 
processes more transparent and thus less prone to regulatory discretion or 
private interests (Levine and Forrence 1990)7
The choice of regulatory instruments and, as a consequence, the character of 
regulatory pohcy has therefore been a key concern across the literature on 
regulation. The shared emphasis of these contrasting approaches to regulation is 
mainly on the (im)possibility of control. They have, however, difficulty in 
accounting for the diversity of choices across domains, states or time which are 
observable empirically. Nor can they explain the extent to which the solutions 
adopted in various time periods reflected contemporary doctrines, ideas or 
'recipes'. Furthermore, the attention paid to control implies a view of the world 
which distinguishes between 'private' and 'public' interest. This assumes a clear-
 ^Structural solutions involve incentives, monitoring and the allocation of resources and 
decisional authority within a regulatory agency, whereas procedural control solutions 
rely on administrative procedures which set the rules and standards applying to the 
agencies' pohcy decisions.
 ^ Horn extends this argument by mtroducing 'uncertainty' into the calculus of the 
legislators and constituents - certain institutional forms will be selected to increase 
commitment costs so that particular pay-offs remain secure beyond the tenure of the 
enacting 'winning coalition' (Horn 1995: 7-39), the choice is influenced by four functions: 
costs of legislative decision-making and private participation, commitment problems (the 
risk incurred to constituents that benefit flows might be altered or reversed by future 
legislators), agency costs regarding monitoring, enforcement, incentive-setting and 
compliance costs and uncertainty and risk costs due to the unknown impact of the 
particular measure.
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cut public-private dichotomy which does not reflect the role of many private 
organisations which fulfil public regulatory functions.®
The importance of existing political institutions which enable and disable action 
by societal, political and administrative actors is not sufficiently considered: 
individual and corporate actors are influenced by rules, organisational and 
social settings. Preferences are shaped by institutional procedures and norms. 
Finally, and most importantly, actors desiring pohcy change require a 
'justification' as well as a 'legitimate' model to argue their case. While the 
traditional approaches on regulatory origins are able to make claims about why 
regulatory reform occurred, they cannot explain why a particular regime was 
chosen and how  different design ideas were taken up or neglected. This interest 
in the political selection of reform options in an institutionally shaped regulatory 
space is central to the historical and sociological institutionalist approach (Black 
1997, Hall and Taylor 1996, Hancher and Moran 1989). The choice of regulatory 
instruments is inevitably a process of emulation and 'lesson searching' for 
'appropriate' policy instruments: when actors choose, they 'seek guidance from 
the experiences of others in comparable situations and by reference to standards 
of obligation' (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b: 10). Arguably, the successful 
diffusion of particular design ideas on regulatory and other organisational 
arrangements depends more on the persuasiveness of these proposals or other
® Hancher and Moran criticise that 'the very idea of "capture" betrays an assumption that 
there is a sphere of public regulatory authority which ought to be inviolate from private 
interest' (Hancher and Moran 1989: 274). This criticism seems to address mainly a 
Bernstein-type capture; the normative claim of Stiglerian approaches would be that there 
should be a wide-ranging private sphere which should be inviolate from the public 
sphere.
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'attractive' assets than their functional necessity (Hood and Jackson 1991). As 
Hancher and Moran note:
'the most casual acquaintance with any important substantive area of 
regulation soon reveals that institutions and rules are widely 
imitated. Copying is obviously an economic way of solving the 
problem of regulatory design. [...] [MJodels emanating from 
countries exercising great economic and political power are most 
likely to be the object of emulation' (1989: 285).
The following aims to establish an institutional framework for the analysis of 
regulatory regime orientation. It does not discuss whether policy imitation is 
possible or desirable but asks instead 'why a particular model becomes 
influential at a given time' (Majone 1991: 104). Rather than searching for 
'efficiency', 'optimal solutions' or relying on 'competitive selection', the design of 
regulatory regimes is shaped by the search for legitimate and 'appropriate' 
policy options which fulfill some form of 'goodness of fit' (March and Olsen 
1989). Thus, while established approaches towards regulation have provided an 
extensive discussion on the original causes of regulatory change, there has been 
an insufficient interest in the conceptual origins of regulatory design ideas. In 
the following sections, an institutional approach towards explaining the 
different orientations of regulatory reforms is proposed.
Institutional Isomorphism and the Selection of Regulatory Design Ideas 
As noted in the introduction to this chapter, isomorphism defines a process in 
which the characteristics of a regulatory regime are modified in the direction of 
increasing compatibility with characteristics of units in a shared policy
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environment (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a: 65-6). The notion of institutional 
isomorphism emphasises that this increasing homogenisation is not caused by 
competitive market pressures (for such an approach, see Hannan and Freeman 
1977; 1984). As a consequence, regulation is not merely characterised by a 
conflict between actors and coalitions; it also requires an understanding of the 
decision-maker's assumptions regarding their instrument choice (Linder and 
Peters 1989: 37). The following analysis asserts that while isomorphism may lead 
to uniformity across policies, social life is diverse and numerous 'fields' might be 
drawn (or forced) upon as a 'legitimate' source for regulatory design (Powell 
1991: 195; Fligstein 1997). It is argued that, despite the potential variety of 
sources for regulatory design ideas, these sources of isomorphism can be placed 
on a continuum between their domain- and paradigm-orientation.
Before expanding on this line of argument, the next section discusses the wider 
public policy literature from which this account draws. On the one hand, the 
notion of isomorphism, while originating in mathematics, has been developed in 
the (sociological and organisational) institutionalist literature. On the other 
hand, central themes of this study also relate to the increasingly popular notions 
of 'policy learning' and 'policy transfer'. The examination of the impact of 
institutional factors on processes of isomorphism builds on these literatures, 
while also drawing on an established framework with clear institutional 
assumptions and expectations.
Institutionalism and Policy Transfers
Across disciplines, institutional explanations have emphasised the importance of 
institutions for imposing order, for defining actors' resources and (inter-)
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dependencies. A key institutionalist aim is to 'expose and analyze the 
discrepancy between "potential" interests and those that come to be expressed in 
political behaviour' (Immergut 1998: 7). An institutional perspective regards the 
state as a fragmented entity in which policies are produced only after the 
interaction by and co-operation among numerous individuals acting within 
policy domains in which 'inheritance' in terms of legal traditions and policy 
commitments dominate. Approaches stressing the impact of political institutions 
on public policy have focused on the effect of constitutional and decision­
making rules on tax policy (Steinmo 1993), the importance of institutional veto- 
points (Tsebelis 1995, Immergut 1992), the position of courts vis-à-vis 
legislatures in shaping the strategies of trade unions (Hattam 1993) and 
administrative capacities (see Rothstein 1996: 142, John 1998: 57-65). The 
existence of order and stability, inertia and the persistence of increasingly 
inefficient policies are a common theme in the institutionalist literature. The 
range of policy options is said to be a product of institutional opportunities 
which are themselves an inheritance from the past. Policy change is said to be 
path dependent, allowing for both incremental and rapid change following the 
overturn of 'punctuated equilibria' (Krasner 1984).
Despite these shared claims, the various schools of institutionalism offer 
contested starting assumptions and definitions of 'institutions' (Goodin 1996: 20- 
4; Hall and Taylor 1996, Peters 1999). Thus, for March and Olsen (1989: 22), 
institutions are 'routines, procedures, conventions, roles, strategies, 
organisational forms and technologies, [...], beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures 
and knowledge', whereas for North they are 'the rules of the game in a society 
or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human
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interaction', consisting of both formal and informal constraints (North 1990: 1). 
This study utiHses Peter Hall's definition as institutions as 'formal rules, 
compliance procedures and standard operating procedures that structure the 
relationship between individuals in various units of policy and economy' (Hall 
1986: 19). Similarly, Thelen and Steinmo argue that institutions show 'how 
[factors] relate to one another by drawing attention to the way political 
situations are structured' (Thelen and Steinmo 1992:12-3).^
Persistence, stability and path dependent change are among the key claims of 
institutional approaches, leading to the persistence of national institutions, 
difficulties in inducing institutional change and institutionally moderated 
responses to external challenges (Thatcher 1999). Path dependency, based on 
self-reinforcing mechanisms, such as high fixed costs, learning and co-ordination 
effects as well as adaptive expectations (North 1990: 94), can be understood as a 
persistence ('lock-in effect') of certain, often suboptimal structures, the primary
 ^Similarly, the debate concerning 'human rationality' has attracted great debate, mainly 
on the notion of 'self interest', offering a debate between 'calculus' and 'cultural' 
approaches towards explaining human agency (see Hall and Taylor 1996; Hay and 
Wincott 1998; March and Olsen 1996; North 1990; Thelen and Steinmo 1992; Norgaard 
1996; DiMaggio and Powell 1991b). It is assumed here that self-interested behaviour can 
be associated with a (reasonable) interest in one's own survival or existence, in resources 
as well as in organisational autonomy in contrast to self-destructive or idiosyncratic 
action (see Mayntz and Scharpf 1995b: 54). In general, different institutional theories 
should be regarded as complimentary rather than as competing as they each provide 
distinct explanatory and conceptual tools for particular areas of academic interest. The 
decisive choice for policy research seems rather the focus of the analysis rather than 
different philosophical positions (see also Kato 1996).
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example being the QWERTY keyboard (David 1985, Arthur 1988).^^ Numerous 
causes for 'path dependency' have been identified. For example, 'path 
dependency' has been defined in terms of a persistent regulatory configuration 
or, alternatively in terms of a continuous re-generation of dominant actor 
constellations and decision-making patterns due to constitutional incentives 
(Steinmo 1993). Similarly, 'unintended consequences' and 'feedback' effects are 
stressed which lead to a self-stimulating growth of regulatory bureaucracy 
(MacDonagh 1961, Pierson 1995). In addition, ideational 'path dependency' has 
been identified, constraining the scope of legitimate reform options (Dohler 
1995). At an 'ideational' macro-level, Dobbin (1994) has discussed 'industrial 
cultures' which shape the perception of problems and proposed solutions. Most 
prominently, Silberman (1993) claims that instead of witnessing an unifying 
march of bureaucratisation according to Weberian ideals of legal-rationality, 
bureaucratic development across countries has been path dependent, set by the 
way critical institutional design dilemmas were handled at major historical 
turning points. In the regulatory literature, Hancher and Moran (1989) discuss 
various path dependencies which shape the 'regulatory space', ranging from 
state and legal traditions, policy-making patterns to historical timing.
However, while policy inheritance is crucial for explaining policy developments, 
it remains necessary to account for the multiplicity of possible paths from which 
decision-makers can choose and, as a consequence, explain why particular paths 
become dominant. A further problem with the notion of 'path dependency' is its 
reliance on the existence of a 'formative constellation' (see Stinchcombe 1965)
The current British mainland railway gauge draws on the 1825 Stockton & Darlington
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where small differences in the initial condition may lead to great differences in 
the future. As in the case of the dispute among zoologists regarding the status of 
the tortoise as a 'primitive' or 'ordinary' reptile following the examination of 
fossil headbone structures, the nature of initial policy conditions might in itself 
be open to dispute and interpretation.
As a consequence, this study addresses four key institutionalist concerns. First, it 
is interested in questions of the 'logic of appropriateness' in the selection of 
regulatory instruments (March and Olsen 1984, 1996). Second, by investigating 
the impact of political institutional factors, this account considers the 
distribution of resources and the access to the regulatory space, which facilitate 
pressures for isomorphism and linkages to particular policy environments. 
Third, an analysis of key events over time is likely to reveal whether continuities 
and recurring patterns. This also includes the analysis of choices between 
different 'paths'. Finally, by analysing how regulatory spaces are linked with and 
adapt to policy environments, it shares the sociological-institutional interest in 
the embeddedness of institutions.
At the same time, the interest in the selection of regulatory instruments follows 
an increasing interest in the notions of 'policy learning' and 'policy transfer'. In 
their original contribution, DiMaggio and Powell (1991a: 69) include among 
their pressures for isomorphism 'mimetic sources': imitation as a product of 
uncertainty and poor understanding of policy instruments and their 
consequences. Emulation and institutional transfer have been discussed in the
railway line where passenger services were provided by horse-drawn carriages.
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field of 'policy learning' (Heclo 1974), 'policy convergence' (Bennett 1991) 'policy 
transfer' (Dolowitz and March 1996), 'lesson drawing' (Rose 1993) and 'policy 
diffusion' (Berry and Berry 1999) in public policy. Most of the literature on 
'policy learning' has been concerned with evaluating the extent to which policy­
makers are aware and knowledgeable about potential pohcy lessons and the 
extent to which these experiences were utilised in policy reforms (Bennett 1997). 
Attention has also been paid to the 'moments of crisis' in which 'lesson drawing' 
occurs, on identifying the 'learners' and on the sources of pohcy transfer 
(Dolowitz 1997). The main focus of analysis has rested on 'convergence' (Bennett 
1991) and on the force of ideas proposed by 'advocacy coalitions' (Sabatier 1988; 
Sabatier and Jenkins 1993), the spread of professional norms by 'epistemic 
communities' (Haas 1992, Hoberg 1986) as well as developing different types of 
'transfer' and learning (Haas 1990, May 1992, Hall 1993).
The present study's concern shares many of the interests of the 'policy transfer' 
literature which seems more actor-centred in its perspective than institutional 
approaches. The concerns of the 'policy transfer' literature in identifying causes 
and sources for transfer have also been reflected in DiMaggio and Powell's work 
on isomorphism where three mechanisms inducing increasing homogenisation 
are identified: coercive forces, mimetic sources or normative pressures. This 
study treats the nature of isomorphism as dependent variable. It stresses the 
importance of institutional factors and capabihties which to a considerable 
extent determine 'whose learning matters': 'what is learned and remembered 
must always be seen in the context of political interests and political power' 
(Bennett and Howlett 1992: 291).
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The next section extends the discussion of isomorphism and introduces the 
distinction between domain- and paradigm-orientation. While organisational 
structures both enable and constrain actors, the motives and orientation of these 
actors dealing with uncertainty are of crucial importance (Ziegler 1995: 344). 
Regulatory instruments 'incorporate implicit theories about how to achieve their 
objectives' (Sabatier 1993:17; Majone 1989:150). The study further focuses on the 
impact of political institutional factors on the contestation between institutional 
templates and 'implicit theories' (Hofmann 1993).
Domain- and Paradigm-oriented Isomorphism
DiMaggio and Powell's original account of isomorphism stressed increasing 
homogenisation of institutional forms in a so-called organisational field. It is 
argued here that the regulatory space of any policy domain is potentially 
connected with numerous policy environments which provide distinct 
institutional forms for emulation, therefore offering different sources for 
isomorphism. This section sets out the distinction between paradigm- and 
domain-oriented isomorphism and claims that they offer one way to establish 
descriptive categories for the analysis of regulatory change.
Domain-oriented isomorphism defines change in the regulatory regime as an 
increasing similarity with regulatory regimes in the same sector, either in other 
countries or in previous periods of time. Thus, reforms draw on examples in the 
specific policy domain both in the national and in the international context, often 
with the justification of enhancing the performance of the domain. Domain- 
oriented isomorphism at the national level leads to cumulative policy change in 
which inherited regulatory regimes are used in the selection of regulatory
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instruments. In the case of international domain-orientation, experiences in the 
same sector in other countries are used to formulate policy proposals. Other 
domain-specific models may be imported by external actors via supranational 
processes. However, as the case of Meiji Japan shows (Westney 1987, Lehmbruch 
1995), lesson-drawing' (Rose 1993) does not necessarily lead to either the 
complete transfer of policy models or their emulation; nor do they prohibit the 
existence of 'non-lessons', where it is decided that certain practices should not be 
imported.
Paradigm-oriented isomorphism, in contrast, involves a transformation of 
existing policies to achieve congruence with an existing policy 'recipe' or concept 
across domains. These policy ideas are often granted the status of universal 
applicability, allowing actors to 'privatise', 'nationalise, 'public managementise' 
along lines used in other sub-systems. Similarly, Peter Hall (1993: 279) has 
defined the term 'policy paradigm changes' as 'radical changes in the 
overarching terms of policy discourse'. While the term 'paradigm-oriented' 
operates at a lower level of policy analysis than Hall's discussion of macro- 
economic policy discourse, it defines a similar change: the application of an 
overarching framework to particular policy practice. Again, national and 
international sources of paradigm-oriented reforms are feasible (Rose 1993: 95- 
117), often leading to both national in addition to international 'pohcy 
bandwagoning' (Ikenberry 1990). Internationally, paradigm-oriented reforms 
may occur either by governments of similar persuasions, or directly or indirectly 
by countries exercising economic or political power, or by international 
organisations. Moreover, an international orientation may reflect 
interdependence by requiring adaptation of national regulatory regime. At the
36
domestic level, experiences in other sectors are drawn upon in the design stages 
of later regulatory reforms.
Isomorphism-type Source
Domain Domestic
International
Paradigm Domestic
International
Expected Phenomenon  
Policy Cumulation 
Sectoral Isomorphism
Cross-Domain Policy Ahkeness 
International Policy Bandwagoning
The distinction between domain- and paradigm-oriented isomorphism can be 
operationalised by assessing dominant regulatory ideas and various properties 
of 'hardwired' regulatory instruments (Macey 1992). In the following empirical 
studies, regulatory regimes are analysed in the context of their origins, 
justification as well as their motivation. Of further crucial importance is why 
other regulatory ideas are rejected. 'Hardwiring' describes the attempt to impose 
commitment into the regulatory regime. Commitment provides stabiHty and is 
perceived as key aspect of regulatory choice to prevent so-called coalitional and 
bureaucratic drift (Horn 1995:16-9). Coalitional drift occurs in cases of a change 
in preferences of the government which leads to policy preferences and 
objectives other than those of the 'enacting' coalition and is therefore likely to 
harm the latter's constituencies' interests. Various means have been discussed in 
the literature to prevent such 'drift' problems. Attempts to solve these problems 
are analysed in the empirical chapters with regard to questions concerning the 
organisational structure o{ the regulated industry, the distribution and objectives 
of regulatory authority and, finally, the definition and accommodation of non­
commercial objectives, or 'public services'. Across all these issues, policy-makers 
can choose between various possibilities and options, either emphasising to 
some extent the 'domain-specificity' of the regulatory regime or, alternatively.
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the need to apply broad policy recipes drawn from reform experiences in other 
policy domains. The advantage of utilising such a differentiated approach 
towards a regulatory regime is that it offers an analytical categorisation of 
regulatory instruments for the discussion of the empirical cases which is 
grounded in the regulatory literature itself. Furthermore, it increases the number 
of observations at various levels of analysis.
An analysis utilising the notion of isomorphism allows for a clear and 
established conceptual framework. The differentiation of paradigm- and 
domain-oriented isomorphism builds on the notion of increasing uniformity 
within a policy environment, but also draws attention to the existing variety 
across pohcy environments. It aUows for the comparison of recurrent or non­
recurrent 'convergence' between the regulatory regime in question and the 
'desired' policy template. By differentiating between domain- and paradigm- 
orientation, different 'legitimating sources' which offer competing sources of 
design ideas can be distinguished.^^ Furthermore, institutional isomorphism 
stresses the importance of 'appropriateness' of regulatory instruments, thus
DiMaggio (1991) provides the example of the 'structuration' by professionals of the art 
museum 'policy field' emerging from a competition between 'art-as-such' and 'art-for-use' 
approaches. Stone (1989) has stressed the importance of 'causal stories' for pohcy 
argumentation. The distinction between domain- and paradigm-oriented isomorphism  
differs from the typology estabhshed by Feigenbaum, Henig and Hamnet (1998: 28-58). 
They argue that privatisation experiences can be differentiated in pragmatic (adaptation 
to a changing policy environment of fiscal crisis), tactical (achievement of short-term 
political goals) and systemic reforms (reshaping of an entire society). Their analysis 
emphasises political imperatives and relies on interpretations of the importance of key 
motives of pohtical actors. Arguably, the differentiation in domain- and paradigm- 
oriented isomorphism also provides a more precise analytical tool than Rose's (1993) 
'lesson-drawing' across space and time.
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emphasising the need to study regulatory instruments not merely in terms of 
their technical efficiency or effectiveness in preventing 'market failures'. Finally, 
it highlights the importance of policy environments which shape regulatory 
regime design. These environments operate as reference points for formulating 
reforms inside the regulatory space. The linkages between the policy 
environment and regulatory space are affected and constructed by political 
institutions. Political institutions are therefore crucial for the understanding of 
isomorphism; they provide the access and resources to set the agenda or deny 
the emergence of 'inappropriate' proposals (see also DiMaggio and Powell 1991a: 
80).
The next section suggests three political institutional factors drawn from the 
historical institutional literature which are said to shape the extent of policy 
reform. Applying these to the cases of regulatory regime change in comparative 
and historical perspective will provide some insights into whether and how 
'institutions matter' in isomorphic processes of regulatory change.
Institutional Factors and Regulatory Choice
DiMaggio and Powell (1991a: 67-74) argue that the state and professional 
sources have been crucial for inducing tendencies towards homogenisation 
across organisational forms. They propose three mechanisms through which 
isomorphism occurs - 'coercive' (via legal or other power), 'mimetic' (imitating 
what is considered 'best practice' in uncertainty) and 'normative' (the growth of a 
common professional culture). This study builds on these three mechanisms, but 
adapts the notion of isomorphism to accommodate diversity in policy 
environments. This section sets out three institutional factors which link a
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regulatory space to its policy environments and thereby enable the 
dissemination of certain regulatory design ideas instead of others and therefore 
facilitate the implementation of particular models into the regulatory space 
instead of others.
In order to come to a better understanding how 'institutions matter', the three 
institutional factors have been selected on grounds of their key role in forming 
relationships within the regulatory space, facilitating and hindering access and 
membership of actors representing different policy environments. These factors 
do not claim to be mutually exclusive and fully exhaustive, but they represent a 
set of approaches developed in the (historical) institutionalist literature on 
policy-making. To emphasise the importance of access to and relationships 
within the regulatory space, the institutional factors are evaluated with regard to 
their impact on the 'insulation' of the regulatory space: 'insulation' describes the 
degree to which these institutional factors open the regulatory space to a 
particular policy environment. Insulation of the regulatory space highlights the 
absence of institutional linkages to policy environments; put differently, the lack 
of insulation and institutional penetration into a regulatory space facilitates the 
spread of regulatory design ideas from other policy environments, whether from 
international or from other domestic domains.
These three institutional factors are
a) the insulation of the regulatory space from 'coercive pressures';
b) the insulation of the political-administrative nexus in the regulatory space;
c) the insulation of the regulatory space from societal actors.
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Insulation o f the regulatory space from coercive pressures
According to DiMaggio and Powell (1991a: 67), coercive isomorphism is caused 
by informal and formal pressures by other organisations upon which 
organisations are dependent. In the context of regulatory regimes, such coercive 
pressures are exerted by militarily victorious powers (for instance, the 
imposition of regulations by the US on Japan after the Second World War) or by 
international organisations, such as the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund as agents of their principal donor states. Membership in 
international agreements or organisations further restricts domestic policy 
choice - for example through international trade law under the WTO and GATT 
agreements and the increasing importance attributed to human rights against 
the formerly perceived sovereign authority of national states (Hood 1998: 202).
Membership in the European Union has arguably led to a 'Europeanisation' of 
domestic public policies, given the supremacy of Community law over national 
laws. In addition to this 'top-down' view of EU influence, highlighting the role of 
the European Commission and the European Court of Justice, more informal 
'coercive' institutional mechanisms have been explored within the context of EU 
public policy. For example, market-making legislation, which merely asserts the 
principle of a common market, may not directly challenge national institutional 
arrangements, but may crucially alter market relationships, necessitating an 
institutional response. Moreover, support-building devices, which offer vague 
framework legislation without detailed policy prescriptions, advantage 
particular domestic coalitions over others and provide sources of legitimacy 
(Knill and Lehmkuhl 1998,1999). Participation at the supranational level might, 
at the same time, enable national poHcy-makers to obtain policies which are
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unobtainable in the domestic arena and thereby can enable successful imposition 
of policies on domestic opponents.
As cited above, Hancher and Moran argue that regulatory regimes are often 
emulated from countries which are economically or politically superior. 
Hoberg's analysis is similarly concerned with the extent of the 'sleeping with the 
elephant' effect (applied to the impact of US policies and markets on Canadian 
public policy). The range of possible causes for increasing similarity vary in their 
degree of coerciveness (Hoberg 1991). Thus, emulation may, on the one hand, be 
a result of functional adaptation to perceived negative externalities (such as 
pollution, labour traffic and the like) stemming from a neighbouring country (or 
membership in a common market). On the other hand, such 'emulation by 
followship' may be a result of market dominance by others and pressure to 
create similar market conditions, an argument advanced by Hills (1986) in the 
case of telecommunication liberalisation, pointing to the crucial role of US 
telecommunication and information technology firms.
In terms of predicting either domain- or paradigm-oriented isomorphism, this 
institutional factor is ambivalent. The nature of the coercive pressures and their 
source as well as how these are 'transported' into the national regulatory space is 
likely to vary across cases.
Insulation o f the political-administrative nexus in the regulatory space 
One of the basic tenets of the statist and historical institutional literature has 
been its emphasis on the internal organisation of the state (Egeberg 1999, Hall 
1983). Administrative capacities, in particular, are said to influence the scope of
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'bounded innovation' in policy reform (Weir 1989). This literature builds on 
Hugh Heclo's work on the development of social policies in Sweden and Britain, 
which argued that governments not only 'power', but also 'puzzle'. He found 
that the 'puzzling' by the civil service was more important for explaining policy 
evolution than political parties or interest groups (Heclo 1974: 2 8 4 -3 2 2 ).Weir 
(1989), similarly, highlights the significance of the administrative structure - in 
terms of patterns of recruitment, career promotion and administrative standard 
operating procedures - in order to explain the receptiveness to Keynesian ideas. 
Comparing 'Keynesian' responses to the economic depression of the late 1920s in 
Sweden, Britain and the United States, Weir and Skocpol (1985) note the crucial 
importance of the 'openness' of the administrative system to external advice and 
the institutional division of ministerial responsibitities and bureaucratic 
capacities. A further crucial variable is concerned with the recruitment of so- 
called 'in- and outers' in the US, whose primary identification and prospects for 
career advancement lie in their professional expertise. Such a pattern provides a 
hospitable setting for introducing new approaches towards problem-solving 
(Weir 1992: 193). This contrasts with the strong i?e55orf-particularism and 
identification in Germany and the career-bound, open structure in the UK.
In terms of policy learning. Hood (1996) stresses the importance of the 'lateral 
transfer' of civil servants in the UK across departments for the spreading of 
public sector reform models and learning over time. This contrasts with the
Peter Hall, in contrast, stresses the importance of political parties in policy innovation 
in economic policy (Hall 1986: 273-6). Hayward (1976) emphasises the importance of 
cultural values in order to explain the difference between French and British civil 
servants when engaging in major policy innovation.
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administratively-educated French elite civil servant with the influence of the 
system of 'pantouflage'. In the German case, domain-expertise dominates among 
civil servants, which leads, in particular at the non-political levels of the civil 
service hierarchy, to long-term orientation in the domain and also the occurrence 
of 'pantouflage'. Therefore, the type of 'on the job learning' (defined by Weber as 
' Dienstwisseri in contrast to the educational background of civil servants) allows 
for different degrees of specialisation and establishes different forms of 
institutional memory (Page 1992: 48).^  ^The same factors affect political actors. 
The German legislative committee system and the, on average, long duration of 
ministerial office encourage ministerial specialists in contrast to the UK 
parliamentary system with its, on average, short-term ministerial appointments. 
A further crucial factor for comparison involves the pattern of policy-making 
across departments. Thus, in contrast to the overarching role of the Treasury in 
the UK, the German Finance or Economics ministries are said to have not 
assumed similar importance on issues such as regulatory policy design in 
particular policy domains.
With regard to the extent of domain- or paradigm-oriented isomorphism, a 
regulatory space whose political-administrative nexus is insulated, thus 
allowing for the development of long-term relationships and possibly even 
interchange of personnel between 'private' and 'public' organisations, is likely to 
lead to the formulation of domain-oriented regulatory design ideas. In contrast, 
a lack of insulation, either because of 'lateral transfer' or dominance of other
Sisson (1959: 37) highlights the principle that the British civil service rehed on training 
from the 'actual work on the tasks', relying on 'inteUigent amateurs' whose judgement 
was formed by experience and not by formal training.
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ministerial departments, is likely to open the regulatory space to paradigm- 
oriented 'policy recipes' drawn from other policy domains.
Insulation o f the regulatory space from societal actors
Societal actors have been traditionally regarded as the key source for the origin 
of regulation (Stigler 1971). While discounting traditional 'capture' approaches, 
Hancher and Moran (1989) similarly stress the importance of membership in the 
regulatory space for comprehending regulatory policy-making: understanding
'economic regulation (...) means understanding a process of 
intermediation and bargaining between large and powerful 
organizations spanning what are conventionally termed the public 
and private domains of decision-making' (Hancher and Moran 1989: 
272).
The way in which interests organise and represent their demands is shaped by 
their organisational status. While the role of interest constellations is crucial (see 
J.Q. Wilson 1989: 72-89), political institutions allocate the roles and 
responsibilities of the various interests - institutions shape their access and veto 
power, but they also affect the direction with which societal actors exercise their 
societal demands (Hall 1986: 233).
The study of institutionalised access of societal actors to the regulatory space not 
only includes the regulated industry, in this case, the railway operator(s). As 
with all network industries, the study of railway regulation reveals the crucial 
role played by industries dependent on and affecting the financial performance 
of the regulated industry, both up- and downstream, in the case of railways, 
especially road haulage in both Britain and Germany since the 1920s.
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Furthermore, while railway regulation is mostly concerned with the control of 
railway operator(s), the regulation and competitive position vis-à-vis other 
modes of transport and their lobbying power play an important role in shaping 
the isomorphic orientation of the regulatory regime.
Finally, the organisation of 'experts' who offer solutions to perceived policy 
problems provides a further factor for analysis (Braun 1998). 'Advocacy 
coalitions', unified by their core beliefs, compete to obtain and maintain 
favourable institutional access to impose their favoured institutional or 
regulatory order (Sabatier 1988). At the same time, established organisational 
arrangements, such as the academic advisory councils attached to the federal 
ministries in Germany, might represent an institutionaHsed 'advocacy coaUtion'. 
In addition, the spread of a privatisation and 'deregulation' agenda is said to 
have been facilitated by an international network of management consultants - 
both 'public', such as the OECD and World Bank with 'benchmarks' and other 
comparative exercises in 'good governance' practice, and 'private', such as 
international service providers (see Dunleavy 1994).
In terms of the impact of societal actors on the extent of domain- or paradigm- 
oriented isomorphism, a high degree of insulation of sector-specific societal 
actors inside the regulatory space, for example the railway operator, transport 
academics, rolling stock manufacturers and the like, is likely to lead to domain- 
orientation. In contrast, an 'open' regulatory space, allowing for access to
As the case studies show, international consultancy is not just a recent phenomenon. A 
similar point has been made by Saint-Martin (1998).
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international or domestic non-domain actors, is likely to provide either for 
international and/ or paradigm-oriented reforms.
Conclusion
The empirical case studies which follow are used to investigate the usefulness of 
these institutional factors for explaining the adoption and rejection (whether 
actively or not) of design ideas in regulatory reforms, in particular concerning 
their paradigm- or domain-orientation. The three institutional factors are 
unlikely to offer a fully exhaustive explanation on their own, but it is likely that 
they will provide some indication whether and, if so how, 'institutions matter'. 
Moreover, the application of these institutional factors, should their value in 
explaining outcomes be found lacking, allows for consideration of other 
institutional factors - such as returning to 'veto points' - or other, more 
circumstantial explanations.
Finally, a framework for the evaluation of regulatory regimes has been 
developed which is based not on ad hoc convenience, but rather on problems - 
in terms of organisational structure, regulatory authority and non-commercial 
services - identified in the literature on regulation and regulatory design. The 
consideration of these distinct regulatory areas which have been at the forefront 
of debates concerning regulatory design, provides the basis for distinguishing 
domain- and paradigm-orientated isomorphism. This distinction of two sources 
of isomorphic change develops the original argument by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1991a) further, while accepting that any process of regulatory reform is not 
merely defined by a struggle of interests but also one of rival concepts of the 
'appropriateness' and 'legitimacy' of regulatory arrangements.
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Section II: Regulatory Change after the First World War
'Nationalisation' became one of the key demands of politicians, trade unionists 
and business interests after the end of the First World War, 'Nationalisation' was 
regarded as an economic necessity, given diagnosed economies of scale and 
natural monopoly characteristics in the industry. Following years of private 
and / or fragmented modes of service provision of utilities, a 'publicly owned' or 
'nationalised' actor was said to offer higher 'efficiency' and 'economies'. 
'Nationalisation' policies were, however, not limited to the purchase of an 
industry by the state. Looking at various examples in a cross-country as well as 
cross-sectoral perspective, the policy of 'nationalisation' was pursued in the form 
of various organisational arrangements:
(1) organisational unification - numerous private operators merge into a single 
or a small number of operator(s), which, however, remain private;
(2) financial subsidies -  the government provides subsidies and other financial 
guarantees to a private industry within a regulatory framework;
(3) a unified state-owned operator, but granting some extent of organisational 
autonomy:
(4) a unified state-owned operator integrated into the state's public 
administration.
In Britain in the 1920s, regulatory reform followed types (1) and (2), whereas in 
Germany there was a shift towards (3). The following analysis is not merely an 
account of the different regulatory regimes established in the post-war period in 
Britain and Germany, but also considers the sources of isomorphism and how
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institutional factors shaped and facilitated the spread of particular regulatory 
design ideas and undermined others. In terms of the overall argument of this 
study, the British case offers an example of a contest between domestic 
paradigm and domain-oriented sources, whereas the German example discusses 
a case of national and international domain-oriented sources of isomorphism.
In both Britain as well as Germany a 'nationalisation' of the railway system was 
part of the immediate post-war legislative agenda after the First World War. 
Whereas the British railway sector was characterised by numerous private 
railway companies in a nevertheless oligopolistic market, the Germany industry 
was characterised by numerous state-administered and a few private railways at 
the state level. Whereas in the UK nationalisation was associated with bringing 
the railways 'closer' to the state and within a tighter regulatory framework, in 
Germany the discussion soon turned into how to make the railway operator 
more 'autonomous' from pohtics. According to Witte (1932), there was a 
convergence in terms of the 'organisational distance' between the state and the 
operator not only in Britain and Germany, but also across Europe. However, this 
observation does not consider why such a convergence took place and whether 
regulatory reform took place for the same reasons.
The broad challenges to the railway systems in both countries were fairly 
similar. In the UK and Germany the war experience had raised expectations that 
the railways were bound to be 'nationalised'. On the one hand, both railways 
systems had suffered during the war due to lack of investment and intensive 
use. On the other hand, both countries had made positive experiences with the 
relatively unified and national control and management of the railways during
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the war. In both countries, railway unions were among the most powerful 
unions and considerable pressure was brought upon the governments to 
introduce measures such as the eight-hour working day. In both countries, strike 
action (or the prevention thereof) was among the incentives for governments to 
bring about organisational change.
Moreover, both countries were headed by 'weak governments'. In the UK, Lloyd 
George's coalition government was divided between those who demanded a 
'reconstruction' of the UK with state-interventionist means and those who 
regarded a return to the pre-war pattern of (non-) economic policy-making as 
the best way to return to post-war 'normality'. In Germany, the early years of the 
Weimar Republic were dominated by political and economic turmoil, frequent 
changes in government and international demands for reparation payments.
The following two chapters provide a discussion of the national changes to the 
regulatory regime. In Britain, there was substantial continuity despite 
considerable organisational change, while in Germany, the traditional role of the 
railways as a 'servant' to business was under challenge from international 
sources.
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Chapter Three 
Institutional weakness and domain orientation in Britain
Politics corrupts the railway 
management and the railway 
management corrupts politics
E. Geddes^
Conflicting ideas about future economic policy influenced the extent of change 
in the regulatory regimes of the UK railway domain after the First World War, 
Although UK railway policy became truly 'national' because of the establishment 
of a Ministry of Transport in 1919, this form of 'nationalisation' neither affected 
ownership or the previous commercial orientation of the railway companies. In 
fact, railway policy became 'national' in order to reinforce and ensure 
commercial viability.
The following discusses the 1919 Ministry of Transport Act and the 1921 
Railways Act. It assesses the domain- and paradigm-orientation of the various 
proposals and examines why the selected regulatory instruments were domestic 
domain-oriented, representing little else than policy cumulation. The 1919 
Ministry of Transport Act represents an example of the reassertion of 
deflationary policies in British post-war economic policy, emerging from an 
initial 'policy soup' consisting of policies of deflation and war compensation, 
reconstruction and protectionist policies. The 1921 Act represents a case of 
domain-orientation, caused in particular by an insulated, corporatist decision-
 ^HoL RO F /1 8 /4 /1 0  -  9 February 1920.
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making structure led by the Ministry of Transport with the Railway Companies' 
Association (RCA), the Federation of British Industry (FBI) and, although not in 
direct negotiations with the government, the trade unions. The 1919 Act, in 
contrast, provides an example of a failure of a departmental paradigm-oriented 
reform agenda, which failed due to political resistance. Instead of providing a 
complete account of changes in railway policy, this chapter mainly addresses 
regulatory issues. As a consequence, labour relations and the railway strike of 
1919 (which did not mention nationalisation as an issue) do not receive detailed 
attention as they did not significantly impact on the shape of regulatory reform.
The 1919 Ministry of Transport Act, the deliberation of regulatory ideas and the 
pohcy-making processes, and the 1921 Railway Act, in terms of regulatory ideas, 
organisational structure, regulatory authority and non-commercial public 
services, are described in detail and analysed according to their extent of 
domain- and paradigm-orientation. Finally, the impact of institutional factors is 
assessed.
Th e  1919 M inistry of Transport  A ct 
The Emergence of Regulatory Ideas
The debate concerning the organisational status and the extent of increased 
regulatory control over the railways did not suddenly emerge as a side-effect of 
the First World War and the impact of the war economy. Prior to the war, there 
had been growing support for a close control of the railways from the labour 
movement, business and politicians. The railway economist William Ac worth, 
one of the most prominent opponents of state-owned railways, concluded that 
state ownership had become inevitable as no other form of regulatory control
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seemed feasible or viable (Foster 1992: 58; Wettenhall 1970: 36). Nationalisation 
ideas were promoted by the Railway Nationalisation Society, which was 
founded in 1908 and was supported by trade unions and various politicians.^ 
Various parliamentary committees also supported the notion of further 
concentration and standardisation^, while business tacitly supported state 
ownership, hoping that this would lead to a reduction in freight rates as part of 
an activist economic policy (Armitage 1969: 46).
A change of regulatory structure was, on the one hand, encouraged by the 
financial decline and the market concentration of the railway operators.'^ 
Furthermore, competition on price was virtually non-existent due to pooling 
agreements, while outright mergers had been successfully opposed by so-called 
trading interests. On the other hand, the war-time experience, with railway 
operations managed jointly by co-opted railway managers in the Railway 
Executive Committee under the overall control of the government, made 
stronger control and centralisation of railway activities increasingly politically
 ^ The Railway Nationalisation Society caUed for a state purchase of the railway 
undertakings, which should then be managed by a railway board and a large Railway 
Council which would include representatives from the Chambers of Commerce, 
Agriculture, trade unions and from counties and boroughs served by railway operations 
(Barry 1963:103).
 ^For example, the 1911 Railway Companies (Accounts & Returns) Act provided the basis 
for a standardisation of the railway companies' accounts.
 ^ Derek Aldcroft (1968) points to the deterioration in the railway companies' financial 
position with average returns on capital falling from a peak of 4.4 per cent to around 3.5 
per cent since 1900. This dechne was caused by overcapitalisation, duplication of services 
and facihties, extensive service compensation and a rigid freight charge structure. 
Aldcroft (1969: 11-8) claims that this market behaviour was caused by a general 
confusion between net and gross revenue.
53
acceptable.^ While productivity gains and operational improvements were 
achieved during the war, the financial position of the railway companies 
declined further because of the intensive usage of the network, the need to run 
government traffic free of charge, the inability to change rates and by continuous 
increases in wages (Foreman-Peck and Millward 1994: 24), During the war the 
government paid a 'war bonus', negotiated by the Railway Executive Committee 
and the two railway unions, NUR and ASLEF, which compensated railway 
employees for increases in the cost of living caused by the war. In 1916, the 
railway companies threatened not to accept any further wage increases without 
seeking arbitration as they realised that 'war bonuses' would have to be 
continued after the war. They demanded a financial guarantee from the 
government for five years after the war as compensation.^ The President of the 
Board of Trade, Walter Runciman, fearing economic, and more importantly, 
social upheaval, promised the companies to guarantee the companies' revenues 
at the 1913 level for two years after the official cease-fire, thereby establishing 
government involvement in railway policy after the war.^
 ^This war-time organisation followed provisions from the 1871 Regulation of the Forces 
Act. It represented a direct response to the successful use of the railways by the German 
military in the war against France. The ability to rely on co-opted managers in a 'self­
regulated' arrangement was greatly facilitated by the ohgopolistic structure of the 
industry: while 130 companies fell under government authority in total, 12 companies 
controlled 75 per cent of the network.
 ^House of Lords Records Office (HoL RO) F 1 8 /3 /9  - 14.1.19 (also Armitage 1969; 54).
 ^ In a similarly motivated move to avert industrial trouble, the government promised 
ASLEF 'sympathetic consideration' after the war of their demand in 1917 for the 
introduction of the eight-hour day. This was granted by the Cabinet shortly before the 
general election of 1918. The government's general fear of social unrest following 
industrial disputes led to the establishment of a special cabinet committee, the Industrial 
Unrest Committee in February 1919. Following the 1914 agreement of the railways, docks
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Because of the positive wartime experience of greater operational centralisation 
and the companies' financial difficulties, there was a relatively universal 
agreement that more state involvement in the railway industry was needed. 
There was, nevertheless, less consensus on how 'activist' such a policy was to be 
and what role a ministerial department should play. The proposals can be 
distinguished according to their degree of domain- and paradigm-orientation, 
the former mainly addressing railway-specific issues, to a large extent relying on 
lessons from the past, while the latter aimed to place the railways in an overall 
poUcy concept integrated with policies in other policy domains.
Domain-oriented proposals were expressed by the Board of Trade, the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Future Railway PoUcy and railway 
representatives. In December 1918, Sir Sam Fay, from the perspective of the 
railway industry, called for the creation of a Transport Authority which would 
consist of representatives of labour, trade and commerce, shipping, agriculture, 
mining, textile, chemical and iron masters. The railways, the railway-owned 
docks and the canals were to be controlled and managed by a 'corporatist' 
committee of elected members of these trade associations. This committee would 
act independently of direct political control, despite formal links to the Board of 
Trade.^ In contrast, the 'free-trading' Board of Trade under Albert Stanley argued 
that while the railway problem required an 'entirely new department through
and mining union to form a 'Triple AUiance', the government feared that any strike might 
lead to an economic standstUl, or to social and revolutionary unrest as in Germany and 
Russia (see Dangerfield 1961).
 ^Pubhc Records Office (PRO) MT 45/226, Sir Sam Fay memorandum, December 1918.
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which will be exercised the state control over a unified railway system', this new 
ministry should only be concerned with the railways. Other competencies 
should remain with the Board of Trade.^ The Select Committee shied away from 
detailed policy proposals or voicing an opinion on 'the' ownership question, 
while advocating that single ownership and management would be desirable 
(House of Commons 1918).
More paradigm-oriented proposals were put forward by Lloyd George and the 
Ministry of Reconstruction, which was set up as a research department to 
prepare programmes and present them to the relevant department for 
implementation (Abrams 1963: 50). Lloyd George expressed his interest in an 
activist railway pohcy in a meeting with trade u n io n s.T h ese  ideas appealed to 
Lloyd George's vision of 'garden cities' which would offer solutions to the 
housing and health problems of urban squalor once a well-integrated transport 
system had been established. Furthermore, an active railway policy would 
support the demobilisation of the army and respond to the need for a better co­
ordination of the railways which would lead to a long-term improvement and 
cheapening of transport services.^^ A Ministry of Ways and Communications 
was to initiate these poHcies while the railways remained in goverrunental 
control, with a future public ownership of the railways remaining a possibility.^^
9 HoL RO F /2 /6 /1 2  - 31 December 1918.
Promismg that 'the problem must be taken in hand under the direct inspiration and 
control of the state' {Railway Gazette, 16 November 1918).
HoL RO F /4 5 /9 /2 1  - 9 November 1918.
In a draft for the 1918 election manifesto, Lloyd George incorporated a commitment to 
a 'nationalisation' of the railways. This clause was redrafted by his coalition partner 
Bonar Law into a demand for the state development of a unified system. The agreed
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Thus, the railways were to contribute actively to 'reconstruction', which meant 
'nothing less than an effort to correct the weakness in the British social and 
economic fabric which had been revealed by the war' (Armitage 1969; 6).
Forms of regulatory control and state ownership were also examined at the 
Ministry of Reconstruction, despite obstruction by the Board of Trade and the 
Railway Executive.^^ Great urgency was attached to solving the railway 
'problem' as it was regarded as crucial for the overall development of industry 
and also for accommodating the increasing pressure from trade unions, in 
particular the NUR, on the issue of ownership, but also on so-called 'Joint 
Industrial C ouncils 'B enefits  of nationalisation on the lines of government 
ownership and, possibly, management were seen in preventing the emergence of 
a private monopoly. Furthermore, the ability to take a 'large view' of the 
development of national resources, the establishment of a simplified 
organisation and the pooling of rolling stock were regarded as advantageous. 
NationaHsation was to be achieved by issuing government stock to shareholders 
with a Ministry of Transport taking possession of all railway undertakings. An 
Advisory Council, including worker representatives, was to assist the minister.^^
policy stance for the 1918 election was that while the pre-war 'state of freedom from 
government control' would no longer be acceptable, the exact form of government 
control remained a matter of consideration (HoL RO F /2 /6 /8  - 9 December 1918).
PRO BT 6 7 /1 /6  - Ministry of Reconstruction 1917-19; Railway Nationalisation 
Proposals: minutes and memoranda; 21 November 1919.
Armitage (1969: 64) claims that NUR leader J.H. Thomas seems to have beHeved that 
government ownership of the railways was not realisable in the British context and 
therefore concentrated on other issues.
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The initial policy proposals took such a paradigm-oriented perspective. Lloyd 
George asked Sir Eric Geddes, a former railway company manager, to establish 
and lead a Ministry of Ways and Communications, which would deal with the 
'immense questions of transportation and its development' which would 'vitally 
affect the welfare and prosperity of the nation '.G eddes, whose agenda was, at 
the time, to a large extent set in agreement with Lloyd George, emphasised the 
importance of utilising the time immediately after the cease-fire for major 
initiatives and relief work in railway and canal construction as well as road 
development in order to respond to the pressures of rapid demobilisation. If 
action was not taken immediately, he feared that initiatives could be frustrated 
by opposition from traders. Railway rates could be set to protect and promote 
domestic industry and agriculture. Furthermore, the railways had a vital role to 
play in other policy schemes in terms of agricultural development and 
housing.^^ These policies were also included in the King's Speech which 
emphasised the importance of transport for the development of industrial and 
agricultural resources [Railway Gazette, 14 February 1919: 279)}^
PRO BT 6 7 /1 /6  - 20 February 1919.
PRO ADM 116/1809 - 16 November 1918. Sir Eric Geddes was one of Lloyd George's 
'businessmen in government'. Before the war, he had been deputy general manager of the 
North Eastern Railway. During the war, he was Deputy Director-General of Munitions 
Supply from June 1915, Director-General of Movements from September 1916 and finally 
First Lord of the Admiralty from May 1917. 'Businessmen in government' was one of the, 
arguably unsuccessful, innovations made by Lloyd George during the war (see Turner 
1988: 212, Grieves 1992: 24)
PRO ADM 116/1809 -18  November 1918.
1® Geddes pointed out the role of Lloyd George in shaping the agenda - 'if we are to 
proceed with this policy which you have outlined to me' (PRO ADM 116/1809 - 18 
November 1918; Geddes to Lloyd George) and letter to the parliamentary draughtsman;
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Despite this official emphasis on an active policy which was paradigm-oriented 
as part of an overall reconstruction policy, there was also a 'countervailing' 
tendency that stressed non-interventionist, 'deflationary' policies. These were 
represented in the Balfour Committee report (Committee of the Committee on 
Commercial and Industrial Policy 1918) which argued that in order to encourage 
an expansion of production and efficiency, the government should pursue a 
policy of decontrol and some protective legislation.^^ The Cunliffe report 
similarly called for deflationary policies in order to resume the old gold standard 
parity (Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges after the War 1918; also 
Cline 1970).
Thus, the initial proposals drew on paradigm-oriented sources. However, 
alternative sources for regulatory models were also available and were 
promoted by other government departments. The following section considers 
the successful challenges, drawing on more domain-oriented proposals, which 
led to a veto of the initial suggestions of an activist reconstruction policy.
The Ministry of Ways and Communications Bill
The Bill proposing the establishment of a Ministry of Ways and 
Communications was drafted in January 1919 by a small group of officials with a 
military transport background similar to Geddes. Neither the Railway Executive
This is a very rough outline of what I understand to be the Prime Minister's wishes' (PRO 
MT 45/234 - 15 January 1919).
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nor the Board of Trade participated in the process of policy formulation 
(Armitage 1969: 66). The Bill provided for the mechanism for transferring all 
responsibilities of other departments regarding existing modes of transport, 
railways, light railways, roads, canals, docks and harbours, shipping, tramways 
and road vehicles as well as the supply of electricity to the new ministry. 
Competencies concerning aviation were added later. Clause four of the Bill 
enabled the ministry to take possession of these modes of transport.
The leading officials envisaged a strategic, activist role for the new ministry 
along the lines of the Haldane Report. A Cabinet memorandum on the general 
outline of the Ministry of Ways and Communications Bill strongly emphasised 
the positive role the railways could play in the reconstruction efforts of the post­
war period. It was argued that after the war, the conception of the duties of 
government had changed. The intensity of industrial development required a 
more 'scientific handling' via close co-ordination.^^ Now 'war' had to be waged 
against obsolete and inefficient industrial and social conditions. The country, it 
was argued, no longer expected mere regulation and restriction from the state, 
but positive action in the form of 'initiation' and 'inspiration'.^^ Electricity was 
included in the Bill so that the electricity grid could be extended into remote 
areas of the country. Geddes noted that
'[t]he theory underlying the institution of a Ministry of Ways and 
Communications is surely owing to the development of a highly
The report considered methods to regain economic leadership; among those were 
anti-dumping measures, incentives to increase production and a policy towards 
'combinations'.
PRO 45/226 - 4 February 1919 (also Bagwell 1982: 242).
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civilised and industrial state, it is now necessary to provide in the 
governmental machinery a Department not charged, as in the past, 
with functions of criticism, regulation, conciliation and arbitration, 
but with the inspiration and control of the development of a public 
service comprised in all methods of commercial movement of men, 
animals and materials in the Realm: that inspiration and control to be 
exercised not purely from a narrow point of view as to whether a 
particular development of a system of transport or of a service will 
per se and immediately yield a commercial return upon the capital 
invested and upon the expenses incurred, but whether it will in the 
end [...] be of commensurate service to the community
The financial position of the railway companies increased the urgency attached 
to the need for legislative action. The companies claimed that no investment 
would be forthcoming as long as government policy was not clarified: without 
financial responsibility being taken by the state, private enterprise would not be 
willing to improve and extend the railway n e t w o r k . ^ 3  During the two 'Runciman 
years' of government-guaranteed revenue levels, the new ministry was to ensure
21 PRO MT 45/225 -1 9  February 1919.
22 PRO MT 45/226 - 5 March 1919. However, Armitage (1969: 67) observes that Geddes 
was afraid of the 'extended', even 'autocratic' powers of the minister as provided in the 
draft legislation.
23 PRO MT 45/234 - 22 January 1919; Comment by Nash on draft law. Officials stated 
that the relation of expenditures to earnings was such 'that state assistance and state 
control in some form or another is inevitable'. Furthermore, it was argued that costs had 
increased by £90 million since 1913, consisting of £50 mUlion in increased wages, £5 
mUlion to 'shopmen', £15 million due to the introduction of the eight-hour working day 
and £20 miUion in increased prices.
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that the companies improved efficiency and achieved closer co-operation. 
Furthermore, the pre-war structure of the industry had to be abandoned as it 
had only caused 'waste' and 'profligate m ovem ent'.Pow ers were envisaged to 
allow for 'emergency acquisitions' of the railways in case of financial failure. In 
the course of the following two years the railway companies were required to 
produce amalgamation schemes of their own and to suggest a modification of 
the classification of freight r a t e s . The ministry was to be equipped with powers 
to continue the present guarantees, to enter into working agreements, to 
construct, manage and maintain railways as well as to acquire land. 
Furthermore, the ministry was also enabled to authorise rates and charges and to 
determine the rates of pay and conditions of employment. A Tribunal was to 
decide in cases of financial disagreements between the government and the 
railways, while changes in ownership status were to be effected by the Orders in 
Council procedure.^^ It was left undecided whether the government should then 
'work' (i.e. manage) the railways directly or lease them to private 
u n d e r  t a k i n g s .  27 Nevertheless, despite this power of 'nationaUsation', Geddes 
stressed that if public ownership should occur (which he hoped would not), this 
would not involve direct governmental management as it was 'unthinkable that 
any government department run with a minister in charge should be directly
24 PRO MT 4 9 /4  - 22 July 1920.
25 Armitage (1969: 66) suggests that this dehberate postponement of more far-reaching 
legislation indicates that Geddes had no precise plan for the future organisation of the 
railways.
25 The Order in Council procedure allows measures to be passed without a special vote 
in parliament.
27 Geddes claimed to be opposed to nationalisation in terms of ownership, but feared 
that the companies' financial position would necessitate such a pohcy.
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responsible [...] I cannot conceive anything more disastrous', emphasising that 
some form of board would be essential for exercising managerial control.^^
The scope of the proposals attracted great controversy. It was argued that the 
proposals gave such 'autocratic powers that it would be difficult to get it through 
P arliam en t'.D ue to the numerous election pledges which had to be fulfilled 
and the volatile support for Lloyd George's coalition government in the House of 
Commons, the Ministry of Transport reckoned that 'in the present Parliamentary 
situation the utmost we can expect is an Enabling Bill of the nature of the Bill to 
establish a Ministry of Ways and Communications already drafted [...] the 
shorter and less contentious a measure is, the better its prospect of being 
introduced in the Ho us e ' . Th i s  would enable a ministry to be formed and to 
achieve some improvements by drawing together competencies from various 
departments, although not giving direct power to take the railways into 
government ownership. It was feared that the resistance to the nationalisation 
issue and also the increased complexity caused by an inclusion of nationalisation 
measures in the Bill would lead to the failure of the whole Bill. As a 
consequence, the relevant clause four was considerably weakened in the course 
of the various drafting stages.^^
28 PRO MT 4 5 / 235 - 10 March 1919.
29 PRO MT 45/226 - 12 February 1919.
PRO MT 45/226 - 3 February 1919. Furthermore, Lloyd George was in Paris for most 
of the time conducting the 'peace conference' negotiations.
8^  For example, from 'for the consideration and formulation of policy as to the acquisition 
of undertakings' in the second draft to a 'consideration and formulation of the policy to 
be pursued as to the future position of undertakings' in the fifth draft.
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Resistance to these proposals also emerged from within the Cabinet. In a key 
Cabinet meeting on 19 February 1919, opposition from the Board of Trade, the 
Ministries of Shipping and Air as well as the anticipation of determined 
opposition in the House of Commons led to the elimination from the Bill of 
clauses affecting merchant shipping, local tramways and aviation. The 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, questioned the reasoning 
behind the clauses specifying the terms for purchasing the railways, in particular 
the Order in Council procedure. While Geddes claimed that the nationalisation 
clauses provided effective 'sticks' for negotiations with the railway companies, 
Lloyd George emphasised the potential 'carrot' effect on labour and industrial 
peace. The President of the Board of Trade, Albert Stanley, repeated his 
opposition, suggesting that the scope of the new rriinistry should be limited to 
the railways and the canal system. General oversight over transport facilities 
should remain as a whole in the interest of trade and commerce and therefore 
with the Board of Trade. More importantly, he opposed the transfer of authority 
for electrical supply, claiming that the responsibility for electricity should not 
rest in the hands of the potentially largest customer.^^
Further opposition to the Bill emerged from well-organised interest 
representatives in Parliament.^^ The railway companies were opposed to the 
Order in Council procedure for the state purchase of railway companies and the 
setting up of an arbitrating Tribunal to deal with disagreements between
32 HoL RO F /2 3 /4 /1 5  - 8 February 1919.
33 Geddes informed Lloyd George in Paris that 'roads were noisy, but not formidable', 
while the docks were 'formidable' and that he anticipated stronger hostihty from the 
electricity interests (HoL RO F /1 8 /3 /1 0  - 13 March 1919).
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government and companies. Geddes warned Lloyd George, who had insisted on 
the inclusion of the Order in Council procedure, on the potential risks of this 
procedure should a 'Socialistically inclined Labour government' determine 
railway p o l i c y D u e  to the widespread opposition among the railway 
companies and MPs, who regarded the clause as an infringement of their 
constitutional privileges, the Order in Council clause was withdrawn in the early 
committee stages of the Bill. Furthermore, the transfer of competence for 
electricity supply was rejected during the consideration of the Electricity Supply 
Bül.^  ^The Shipping Committee convinced Bonar Law that docks and harbours 
should be exempted from the scope of the Bill. Finally, the 'nationalisation' 
clause four was withdrawn after vigorous campaigning by the opponents of the 
Bill. Thus, in the course of the process through parliament, the Ministry lost 
proposed competencies on harbours, docks and electricity, its ability to 
nationalise the railways was eliminated and the powers on road pohcy were 
reduced. The House of Lords renamed the proposed new ministerial department 
Ministry of Transport. Beyond the mere change m words, it reflected the new 
ministry's limited planning competencies in network development and 
communication systems. The Act reduced the Ministry to a railway department, 
defining the role of the new ministry as 'improving the means of, and the 
facilities for, locomotion and transport'. The financing of the companies in terms 
of capital was to remain as far as possible with the owners. Direct ministerial 
action was only to be taken after receiving advice from a special advisory
34 H oL RO F /1 8 /3 /1 0  -13  March 1919.
35 HoL RO F 18/3 /18  - 14 August 1919; HoL RO F /1 8 /3 /3 3  -13  November 1919.
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committee consisting of railway company representatives.^^ Far from being a 
ministry of 'initiation' and 'inspiration', the Ministry of Transport's role was 
mainly supervisory, having to search for remedies for the causes of the railway 
companies' decline, such as the impact of the reduction of working hours, and to 
promote the pooling of rolling stock. A further task was to examine the methods 
of operation, to co-ordinate the systems and to 'cut out redundant services'.
In sum, the case of the 1919 Ministry of Transport Act represents a case of 
competition between two 'policy environments' which were used to legitimise 
policy programmes with regard to railways. On the one hand, there were 
demands to modify the pre-war structures, while, on the other hand, there were 
attempts to integrate transport into an overall policy of reconstruction. The 
establishment of the Ministry of Transport represents an example of the more 
general shift in emphasis in the UK policy on reconstruction after the First 
World War in which advocates of a return to pre-war policy principles 
succeeded in opposing the proposals of 'activist' policies (Lowe 1978). In the case 
of railways, this not only meant that instead of 'nationalisation' via 'inspiration', 
possibly ownership and, potentially, even management, there was 
'nationalisation' via financial subsidies, granted under the 'Runciman' 
agreement. It also represented a defeat of the activist, reconstruction-oriented 
elements in post-war politics against the short-term political imperatives of 
economic downturn, limited credit facilities and long-term Treasury ideas
Ministry of Transport Act 1919, clause 3. 
37 H oL RO F /1 8 /3 /1 7  -13  August 1919.
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concerning the need for decontrol and deflation.^^ Similarly, the ministry had no 
effective enforcement powers, but had to rely on persuasion (Grieves 1992: 32).
Th e  1921 Railw ays A ct
In contrast to the 1919 Act, the 1921 Railways Act received only Httle interest 
from Lloyd George or the Cabinet (Grieves 1989: 76). Most policies were 
formulated between the Ministry of Transport, the Railway Companies' 
Association and the FBI. The main opposition expressed by the Treasury and the 
so-called 'anti-waste' campaign had less to do with the details of railway policy 
and regulation, but rather with the Ministry of Transport's overall existence.^^ 
The Act was partly motivated by the coming to an end of the 'Runciman' years 
for the railway companies and their continuing financial difficulties. Partly it 
was shaped by the preceding railway strike (see Armitage 1969: 73-5; Grieves 
1989: 86-7), which led Lloyd George to insist on including a provision allowing 
workers' representatives on the management boards.^^
Johnson (1968: 411) speculates on various reasons, such as a change in government 
preferences due to interest group pressure or MP revolts, an imprecise first draft whose 
controversial details were clarified over time, or an attempt to 'buy time' to overcome 
strike threats.
PRO T l / 12373/36905 - (no date); Memorandum to Chancellor of Exchequer; Chisholm  
and Davie (1993): 292.
In broad terms, the White Paper (Cmd 787) suggested that employee representatives, 
elected from and by employees of the railway company, should participate on the boards 
of management, together with stockholder representatives. The employee representatives 
would represent the workers of the company and not be agents of trade unions. Benefits 
were seen in adding experience to board meetings as well as a 'moderating' and 
'educating' effect on worker demands (PRO CAB 24/2824 - 12 April 1921; Railway Bill 
1921). While business interests were ambivalent, the RCA opposed these suggestions 
arguing that this would lead to a 'constant struggle to prevent further concessions' (PRO 
MT 4 9 /2 -2 2  October 1920). The RCA offered as an alternative a committee composed of
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The following analyses the limited debate concerning regulatory ideas and the 
hardwiring of the regulatory regime. The Act not only offers a good example of a 
dominant domain-orientation which drew its conceptions and legitimisation 
from existing railway regulation, but it also provides an example of corporatist 
decision-making between the Ministry, the railway association and main 
business association, the FBI.
The emergence of regulatory ideas
Two alternatives for the future organisation were presented by Geddes to the 
Cabinet: either nationalisation in terms of both ownership and management of 
the railways or the amalgamation of private companies under tighter regulatory 
and managerial control while also providing the companies with financial 
guarantees.'^^ Geddes argued that no state had pursued policies of 
nationalisation in terms of ownership for reasons of theoretical superiority, but 
only on grounds of financial necessity. Public ownership would only lead to 
stagnation and a situation where 'politics corrupt the railway management and
board and worker representatives to discuss matters of wages and operational issues 
(PRO MT 4 9 /5  - 2 April 1921). While Geddes regarded these proposals as insufficient, the 
railway unions were increasingly hostile to the idea of worker representatives, fearing 
that this would weaken their own position in dealing with the companies (MT 4 9 /3 - 2 9  
March 1921; CP 2824). They therefore took up the offer of the RCA and reached a 
compromise without consulting Geddes (Bagwell 1963: 411). This ensured the continued 
existence of the National and Central Wages Boards, the setting up of Group Councils 
and some clauses on workplace discipline. Geddes had to ask the Cabinet to withdraw  
the initative (Cmd 1292).
41 HoL RO F /1 8 /4 /1 0  - 9 February 1920.
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the railway management corrupts p o l i t i c s ' 2^ J n  contrast, a 'regulatory 
arrangement' would allow the government to 'exercise all the powers we require 
without doing this [taking into ownership] and this is a favourable time for 
altering the relationship between the state and the companies, Geddes
proposed to amalgamate the railway companies into seven groups which would 
form regional monopolies. This scheme was administratively convenient as it 
did not necessitate a separation of individual undertakings."^ Rates were to be 
fixed at a level that would allow for the companies to earn the equivalent of the 
pre-war revenue of all companies absorbed into the group, while profits were to 
be regulated by a sliding scale mechanism where the government's share would 
be channelled into a transport development fund.
The justification for these proposals indicates the reduced ambitions and the 
reforms' domain-oriented isomorphic nature. It was argued that reforms were 
necessary because of the poor financial position of the railway companies which 
were due to be released from government control in August 1921 and the 
necessity for some comprehensive re-organisation of the country's railway 
system so as to 'give the best service to the shareholders and others concerned in 
Rahway Transport'."^^ An efficiently functioning railway system, operating 
effectively and economically, was both in the public and in the shareholder 
interest. The central assumption was that the function of government was to
42 HoL RO F /1 8 /4 /1 0  - 9 February 1920.
43 HoL RO F /1 8 /4 /1 0  - 9 February 1920; Future transport policy - memorandum for the 
cabinet by the Minister of Transport.
44 These were Southern, Western, North Western, Eastern and North Eastern, London 
with a separate railway system for Scotland. Ireland was no longer considered.
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assist the railway companies to attain a higher standard of efficiency and better 
co-ordination rather than 'attempting any direct management of a vast 
machinery of transport' {The Times, 4 May 1920: 4). These intentions were also 
reflected in the White Paper 'Outline of Proposals as to the Future Organisation 
of Transport Undertakings in Great Britain and their relation to the State' 
(Ministry of Transport 1920), which set out the basic structure of the future 
amalgamated railway companies.
The regulatory ideas considered were markedly different to those discussed 
during the formulation of the 1919 Act. There was a lack of debate on principles, 
with most ideas being agreed upon and only discussed at the level of detail. This 
reflected the domain-oriented nature of policy proposals, which was induced by 
the corporatist decision-making pattern. Therefore, the prime concern was to 
place the railway companies on a 'sound basis' rather than being subject to a 
distinct policy recipe.
Organisational Structure
The 1921 Railway Act aimed to establish - by means of amalgamation - a more 
'efficient' system which would enable 'economical working'. Such domain- 
oriented and evolutionary changes would be more beneficial than a continuation 
of the 'illusory benefits' of 'wasteful competition'. It was further argued that 
although 'more logical' grouping schemes could be imagined, the proposed 
scheme kept the companies integrated and therefore minimised administrative
45 PRO MT 49/10 - 2 May 1921.
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transaction cos ts .Whi le  competition could still emerge in terms of services and 
facilities, which would ensure further advances in operational efficiency among 
companies, the full benefit of the system could by obtained only by the way of a 
'regulated monopoly'.
Despite the near universal agreement on the benefits of amalgamation which 
was domain-oriented and evolutionary, the exact nature of these new railway 
groups caused some debate. The White Paper proposed the full financial 
amalgamation of the railway companies into five regional monopolies in 
England and Wales (Southern, Western, North Western, Eastern, North Eastern, 
while keeping London separate) and a single operator for Scotland. The FBI 
agreed with the principle of the grouping scheme.'^^ In contrast, the Association 
of the British Chambers of Commerce (ABCC) opposed the government's 
grouping scheme as it would lead to regional monopolies and higher charges for 
both passengers and freight. While amalgamation was not opposed in principle, 
the ABCC demanded that as much competition as possible should be 
maintained as otherwise the Ministry of Transport would have the incentive to 
stifle all other modes of transport to make the railway companies viable.
Very similar demands had been made by the Railway Gazette (5 November, 
revised version: 26 November 1920: 697-9). According to the Gazette, the
The companies were to be set up by 1 January 1923. The larger companies - called 
constituent companies, were mutually to agree on and submit a scheme for 
amalgamation. These companies were then to absorb the smaller, so-called subsidiary 
companies.
47 PRO MT 4 9 /4  - 22 July 1920.
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government's proposals had not met with a favourable reception. Alternatively, 
the formation of eight operators (or nine, if two Scottish companies were to be 
maintained) would not only maintain competition where it 'was desirable' but 
also secure the identity of as many companies as possible. It would also avoid 
some huge but very invertebrate systems for the sake of problematical operating 
systems'.
The main controversial organisational issue was the inclusion of the Scottish 
railway companies into English companies. The Scottish companies' demand to 
be included in English companies, was, at first, rejected by the latter.^^ Later, in 
their formal submission, the RCA suggested an alternative scheme which would 
consist of five regional monopolies which included Scottish companies in 
Enghsh groups. It was stressed that direct competition could not be fully 
eliminated and that therefore the fullest co-operation between the companies 
should be allowed for. Furthermore, expectations concerning the potential 
economies of amalgamation should not be set too high.^^
48 PRO MT 49/13 -1  December 1920.
49 The Ministry of Transport rejected these proposals as they offered 'no advantages over 
the Ministry's proposals which are not attended by even greater drawbacks, it is open to 
formidable objections and it fails to provide sufficiently for the enforcement of economy' 
(MT 4 9 /9  - no date. 'Rahway Gazette and Rahway News - Alternative Proposals for 
Grouping').
50 PRO MT 4 9 /2  -1 1 /1 2  October 1920.
54 After internal consultation, the RCA stated that the Scottish companies would not be 
viable on their own and that the North Eastern Railway Company should be grouped 
with weaker companies, arguing that the grouping scheme would not pass the House of
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A note from the Secretary of the RCA to Geddes suggested that with the 
exception of the North Eastern company, all the English companies unanimously 
desired the adoption of a grouping scheme which included the Scottish 
companies in the English g r oups . Geddes ,  in contrast, argued that such a 
longitudinal grouping' would be disadvantageous from an operating point of 
view.^^ In the Bill, the Scottish railways were divided into two groups. East and 
West (Ministry of Transport 1921).^  ^The Scottish demands for integration into 
English groups were initially rejected by the Ministry because there was no 
justification 'in throwing the burden of a Scottish deficiency on to the shoulders 
of English traders' (Ministry of Transport 1921). Due to continuous lobbying by 
the (Scottish) companies as well as pressure from Scottish MPs, Geddes gave up 
his opposition and conceded to a longitudinal amalgamation of English and 
Scottish railway companies during the first committee meetings {Railway 
Gazette, 17 June 1921: 945-6).^  ^ As a consequence, the 'four' great railway 
companies, the Southern, Great Western, London, Midland and Scottish and the 
London North Eastern Railways were established.
Commons, if the North Eastern and the Hull & Barnsley were not amalgamated with the 
Eastern grouping.
52 PRO MT 49/13 - 14 December 1920.
55 Longitudinal' grouping describes the grouping of the Scottish companies with English 
groups, leading to what are today known as the East and West Coast mainlines from 
London to either Edinburgh or Glasgow and beyond.
54 Furthermore, the North Eastern and Hull & Barnsley lines, previously autonomous, 
were combined with the Eastern grouping. London traffic was excluded from the BiU.
55 Geddes claimed that he conceded this clause because of the pressure from MPs and by 
the indicated support from the railway companies. He argued that he had wanted to
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The change in organisational structure towards creating the four great regional 
monopolies was domain-oriented and evolutionary. Pooling, which might be 
regarded as a form of informal amalgamation, had been part of the development 
in the railway sector since at least the mid-1870s and was therefore not opposed 
in principle. It also illustrates the low value attached to 'wasteful' competition 
given at the time.^^ The evolutionary domain-oriented character of the proposals 
is also evident in the miimnisation of administrative transaction costs by 
grouping companies according to existing organisational arrangements without 
attempting any major reform.
The allocation of regulatory authority
The analysis of the control mechanisms over the activities of the railway 
companies reveals the limited coercive powers of the Ministry and the emphasis 
on 'enabling' the railways to regain their 'equilibrium'. Thus the main aim of the 
rate-setting authority was to enable the railway companies with an efficient and 
economic management to obtain levels of revenues equivalent to an, at first, 
undefined pre-war basis. At the same time, the deliberation on the allocation of 
regulatory competencies also reveals a substantial amount of conflict which to 
some extent resembled the controversies concerning the 1919 Act.
The Act determined that both the Ministry of Transport as well as the Railway & 
Canal Commission should take on enhanced regulatory functions on the basis of 
the 1919 Act. Geddes rejected suggestions that the Railway & Canal Commission
preserve a 'Scottish' identity and that there had also been disagreement between the 
Enghsh and the Scottish railway owners.
56 PRO MT 49/10 - 2 May 1921.
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should be disbanded and its tasks merged with the Ministry, arguing that this 
would lead to too strong a dependence of the railways on political control. Both 
Commission and Ministry were entitled to request that the companies should 
offer reasonable facilities. The Commission was to secure and promote public 
safety and to respond to the interests of business. It was allowed to impose 
'improvements' on railway companies, if these amounted to less than £100,000 
and had no negative impact on shareholders. The Ministry's competencies rested 
in areas of standardisation of ways, plant and equipment and to enforce schemes 
for co-operative operation and usage of rolling stock (Railway Act: clause 16(2)). 
Nevertheless, the minister had to consult an expert committee, consisting mostly 
of railway managers, on his proposals before any action could be taken. The 
companies were granted the right to appeal to the Railway & Canal Commission 
when the capital expenditure involved could either not be provided or would 
affect the interests of existing shareholders. The continued existence of the 
Railway & Canal Commission highlights the critical importance given to 
regulatory bodies with political independence which were supposed to limit the 
possibility of political involvement.
In contrast to these final regulatory arrangement, original plans, as presented in 
the White Paper, had stressed that the Ministry of Transport should have new, 
stronger control functions over the railway industry. These competencies, 
nevertheless, in no way resembled those envisaged in the 1919 Act as they were 
justified as 'necessary for the most economical transport possible'. This could 
only be obtained by the exercise of central a u t h o r i t y T h e s e  competencies
57 CAB 105/C.P. 1264 - 1 May 1920.
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concerned the protection of the public, the maintenance of an 'economical 
working' of the railways and the safeguard of 'national interests'. The Ministry 
should have the right to require the provision of adequate services and facilities 
in order to secure the necessary returns to the companies while keeping rates at 
a low level. Regulatory authority extended to the right to impose 'reasonably 
high' standards to require closer co-operation and to prescribe the detail and 
amount of the accounts produced and published. The companies were to obtain 
approval for all plans involving capital expenditure and for the methods of 
raising the necessary capital.
These proposals met with resistance from both business and the railway 
companies. The FBI feared that the increased governmental control would be an 
impediment to effectiveness. The ABCC simply stated that the 'pre-war control 
exercised by Parliament through the Board of Trade amply protected the 
Publ ic ' .Geddes  dismissed these criticisms, pointing out that the government 
would not be an impediment to effectiveness. Moreover, powers would look 
more formidable in print than would be exercised in practice. Other suggestions, 
such as the establishment of a tribunal to replace the ministry, were also 
rejected.^^ The RCA opposed the government's proposals, claiming that the 
control functions would take away all powers from Directors and the 
Management, leading to a 'nationalisation without any guarantees of dividends'. 
It was claimed that the companies refused to improve their operations under
58 PRO MT 49/13 - 1 December 1920.
59 PRO MT 4 9 /4  - 22 July 1920.
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these conditions and would prefer nationalisation.^® They claimed that the 
minister would be under continuous political pressure to demand and compel 
the companies to offer additional services. The RCA also told the Ministry 
officials that regulation to encourage standardisation was unnecessary as the 
groups would further standardisation by themselves. Furthermore, the RCA 
claimed it was too costly to produce statistics as required under the 
government's proposals. In order to find a compromise, the Ministry proposed 
the creation of an independent committee of experts which would be consulted 
before any ministerial decision in order to prevent abuse of ministerial power for 
political reasons.^^ Moreover, the White Paper's suggestions that the companies 
should submit their capital expenditure and capital raising plans for approval 
were dropped.
A Railway Rates Tribunal was established as a further regulatory authority. 
Despite its authority as a court of law, the Tribunal also had many 
adrninistrative functions with its power to fix standard rates and fares, to 
classify merchandise and decide on the conditions under which goods should be 
carried. The Tribunal was to consider whether rates were reasonable and the 
best available means to raise revenue (see also Foreman-Peck and Milward 1994: 
246-7). It consisted of three permanent members who would be advised by two 
panels - one of a more general nature consisting of twenty-two Board of Trade 
nominated representatives, twelve representatives nominated by the Ministry of 
Labour and two representatives from the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
the other consisting of twelve representatives nominated by the Ministry of
6® PRO MT 4 9 /2  - 22 October 1920.
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Transport. The rates were to be set at a level which would allow the companies - 
given 'economic and efficient management' - to earn net revenues at the 1913 
level. In the course of the formulation of the 1921 Act, the rate structure, their 
level and classification were elaborated by the so-called Rates Advisory 
Committee with the goal to secure a financial equilibrium for all railway 
companies (Rates Advisory Committee 1 9 2 0 ).
The original intention was to make the whole process less judicial than under the 
previous procedures at the Railway & Canal Commission, while securing the 
companies a 'fair' rate of return. Rates were to remain outside any political 
influence. Exceptional rates were to cease unless they were more than five per 
cent below standard rates. The White Paper argued that a parliamentary act 
should fix rates and fares at a level where 'efficient and economic management' 
would allow revenue to reach pre-war levels. The exact level of fares and rates 
was to be determined by a Rates Advisory Committee (Rates Advisory 
Committee 1920). The Ministry argued that despite the indeterminate nature of 
the term 'pre-war basis', it would be ensured that the rates were set at such a 
level that allowed the companies a secure future.
The companies demanded a continued financial guarantee and a precise 
definition of the term 'pre-war level'. The RCA managers told the officials that 
no pre-war level would be sufficient in the present and foreseeable
PRO MT 4 9 /2  26 October 1920.
Common carrier obligations were not abolished.
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circumstances.^^ It was agreed that the provision of a ministerial veto for 
applications for increased rates might be dropped if railway companies would 
agree to supply detailed statistics.^ The Ministry also offered provisions that 
would grant the companies short-term loans.^^ The RCA also opposed the 
sliding scale regulation on profit sharing, on the grounds that the state was not 
accepting any responsibility in respect of loss of revenue due to circumstances 
outside the companies' control. They demanded that until amalgamation had 
been effected - by 1 January 1924 - that the guarantee on 1913 levels should be 
continued. Geddes rejected any financial guarantees. The issue was resolved 
after the companies indicated that they would be unable to pay dividends 
should the financial guarantee be discontinued.^^ Linking this issue to the 
conclusions of the Colwyn Committee which had deliberated on government 
compensation for the railway companies' wartime services, it was agreed that 
the government would pay a compensation payment for the period of 
government war-control, amounting to a total of £60 million payable in two 
equal instalments.
The allocation of regulatory authority provides further evidence that the goals of 
post-war reconstruction policies had been abandoned due to a lack of political 
and societal support. Domain-oriented reforms, such as the establishment of the 
Rates Tribunal and the grouping scheme survived. The system of allocating 
regulatory authority was characterised by a lack of centralised control and the
63 PRO MT 4 9 /2  -1 1 /1 2  October 1920.
64 PRO MT 4 9 /2  - 22 October 1920.
66 PRO MT 4 9 /2  - 9 November 1920.
66 PRO MT 49/13 - 2 February 1921; 3 February 1921.
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absence of central financing mechanisms. The Ministry of Transport presented 
only a weak centre as the companies and interest groups were given 
considerable rights of participation both as advisors and as policy-makers in 
areas such as the various advisory councils at the Ministry, the Railway Rates 
Tribunal and the Railway & Canal Commission.
Non-commercial objectives
The proposal to estabHsh a Development Fund was one last reminder of 
proposals that the railways were to play a key role in an active regional and 
reconstruction policy. The failure of this proposal shows in itself the lack of 
support for paradigm-oriented proposals during this period. The proposal built 
on the understanding that while rates and fares were to be fixed at a level which 
would allow revenue to reach pre-war levels, the state, given that it would grant 
monopoly status to the companies, should be entitled to a share of surpluses, 
which were to be distributed on a sliding scale. These funds were to be utilised 
for development work in order to connect remote regions to the railway 
network. Geddes argued that these services would not lead to a subsidisation of 
competition for the established operators, but would provide feeder services to 
the main network.
Both the FBI and the Chambers of Commerce criticised the idea of a 
development fund and the proposed profit-sharing mechanism, claiming that 
this would provide the government and the operators incentives to set rates and 
charges at a high level so as to obtain high profits.^^ In contrast, Geddes argued
67 PRO MT 49/13 -1  December 1920.
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that the profit-sharing mechanism would provide the government with the 
incentive to enforce the most economical working of the railway companies.^^ 
Moreover, it represented the most practicable way to ensure investment in the 
development of backward regions.^^ Nevertheless, due to the objections raised 
by business and the railway companies to the idea of the development fund, the 
proposal was eliminated. The new provision allowed the companies to raise 
their rates, should average earnings fall below levels obtained in 1913. If they 
earned more, twenty per cent of the surplus would go to the rail operator and 80 
per cent would be used to reduce charges.^^ The defeat of this proposal, which 
arguably can be regarded as a last reminder of the previous 'reconstruction' 
intentions, signalled the corporatist rejection of any non-domain initiative, thus 
signalling the dominance of domain-oriented ideas.
The impact of institutional factors
The examples of the 1919 and 1921 Acts provide cases of a dominance of 
domain-oriented isomorphic pressures. Policies were implemented which drew 
on and continued domestic railway regulation. In contrast, non-domain policy 
environments were not used to legitimise policy initiatives. Conventional 
explanations (Abrams 1963) of the 'failure' of the Lloyd George government in 
pursuing activist policies have pointed to 'hard-faced businessmen' in 
government and parliament. Treasury dominance and the quaUty of civil 
servants. Reforms followed domestic experience and therefore limited the 
possibilities for policy innovation. The application of the reconstruction 'policy
68 PRO MT 4 9 /4  - 22 July 1920.
69 PRO MT 4 9 /5  - 16 December 1920.
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recipe' - however vaguely defined - was rejected. Instead, incremental change 
dominated, leading to policy cumulation. The assessment of the three 
institutional factors confirms the importance of institutional status and it 
highlights the importance of the political-administrative nexus in explaining the 
character of the selected regulatory instruments.
Insulation o f the regulatory space from coercive pressures
The assessment of this institutional factor is limited in that there were no 
coercive pressures on policy-makers. As a victorious war power, Britain did not 
have to accept policy advice from other countries. No evidence was found that 
other policy provisions or experiences from other legal systems were drawn 
upon. This view is also shared by Susan Armitage who in her study of decontrol 
pohcies in the US and Britain found no evidence that 'either British or American 
government officials ever paid much attention to what was happening across the 
Atlantic' (Armitage 1969: 99).
The insulation o f the political-administrative nexus in the regulatory space 
The failure to translate the paradigm-oriented proposals into practice can be 
explained by the extent of the different actors' institutional power. In the case of 
the 1919 Ministry of Transport Act, paradigm-oriented reform proposals were 
promoted by a small circle of officials with merely war-time experience in 
government. The formation of the Ministry of Ways and Communications was 
to represent one of the preconditions for a more active government poHcy. The
The railways never achieved the 1913 earning levels.
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original dominance of paradigm-oriented reform plans, however, mainly 
originated in the interest of Lloyd George in a policy of active reconstruction.
This initial insulation of the political-administrative nexus meant that the 
original plans for the 1919 Act were produced by 'men whose experience in 
government was limited to these war-years, when grand schemes were possible, 
even necessary, and power and money for them comparatively easy to obtain' 
(CHne 1974: 91). The background of Geddes further encouraged this disposition 
as he had been exposed to the weaknesses of the pre-war railway industry and 
beUeved in transport as a key aspect for economic development. This was also 
visible in his strong interest in obtaining the competence for electricity supply. 
Against these aspirations, the immediate post-war period was characterised by 
the ascendancy of the Treasury as the most powerful department within British 
government. In 1919, for example, the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury was 
made head of the civil service. Moreover, Finance and Establishment Officers 
were established to standardise staffing and accounting arrangements (Lowe 
1974: 428; also Roseveare 1969: 246-9). More importantly, in particular following 
the institution of the Ministry of Transport, the Treasury - in line with the overall 
'anti-waste campaign' - ran a permanent cost-cutting policy, accusing the 
ministries of over-spending. Besides this increasing hegemony of deflationary 
policy arguments over economic policy-making, the proposed transfer of policy 
competencies from other departments, such as the Board of Trade, leading to 
battles over turf and authority represented a further cause inhibiting the 
adoption of paradigm-oriented proposals.
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Finally, in terms of political actors, the progress of the initial transport proposals 
was further impeded by the absence of prime ministerial involvement and 
interest. Given the Unionist party's majority in Lloyd George's coalition 
government, the initial 'reconstruction' proposals faced the opposition of 
ministers and MPs with business interests. At the same time, prime ministerial 
attention was lacking. During the discussion of the 1919 Act, Lloyd George was 
occupied mainly with the international post-war settlement, and during the 
passing of the 1921 Act, he showed no involvement, especially after the end of 
the railway strike in 1919. The impact of the limited insulation of the poHtical- 
administrative nexus seems crucial for explaining the outcome of the attempts in 
regulatory reform after the First World War. The lack of authority determined to 
a large extent that reforms did not reflect the initial desire to lead to paradigm- 
oriented isomorphic change, but led to policy cumulation.
Insulation o f the regulatory space from societal actors
Although the importance of the threat of a general strike was one of the 
dominant themes in the immediate post-war period, the trade unions played 
only a small role with regard to the railway regulatory reforms; one single 
meeting, at the end of the legislative process, was recorded in the archives. The 
negotiations on worker representatives were conducted mainly between the 
RCA and the railway unions.^^
The list of 'deputations' received by the minister in connection with the railways bill 
showed the following meetings (MT 49 /3  - 29 March 1921; CP 2824): 2.2.20 RCA; 23.4.20 
Chairman of Irish Railways; 19.7.20 Sir W. Nugent, Midland Great Railway, Ireland;
20.7.20 Central Council Railway Stockholders' Association; 22.7.20 FBI, 23.7.20 RCA;
5.8.20 Associated Chambers of Commerce; 29.3. 20 FBI; 19.10.20 Lord Bessborough and 
Southern Group; 9.11.20 Scottish Railway Companies; 10.11.20 Chambers of Commerce;
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Nevertheless, the 1921 Act can be regarded as an outcome of interest group 
politics, given its corporatist decision-making patterns and the dominance of 
consensus. The main proposals, such as amalgamation, were in principle 
consented to by all societal actors as they reflected historical tendencies. 
Innovative polices, such as the proposal to establish worker representatives, a 
reform of the rate setting machinery or the development fund failed or were 
emasculated because of the resistance among coaUtions of groups. However, 
despite the close involvement of the RCA, the internal organisation of the 
railway companies' representatives prevented them from 'capturing' the 
Ministry. Not only was their committee of representatives sent to ministerial 
discussions unable to bind members, but the railway companies were in 
themselves further divided in terms of size and wealth - as was evident in the 
initial rejection to amalgamate the Scottish companies with the wealthier English 
operators. Furthermore, Sir Frederick Banbury, an MP for the City of London 
and a railway director for the North Eastern railway, caused problems in the 
House of Commons as well as within the Association.
11.11.20 Hull & Barnsley; 19.11.21 Cumbrian railways; 2.12.20 North Eastern Directors;
5.1.21 RCA; 12.1.21 Association of Smaller Railway Companies; 13.1.21 FBI; 1.2.21 
Goulding, Irish Railways; 2.2.21 Committee of Nine; 3.2.21 Rail Stockholder Association;
16.2.21 Scottish Chambers of Commerce; 2.3.21 Chairmen Scottish Railways; 3.3.21 
Scottish Local Authorities; 23.3.21 Committee of Scottish members; 20.4.21 Thomas, 
Walkden, Bromley and about 60 members (railway unions). This meeting was set up 
following a note by Geddes from 25 January 1921: '1 think the NUR should be asked 
about their views as have all the large interests involved, prior meeting and suggest a 
meeting of not more than 25 from the three unions' (PRO MT 49 /7  - 25.1.1920).
85
In contrast, during the deliberations over the 1919 Ministry of Transport Act, the 
railway companies played a minor role. Nevertheless, given his background, 
Geddes was accused by other departments and business interests of being a 
'railway man', aiming to disadvantage the road in favour of the railway 
industry. However, Geddes himself criticised the railway interest for showing 
little self-initiative during the passage of the 1919 Act.^^
The nature of the relationship between minister and RCA was best revealed 
when during the passing of the 1921 Act, Viscount Churchill, the RCA's 
chairman, was forced to promise to secure a united RCA line and to offer full 
support for the Bill during the second reading stage in the House of Commons. 
Otherwise, he would, forced by Geddes, 'break from the Association'.^^ 
Furthermore, the FBI provided a 'countervailing force' to the railway interest. As 
the examples of the development fund and of worker representation on 
management boards show, policies were abandoned as a consequence of a 
mutual opposition to proposals rather than as a result of a hegemony of a single 
interest.
PRO MT 49/94 - 15 February 1920. Geddes noted that 'this seemed a most unfortunate 
position, that 1 could not go on defending the Railways unless there was a certain amount 
of mutual action, and that when there was an unreasonable attack upon the railways, it 
should not rest simply with the Ministry to defend them, but that the Railway Directors 
in the House ought, 1 thought, to take part in the debate'. Furthermore, he criticised the 
'difficulty in which 1 was placed in having to negotiate with a body which was bound to 
repeat what passed to its constituents in the Conned'. ^
PRO MT 4 5 / 5 - 1 9  Aprd 1921. Churchill succeeded - on 2 May 1921 the majority of the 
Association supported the Bill to pass the second reading stage with the exception of the
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Thus, while during the formulation of the 1919 Act the regulatory space was 
largely insulated from societal forces, interest representatives in parliament were 
still successful in limiting the scope of the Act. In the course of the 1921 Act, the 
regulatory space was open to societal actors, mainly the RCA and the FBI, 
limiting and shaping the scope of policy proposals, albeit not too significantly as 
initial ambitions were already modest. Societal actors did not define the nature 
of regulatory reforms as the processes within the government dominated. 
Rather, governmental action provided the railway companies with a 
reorganisation which they themselves, due to internal as well as external 
resistance, could not perform themselves in the pre-First World War period.
Conclusion
The case of the 1919 Ministry of Ways and Communications Bill provides an 
example of a defeat of sources of paradigm-oriented isomorphism in contrast to 
proposals based on domain-oriented isomorphism. Although initiatives existed 
to forge homogeneity of railway policy with the 'policy fields' of active 
reconstruction policies in labour and housing policy, these proposals were 
defeated by a different type of policy orientation. Actors, referring to pre-war 
experience, proposed domain-oriented regulatory design ideas to tackle specific 
railway-related policy problems, and rejected the application of 'universal' 
policy recipes. This choice between regulatory design ideas can be explained by 
the lack of insulation of the political-administrative nexus, which, in course of 
the passing of the 1919 Act, led to the defeat of the Ministry's reconstruction 
plans. In the case of the 1921 Act, it was the insulated membership of societal
Scottish railway companies, who at that stage stiU demanded 'longitudinal grouping', the
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actors, in particular the RCA and the FBI, which led to the rejection of any non- 
domain ideas.
North Eastern Railway Company and a Welsh operator.
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Chapter Four
Minimum Insulation and Persistence in Germany
'[The railways] have been^ 
according to the German 
understandings administered as a 
transport agency and no t as [a 
case of] a cow doing the m ilking' 
Alfred von der Leyen^
One key interest in the literature on policy transfer has been the 'reading across' 
from international sources. Due to the railways' role in the post-war settlement 
between Germany and the victorious First World War powers, the reforms of 
German railway regulation during the early 1920s offer an example of the 
presence of international actors in a national regulatory space. As in Britain, 
German railway policy became 'nationalised' after the First World War as the 
Reich took over responsibility for the railways from the Lander and established a 
Ministry of Transport. Domestic conflict soon emerged in the quest to combine 
the traditional role of the railways as a 'servant' to the perceived German 
'economic interest' and the need to reduce operating deficits. The requirement to 
provide resources for reparation payments and the deliberation of an 
international reparation commission added a non-domestic poUcy environment 
to the selection of regulatory instruments.
The following discusses the various regulatory frameworks proposed between 
1919 and the passing of the 1924 Act which established the Deutsche Reichsbahn
R5 2047.
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Gesellschaft (DRG). Particular attention is paid to the interaction between 
international demands and domestic actors as well as the impact of design ideas 
'prescribed' by international actors. The analysis of the regulatory regime that 
emerged with the 1924 Act reveals a puzzle: a large extent of domestic domain- 
orientation persisted despite the openness of the regulatory space to an 
international agenda with the power to impose a more commercially-oriented 
regulatory regime. The analysis considers the regulatory design ideas that were 
debated and discusses whose proposals were influential given the rhetoric of an 
imposed Diktat at the time (Kolb 1999: 114-5). It describes the debate between 
two regulatory reference points within the German political establishment: one 
of operational autonomy and one of the railways as an 'economic tool'. The 
debate, however, was overshadowed by financial crises and reparation 
demands.
The case of the 1920s reforms has attracted considerable interest. Among 
contemporaries, various interpretations regarded the establishment of an 
autonomous railway company as an act of foreign imposition or as a conspiracy 
by global finance (Heiber 1981: 157). In the legal literature, the case of the 1924 
Act has been used as an organisational example for a combination of state 
ownership and formal autonomy and has been heralded as a 'model' of 
autonomy, in particular in contrast to the 1951 Bundesbahngesetz. This chapter 
first discusses the regulatory ideas, both at the domestic and the international 
levels. Then the features of the regulatory regimes, which were established after 
1923, are considered. Finally, the impact of the three institutional factors is 
examined.
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The emergence of regulatory ideas
The regulation of a nationally unified railway operator attracted considerable 
debate. The following considers intergovernmental debates between the Reich 
and the Lander, then discusses the debates following the economic downturn in 
the early 1920s with business interests advocating a 'corporatisation' of the 
operator and, finally, the international regulatory design ideas brought into the 
regulatory space by the Reparation Commission.
Establishing a national German railways
Before the First World War, the railways in Germany had been under the 
authority of the federal states. Prussia, due to the size of its territory and its 
responsibility for the railways in Hesse and in the annexed territory of Alsace- 
Lorraine dominated rate-setting and other railway policies.^ Nevertheless, the 
other Lander, especially the larger ones such as Bavaria, guarded their 
individual authority over their railway systems as a means to promote the local 
economy and as a source of financial income given the substantial pre-war 
railway surpluses. While states such as Prussia and Bavaria operated the 
railways as part of their general administration, other states such as Baden and 
Hannover had separated the finances of the railway operations from their 
budgets (see also Appendix 2).
The perception that the previous system of Lander-administered railways would 
no longer provide financial resources as in the pre-war period and that an end to
 ^The share of the individual Lander on the overall railway network was: Prussia 64.38 
per cent, Bavaria 15.94 per cent, Saxony 6.30 per cent, Württemberg 4.03 per cent, Hesse 
2.45 per cent, Mecklenburg 2.20 per cent and Oldenburg 1.27 per cent.
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the competition between various regional railway lines would be beneficial 
emerged towards the end of the First World War. Prussia, with the support of 
Baden and Württemberg, issued the so-called 'Heidelberg Programme' at a 
meeting of Lander transport ministers in June 1918 (Barter and Kittel 1924:11), It 
envisaged an intergovernmental unification of the German railways in the areas 
of finance and operations, while maintaining separate railway administrations. 
The aim was to achieve unification without transferring the authority for 
railways to the Reich. These plans were rejected by Bavaria. As a consequence, 
any further discussion was postponed until after the war.
After 1918, the idea that the railways should be brought under the authority of 
the Reich gained popularity. The trade unions called for immediate 
nationalisation.^ The federal cabinet hoped that a unified railway system would 
increase citizens' loyalty towards the Reich. Furthermore, the railways could be 
utilised as a job creation tool to prevent social tension after demobilisation. The 
smaller Lander were also interested in unification as this would weaken 
Prussia's hegemonic position. The bigger states, such as Prussia and Bavaria, 
showed less enthusiasm. The Bavarian government demanded in particular the 
establishment of powerful decentralised railway directorates. In the face of 
determined Bavarian resistance, the Transport Ministry suggested a possible 
unification without the Bavarian railways.'^ The Bavarian government withdrew 
its opposition once it was realised that the railways could no longer be regarded 
as a source of income (Ruser 1981:11-3).
3 BA R 3 11035 - 21 March 1919.
4 BA R 38 (old) 100 - 22 December 1919.
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Articles 89 and 92 of the Weimar constitution called for Reich ownership of a 
fully unified railway system. The management of the railways was to be 
organised autonomously and separately from the ministry. The railways were to 
become an autonomous, commercial undertaking which was to finance its 
expenditures itself, including debt-repayments. The suggestion that the railways 
should be organised as a special property (Sondervermogeri) was rejected in the 
constitution committee of the national assembly by the Reich Finance Minister 
who insisted that the operator's accounts should remain a part of the general 
budget (barter 1924: 201). According to Article 171 of the constitution, the 
unification of the railway systems was to be effected by 1 April 1921.
Given the deterioration of the economy, the discussion about a unification of the 
railway systems remained a political priority. The railway companies indicated 
that their financial situations had rapidly worsened. The poor condition of the 
track and rolling stock affected freight and the transport of foodstuffs. Even a 
stoppage of non-urban and non-commuter passenger services had to be declared 
for ten days in November 1919.^ As a consequence, the Cabinet decided that the 
Reich transport minister and the Lander should investigate whether a 
unification could be effected by 1 April 1920. The Lander, driven by their 
financial difficulties, consented to an accelerated process of organisational 
unification. The main discussions focused less on the regulation of the operator, 
but rather on the regulation of intergovernmental relations, with contested 
issues including the extent of Reich authority and administrative
5 BA R43 I 2111 - 23 November 1919.
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decentralisation, the financial compensation of the Lander and other guarantees 
to the Lander and the need to integrate the various civil servant structures into a 
unified system. Bavaria, in particular, aimed to protect its policy autonomy and 
ability to promote the regional economy. It, again, proposed a decentralised 
structure which would split the railways into six to eight operating companies. 
These suggestions were rejected by the Reich government and by the smaller 
Lander which feared that an integration into a Munich-biased administration 
would be to their economic disadvantage and, more generally, could mean a 
substantial rationalisation of their railways. The Lander accepted the Act in the 
Reichsrat on 23 March 1920 after compensation payments and other 
commitments had been clarified in the Intergovernmental Treaty.^ Despite 
resistance among industrial interests in the Rhine-Ruhr area, the newly 
established Ministry of Transport finally took over control of a nationalised 
railway system on 5 May 1920. The Ministry of Transport was structured along 
the lines of its Prussian predecessors, the Ministry of Public Works, with the 
administration of the railways being integrated into the ministry.
Towards increased delegation
 ^Among these commitments was the agreement that the Reich would only initiate major 
alterations to the Reichsbahn after the consent of the Reichsrat. The Reich Cabinet 
criticised the financial settlement as an immense financial burden for the Reich. However, 
it was argued that no other outcome would have obtained the support of the Lander. 
Reich transport minster Bell argued that the setting up of the new ministry had been 
'messy' as the Lander, used to relying on the railways as a second source of income 
alongside direct taxation, had required rapid unification due to economic downturn, 
problems in financing the railway deficit, an unwillingness to invest and worker unrest. 
The Lander's lack of financial resources was further facilitated by the transfer of the 
competence for direct taxation to the Reich level (R 43 1 1044 - 4 March 1920).
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During the economic, financial and political turmoil of the early years of the 
Weimar Republic (see Heiber 1981: 89-151), the regulatory regime of the railways 
remained contested. Societal actors in particular argued that more 'autonomy' on 
the lines of a 'corporatist' undertaking should be established to safeguard the 
traditional (and undisputed) 'commonweal' functions of the railways.
Due to the government's difficulties in raising sufficient resources for reparation 
payments, it asked industrial circles to provide the government with credit. The 
industrialist Hugo Stinnes responded in 1921 by offering the government 
monetary support in exchange for a sale of the state-railways to private industry, 
while the rights of civil servants and the supervisory authority of the ministry 
were to be preserved. A similar demand was made by a commission organised 
by the Association of German Industry, the Reichsverband der Deutschen 
Industrie (RDI).^ It proposed transferring the railway undertaking to a 
'commonweal' joint stock company [gemeinwirtschaftliches Unternehmen) 
which would be owned jointly by agricultural, commercial and banking 
interests, industry and the craft sector as well as by trade unions and 
municipalities. The highest priority was to continue to serve the German 
economic interest before a profit-maximising motive. This would be guaranteed 
by the corporatist structure, while private ownership would eliminate public 
sector inefficiencies and 'red tape'. Furthermore, the difficulties inherent in 
regulating a franchised company would be avoided. The ministry was to remain 
responsible for the safety of the railways as well as for co-ordinating Germany's 
trade and transport policies.
7 BA R 43 1 1048 - 3 April 1922.
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Similar proposals were made by trade unions. The 'christian-national' railway 
union, the ' Gewerkschaft deutscher Eisenbahner und Staatsbedienstetei^ called 
for a separation of Reich ownership and a newly established company 
responsible for railway management and operations.^ The 'Deutsche 
Gewerkschaftsbund' trade union federation opposed any transfer to 'industrial 
capital', but suggested that the Reichsbahn would benefit from de- 
bureaucratisation, de-politicisation and autonomy by becoming a 'commonweal 
undertaking', including both capital and labour under the part ownership of the 
Reich (Roth 1921).9
While opposing 'privatisation', proponents of a continuation of Reich ownership 
called for increased commercialisation. Such views were presented in the 
majority report of the so-called 'Sozialisierungskommission' (socialisation 
committee), which had been specifically requested to discuss the future status of 
the Reichsbahn (Sozialisierungskommission 1921, Berliner Tageblatt, 19 
December 1921).^^ The majority report argued that the Reichsbahn was essential 
for trade, economic development and German unity. A privately owned
 ^ An undated ministerial document distinguishes between the 'AUgemeine 
Eisenbahnverband (democratic), the 'Gewerkschaft deutscher Eisenbahner und 
Staatsbediensteter' (christian-national), the 'Deutsche Eisenbahnverband' (split, with a 
radical left wing), the 'Eisenbahn Union' (operating mainly in the south-west and close to 
the left-wing 'independent social democrats', the USPD) and the 'Vereinigung Deutscher 
Verkehrsarbeiter' (communist) (R 43 11035).
9 BA R 43 11048 - 5 December 1921. Roth (1921).
The Commission was formed by the Economics ministry but consulted mainly officials 
from the Transport ministry, the railway industry, the civil service and from the railway 
unions.
96
Reichsbahn would not operate in the public interest, would reduce its 
construction efforts and would be open to exploitation by private interests, and 
would therefore not be 'de-politicised' at all. It was concluded that the 
Reichsbahn could be placed on a more viable basis by introducing more cost- 
consciousness, by estabhshing a commercial accounting system and by creating 
an independent managing directorate.^^
Various railway experts responded to these proposals, suggesting a similar 
range of positions. The former Prussian railway minister, von Breitenbach, 
argued that the RDI study ignored the advantages of an increased commercial 
orientation. Furthermore, cost-cutting measures could be implemented with the 
Reichsbahn remaining in state ownership. Furthermore, while 'de-politicisation' 
was laudable, in particular with regard to the Reichstag, too much independence 
would lead to capture by industry interests (von Breitenbach 1922). A more 
critical view was presented by the former Prussian railway official, Alfred von 
der Leyen, who stated that the RDl's proposals would do little else than 
immediately benefit 'big capital' (von der Leyen 1922). The main problems, von 
der Leyen claimed, were attributable to war damage, reparations and 
employment measures such as the eight-hour day and employment legislation 
following demobilisation.^^ In contrast, the railway economist Otto Blum argued 
that most German publications on railways showed a mistaken bias in favour of
In a minority report, the representatives of the christian-national union repeated their 
demand for the creation of a 'commonweal' joint stock company. In contrast, the later 
chairman of the administrative board, von Siemens, called in another report for further 
studies before any organisational re-arrangement was undertaken.
97
state-owned railways. He maintained that the Transport Ministry 
underestimated the seriousness of the situation, suggesting that a joint stock 
company should be established in which a 30 per cent share should be owned by 
the Reich and up to 50 per cent by 'private capital'. Blum argued that evidence 
suggested that private companies would, while minimising bureaucratic slack, 
also act in the interest of the German nation, citing the examples of the German 
shipping companies 'Hamburg-Amerika Linie' and the 'Norddeutsche Lloyd' 
(Blum 1922).
The Reich transport ministry was fully opposed to the 'socialisation' proposals 
made by the RDI. It argued that the poor financial performance was due to war­
time wear and tear, technical faults, urgent repair needs and, because of the 
political priority given to the avoidance of industrial unrest, a lag in rate 
increases.^^ Nevertheless, the Ministry claimed that the Reichsbahn's position 
was improving: services had increased in quantity and quality, costs had been 
cut and staff numbers reduced. Rates had been increased since the autumn of 
1921, once it had been reahsed that the government could no longer finance the 
railways' deficits.^'^ Privatisation would be an ineffective tool to improve 
performance: wage costs could not be brought down due to legal guarantees 
given to civil servants. Despite offering potential benefits in terms of increased 
flexibility, a privatised Reichsbahn would not be in a position to achieve
The German railways had to deliver 5,000 locomotives, 150,000 freight wagons and 
24,000 passenger carriages as reparation payments.
13 BA R 43 11049 - 23 November 1921.
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'cheaper' deals with its suppliers. The solution was to establish the Reichsbahn 
as a special property. Costs could be cut by introducing private industry 
elements and by changing the civil service structure. The Ministry claimed that 
entrepreneurial spirit rather than the legal form would allow a company to be 
competitive. Furthermore, only as a state-owned railway would it be possible to 
accommodate the various interests of economic life and to 'make sacrifices'.^^ 
The Ministry was opposed to a separation of operations and control, claiming 
that this would be rejected by the Lander (Fromm 1986; 196).
In sum, the debate concerning the selection of appropriate regulatory 
instruments, in particular with regard to the extent of operational autonomy, 
was less concerned with conceptual ideas in terms of either domain- or 
paradigm orientation, because there was a domain-oriented consensus that the 
railways had to remain a 'servant' and 'economic tool' of political and economic 
interests. Instead, the debate focused on the intergovernmental allocation of 
powers.
At the same time, the Transport Ministry was in the process of drafting versions 
of the new railway finance law, the Reichsbahnfinanzgesetz, in order to clarify 
and evolve the provisions of the constitution.^^ The main aim was to avert any 
foreign influence on the Reichsbahn, while introducing some private company
BA R 43 I 1067 - 6 December 1922. Groener argued that the rate increases did not 
reflect the price increases for coal and iron. Much of the better financial position during 
1922 was due to cost reduction and rationalisation.
BA R 43 11067 - November 1921.
BA R 43 11046 - December 1921.
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law arrangements. A 'privatisation' or sale of the Reichsbahn was therefore 
rejected both by the ministry and the cabinet.^^ The first draft of the railway 
finance law stated that the Reichsbahn was to be established as a special 
property of the Reich {Sondervermogeri des Reiches) with the Minister of 
Transport both supervising the operations of the railways and also heading the 
administration of the undertaking. The minister's role was to be supported by an 
administrative council consisting of six members of the Reichstag, the Reichsrat, 
the Economic Council of the Reich and staff representatives respectively as well 
as twelve economic and transport experts.
During the period of hyper-inflation, the government imposed strict expenditure 
controls on all its departments and consequently also on the Reichsbahn. On 15 
November 1923, the Finance Minister stopped all financial support to the 
Reichsbahn and declared it fully autonomous. The Transport Minister initially 
called for a 'radical' reform of the regulatory framework: the railways should be 
given a very strong commercial orientation, be debt-free and receive an initial 
lump-sum payment. The Reichsbahn was to become an independent 
undertaking with legal personality, independent of the administration of the 
Reich and was to receive no subsidies.^^
There was a lack of debate on conceptual ideas with regard to railways with the 
main discussions concerning the extent of delegation either to the federal level 
(from the Lander perspective) or to the operational railway level (from the
BA R 43 1 1046 -18  November 1921, 4 December 1921. 
BA R 43 11048 - 9 November 1923.
100
government's view). While 'reading-across' took place, in particular with the 
proposals to form a 'special property' borrowing from the legal arrangements 
governing German limited companies, this was not used to legitimise reform 
proposals. Instead, the legitimate source for proposals of the future regulatory 
regime was domain-oriented - to search for a form which would facilitate a 
reduction of the financial burden and a continuation of the role of the railways 
as a promoter of economic interests.
The international dimension
A different policy environment was introduced by international actors. 
According to §248 of the Versailles Treaty all publicly owned property was liable 
for reparation payments. As the railways had been commercially successful in 
the pre-war period, they were regarded as a prime resource for providing 
payments. The possibility of utilising the railways for reparation payments was 
first raised by the German government under Chancellor Cuno in a 
memorandum to the French prime minister.^^ It was suggested that the 
Reichsbahn's status should be changed into a 'special property', which would 
issue bonds amounting to 10 million Goldmarks, on which an interest rate of 5 
per cent was to be paid from 1 July 1927, leading to an annual payment of 500 
million Goldmarks. Later proposals to the Dawes Commission, set up to settle
Memorandum, 7 June 1923 (in Sarter and Kittel 1924: 16-7). The memorandum was 
addressed to the governments of the USA, the UK, Belgium, Italy and Japan. It received 
no response. The Reichsbahn's staff had previously consented to the proposal that the 
railways were to be used for the provision of reparation payments as long as it did not 
affect the Reich's role as owner and manager (BA R 43 11048 - 3 June 1923).
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the reparation payment issue, proposed the creation of a joint stock company.^^ 
As the government anticipated opposition to such proposals from the Lander, it 
consequently moderated its offer, proposing the creation of a company which 
would obtain the concession to operate the Reich's railway property. 
Furthermore, it demanded that all major appointments had to be made by the 
Reich President and that the discretion for intervention of international actors 
should be nûriiinised.^^
The Dawes Commission's main initial demand was the payment of l lb n  
Goldmarks as war reparations to the victorious countries. It was argued that the 
Reichsbahn could be profitable with fewer staff and lower capital expenditure. 
The regulatory regime was to be altered by changing the organisational status of 
the railways into that of a commercial operator, establishing an administrative 
board consisting of 18 members and by controlling the undertaking by a non- 
German commissioner (Sarter and Kittel 1924: 18).^  ^A specialist committee for 
the railways was set up, consisting of two railway experts, William Acworth and 
Gaston Le verve. Their report argued that the German government was to a large 
extent responsible for the poor state of the Reichsbahn's finances. By employing 
too many staff and by investing too extensively in infrastructure and stations.
20 BA R 43 1 1036 (no date).
21 BA R 43 11049 - 20 May 1924.
22 The Dawes Commission's report argued that nine board members should be 
appointed by the German government and, if necessary, shareholders, and nine members 
by the countries receiving reparations, of whom, however, five should be of German 
nationality. Both the president of the administrative board as well as the Director General 
were also to be German.
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the finances had been badly affected.^^ Given a status as a joint stock company, 
the Reichsbahn would, in contrast, be in a position to be profitable. If the 
railways were run as a commercial operation, 'therefore with the strong 
commitment, on the one hand, to set rates to obtain maximum income and, on 
the other hand, to reduce expenditures to a minimum', then the reparation 
payment obligations could be fulfilled.^^ However, Acworth and Leverve 
claimed that 'we do not believe that any German administration will have the 
necessary strength to battle successfully against the traditional predisposition, 
unless there is a permanent pressure exerted by an expert, established and 
maintained by the allies in their own interest in order to supervise the 
management with regard to rates and expenditures'.^^
There were therefore two competing policy environments which were used to 
propose alterations to the regulatory regime. Domestic-domain arguments 
aimed to maintain a continuation of the railways' original function in a time of 
economic and political adversity, despite disagreement on matters of 
administrative detail and the allocation of responsibilities. The proposals as
Following demobilisation legislation, the Reichsbahn was required to take on 
demobilised soldiers to avoid unemployment and social unrest. As a consequence, staff 
figures at the Reichsbahn rose from 740,500 to 1,121,745 in 1919 despite territorial losses. 
Rates were not increased to the extent of inflation. In 1920, the railways reported a deficit 
of 15.6bn marks, while in 1921 this deficit was reduced to lO.Sbn marks.
BA R 5 2045 - 26 March 1924; 'Regelungen der Eisenbahnfrage im Bericht des ersten 
Sachverstandigenkomitees'. The transport ministry criticised this accusation as 
unfounded, claiming that since the Reichsbahn had been made autonomous in November 
1923 the operator had prioritised the promotion of its finances rather than the promotion 
of the German economy (BA R 43 11049 - no date).
25 BA R 5 2045 - 26 March 1924.
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submitted by Acworth and Leverve were condemned as being ignorant of the 
German understanding of the appropriate role of a transport undertaking. Von 
der Leyen claimed that the 'experts cannot understand such a commonweal rate- 
setting policy, because they are rooted in a private industry p o l i c y T h e  
international actors added an international domain-orientation to the process, 
aiming to induce isomorphic processes towards a more commercial, business- 
type form or railway regulation.
Organisational Structure
The debate concerning the organisational structure of the operator focused on 
the legal status of the operator and, as a consequence, the degree of delegation of 
authority. The German government's key imperative was to minimise the 
exposure to the financial impact of the railways' deficits on the budget, while 
also minimising the organisational distance between state and operator in order 
to prevent not only 'non-German' participation but also to safeguard the 
continuation of a transport policy aimed at facilitating regional and sectoral 
economic development. In contrast, actors from the international policy 
environment requested an enhanced commercialisation of the Reichsbahn as 
safeguard against political involvement in the railway administration.
The 1924 law established the 'Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft' (DRG) as 
monopoly operator. It fully separated regulatory control and operational- 
managerial functions. The Reichsbahn remained in the ownership of the Reich 
and did not become the property of the new undertaking. The railway property
BA R5 2047 - Alfred von der Leyen 'Das Schicksal der deutschen Reichsbahn', cutting
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was administered by the DRG within the constraints of the regulatory regime. 
The DRG was set up as a special body of public law with some private law 
applications. The administrative board supervised the management of the 
company and decided on all major issues. Half of the 18 members were 
representatives of the German government, four of these seats were to be 
relinquished should the sale of shares become necessary. The other half was 
reserved for representatives of the countries to whom reparation payments were 
being made. Due to William Acworth's insistence, the 'traditional' privileges of 
civil servants were weakened and performance related pay was introduced.^^ 
These changes meant that a new category of civil servant had to be created by 
overruling Article 129 of the Weimar constitution which stated that civil servants 
were not to be forced to change employer or face alterations to their guaranteed 
welfare provisions. The new railway law also conflicted with other 
constitutional provisions: while Article 89 called for the administration of the 
railways by the Reich, the Reich would now mainly act in a regulatory function 
despite having representatives on the adrrdrdstrative board. Article 92, which 
demanded the inclusion of the railways' expenditure in the overall budgetary 
framework, was also overruled by establishing the railway operator as a special 
property.
The organisational structure represented the final stage of an evolutionary 
development of regulatory proposals with regard to the appropriate 
organisational distance between the operator and the state. Drafts of the 1922 
Railway Finance Law proposed to establish the Railway as a 'special property',
from Weltwirtschaftliche Zeitung.
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separating the budget of the railways from that of the government and 
establishing the Reichsbahn as an independent company. The existing functions 
of the Reichstag and Reichsrat were to be transferred to a administrative board 
consisting of representatives from business and other interest groups. However, 
as a separation of regulatory and operating functions was not envisaged, the 
transport minister acted in a dual function. Following the occupation of the Ruhr 
industrial area by French and Belgian troops, the draft law, then in its sixth draft, 
was taken from the political agenda.
In November 1923, the Finance Minister decided to end all financial support to 
the railways in order to reduce public expenditure. As a consequence, the 
Transport Minister argued that the Reichsbahn had to become an independent 
company with a commercial law framework that would suit its financial status. 
This would necessitate a split of the Reichsbahn from the Reich administration 
and an end to the special privileges for Reichsbahn civil servants. Furthermore, 
the Reichsbahn was to be debt-free and be provided with a lump-sum payment 
as initial support from the governm ent.O pposition  was expressed by the 
Interior Minister who argued that the operational autonomy should not extend 
too far, while the Minister for Food and Agriculture emphasised the need to 
continue government influence on rate-setting.
This could amount to five per cent of the overall wage (§26(3) Reichsbahngesetz).
Other ministries had also voiced their objections. The Economics Minister successfully 
initiated the alteration of the provisions that any surplus profit should be used for rate 
reductions, enabling the government to utihse surpluses for general pubHc expenditure. 
In contrast, the Post Ministry was unsuccessful in his attempt to veto the charging of rates 
at the commercial level for services provided for other government-owned undertakings.
BA R 43 11046 - 9 November 1923.
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The consequent directive (Verordnung) established the Reichsbahn as an 
independent commercial undertaking with its own legal personality, although 
not as a special property. It was argued that the first prerequisite for obtaining 
maximum competitiveness was the creation of an independent company 
operating according to commercial principles. The Reichsbahn remained in 
Reich ownership and administration. The status of the minister continued 
unaltered as both main supervisor and head of railway administration as the 
Directive aimed merely to demarcate the borders between operational and 
sovereign tasks i^hoheitliche Aufgabeii) and to enable the Reichsbahn to take on 
loans. The minister replaced both Reichstag and Reichsrat as expenditure 
controlling authority. Due to the constitutional constraints of Article 92 which 
demanded an integration of the Reichsbahn's finances into the Reich's budget 
and a lack of parliamentary and cabinet support for a constitutional amendment, 
a formal separation of regulatory and operational functions was not undertaken. 
Any further moves towards a new Reichsbahn law were postponed due to the 
occupation of the Rhine-Ruhr area by French and Belgian forces and the pending 
decisions in the reparation committee.^*^
The differences between the international and national policy environments was 
highlighted in the publication of the expert report for the Dawes Commission. 
The Acworth and Leverve report, besides the restoration of German economic 
unity (i.e. the removal of the French-Belgian control over the Rhine-Ruhr area 
including the railway operations), a change in the legal status of the
30 BA R 43 1 1049 - 2 May 1924.
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Reichsbahn.^^ Although the government had, in their view, already moved in 
the appropriate direction by starting to separate operational areas from 
regulatory control, by reducing the investment programme and by increasing 
rates, the German railways' main operational priority had remained the 
promotion of German economic interests rather than maximising obtainable 
profits. Nevertheless, Acworth and Leverve conceded to the German demands 
that the majority of the administrative board should be German.
The German government decided that the main priority was to avoid any non­
national influence on rate-setting. The detail of the organisational structure was 
regarded as a secondary issue, although the possibility of a dominance of non- 
German actors was to be averted. The government demanded that any 
'privatisation' of the operator should be restricted to Reichsbahn operations and 
should not affect the Reich's ownership status over the railways. The Reich 
President should consent to the appointment of the chairman as well as of the 
members of the administrative board. No general meetings were to be held and 
all members of the administrative board who represented preferential 
shareholder interests should be German.^^ This position was successfully 
maintained during the deliberations of the Organisation Committee, which was 
given the task of formulating the new law and consisted of Acworth, Leverve 
and two German officials appointed by the transport ministery, who were.
R 5 2045 - 17 April 1924. The following reparation payments were set: 1924-5: 330 
million Goldmarks, 1925-6: 465 million Goldmarks, 1927-8 and subsequent years: 660 
million Goldmarks.
32 BA R 43 1 1049 -12  May 1924.
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however, leading officials in the finance ministry. The committee concluded that 
it 'did not seem possible to refuse a government such control as belongs to a 
sovereign p o w e r ' T h e  Reich retained the ownership of the Reichsbahn. It also 
secured a permanent German majority on the administrative council, while the 
president of the administrative council was also to be German. Moreover, 
despite becoming a private law undertaking operating in accordance with 
business principles, the operator was, by statute, to pay due regard to the 
interests of the German economy.
The DRG's organisational structure shows a continuation of the domestic 
domain-oriented character. Given the presence of international actors, the 
German government established an operator that in its constitution and 
operational management was similar to a commercial undertaking. At the same 
time, in many respects, the operator retained 'public' aspects and duties, in 
particular the obligation to safeguard the interest of the German economy. The 
special property law status which was introduced after previous domestic 
resistance might be regarded as a particular impact of the international policy 
environment, but domestic developments had, in any case, already moved 
towards that organisational status, despite considerable domestic (federal) 
opposition.
BA R43 1 1049 - 24 July 1924. Organisation Committee Report 1924: 4. The report 
stresses that the Organisation Committee had used the previous expert report by 
Acworth and Leverve as a basis. However, it was stressed that 'we have found it
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Allocation of regulatory authority
The following section considers the regulatory functions of the minister and the 
formal autonomy of the operator. Furthermore, it assesses the role of the so- 
called International Commissioner. It is argued that while the 1924 Law 
estabhshed a substantial extent of formal operational independence, the 
government resorted to less direct means to 'pursuade' the DRG to follow its 
poHcy intentions. First, the legal relationship between government and operator 
is analysed, then the creation of the position of the international commissioner is 
considered and, finally, the 'regulatory practice' is assessed.
As the DRG was estabhshed as an independent undertaking with its own legal 
personality, no legal links existed between the company and the Reichstag and 
Reichsrat. Neither the administrative board nor the Director-General of the DRG 
were accountable to parliament. The participation of the minister or other 
representatives of the Reich or the Lander in meetings of the administrative 
board was not envisaged in the 1924 Act. Previously, the reduction of the 
minister's role towards a regulatory function had been rejected following claims 
that such a separation would lead to 'permanent friction' between political and 
managerial preferences and even the argument that 'if a government is unable to 
manage a railway, it cannot be expected to be able to regulate a railway
According to the 1924 law, the transport ministry was responsible for so-called 
sovereign hoheitliché) tasks. These included the supervision and enforcement
necessary in not a few cases to apply the principle which is sometimes described as 
interpretation' (Organisation Committee 1924: 2).
34 BA R 43 1 1050 -1  February 1926.
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of the railways' technical and safety regulations. It Hcensed all major alterations 
and modifications and had to give its consent to any acquisitions by the DRG 
which were not part of the core railway business. The ministry also had the right 
to require information about the financial position of the DRG as long as this 
would not cause substantial costs .H ow ever, this organisational separation of 
managerial and operational from the ministerial-regulatory functions did not 
lead to a 'physical separation': one part of the ministry continued as central 
administration of the DRG, whereas two units within the ministry remained as 
official regulatory and supervisory groups, responsible for administration and 
rates as well as technical aspects and safety (Ruser 1981:131).
The report by Acworth and Leverve emphasised especially the need to secure 
the independence of the company and its commercial operation. To safeguard 
the independence of the Reichsbahn against the 'statist predisposition' of 
German civil servants, the creation of an independent Commissioner was 
proposed. An internationally recognised railway expert was to be appointed as 
Commissioner by the countries receiving reparation payments.^^ Otherwise the 
railways would remain an economic tool to be used to support German industry 
- they diagnosed that rates had continued to be used as 'weapons in the hands of 
the t r a d e r s ' . Ac wo r t h  and Leverve suggested that the International 
Commissioner should be able to sell shares of the DRG immediately once 
reparation payments were under threat. Powers were to be provided that the
§32 Reichsbahngesetz.
36 BA R 43 1 1036 - 13 March 1924.
37 BA R 5 2045 - 17 April 1924. 'AUgemeiner Bericht über die deutschen Eisenbahnen von  
Sir William Acworth und Herrn Leverve', 26 March 1924.
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Commissioner should, if necessary, be able to regulate the German railways and, 
as a last resort, to take over the management of the Reichsbahn. Should there be 
no surpluses and therefore no possibility of extracting reparation payments, the 
Commissioner was enabled to set directives, to reduce expenditure and to 
increase rates without any consultation. In terms of organisational resources, the 
Commissioner was to be given staff and information about all major decisions.
The proposed powers of the International Commissioner were restricted due to 
the concerns of the German government after discussions in the Organisation 
Committee (Organisation Committee 1924: 8). The German government objected 
particularly to the suggestion that the Commissioner should be involved even 
before any delay in reparation payments had occurred. The Commissioner was 
given the right to participate, but not to vote in meetings of the administrative 
board and its committees. Full access to all information was also granted. In 
cases where the Commissioner felt that reparation payments were endangered, 
the Commissioner had the legal authority, once consultation had failed, to 
restrict expenditures, to increase rates, to replace the Director-General, and, as a 
last resort, to take over the business himself. In addition, in cases where 
reparation payments were affected or where disagreements between countries 
receiving reparations and the German government emerged, an 'international 
arbitrator' was to be appointed on a case-by-case basis by the President of the 
International Court of Justice in The Hague. Conflicts between the Reichsbahn 
and the national government were to be resolved by a special court-like railway 
tribunal.
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Thus, in a formal perspective, the ability of the ministry to interfere with the 
operations of the DRG had been limited. Nevertheless, the reduction (compared 
to the original proposals in the Leverve/Acworth report) of the International 
Commissioner's involvement and competencies (Leverve was appointed to the 
post), allowed for a substantial extent of discretion in terms of government- 
operator relations.
The relationship between operator and government was tense. A former 
transport ministry official and then member of the DRG's administrative board, 
Stieler, argued that, because of information asymmetries, the relationship 
between ministry and the operator was 'unsatisfactory'. This had led to a 
situation where the International Commissioner, who had full access to 
operational information, showed greater trust in the DRG than the government. 
He called for the participation of ministry officials in negotiations of the 
administrative board.^^ After the appointment of a new Director-General, 
Dorpmüller, without government consent in 1926 and a tribunal ruling in favour 
of the Reichsbahn against the government, the Chancellor took the opportunity 
to criticise the chairman of the administrative council, von Siemens, on the 
grounds that Dorpmiiller's appointment had gone ahead without the consent of 
the Reichpresident. The government would only officially agree to the 
appointment once it had been established that the DRG would regard an appeal 
to the tribunal as a last resort. Furthermore, the transport minister should be 
provided with all the information on staff issues, on policy decisions and on rate 
setting while the rationalisation programme should only proceed with the
113
greatest caution.^^ The transport minister or his representatives should also gain 
access to the meetings of the administrative council. The DRG argued that its 
actions were pursued in order to prevent the worst 'evil': non-German influence 
on railway operations. In contrast, the Transport Minister criticised the DRG for 
not having shown sufficient consideration for the needs of the German economy, 
claiming that it was behaving too much in the spirit of the 1924 Act. It was also 
argued that despite the legal framework, the DRG should, in particular 
regarding appeals to the railway tribunal, subordinate itself to the state 
'organism' and show restraint.
Thus, despite the legal provisions estabhshing a special railways tribunal for 
conflicts between government and operator to emphasise the full separation of 
the operator from political interference as well as evidence of 'commercial 
discretion' exercised by the DRG against the wish of the government, this 
separation was informally abandoned over time. The legal literature has often 
emphasised the formal separation and reduction of the ministerial role towards 
a regulatory role, as a successful example of a depoliticised public undertaking. 
The evidence presented here suggests substantial policy cumulation and 
continuation, especially with regard to policy practice, despite formal re­
arrangements.
BA R 43 I 1050 - 1 February 1926. This had been previously vetoed by the 
administrative board of the DRG.
39 BA R 43 11050 - 24 June 1926, 2 July 1926.
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Non-commercial objectives
The authority to determine rates and charges was regarded as one of the key 
tools of government. For the German government the main priority was to avoid 
any non-German influence on rate-setting while the legal status was merely a 
secondary issue. Similarly, one of the Lander's key demands during the 
intergovernmental negotiations was the inclusion of a requirement that the 
interests of all regions in Germany should be balanced, both by setting charges 
which facilitated transport into economically backward regions and by 
spreading procurement orders across the country. This section considers the 
successful attempts of the federal government to maintain its ability to use the 
DRG as a policy tool in terms of rate-setting and procurement against the 
demands of international actors.
Following the establishment of the DRG, the railway operator was in formal 
terms fully autonomous from public finances and also from any control by 
national auditors. Nevertheless, with regard to rates, the Reich maintained wide- 
ranging possibilities to propose and veto rate changes in addition to 
competencies with regard to timetabling and the planning and construction of 
new lin es .D esp ite  the commercial orientation, 'imposed' by the Organisation 
Committee, the German government was granted the statutory right that the 
DRG was to pay due regard to the interests of the overall German economy. The 
government could therefore request reductions in passenger and freight charges 
which were regarded as being 'in the interest' of the German economy as long as 
these did not infringe on the Reichsbahn's ability to deliver its reparation
§33 Reichsbahngesetz.
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payments. The government was also provided with the authority to enforce the 
operation and establishment of particular services, being nevertheless under the 
obligation to compensate the operator should these demands negatively impact 
on the Reichsbahn's ability to service its reparation payments. At the same time, 
the DRG operated under the explicit objective to maintain and improve its assets 
according to the 'state of the art'. Financial assistance would only be granted in 
cases where politically demanded network extensions were loss-making (Ruser 
1981:149).
The rate-setting poHcy in the immediate post-war period provides an indication 
of the continuing role of the railways as a supposed facilitator for the growth of 
industry and also highhghts the differences between the national and 
international policy environments. While freight charges and third-class 
passenger rates had been increased by 5.9 and 4.8 index points respectively up to 
April 1920 (1 = 1913/4), industrial prices had increased by 15.7, food prices by 
12.3 and civil servant salaries by 6.8 index points.Exceptional rates to support 
the economic integration of economically backward regions and special sectors 
such as coal, food and fertilisers were con tinued .D espite pressures caused by 
the devaluation of the currency, by the constitutional provision that expenses
BA R 43 I 1067 - 'Tarifpolitik der deutschen Reichsbahn', Berlin, Verlag Georg von  
Stilke, 1922. In the 1923 edition, similar claims were made that rates had been kept as low  
as possible while attempts had been made to maintain a 'financial equilibrium' by 
reducing expenditures and rationalisation measures.
The case of fertilisers provides one example of the actor constellation at the time. The 
Transport and Finance Ministers resisted pressures from the Economics and the Food and 
Agriculture ministers as well as from the Chancellor. Following representations by the
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should be covered by income and by the demands of the Versailles Treaty, the 
ministry committed itself to continue a poHcy of 'rate-setting in the interest of 
the German economy'. Further pressures to reduce rates, expressed primarily by 
the Economics Ministry, were, nevertheless, rejected by both the Finance and the 
Transport Ministers. The Finance Ministry argued that, given the scale of the 
budgetary burden, the main priority could no longer be to hold domestic prices 
down by low transport charges, but to reduce the deficit.'^^ Similarly, Transport 
Minister Oeser argued that had passenger rates risen to the same extent as 
freight charges, the latter could be reduced by 20 per cent. Moreover, had he and 
the Finance Minister submitted to the pressure exerted by the Economics 
Ministry, business and agriculture and the Lander and discontinued the policy 
of 'ehminating rate exemptions', the Reichsbahn would have been completely 
ruined financially while the budget of the Reich would have been 
overburdened.*^ However, once, the economic and financial situation had 
stabilised, the cabinet agreed that all freight rates should be reduced by an 
average of 8 per cent from January 1924.^^
The issue of rate-setting was specifically addressed by the Dawes Commission 
and the experts' report. Acworth and Leverve highlighted the extensive
industry to the Chancellor, the Cabinet decided on a reduction on fertiliser rates on 17 
October 1923 (BA R 43 11046 -1 7  October 1923).
43 BA R 43 11046 -12  July 1923.
44 BA R 43 1 1046 - 23 July 1923.
45 BA R 43 11046 -12  July 1923.
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subsidisation by the railways of transport se rv ices .T h ey  suggested that an 
international arbitrator should be created to guard the commercial orientation of 
the operator against the interventionist tendencies of German civil servants. This 
proposal was rejected by the German government, claiming that the 
international arbitrator's role should be limited to disputes between the 
government and the states receiving reparation payments. The Organisation 
Committee, consisting of Leverve and Acworth and two German government 
officials, agreed that an international arbitrator provided with competencies as 
originally proposed by Acworth and Leverve would be 'not suitable for 
everyday use' (Organisation Committee 1924: 4). Therefore, in cases of lack of 
agreement between operator and government, the issue was to be settled by a 
special German tribunal.'^^
The DRG's main operational priority was, however, to deliver reparation 
payments. It was therefore able, against protests from business and the Cabinet, 
to increase rates and to close down railway workshops, arguing that otherwise 
funds to meet the reparation payments would not be obtainable. Motivated by 
protests from Lander governments. Krone, the Reich transport minister, 
criticised the DRG for its behaviour, pointing out that in other areas, such as 
executive pay and expenditures for representative buildings, the DRG would not
A transport ministry memorandum notes the German suspicion that behind Acworth's 
proposals lay the interests of English industry, using the imposition of higher railway 
rates as a hidden import duty against German goods (BA R 43 11036 - 9 March 1924).
^  In 1928, the tribunal sided with the DRG against the government in favour of rate 
increases.
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act with such frug a lity N ev erth e less , the continuation of the statutory 
obligation that the DRG was to take the interest of the German economy into 
consideration indicated the rejection of international domain-orientated sources 
of isomorphism. As a consequence, this meant a rejection of niiniinising 
government discretion over a poUcy tool which was regarded as having a 
substantial impact on the future development of the economy.
The impact of institutional factors
The analysis of the regulatory regime of the DRG and its origins suggests a 
dominance of domestic and domain-oriented sources, despite the presence and 
influence of international domain-based experts. The German proposals to 
manage its railways as a 'special property' were made in order to find a solution 
which would maintain the 'economic tool' function of the railway operator while 
increasing organisational autonomy as means to reduce expenditures. There was 
little evidence that other policy domains, either nationally or internationally, 
were considered.^^
BA R 43 I 1050 - 19 January 1926. In general, however, the rate structure was not 
changed to a large extent. Reduced rates and exceptional rates for freight developed  
along previous patterns (Barter and Kittel 1931: 303).
In 1924, the reform of the postal and telegraph services led to a direct 'reading across' 
from the German railway finance directive {Archiv fiir Eisenbahnwesen 1924: 413-24). 
Given similar circumstances - the intention to minimise the financial habihty of the state 
- this transfer represented a case of administrative convenience rather than the 
application of a paradigm-type policy recipe.
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Insulation o f the regulatory space from  coercive pressures
In terms of 'insulation', the example of the 1920s regulatory reform in Germany 
provides an ideal case for 'non-insulation', given Germany's status as a defeated 
power, obliged to make reparation payments with the status of the railways 
being decided in intergovernmental negotiations during a peace conference. 
Nevertheless, an imposition of international domain-oriented proposals, 
delivered by two railway experts, did not take place. Instead, regulatory reforms 
were domestic-domain oriented, isomorphic to the extent that all proposals were 
legitimised with reference to the traditional 'commonweal' and 'economic tool' 
function of the railways. Furthermore, the impact of international coercive 
pressures was limited as the proposals for reform were moving in a similar 
direction at the domestic level.
The interest in imposing a stringent settlement on the German government was 
not shared by all allied states. In particular, the British government regarded the 
settlement of the Versailles Treaty as potentially dangerous.^^ Lloyd George was 
urged not to sign a treaty which could potentially weaken Germany's economic, 
financial and, most importantly, political stability. Otherwise, military conflict 
was likely to re-occur. Therefore, the British government, like Acworth and 
Leverve in their report, did not support the occupation of the Rhine-Ruhr area 
by French and Belgian troops. Furthermore, the British government also reacted 
with astonishment to the French reconstruction efforts where a large part of 
public spending was invested in military facihties. To maintain a 'balance of 
power', the British government therefore attempted to maintain Germany as a
50 HoL RO F /4 5 /9 /2 1  -  9 Novem ber 1918.
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necessary counterbalance to France. The organisation and regulation of the 
railways were one part of this constellation. It resulted in a regulatory regime 
which maximised the discretion of the German actors who merely had to 
provide reparation payments in order to conduct their business without 
international involvement.
The domain-orientation of the proposals and final regime was further facilitated 
by the appointment of two railway experts to report on the German railways. 
While coming from a different, more commercial background, they showed 
commitment to maintaining the German railways and to paying due regard to 
existing laws.^^ Furthermore, as noted in the previous chapter, William Acworth 
himself, although in principle opposed to state-owned railways, had accepted 
that even in Britain a nationalisation of the railway system had become 
inevitable.
As argued in chapter two, coercive pressures can also be exerted in 'indirect' 
ways, in that experiences are used to legitimise or develop policy instruments. 
Although the German government was to a considerable extent aware of the 
reforms in other European countries (and in the United States), this was used 
mainly to legitimise own proposals. For example, the London embassy reported 
that the British 1921 Railways Act signalled a tendency towards 
n a t i o n a l i s a t i o n . ^ ^  Similarly, a transport ministry official in a discussion on the 
advantages and disadvantages of 'privatisation' pointed to European evidence
Arguably, this understanding was facilitated by increasing domain-specific interaction 
in organisations such as the Union Internationale des Chemins d e /er  (UlC).
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and argued that there was a tendency towards increasing state control, with the 
British 1921 Railway Act representing 'a preparation for the future 
nationalisation ',T hus, the existence of an international domain environment 
was utilised in order to legitimise the ministry's own unwillingness to pursue 
options which were declared as dysfunctional or used to support positions 
developed in the domestic context. Nevertheless, as the dominance of the 
finance ministry vis-à-vis the transport ministry shows (see below), the 
international discussions enhanced the position of those domestic actors who 
advocated greated operational autonomy for the Reichsbahn.
Therefore, despite a miriimum of insulation of the regulatory space from 
coercive pressures, the impact of these pressures was limited. Notwithstanding 
the establishment of a regulatory regime that increased the formal independence 
of the operator, this reflected more the position of domestic actors than an 
imposition of international experts or governments.
Insulation o f the political-administrative nexus in the regulatory space 
In spite of changes in the regulatory regime, the impact of the war and frequent 
changes in ministers and governments, with seven different governments from 
1919 to 1924, there was little change in terms of officials, not only in the Ministry 
of Transport, but also in other departments. This continuation facilitated 
'bounded innovation' (Weir 1989), The emphasis on increasing the organisational 
distance between state and operator by proposing a joint stock company
BA R 43 1 1048 (no date).
53 BA R 3 11049 - 7 /8  October 1921.
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originated from both the finance and the foreign ministries rather than the 
transport ministry. In fact, the two finance ministry officials conducting the 
negotiations in the organisation committee, Bergmann and Fischer, criticised the 
transport ministry's resistance to considering organisational separation, claiming 
that such resistance would lead to a 'foreign fran ch ise '.H o w ev er, the 
dominance of the finance ministry was not only facilitated by international 
negotiations. The provisions following the formal separation from financial 
subsidies in November 1923 were also substantially determined by the finance 
ministry's demand to end any linkage with the railway undertaking (barter 1924: 
203, barter and Kittel 1931).
In terms of 'state structure' the federal organisation of the German Reich meant 
that the Lander were in a strong position to demand a recognition of their 
perceived interests. Their position was enhanced by their prior ownership of the 
railways and ensured by their power to veto in the Reichsrat any major 
alterations to the regulatory regime in the Reichsrat. The permanent (mainly 
Bavarian) opposition to Reich railway policy also induced a continuation of the 
'commonweal' function, requiring a recognition of regional policy aspects in 
terms of rates, timetables and services. The potential veto of the Lander was also 
used by the German negotiators to weaken the international railway experts' 
proposals, claiming that a too autonomous operator would be unacceptable to 
the Lander.
BA R 43 1 1036, 13 March 1924. Both were later to become members of the DRG's 
administrative board.
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Therefore, while the federal structure shaped the terms of the inter­
governmental debate, these debates were conducted within a relatively insulated 
regulatory space. The inclusion of the finance and foreign ministries contributed 
to the growing acceptance of the idea of increased operator independence. 
Nevertheless, despite the existence of international actors, there was a 
continuation of a domestic domain-orientation. Thus while the regulatory 
regime reflected a tendency towards more autonomy, the pre-war domain 
environment, regarding the railways as an 'economic tool', was maintained.
Insulation o f the regulatory space from societal actor^^
While both trade unions and business were unsuccessful in their demands to 
establish a 'commonweal' joint stock company, most positions were shared with 
the government. This joint approach was, to a large extent, established by the 
membership of these societal actors in the regulatory space. For example, the 
pre-war arrangement of decentralised rate committees, which included members 
from industry, commerce and agriculture, continued to be responsible for the 
consideration of individual rate setting. Similarly, the trade unions, also due to 
the civil servant status of railway workers, were recognised and accepted in that 
work councils had been established.^^ Therefore, the pre-war institutionalisation
Given the Reichsbahn's status as a formal part of the ministry prior to 1924, it is 
difficult to perceive the operator as a 'societal' actor. Furthermore, the public records 
which were examined do not indicate a distinct position from that of the Reich transport 
ministry.
The pacification of trade union interests was facihtated by a collective agreement 
between business interests and the estabUshed trade unions in 1917/8 (the so-called 
'Stiimes-Legien' agreement). Part of the agreement was the recognition of trade unions as
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of societal actors facilitated the persistence of a domestic domain-orientation 
which continued the 19th century assumption of the railways as being a 'servant' 
of industry and economic development.
More importantly, however, the government perceived it as necessary to 
continue a policy of rate reductions following pressures from industry in order 
to stabilise the economy and to 'pacify' regional interests. Furthermore, the 
presence of 'experts', in particular former Prussian railway officials, added 
further influential members to the regulatory space which, to a overwhelming 
extent, claimed that 'railways' were 'special' and that an imposition of a more 
commercial, 'foreign' orientation would be inappropriate.
Conclusion
The 1920s regulatory reforms in the German railways provide a case of a 
maximum exposure to coercive pressures, which nevertheless led to domestic 
domain-oriented isomorphism. The analysis has provided a detailed account of 
the persistence of the 'commonweal' function of the Reichsbahn which was 
'hardwired' in terms of the organisational structure, in which the state remained 
the owner of the railway property, in terms of the allocation of regulatory 
authority, where the government was successful in minimising the discretion of 
international control over its activities, and in terms of the rate-setting regime, 
which included, despite the need to fulfil reparation payment obligations, a 
primary duty to consider the perceived interest of the German economy and 
Germany's regional structure.
equal partners, the creation of collective wage bargaining and the imposition of the eight
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Furthermore, the analysis has suggested why 'coercive' non-domestic pressures 
were not dominant, despite a minimum insulation to international factors. It has 
been argued that 'high politics' at the international level were one reason why 
full coercive powers were not exercised, thus allowing the German government 
and the operator considerable discretion in performing their obligation to deliver 
reparation payments. The domain-orientation of the regulatory reforms, 
represented in the continuation of the 'economic tool' function of the DRG, was 
facilitated by the joint interest of the Reich and the Lander governments, but also 
by the interest of business in low rates. In contrast, the need to find international 
agreement and a solution to problems of hyper-inflation introduced other 
administrative and political actors into the regulatory space, which led to the 
domestic acceptance of an increasing formal autonomy of the railway operator. 
Thus, despite the 'ideal conditions' for an imposition of a regulatory framework 
by international actors, the regulatory reforms in the German railways during 
the early 1920s provides a case of domestic policy cumulation.
hour day (see Blaich 1998).
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Section III: The Age of Public Ownership
The late 19th and early 20th century saw the worldwide development of state 
enterprises. The rapid spread of various organisational forms of publicly owned 
undertakings in the inter-war period, ranging from being part of the national 
public administration to the public corporation form, reached a preliminary peak 
in the immediate period following the end of the Second World War (Hood 1994: 
38). As in the 1980s and 1990s, when privatisation advocates claimed that 
privatised utilities were the natural form of public utility provision, by the late 
1940s, state-owned enterprises seemed the natural form of public utility 
provision. While some observers point to economic decline of industries, nation- 
building or international competition as explanations for a shift towards public 
ownership, post-Marxists in particular stress the notion of 'Fordism'. Thus, the 
development of large, mass-scale production was most compatible with large 
state-run enterprises.
In particular in Britain, the post-war years represented the shift towards a 
welfare state, leading to a period of 'ungrounded statism' (Dunleavy 1989: 242- 
3). This notion reflects the mixture of relatively heavy governmental 
involvement in economic activities, which was paralleled by only small 
involvement of third sector bodies in the provision of public services. In 
contrast, the development in Germany in the post-1945 period reflected more 
continuity in terms of welfare and utility provision, despite a stronger emphasis 
on ordo-liberal principles in competition policy.
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In terms of railway policy, challenges to the industry (as outlined in the 
introduction to section 11) had increased during the inter-war period. In 
particular, competition from road haulage and road vehicles in general had 
facilitated the financial decline of the railway industries. In terms of the various 
forms of 'nationahsation', as discussed at the beginning of the previous section, 
this period saw, in organisational terms, a remarkable convergence. In both 
states, the railways were operated as unified state-owned undertakings.
The following two chapters provide an analysis of the two post-Second World 
War experiences and discuss in particular the sources of isomorphic change. It 
has often been argued that the election of the Labour government in 1945 
marked a fundamental policy shift. However, here it is argued that the 
regulatory reforms resembled more domain-oriented policy cumulation. 
Germany was not only defeated, but also without a national government of its 
own. In terms of the overall argument, the British case provides an example of a 
conflict between domestic domain and, to some extent, more paradigm-oriented 
sources of isomorphism, whereas the German example offers a case of two 
competing domestic domam-oriented policy environments.
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Chapter Five 
The 'Socialisation of Transport' and the search for efficiency 
in Britain
[...] and the minister's functions become more 
regulatory and supervisory in character 
H. Morrison, 'Taking Stock'^
The wave of nationalisation in Britain following the election of the Labour 
government under Clement Attlee in 1945 is regarded as the prime case for the 
emergence of the 'public corporation' model as part of a shift towards the 
'positive state' (Majone 1997). Chester notes that socialisation was 'hailed as the 
pattern of a brave new world' (Chester 1952: 27). A crucial part of Labour's 
scheme of 'socialisation' of economic activities was the railway system. The 
Labour Party's manifesto for the 1945 general election 'Let Us Face the Future' 
called for the taking into public ownership of the Bank of England, the fuel and 
power industries, inland transport as well as iron and steel (Chester 1974: 1). 
Nationalisation of these industries was said to make possible the establishment 
of efficient undertakings which would consider the interests of the consumer 
and workers alike. In the particular case of transport, benefits were seen in a 
proper co-ordination of transport which could only be effected under public 
ownership, as otherwise particular interests would be able to veto any co­
ordination.
I PRO MT 47/15 - S.I. (M) (47) (32) -  18. July 1947.
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The established literature approaches the socialisation of the railways in various 
ways. In the regulatory literature, much scorn has been placed on the design of 
the regulatory regimes set up for the nationalised industries in post-1945 Britain. 
It is argued that too Httle attention was paid to the specification of regulatory 
objectives, the extent of public control and the reliance on informal relations and 
trust as main regulatory techniques (Thatcher 1998: 221; Majone 1996a: 11-15). 
Other accounts highlight the 'policy paradigm' shift involved with 
nationalisation as part of a consensual acceptance of a welfare state (Hall 1993). 
The 'public corporation' design idea received cross-party support. Delegated 
modes of control in terms of boards had been initiated and established in the 
inter-war period by both Labour minority and Conservative governments, such 
as for the British Broadcasting Corporation and the Central Electricity Board 
(both 1926), the London Transport Passenger Board (1931) and the British 
Overseas Airways Corporation (1939). This paralleled in particular the rise of 
Herbert Morrison's concept of the public corporation as a key influence on 
'socialisation policies'. Its main emphasis was to create an 'efficient industry', 
which by being placed on a financially sound basis, would operate in the public 
interest.
The move towards public corporations as an organisational design for 'socialised 
industries' has also been interpreted as a consequence of previous dysfunctional 
modes of control and production, in addition to overall technological 
backwardness (Foster 1992: 73). During the inter-war period, various initiatives 
had been launched by the four railway companies to cope with the emerging 
competition from the road haulage industry. Legislation in 1930 and 1933, 
restricting the unlicensed operations of road undertakings but also allowing the
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rail companies to operate services on the road, aimed to respond to the 
increasing economic and financial problems of the railway companies. In 1938, 
the railway companies launched the 'Square Deal' campaign, demanding a 
regulatory framework equal to that of the road haulage industry, including the 
abolition of such rules as the common carrier obligation. The outbreak of the 
Second World War prevented any legislative action being taken.
Derek Aldcroft notes that railway nationalisation was 'nearly a dead issue by 
1945 [...] since some form of public ownership or control was largely inevitable' 
(Aldcroft 1968:105-6). In contrast, Tivey (1973: 50) claims that the 'Transport Act 
of 1947 was a nationalization measure with a poHcy', designed 'to bring about 
the integration of the country's transport'. Similarly, Robson noted that the 1947 
Transport Act 'embodied the most grandiose scheme of nationahzation so far 
witnessed in Britain' (Robson 1962: 95). Numerous design ideas with regard to 
post-war railway organisation had been developed during the war, contrasting 
substantially with Emanuel Shinwell's experience as Minister for Fuel and 
Power where he 'found nothing practicable and tangible existed. [...] 1 had to 
start on a clear desk' (Shinwell 1955:172).
This chapter highlights the substantial regulatory debates which were conducted 
and emphasises the importance attributed to regulatory issues in the British 
nationalisation debates in the post-war period. Two policy environments, both 
offering sources for isomorphism, affected the various regulatory ideas. The 1947 
nationalisation of transport reveals a tension within the Government between 
those who regarded the socialised industries as primarily commercial 
undertakings and those who expected the industries to be extended arms of
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government (Craig 1994: 100). In particular, the debate surrounding C licences' 
for road haulage^ suggests not only that nationahsation was controversially 
discussed and various interests competed, but also that there were also 
competing sources - one drawing mainly on domain-oriented change in 
suggesting that a 'rational' organisation would provide sufficient incentives and 
the other, somewhat more paradigm-oriented proposals, aiming to establish an 
'integrated' transport system. The former view was supported by the majority of 
the Cabinet and, in general, by the Ministry of Transport which was concerned 
not to offend industrial interests. The main political motivation for 
nationahsation rested in the elimination of potential excess profits reaped by 
private monopolies.^
This chapter discusses the formulation of various regulatory ideas during and 
immediately after the Second World War. It then considers the 'hardwiring' of 
regulatory instruments in terms of organisational structure, allocation of 
regulatory authority and non-commercial policies. Finally, it considers the 
impact of the three institutional factors.
The emergence of regulatory ideas
 ^The 1933 Road Traffic Act established three types of vehicle hcence:
'A' hcence for those who carried exclusively for hire or reward;
'B' hcence for those who carried their own goods but also goods for others;
'C hcence for those who carried only their own goods (Gourvish 1990:17).
 ^ In contrast, Zahariadis (1999) claims that the party pohtical demand to obtain full 
employment and increasing operational dysfunctionaHsm explains the sociahsahon of 
railways.
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This section considers the development of regulatory ideas during the war and 
in the immediate post-war period. It argues first that the concept of public 
corporation was not uncontested and alternative proposals for regulatory 
change existed. Furthermore, proposals for a public corporation model were not 
solely introduced by the Labour Party or the Trade Union Congress (TUG). Even 
at these early stages, a 'board model' had already been discussed within the 
Ministry of (War) Transport.
Proposals for the future organisation of the railways and the transport industry 
overall were developed during the war. In contrast to the nationalisation of the 
coal, gas and electricity industries, where technical needs are claimed to have 
been pre-eminent, in transport the main virtue of nationahsation was supposed 
to lie in achieving 'co-operation'. In particular, the key concern was the pre-war 
problem of organising competition between the railways and the road haulage 
industry for the traffic of goods. As early as July 1943, Sir Cyril Hurcomb, the 
Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of War Transport, urged that a 'definitive' 
view was to be established in order to 'prevent slipping into competitive chaos' 
immediately after the end of the Second World War.'^
The various alternative suggestions agreed that a return to the status quo ante 
helium was infeasible. Nevertheless, the different proposals can be distinguished 
according to the extent to which they required the unification of railway 
companies. The so-called 'Mance scheme' advanced a model which separated 
responsibility for the infrastructure (road and rail) from responsibility for the
4 PRO MT 74/1 - July 1943.
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operation of transport services. The operating bodies would be charged for the 
use of the permanent way.^ For Hurcomb, as for the modern advocates of the 
separation of infrastructure and operations, the theoretical attraction rested in 
the separation of the fixed costs for the infrastructure from the variable costs of 
providing services on these 'permanent ways'. However, one supposed 
disadvantage rested in the problem of allocating cost for track usage to the 
carriers, in particular the road haulage industry.
Whereas the Ministry does not seem to have seriously discussed this proposal, it 
formed one of the suggestions of the LMS and LNER railway companies, despite 
opposition by the Southern and Great Western railway companies. In May 1942, 
a LNER memorandum argued that the arrangements as existed before the war 
had been 'complicated, unsatisfactory and costly' so that any 'resuscitation' could 
not be 'reasonably contemplated' as there was a need for 'greater efficiency'.^ It 
was suggested that the most promising solution was the purchase of all land, the 
permanent way, stations and buildings by the government, while rolling stock 
and other moveable assets should remain with the railway companies, which 
would form a single financial unit under the control of a joint body. Due to 
internal disagreements, the railway companies presented a different platform in 
1943, demanding that the road haulage industry should be placed on a joint 
organisational footing, that the inequality of track costs should be balanced
 ^ PRO MT 74/1  - July 1943. This vertical separation proposal was put forward by Sir 
Osborne Mance in his 'The Road and Rail Transport Problem' (1940).
 ^ PRO RAIL 1007/606 - 15 May 1942. This statement questions the claims made by 
Gourvish (1990) who emphasises the advanced quahty of the service achieved by the
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across modes of transport and that equality of charging power should be 
established/ After the war, the separation of track and transport operations was 
advocated again by both the LNER and LMS chairmen, claiming that such a 
'landlord-tenant' system was the only viable alternative to the government's 
socialisation proposals in the unlikely event that the government decided not to 
pursue its policies/
Proposals advocating the establishment of a single monopoly were also placed 
on the agenda. In 1941, Dr William H Coates from ICl was asked to report on a 
possible scheme for the post-war railways industry. Coates proposed the setting­
up of a public corporation which should be politically and financially 
independent.^ A single, well-informed control mechanism governed by one 
financial interest was regarded as the most effective instrument. This 
corporation was to be granted gradually expanding monopoly rights in
railway groupings by 1939, despite the poor financial position. His claims recall the 
'official' post-war anti-nationalisation arguments by the railway companies.
 ^ PRO Rail 1007/606 - 13 May 1946 (summarising a meeting on 15 October 1943). The 
Department argued that it was difficult to frame legislation for these proposals. On 24 
November 1943 the railway companies conceded that their proposed scheme could not 
be seen as a permanent solution.
 ^ PRO RAIL 1007/606 - 6 June 1946. These suggestions were rejected by Great Western 
chairman Lord Portal who argued that these proposals would only advance the support 
of nationalisation advocates (PRO RAIL 1007/ 606 - 22 March 1946).
 ^ PRO MT 7 4 /7  - July 1942; 'Report on the Transport Problem in Great Britain'. Coates 
had been asked to produce a report in 1941 and submitted this report in July 1942. With 
the then Deputy Secretary, Sir Alfred Robinson, he had produced a report in October 
1940, following a request from the then Minister for War Transport, Sir John (later Lord) 
Reith. It similarly recommended the establishment of a national corporation. The report 
received little attention, because of a change of ministers which resulted in a shift of 
policy priorities (see also Gourvish 1990:16-20).
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particular defined areas, also prohibiting the traffic of goods in traders' vehicles. 
The corporation was to have full commercial freedom in fixing rights and 
charges. Coates argued that a 'wise' transport policy would establish a system 
that would utilise road transport for short distance transport, while long 
journeys would be undertaken by the railways. Such a policy would include the 
electrification of these lines, while a substantial number of local railway routes 
would have to be shut down at the same time.^^
These proposals were regarded as too far-reaching by the officials in the 
Transport Ministry. Alfred Barnes, the first post-war transport minister, 
objected, claiming that the Coates scheme would 'mean the building up of a 
machine which would be more powerful than the Minister himself. 
Furthermore, the industry, and not the government, was to carry risks and 
should continue to 'pay its way'.^^ Among officials, the scheme was attacked for 
too readily assuming efficiency gains. The real problem was seen in ensuring the 
'most economic allocation of transport'.
The Ministry's preferred solution was the establishment of a 'national clearing 
house' which would allocate rates and traffic.^^ Hurcomb reckoned that such a 
'clearing house' solution was impracticable. In particular, he feared that if such a 
proposal was adopted, the department had to be 'all-knowing', leading to a
The immediate ministerial response to these proposals was negative. Lord Leathers, 
the then Minister of War Transport, claimed that a sufficient case for complete 
centralisation of all transport services had not been made (PRO MT 7 4 / 3 - 3  September
1945).
PRO MT 7 4 / 1 - 8  October 1945.
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distortion, if not destruction of the 'functional needs of tra n sp o rt'.S u c h  an 
authority would also not only be exposed to numerous political pressures, but 
also possibly require too large an organisation which inevitably would be 
criticised for being bureaucratic in its conception and working. Moreover, it 
would also separate rate-setting from the financial responsibility of the railway 
companies and would not end the duplication of facilities. Furthermore, 
Hurcomb argued that expectations should not be guided 'by what can be done 
under war conditions'.
Despite the initial rejection of the Coates plan, the option of a public corporation 
received further attention within the Ministry before 1945. Advantages of a 
'public utility corporation' were seen in the possibility of facilitating co-operation 
between the various modes of transport. Difficulties were seen in the creation of 
a monopoly and in setting up a charging system. Hurcomb pointed out that such 
a scheme had been advocated before and that nobody favoured a solution to 
organise transport as part of a government department on the lines of the Post 
Office. The creation of a public corporation was also advocated by the Labour 
Party and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). The increasing interest of the 
Labour Party, already seen during the inter-war period, in the concept of a 
'public corporation' reflected a more long-term change away from promoting 
either municipal or ministerial control of publicly owned undertakings. This 
shift was based on the initial interest of trade unions in participating in the 
management of operations, on the widespread distrust of the civil service's
12 PRO MT 7 4 /7  -11 October 1943.
13 PRO MT 7 4 /7  -11 October 1943.
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competence to run a 'business' as well as on developments within private 
industry, where an increasing tendency towards a separation between the 
ownership and management roles was prevalent (Chester 1952).
Most prominently, Herbert Morrison argued that transport required an 
organisation that would allow for commercial flexibility as well as public control 
and accountability. A public corporation would not be a capitalist business, the 
'be-all and end-all of which is profits and dividends, even though it will, quite 
properly, be expected to pay its way'. Furthermore, boards and officials had to 
act as 'high custodians of the public interest' (Morrison 1933:156-7). Rather than 
providing rniriisters with a wide margin of interventionist instruments, Morrison 
argued that responsibility should be 'thrust down [the Board's] throat' to 
establish clear lines of responsibility that would prevent any 'mischievous and 
not too competent minister' from harming the business and to prevent a 'weak 
and inefficient Board' from being able to shift the blame on to the minister 
(Morrison 1933: 170). These conceptions dominated the development of the 
Transport Act, but also in political terms Morrison 'held their hands, for 
example, Barnes asked Morrison what to do and how to do it and that went for a 
lot of the nationalising ministers' (Donoughue and Jones 1973: 349).
Although these proposals and the suggestions emerging from within and 
outside the civil service, provided only 'a limited number of accepted truths' 
(Chester 1974: 44), there were no alternative proposals for the organisation of the 
nationalised industries, given, in particular, the trade unions' reluctance to end
14 PRO MT 74/1  - July 1943.
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their adversarial relationship vis-à-vis management (see Morgan 1984). The 
Labour Party argued that a national transport corporation with subordinate 
boards should be established. It was proposed that a unified and co-ordinated 
system under public ownership would prevent the evils of a private monopoly 
and would obtain a maximum of efficiency, the application of 'socialist' 
principles therefore represented 'good business for the n a tio n '.S im ila r  
proposals were made by the TUC (Railway Gazette, 7 September 1945: 295). It 
was argued that a National Transport Authority, subordinate to the Ministry of 
Transport, would 'provide a door-to-door service of maximum efficiency and co­
ordinating aU forms of inland transport by road, raü and air' at least cost to the 
community. This National Transport Authority should be set up as a public 
corporation, independent of government control in matters of day-to-day 
administration, being ultimately responsible for the efficient operation of the 
industry and general policy. Seven boards would operate the various modes of 
transport, while the National Transport Authority would be responsible for 
establishing a comprehensive rates and fares system, for insurance schemes as 
well as for the training of staff and research and development.
After the election, officials were instructed that 'no policy will be acceptable to 
the present government which does not assert the principle of public 
ownership'. The railways should be unified under a centralised finance 
machinery for 'central direction of p o lic y M in is te rs  also decided to establish 
executive boards which were to be appointed by the minister. These were to be
PRO MT 74/3; Labour Party National Executive Committee, Post-War Organisation of 
Transport.
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set up on the regional basis, although at first - to minimise disruption - boards 
were to be organised on a functional basis. The task of co-ordinating the boards 
as well as decisions on the machinery for controlling fares and charges and the 
provision of facilities were to be left to the central au thorityO fficials, working 
under these directions, argued that among the 'infinite graduations' in 
organising a public corporation, it was essential that the Board should be left 
relatively free of ministerial control.^^ Thus, particular importance was 
attributed to finding a formula which would preserve the public interest as well 
as securing managerial freedom. It was most likely that the tension between 
these two interests would lead to clashes on issues such as rates and non- 
remunerative services as well as the timing and extent of new capital 
expenditures and specific provisions for national defence.^^
In conclusion, the proposals for the re-organisation of the transport industry 
regarded the railways as an activity which should be run as a commercial 
activity. The degree of domain orientation focused on the extent of centralised 
authority - ranging from re-regulation and track ownership to the establishment 
of a central authority supervised by the Transport ministry. It was argued that a 
unified organisation under a central authority would enable the railways to 
function efficiently within a co-ordinated system including all modes of 
transport rather than obtaining an instrument for economic intervention.
PRO MT 74/32 - October 1945.
17 PRO MT 74/32 - October 1945.
18 PRO MT 74/1  -19  October 1945.
1  ^PRO MT 74/1 - 19 October 1945. Officials pointed out that other 'public control' modes 
such as departmental organisations or guild socialism were to be dismissed.
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Morrison claimed that these plans would avoid the 'waste' of competitive 
services, although the continuation of a 'healthy rivalry' was perceived to be 
essential.20 Tension existed between the assumption that any central authority 
was likely to be overburdened and the suggestions that a closely integrated 
transport system should be established. The former view emphasised the need to 
combine the co-ordination of transport services with decentralised management. 
The latter view stressed the importance of central organisation for serving users 
with a regular and prompt service regardless of the mode of transport. 
Furthermore, proponents of this orientation were attracted to the possibility of 
large capital investments in the nationalised industry which could be used to 
balance the assumed inherent instabilities of the economic system (Cairncross 
1985: 471; Chester 1974:1034).
Organisational Structure
While the broad structure of the public corporation was undisputed, the nature 
of the central authority, the Board, attracted controversy, highlighting conflict 
between the two sources of isomorphism. The internal ministry discussions 
established the basic framework for the Transport Act. A National Transport 
Authority was to be subject to 'general directions' given by the minister. The 
Authority itself was to control the activities of separate operating boards and to 
ensure that an adequate and well co-ordinated system was provided. To 'avoid 
bureaucracy', the boards were supposed to hold all assets and property and be
20 PRO MT 74/1 -10  October 1945.
21 PRO MT 74/1 - 8 October 1945.
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under an obligation to operate the undertaking efficiently. The detailed 
proposals for the functions of the transport authority drew on two distinct 
sources. On the one hand, the eventual Transport Commission was regarded as 
an instrument of the government; on the other hand, the 'appropriate' design 
idea was that of an 'independent public u t i l i t y T h i s  section explores the 
tension between these two sources of potential isomorphism which were evident 
in the three distinct debates. The following first discusses the different 
arguments concerning the character of a National Transport Authority. It then 
considers the debate with regard to the extent of aspired integration of policies 
for the different modes of transport and finally assesses the arguments relating 
to the allocation of assets in either the Transport Authority or the executive 
boards.
Substantial differences concerning the character of the National Transport 
Authority (renamed the National Transport Commission (NTC) after ministerial 
intervention) emerged in the discussion whether the NTC should be enabled to 
raise capital on its own b e h a l f . 4^ According to one perspective, the NTC should 
be regarded as an instrument of the government which could be guided via 
general and particular directions of the Minister of Transport, accepting 
'disadvantages' from political involvement in order to allow for opportunities for 
intervention in the public interest.^^ The alternative view proposed that the NTC
PRO MT 7 4 / 1 - 1 5  November 1945.
PRO MT 7 4 / 2 - 7  January 1946.
It was claimed that a commission would be less powerful to resist ministerial demands 
than an authority.
25 PRO MT 7 4 /2  - 7 January 1946.
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should be regarded as a public utility where the publicly owned undertaking 
would interpret the 'public interest' largely autonomously, with the minister 
exercising only remote powers of control and issuing directions of a more 
general character. This option favoured a wide distancing of the transport 
industry from political control with the business element remaining dominant. 
This view was particularly stressed by the economic section in the Cabinet 
Secretariat.^^ It was argued that the purpose of socialisation was to ensure that 
the industries were 'operated with the greatest efficiency and economy', making 
it an obhgation that the board should be chosen only on its technical and 
economic abiUties and on its experience in managing the industries in question. 
The goal of balancing 'control desirable on general economic grounds' and 
managerial independence could only be found incrementally over time.^^
The second view prevailed. Hence the NTC was to become the organ through 
which unification and co-ordination of the transport industry should be effected 
and through which the full power of direction and control of the activities of the 
executive boards should be exercised. To accommodate more 'interventionist' 
views, it was stressed that while detailed and permanent control by the ministry 
was to be avoided, ministerial control would not to be too re m o te .T h e  NTC 
was to be established as an organisation which would be an instrument to 
implement government policy. Although it would not be an operational body, 
all assets and properties were to be vested in the NTC, now to be called the
PRO MT 7 4 /1 0 -8  November 1945. 
PRO MT 7 4 /1 0 -8  November 1945. 
PRO MT 4 7 /2  - 11 January 1946.
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British Transport Commission (BTC).^  ^ Among its tasks was to organise the 
operational executives, if possible on a regional basis, while it would also control 
capital expenditures.^^ Decisions on the internal organisation of the Commission 
and the nature of delegation to the executive were to be left to the 
Commission.^^ The BTC was to be a policy-making, co-ordinating and 
controlling body which would act as principal with regard to the operational 
executives. In a memorandum to the ministerial committee on socialised 
industries, the minister, Barnes, reasoned that 'above all I want them to be a 
thinking team, giving guidance and support to the various subordinate 
executives', with the functions of the operational executive boards to be specified 
by the BTC itself
The second major discussion which separated proposals drawing on domain- 
and paradigm-oriented sources concerned the tension between the desired co­
ordination and integration of the various modes of transport on the one hand 
and the interest in minimising transaction costs on the other. The key interest 
concerned the organisation of the executive boards, which were to execute the 
strategic guidelines of the BTC. Officials feared that without executive boards.
29 PRO MT 74/2, S.l.(M) (46) 4 - 3 March 1946.
30 PRO MT 74/3, S.I.(M) (46) 4 - 3 March 1946.
31 PRO MT 74/20 -11 January 1946.
32 PRO MT 74/14 - 4 June 1946. In March 1946 the BTC's tasks were defined as
instruments of the minister 'to carry out the general policy of the government and to see
that due regard was paid to the over-riding public interest in the general organisation of 
inland transport', thus being vested with all assets, being responsible for the creation of 
executive boards and for the fixing of rates, as weU as accommodating poHtical demands 
to provide unremunerative services (PRO MT 74/16, S.M. (46) 3rd meeting - 8 March
1946).
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the Commission would become an 'overweight central body'.^^ Three different 
plans were tabled, proposing either the establishment of transport executives on 
a regional basis, or on a so-called territorial basis along the lines of the existing 
railway companies, or on a functional basis. The Ministry favoured the 
functional solution, providing the Boards with the right to sue and be sued and 
to hold their assets. The Boards would also be obliged to manage efficiently and 
produce profits. Although a functional organisation was perceived to hinder real 
co-ordination of the various modes of transport, the Ministry was interested 
mainly in a smooth transition. An initial adoption of a functional organisation 
represented the most convenient basis. '^^
In contrast, advocates of a territorial organisation agreed that assets and 
liabilities should remain with the various operational boards. In order to achieve 
proper co-ordination and some competition, all modes of transport should be 
integrated into territorial boards following the structure of the pre-war railway 
groupings. The trade unions objected to the notion of establishing functional 
boards, arguing that they would continue to divide the various modes of 
transport. The Cabinet, however, decided that, for reasons of administrative 
convenience, the executive boards should, at first, be set up on functional lines 
with the aim to establish regional boards later, thus opting for policy cumulation 
rather than 'integration'.
PRO MT 74/1  - 21 December 1945. 
34 PRO MT 74/1  - 27 November 1945.
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The third issue where differences in approach were observable concerned 
whether assets should be held by the BTC or by the executive boards. The 
ministry at first proposed the vesting of assets with the boards. Contrasting 
views argued that such an arrangement would lead to an 'illogical divorce' 
between ownership and direction of policy, leading to a dependence of the 
Commission on the resources and control of the Treasury. It was essential to 
establish clear lines of responsibility.^^ Additional advantages of vesting assets 
centrally were that it would facilitate co-ordination and integration among 
modes and that it would be closer to ministerial control (Chester 1974: 394). 
Furthermore, such an arrangement was regarded as a response to war-time 
experience, where tensions had occurred between the minister and the 
controlled railway and canal undertakings, when the minister was entitled to 
use the latter's property at his discretion.^^ In contrast, inside the Transport 
Ministry other arguments were voiced which argued that a vesting of assets in 
the transport commission would lead to a 'top-heavy' structure, all assets should 
therefore remain with the respective ex ec u tiv e s .In  December, the Minister 
decided that assets should be vested with the central authority rather than the 
operational executives.^^
The organisational structure established in the 1947 Act represented an attempt 
to combine multiple goals; first, to establish a commercially viable undertaking; 
second, to establish central direction, control and clear lines of responsibility;
PRO MT 74/1 - no date.
36 PRO MT 74/14 -18  June 1946.
37 PRO MT 74/1 - 28 November 1945; 30 November 1945; 5 December 1945.
38 PRO MT 74/1  -10  December 1945.
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and third, by delegating authority to the executive boards in order to provide 
'flexibility' and to prevent the creation of a 'top-heavy' organisation. The BTC 
was entrusted with estabHshing policy principles for the provision of an 
adequate and properly co-ordinated system of transport as well as fixing fares 
and charges in a way that would balance expenditure and incom e.M in istry  
officials feared that this balance between commercial autonomy and strategic 
policy development could lead to BTC 'overload' should the executives not keep 
their detailed administrative work away from the Commission. Furthermore, it 
was feared that the BTC's tasks could lead to an increase in its size which would 
reduce its effectiveness. Thus, its resources were to be set deliberately small. The 
debates about the appropriate organisational structure of the socialised modes of 
transport reveal the inherent tension between domain-oriented views, regarding 
socialisation as an efficient form of business organisation, and to some extent 
more paradigm-oriented views, which demanded an integrated transport 
system.
Allocation of regulatory authority
In terms of regulatory control exercised by the minister, great stress was placed 
on the need to avoid involvement in the management of the industry. The pubHc 
corporations were to be provided with a wide extent of discretion. This section 
analyses the debates concerning the extent of regulatory authority, which reveal 
the underlying tension between granting the operator managerial flexibility and 
limiting the operator's discretion. One example of this anxiety about limiting the 
discretion of the 'transport authority' was its relabelling as a 'transport
39 PRO MT 74 /4  - 21 M arch 1946.
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commission': this commission would act as an agent to the minister and would 
control the executive boards according to the minister's general directions.
Great emphasis was placed on the significance of ministerial control being 
limited to general issues rather than allowing involvement in detailed policies. 
Only after consultation with the Transport Commission was the minister 
supposed to give directions 'of general character' in order to safeguard the 
perceived public interest concerning performance and management of the 
Commission.^0 Concerning direct means of command, it was stressed that 'the 
Government must avoid very carefully any suggestion that it is issuing 
directions to Boards of Socialised Industries [...] or attempting to teach them 
their business'; nevertheless, by indirect means, for example via appointments to 
the Board, it would be possible to bind members to particular policies.'^^ Barnes, 
the transport minister, against the intentions of his officials, extended this power 
of appointment to the membership of the executive boards.^^ Intervention in 
policy detail was feasible in matters such as borrowing or requirements to 
provide non-remunerative services.^^
Morrison's intentions on the extent of ministerial control were given in a 
memorandum called 'Taking S to c k '.I t  was claimed that an industry would not
40 PRO MT 74/21 - 4 July 1947.
44 PRO MT 74/12, S.I. (46) - 10th meeting -10  October 1946.
42 PRO MT 74/19 - 28 October 1946.
43 PRO MT 74/21 - 4 July 1947.
44 PRO MT 74/14 - S.I. (M) (47) 32,18 July 1947.
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'become efficient by the mere act of socialisation and even the setting 
up of a good Board to run an industry does not, in itself, ensure that 
the long-term policy of the Board is on sound lines'.
Critical comments were made to the effect that no steps had been undertaken to 
provide the Boards with a standard of efficiency and cost which they were 
supposed to achieve. While rejecting any notion that Boards should be 
accountable to Parliament, Morrison advocated that the Boards should provide 
themselves with 'modern means of checking their efficiency'. There should be as 
few general ministerial directions as possible, directions should mainly be 
exercised via 'friendly' relations between the minister and the chairman of the 
Board of a socialised industry. Furthermore, a 'close channel of communication' 
should be established between the minister and the board so that the minister 
could exercise influence on appointments. At the same time, it was necessary to 
reorganise government departments. The transfer of the (war-time) 'mass of 
detailed work' from the departments to the boards would allow the nature of 
departmental work to become 'more regulatory and supervisory in character'.'^^
The arguments surrounding the extent of regulatory powers of the minister over 
the transport undertakings reveals a tension between the anxiety to allow for 
managerial flexibility and the aim to see the government's policy intentions 
acknowledged by the BTC and the transport executives. The aim was to establish 
a government department as a regulatory and guiding body rather than as an 
interventionist and activist authority. The most significant controls on 
ministerial intervention were statutory policy instruments such as the 'pay their
45 PRO MT 74/14 - S.I. (M) (47) 32,18 July 1947.
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way' obligation as well as the placing of the duty to achieve statutory objectives 
with the British Transport Commission and not directly with the minister or the 
government (also Chester 1974: 994). Regulation of the Commission was to be 
undertaken via consultation and not compulsion, based on close and friendly 
relations between the ministers and the Commission. This preference for 
informal tools of regulation made the possibility of applying formal 'directions' 
remote, while they provided an opportunity to undermine Morrison's aim to 
establish clear lines of responsibility and opened up the opportunity for informal 
pressures, leading to a 'no man's land [...] in which a nominal responsibiHty does 
not coincide with the real power of decision-making' (Robson 1962: 76).^^
The same principles were also applied with regard to the re-arrangement of the 
rate setting machinery. The initial debate focused on the question whether the 
Commission was to be provided with sufficient monopoly powers to determine 
the rate-level, or whether a 'more laissez-faire' attitude was to be taken, which 
would allow for a moderate degree of competition where it 'afforded sufficient 
benefit to industry and the pubHc'.'^^ At an early stage, it was decided that each 
of the operating boards was to be financially independent, with the collective 
revenues from all Boards being at least sufficient to pay the interest of the whole 
Treasury issue of Transport Commission stock.^^ While there was to be cross-
Robson offers three explanations for this reliance on 'unclear lines of responsibility': an 
attempt by ministers to distance themselves from blame, a corporation's lack of courage 
to refuse a minister's pressures and a 'widespread habit of EngHsh life of preferring an 
informal understanding' and favouring 'gentlemanly persuasion to a formal instruction 
or a local document' (Robson 1962:161).
47 MT 7 4 / 2 - 7  January 1946.
48 PRO MT 74/1  - 4 December 1945.
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subsidisation across executive boards, there was no aspiration to harmonise rates 
and charges.'^^ There was early agreement that a Transport Tribunal should take 
over the role of the existing Railway Rates Tribunal as a supposedly impartial 
and independent body to settle disputes between business, business associations 
and the railways. The Transport Tribunal was also allocated the competencies of 
the Railway and Canal Commission as well as of the so-called Appeal Tribunal 
which had been set up in 1933. Further ministerial guidance would allow the 
Transport Tribunal to set rates that would permit the railways to earn standard 
revenues.^^ However, in January 1946, it was realised that any reform of the rate 
structure would necessitate detailed preparations which would make any 
inclusion in a 1947 Act impossible. It was therefore proposed that the principles 
should be formulated by the Transport Commission with the Transport Tribunal 
being charged to settle the details.^^
The proposals with regard to a modification of the rate regime offers a further 
indication of the existence of various approaches towards the function of the rate 
regime. None of the proposals, however, suggested that the government should 
occupy a central role. The Minister of Transport suggested that the Charges 
Advisory Committee should be asked to hold a public enquiry on rates. 
Parliament would then agree on the broad framework which was then to te 
implemented in detail by the Transport Tribunal. These proposals were opposed 
by the President of the Board of Trade, Sir Stafford Cripps, who argued that tie 
government would deprive itself of one of the most powerful policy
49 PRO MT 74/1  - 8 October 1945.
50 PRO MT 74/32 - October 1945; PRO MT 74/1 - 4 December 1945.
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instruments. As, however, an active governmental role in rate setting would 
attract political controversy, he proposed the establishment of an independent 
body. Morrison also criticised the Transport Ministry's proposals.^^ He claimed 
that these proposals would create unclear responsibilities where the BTC could 
attempt to blame Parliament, the minister, the Charges Advisory Committee or 
the Transport Tribunal for its poor performance. Furthermore, he doubted 
whether parliament was a suitable arena for settling rate issues.^^ Barnes 
defended his position, claiming that business interests would oppose any 
provision that would grant BTC rate-setting powers, moreover, rate-setting in 
general was of too high importance not to be discussed by Parliament.^'^ 
Morrison affirmed that the minister was not responsible for rate-setting as this 
would expose him to the 'activities of pressure groups in Parliament'. As the BTC 
was a public board, performing a public duty, it should be trusted to establish an 
'equitable frame of charges'. The minister should merely ensure that the interests 
of government policy were taken into account, either by issuing formal 
directions or 'more normally' by informal discussion.^^
As a consequence, the Ministry of Transport withdrew its proposals concerning 
a public enquiry and suggested that the Transport Commission should establish 
the main principles which were then to be applied by the Transport Tribunal. 
The BTC was to prepare a draft scheme for charges for their services and these
51 PRO MT 7 4 /2  - 25 January 1946.
52 PRO MT 74/20, C.M. (46) Cab 96 -14  November 1946.
55 PRO MT 74/20, S.I. (M) (46), 13th meeting - 11 November 1946.
54 PRO MT 74/20, S.I. (M) (46), 13th meeting -11 November 1946.
55 PRO MT 74/20, S.I. (M) (46), 14th meeting - 15 November 1946.
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proposals were to be presented to the Transport Tribunal for examination and 
confirmation. To accommodate the Transport Minister's interests, a public 
enquiry was announced that would allow all business and other 'users' to voice 
their co n cerns.T he  main obligation of the Commission was to ensure that the 
rate structure allowed services to cover their expenditures and gave boards the 
opportunity to implement ministerial directions. It was agreed that the BTC 
should be financially self-sufficient, parliament should 'under no circumstance' 
be concerned with actual charges and the Minister was also preferably not to be 
involved with the fixing of rates.
In sum, the assumption was that rates were not explicitly to be used as 
instruments for economic policy. Regulatory relations were to be based on co­
operation, friendly relations and a good understanding between the 
Commission and the Minister, while business interests were granted a right to 
appeal against rate decisions. The absence of any other formal powers other than 
to 'give directions' indicates the limited ambition of the government to direct the 
railways to a defined policy goal or to utilise the railways as a tool for its 
economic policy.
Non-commercial objectives
The issue of non-commercial policies was not governed by the perceived need to 
pursue policies which would actively promote access to the railways by 
providing extensive and inexpensive services, but rather by the debate whether
PRO MT 74/36 - 30 November 1946. 
57 PRO MT 74/32 - 12 November 1946.
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and how the whole transport system could be made self-sufficient in financial 
terms. As noted above, the operational obligation that revenues were to cover 
expenditures and possible contingencies was established at the earliest stage of 
decision-making. The following discusses the debate concerning the importance 
attached by the government to the 'self-sufficiency' notion and, more 
importantly, the controversy on the restrictions placed on 'C licences, which, 
while not directly affecting railway regulation, is crucial for the understanding 
of the government's overall approach towards transport regulation.
The civil servants' 'Committee for SociaUsed Industries' argued against placing a 
rigorous obligation on the board to earn sufficient income to cover the servicing 
of their stock, maintaining that the relevant Boards should merely cover their 
expenses over a 'reasonably short p e rio d '.T h e  rule that the BTC should 'pay its 
way' was also attacked by the Minister of Supply, Wilmot, who complained to 
Barnes that 'political and social considerations [...] would make it desirable that 
in some cases charges should be deliberately fixed on an uneconomic basis - for 
instance, to assist enterprises in development areas'. Under the proposals, there 
was no scope to allow for such uneconomic arrangements. Furthermore, the 
Commission could be placed into a situation where it had to pay its way while 
the basis of charges was decided by someone else.^^ Wilmot's arguments, 
however, had little impact. The government's intention was that its charges 
should be set as low as possible to receive sufficient revenue to cover its 
expenses. However, when, in 1947, the economy deteriorated sharply, the
PRO MT 74/12, S.I. (O) - 19th meeting - 22 March 1946; 
59 PRO MT74/35 -13  November 1946.
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majority view that transport should cover its own costs was overturned. Despite 
the opposition of the Transport Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Attlee, the prime minister, sided with the Ministers of Health and of Fuel and 
Power in deciding against an increase in the transport charges for coal.^®
The notion of an 'integrated transport system' caused difficulties in finding 
appropriate policy instruments with options ranging from absolute monopoly to 
maintaining a moderate degree of competition between the various forms of 
transport. In order to make the Transport Board financially self-sufficient, it was 
proposed to restrict the operation of 'C licence holders to a radius of 40 miles. 
Otherwise, it was feared that the economic basis of the BTC would be 
undermined. Initial proposals suggested that the Transport Commission should 
acquire all haulage undertakings which normally operated either for hire or 
reward within a radius of over 40 miles. Businesses operating between 10 and 40 
miles could be granted permits. Ministers recognised that no proposal would be 
acceptable to the industry itself, but one could 'undoubtedly mitigate opposition 
if we avoid too drastic interference with a large number of small men who have 
a great deal of public sympathy
Opposition towards restricting 'C  licences emerged from both the road haulage 
industry, including Co-operative Societies, and from within the government. 
Douglas Jay voiced his 'alarm' at the proposals to 'suppress "A" and "B" licences' 
and to restrict 'C licences. He complained that while the whole transport
18 July 1947 - L.P. (47) 22; Lord President's Committee.
PRO MT 74/3  -19  February 1946; Draft m em orandum  to the S.I. (M) committee.
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nationalisation scheme was biased towards the idea of making a state monopoly 
profitable, too little effort had been spent on creating 'an efficient national 
transport system'. As the railways were already a monopoly, there was a case for 
nationalising them. Nevertheless, while it was inevitable that the railway 
industry would come to terms with competition from the 'A' and 'B' licensed 
operators, any move to restrict the operations of 'C licences would be an 
interference with an essential part of the manufacturing process. Jay proposed 
that any restrictions on the road haulage industry should be eliminated, 
claiming that any monopoly would be inefficient 'ex-hypothesis'.Further 
resistance emerged in the Cabinet, with the Board of Trade and the Minister of 
Fuel and Power claiming that their regional development policies would be 
potentially undermined if 'C licences were restricted. Further consideration by 
the ministerial socialisation committee was requested.^^
Morrison also favoured a less restrictive licensing system. He argued that a 
National Transport Commission would not have to fear competition if it worked 
efficiently or had economic advantages. The task of the public transport system 
was to maintain its profitability by being efficient and by reducing costs and not 
by restrictive practices. Monopoly profits were also less important than 
efficiency. Moreover, claims that fewer restrictions on the road haulage industry 
would lead to 'cream-skimming' (in modern parlance 'cherry-picking') could not 
be pushed very far.^
62 PRO MT 74 /3  - 16 March 1946.
63 PRO MT 74/20 - C.P. (46) 149.
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The Ministry of Transport opposed such arguments, although at the same time 
doubts were expressed whether the original scheme was administratively 
feasible.^^ The ministry claimed that if complete freedom for the 'C  licences was 
granted and 'A' and 'B' licences were free to operate up to the radius of 60 miles, 
more competition would be introduced than existed at that moment. While such 
a situation would possibly benefit business in the short term, in the long term 
this would lead to the provision of redundant and wasteful facilities which 
would be costly to the whole community.^^ A proposal to grant 'C licence 
undertakings unrestricted operations up to a radius of 40 miles from their base 
was rejected, because, in the opinion of ministry officials, large volumes of 
haulage movements should not be automatically barmed if they could be 
undertaken economically and efficiently. It was also pointed out that fewer 
restrictions would mean that the BTC would be forced to quote prices below cost 
and that further relaxations would attract opposition from Labour supporters, 
such as trade unions.^^ It was argued that the Transport Commission was at risk 
of being seriously undermined if the 'C licencees were given too wide a scope 
for their operations.
Although the Ministry recognised that the argument that business should be free 
to choose and should be protected from any 'oppressive monopoly' was strong, 
it was claimed that any relaxation of the provisions, would lead to an over-
64 PRO MT 74/14 - 26 March 1946.
66 PRO MT 7 4 /4  -1  April 1946. Doubts were expressed whether, given the wide remit of 
the exemptions, any restrictions could be imposed by the administrative machine in the 
first place.
66 PRO MT74/4, S.I. (M) (46) 11th meeting - 29 March 1946.
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burdening of public services with uneconomic services and a disadvantage to 
those businesses which did not operate their own haulage operations. In July 
1946, the Cabinet decided that the operations of C  licence vehicles generally 
should be restricted to a radius of 40 miles, with an overall exemption given to 
agricultural traffic following the Transport Ministry's claim that the imposition 
of restrictions would provide more political gain from the trade unions than any 
concessions to the road hauhers.^^ Given further opposition to the proposals, the 
Ministry decided in March 1947 to drop its 'C licence proposals. This decision 
was not taken on a matter of principle, but rather as an attempt to niinirriise costs 
of transition so that 'it would be better to drop them a l t o g e t h e r T h e  Cabinet 
concluded that it would be 'the wiser course [...] to abandon the proposals 
altogether [as it] would not prevent government action at a later date'7^
Attempts to control and effect an 'integrated' transport policy were therefore 
abandoned for reasons of both political and administrative convenience. This 
case indicates not only the strength of a particular industry, but also the lack of a 
unified approach towards the socialisation of transport. The final act represented 
the success of the perspective which regarded 'socialisation' as a means to 
enhance business conduct, not as the creation of a government-shaped transport 
system. The lack of any interventionist or active state policies to provide 'public 
services' was also hardwired by the provision that the Commission had to 'pay
PRO MT 74/14, S.I. (M) (46) 12th meeting -1  May 1946.
68 PRO MT 74/20 - C O. (46) 225.
69 PRO MT 74/20, CM (47) 28 - 14 March 1947. The anticipated difficulties in 
implementing and maintaining such a scheme were a further consideration.
70 PRO MT 74/20, CM (47) 28 -14  March 1947.
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its way': Any ministerial request to provide non-remunerative services would 
possibly lead to rate increases and a maximum of publicity during the 
proceedings of the Rates Tribunal.
The impact of institutional factors
The regulatory regime established for the British railways provides a further 
case for domain-oriented isomorphism. The aim was to improve the 
performance of the railways in terms of 'efficiency' and to bring the historical 
trend of increased industry concentration to a seemingly logical conclusion 
rather than utilising the railways as an economic tool for reconstruction 
purposes or other interventionist policy endeavours. This was also noted by 
ministry officials: 'The Bill obviously cannot set the detailed machinery 
necessary to establish full integration. What it can, and I submit, does do, is to 
establish a sound basic structure on which integration can be built', by 
eliminating 'unnecessary duplication and overhead charges', by closer co­
ordinating the different modes of transport and by specialisation and 
standardisation.
In 1949, the Attorney General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, reflected that 
nationalisation
'does not seem to have been expressed in such a way as to enable 
nationalised industries to be used as instruments for promoting 
economic results outside their own immediate field. The power of 
direction has to be considered in the light of the general obligation
PRO MT 74/37 - no date. Notes for Second Reading.
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placed on the Boards to make revenue balance over a period. Under 
Section 3 of the Transport Act, the Commission is not required to 
operate the industry in a way conducive to the economic good of the 
country as a whole but in a way which promotes the efficiency and 
economy of the industry itself [...]' (in Chester 1974: 984).
The insulation o f the regulatory space from coercive pressures 
As in the case of the 1920s, there were no direct or indirect coercive pressures 
which were exerted on British poHcy-makers to change domestic transport 
policies. There is little evidence in the historical records that experiences or 
models in other countries were investigated. Moreover, even on the domestic 
level, the ideational pressures emanating from the existence of the pre-1939 
public corporation models, such as the London Passenger Transport Board, were 
negligible. The existing bodies were not organised in a uniform way, reflected 
pre-war thinking (and the London Passenger Transport Board represented a 
'weakened' version of Morrison's original proposals after the change in 
government) and had been applied to specific problems. As Chester notes (1974: 
387), it was not the uniform character of the public corporation model which led 
to the cross-party interest in its application for utility undertakings. It was far 
more the absence of agreed administrative and constitutional standards which 
allowed for considerable flexibility, thus making the public corporation an 
attractive policy tool. This inherent flexibility facilitated the domain-orientation 
of the policy-proposals and allowed for substantial flexibility with regard to the 
different socialisation laws across the industries.
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The insulation o f political-administrative nexus o f the regulatory space 
The existence of two inter-departmental committees for socialised industries, 
one ministerial, one for civil servants, did not lead to a convergence of policies 
nor did it facilitate paradigm-oriented isomorphism. Instead, the main proposals 
for the future organisation and regulation of the railways emerged from within 
the Ministry, while the inter-rninisterial committee under the leadership of 
Herbert Morrison fine-tuned policies to allow for coherence and to prevent 
contradictory policies.^^ Across all 'sociaHsation' policies, departments were to 
prepare the initial drafts and then submit these to the Cabinet or 
interdepartmental committees. Only in the final stages of preparing the draft bill 
was there to be consultation with external interests. While, to a limited extent, 
the Transport Bill followed the provisions of the previous Coal Industry 
Nationalisation Act and, in terms of compensation and property transfer 
arrangements, the arrangements setting up the London Passenger Transport 
Board (Chester 1974: 902), the controversial provisions, with the exception of the 
'C licence issue, were discussed and settled within the Ministry of Transport. At 
the stage of the ministerial committee's consent to the draft bill, 'the Ministerial 
Committee had little to say about either the general conception or the means of 
carrying it out' (Chester 1974: 399). Inside the Ministry of Transport, officials, 
such as Hurcomb, had already become acquainted with proposals concerning 
the post-war organisation of the transport industry. Finally, the Treasury was 
mostly concerned about the terms of compensation for the existing shareholders
PRO MT 74/14 - 11 December 1946; S.I. (M) (46) (38): '[...] some of the differences 
between the Transport Bül as introduced and the Electricity Bill as at present drafted, 
may not be easy to justify in debate as necessitated by the differences in circumstances
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and played only a minor role in the formulation of the regulatory regime for the 
transport industry. Nevertheless, while this account has stressed the extent to 
which the socialisation of the British railways represented domain-oriented 
assumptions, building less on party-political, but administrative reasoning, the 
fact that the incoming Labour government advocated the creation of public 
corporations was nevertheless decisive for narrowing down the options for the 
organisation of the socialised railway operator.
The insulation o f the regulatory space from societal forces 
Foster (1994: 496) proposes (and discounts) the view that 'the railways had to 
wait until they could pay a low price in terms of influence to persuade a Labour 
government to nationalize them in 1948'. The evidence shows that far from being 
able to 'capture' the ministry or monopolise the alternative generation and 
agenda-setting process, the railway companies were internally split, unable to 
agree whether to propose a vertical separation or a cartel-like arrangement with 
the road haulage industry. The railway companies' position was further 
weakened by their lack of access to parliamentary opposition as they failed to 
agree with the Conservative Party on a joint approach to oppose the Labour 
government's proposals. The Conservatives defined co-operation of traffic as 
allowing free competition for services between all modes of transport. Any form 
of monopoly was to be prevented and all restrictive regulations to be 
a b o l i s h e d . T h e  railway companies found these proposals unacceptable, 
claiming that the Conservative's proposals were 'not in the realm of practical
and some of these differences wül have to be shown to have valid grounds if w e are to 
escape embarrassment.'
PRO RAIL 1007/606; 26 February 1946.
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politics in 1946'7'^ On the one hand, these arguments represented the opposite to 
the conclusions of discussions between rail and road interests. On the other 
hand, the proposals were perceived to lead inevitably to a 'transport crisis'. The 
railway companies themselves only managed to represent a 'minimalist' joint 
position, arguing that a 'complete fusion [...] would be disastrous', that any 
experimentation by institutional re-arrangements during a post-war period was 
harmful, and that the railways should be put on an equal footing with other 
forms of transport.^^ Finally, the railway companies position to shape poHcy 
proposals was further weakened by their refusal to contribute informally to 
policy formulation. Only from spring 1947 onwards did the railway companies 
allow their staff to deal with the Ministry on technical issues of the 
nationalisation policies (see Chester 1974: 75-7)7^
In contrast, trade unions were more influential. A report by the TUG on the 
advantages of the corporation model provided one of the main sources of advice 
in the alternative generation process. Nevertheless, regular meetings with either 
the TUG or a TUG committee, consisting of transport union representatives did 
not take place prior to January 1946 (with informal, non-recorded meetings 
previously). The trade unions were not allowed to shape the orientation of the 
Transport Act, as Barnes was advised that 'you cannot impart advance 
information of the government's plans ' .Fur thermore,  civil servants were 
anxious 'to avoid the impression that the Minister had entered into any kind of
74 PRO RAIL 1007/606; 26 February 1946 & 25 October 1946.
75 PRO GAB 21/2341; GWR, LMS, LNER and SR (1946) 'British Railways and the Future' 
75 PRO MT 7 4 /2  - 7 February 1946.
77 PRO M T74/84 -  4 January 1946.
163
irrevocable cominitrnent' vis-à-vis interests (Chester 1974: 85). In addition, the 
trade unions did not hinder the late liberaHsation' of the 'C licences, their initial 
support for a strict licensing system being mainly based on their interest in 
improving working conditions for their members rather than in establishing 
some form of 'integrated' transport system. The failure of the Ministry to pursue 
its original policies on 'C licences had also less to do with the organisational 
strength of the road haulage industry, although anticipated protests were 
recognised. More importantly, it was the protests from the Co-operative 
Societies as well as the difficulty in adrrdriistering the original scheme which 
allowed the opposition to oppose the proposals.
Conclusion
This chapter has discussed the case of the 1947 socialisation of British transport 
and railways in particular. It has shown that regulation and the appropriate 
regulatory regime in terms of organisational structure, allocation of regulatory 
authority and non-commercial policies formed a substantial part of the policy 
deliberation process. Furthermore, it has been considered that the 1947 Act was 
shaped by two competing sources of isomorphism, one motivated to establish an 
integrated and activist policy, the other relying on managerial liberty. The much- 
criticised lack of formal and detailed allocation of responsibilities and duties 
does not reveal a failure to debate regulatory and organisational principles. 
Indeed, regulatory issues were widely discussed. The debate on the power 
allocation between Transport Commission and the executive boards was 
conducted in terms of principals and agents. The account has also shown that 
the inherent tension between these two sources of isomorphism was not fully 
resolved and it therefore cannot be surprising that in times of 'political need', for
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example during the economic crisis beginning in 1947, these informal regulatory 
arrangements were subverted.
Finally, the three institutional factors can to some extent explain why there was 
domain- rather than paradigm-oriented isomorphic change. First, there was no 
overarching 'recipe' but rather a loose definition of a public corporation. Second, 
policy-making took place within ministerial departments with, given the nearly 
equal timing of the policy initiatives in the various industries, only little transfer 
of staff. The horizontal co-ordination mechanisms aimed mainly to provide 
policy coherence and adjustment to decisions put forward by individual 
departments. Third, societal actors, despite the TUC's influential report in favour 
of pubhc corporations, played only a little role in the selection of regulatory 
instruments. The success of the road haulage interest, including Co-operative 
Societies, in preventing the establishment of an 'integrated' transport system, 
was less an issue of capture by societal interests as predicted by Stigler. In 
contrast, the industry's success was due to a combination of factors, such as its 
electoral strength, the absence of countervailing forces and the domain-oriented 
preference within government for 'competitive forces' rather than establishing a 
transport monopoly.
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Chapter Six
Choosing between domestic 'paths' in Germany
'[...] ministers [...] act in a 
trustworthy manner^ given their role 
as state organs' 
civil servant^
Whereas previous chapters have been concerned with conflicts between various 
degrees of domestic or international domain- and paradigm-oriented 
isomorphism, this chapter provides an analysis of a limited choice between two 
domestic domain oriented 'policy environments'. Both offered, by referring to 
two sets of historical precedent, sources for the legitimisation of regulatory 
design ideas for the post-Second World War German railways' regulatory 
regime.
Furthermore, war-time defeat and, in contrast to the First World War, the 
complete collapse of all governmental functions with final authority being 
exercised by the allied forces, should be expected to have opened the regulatory 
space for international reform experiences, in particular influence from the US as 
the dominant occupying power. At the same time, following Mancur Olson's 
(1982) argument about the elimination of institutionalised rent-seeking positions 
of interest groups following total defeat, a substantial penetration and change in 
membership of the regulatory space should be expected. First, in terms of the 
pohtical-adrninistrative nexus, limited insulation could allow for the 
introduction of 'new' ideas into the poHcy domain, such as the rise of ordo­
1 BA B121/434 -  5 March 1950.
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liberal thinking as expressed in the (West) German currency reform of 1948 and 
the increased appeal of an US-style prohibition approach towards competition 
law (Berghahn 1986:155-81). Second, war-time defeat can be expected to lead to 
an opening of the regulatory space to new interest groups, thus potentially 
leading to a change from the traditionally pro-railways bias in regulation, in 
particular with regard to freight.
The following illustrates the limited influence of allied authorities on the 
formulation of the regulatory regime. Instead, domestic actors based their 
conceptions on examples of domestic pre-war railway regulation, either 
stressing the importance of close goverrunent control of the railway operator on 
the lines of the National Socialist regime, or emphasising the need to grant 
commercial autonomy to the railway operator on the lines of the 1924 Act.
With the coming to power of the National Socialist/national conservative 
government (NSDAP/DNVP) in January 1933 a de facto, although not de jure 
(until 1937) centrahsation and assertion of political control took place 
(accompanied by an overwhelming NSDAP membership among Reichsbahn 
staff and the early introduction of Nazi symbols and forms of greetings). 
Legislation in 1937 terminated all reparation obligations and combined the 
offices of the transport minister with that of the Director General of the 
Reichsbahn (Wilhelmi 1963: 421). The name was changed to 'Deutsche 
Reichsbahn'. In 1939, the Reichsbahn was integrated into the transport ministry's 
administration, eliminating the administrative separation between operator and 
ministry and also reducing the status of the administrative board to that of an 
advisory body under the chairmanship of the transport minister. Debates in the
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post-1945 periods were shaped by two 'traditions' of railway regulation, tending 
either to emphasise the 'commonweal' function {gemeinwirtschaftliche 
Funktiori) and close ministerial control on the formal lines of the 1937/39 
legislation or the necessity for 'autonomy' along the lines of the 1924 Act by 
ensuring some degree of organisational distance between political actors and the 
operations of the Reichsbahn.
It has been claimed that post-war events were shaped by 'naive thinking in 
meta-economical and economically iUiterate arguments' which advocated a 
'healthy regional distribution as a higher moral goal via beneficial effects of the 
rate system' (Kloten 1962: 225). The following considers these claims by 
analysing the regulatory ideas prominent in the deliberation of the 1951 
Bundesbahn-Law and then discussing the 'hardwiring' of these ideas in terms of 
organisational structure, allocation of regulatory authority and the imposition of 
non-commercial functions, in particular with regard to rate-setting. Finally, it 
assesses the dominance of domain-oriented and backward-looking design ideas 
in terms of the three institutional mechanisms and attempts to explain why there 
was both a lack of international influence as well as influence of the ascending 
ideas of 'social market' ordo-Hberahsm, which were ruled out as 'inappropriate' 
for the railways.
The emergence of regulatory ideas
This section first considers the discussion of various policy alternatives in the 
immediate post-war period and then discusses attempts to set the legislative 
agenda by North-Rhine Westphalia and the response of the federal government. 
At both stages there was a dominance of domestic actors and a notable absence
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of decisive influence by allied forces. Furthermore, the following highlights the 
emerging debates that drew on two sources of domain-oriented policy 
environments, on one side, arguments drawing on the 1924 law and, on the 
other, support for a return to close ministerial control and limited operational 
autonomy along the lines of the 1937/39 laws.
From the outset, the deliberation of regulatory policy was shaped and conducted 
by domestic actors, especially in the German-run executive authority for 
transport, with only limited involvement of international actors. After the defeat 
of Nazi Germany, control over economic and political activities rested with the 
victorious powers. The US and British military administrations agreed to 
establish an 'bizonal economic administration' (Bizonale W irtschaftsverwaltun^ 
in their German zones in 1947. In the process of the economic 'unification' of the 
two zones, the responsibility for railways rested with the so-called 
'Administrative Council for Transport' consisting of the transport ministers and 
senators of the two zones.^ The failure to come to all-German solutions due to 
French and Soviet resistance as well as to the US aspiration to promote economic 
revival and to limit dependency on US aid, led to further administrative 
integration of the US and British zones and the creation of the ' Administration 
for Transport' for the Unified Economic Area of the two zones on 12 September 
1948. The allied powers gave the ' Administration' the task of formulating a new
 ^At the same time other 'Administrations' were established to deal with public policies 
(see Niclaufi 1998).
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regulatory regime for the railways. In the meantime, the railways were run and 
regulated on the (slightly modified) lines of the 1939 law.^
First drafts by the Administration in 1947 proposed unlimited powers of 
direction for the Director of the 'Administration for Transport' over the railway 
operator (Nicholls 1999: 274-5). These proposals were rejected by the military 
government, arguing that the Director's powers should be limited to those of 
supervisory 'common direction'. Limited operational autonomy was to be 
granted to the Reichsbahn and its Director General. These objections were 
integrated into the temporary law of 1948. Organisational issues such as the 
establishment of an administrative board or the granting of independent legal 
personality were not considered (Haustein and Mayer 1950).
This orientation towards the post-1937 regulatory regime in the British and US 
sectors was not taken up in the French-occupied zone. There, following an 
intergovernmental treaty, the Lander established the 'Unified Operations of 
Southwest-German Railways' (Betriebsvereinigung der siidwestdeutschen 
Eisenbahnen, SWDE) in 1947. The regulatory regime of the SWDE followed the 
tradition of the 1924 law and granted the operator the legal status of a non-profit 
making authority under public law with own legal personality. The Lander, as 
owners, acted as supervisor, while operational and administrative issues were 
handled by the SWDE under the direction of a General Director who was
 ^ These reforms also established the Economic Council {Wirtschaftsrat) as the highest 
German decision-making body, consisting of members elected by the Lander 
parhaments, and, later, the council for the Lander, the Landerkammer. These reforms
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accountable to a 'Railway Administrative Council' consisting of representatives 
of the Lander and trade unions (Schmidt-ARmann and Fromm 1986:19-20).^
Despite the existence of these two regulatory regimes, developments in the 
French zone had only limited influence on policy formulation. Discussions were 
held in the so-called 'Committee for the Preparation of a new Reichsbahn-Law' 
in the bizonal administration. This committee consisted of representatives of the 
transport administration (whose director. Dr Frohne, later became state secretary 
in the federal transport ministry), the Reichsbahn, trade unions, business, the 
Lander and the Economic Council ('Wirtschaftsrat'), while representatives from 
the French zone were given full membership status only at a later stage. 
Nevertheless, policy deliberations were shaped by competing perspectives on 
the appropriate regulation of the railway operator. At first, the transport 
administration proposed to integrate the operator into the ministerial 
administration. In contrast, the operator aimed to establish a substantial degree 
of operational and organisational autonomy outside the federal administrative 
machinery [Allgemeine Zeitung, 9 June 1949).^
increased the power of the existing German institutions and made them more 
government-hke (see KleCmarm 1991; for a 'practitioner' perspective Litchfield 1953).
 ^The East German government, following the proclamation of the 'German Democratic 
Republic' in 1949, delegated operational autonomy to the railway operator with close and 
substantial supervisory and directing powers given to the minister (WiUielmi 1963: 450)
 ^Newspaper cuttings found in BA B108/28559.
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Timetable of reforms
6 October 1948 First Draft
May 1949 Draft of the Committee for the Preparation of
a new Reichsbahn law 
23 May 1949 Passing of Basic Law
9 November 1949 Legislative Initiative North-Rhine Westphalia
14 September 1950 Federal Government Draft
13 December 1951 Bundesbahngesetz passed
Debates concerning the relationship between the ministry and operator and the 
status of an administrative board as well as the organisation of the executive 
were not solved in the negotiations of the Committee.^ In particular, the 
'Administration for Transport' proposed that its Director should be chairman of 
the administrative board and that various departments of the Bizonal Economic 
Administration should be members of the administrative board. These initiatives 
were opposed by committee members as leading to too close political control. 
Advocates, in contrast, argued that this was the sole way to find consensus and 
to prevent conflicts.^
 ^The provisional Basic Law, in contrast to the provisions of the Weimar constitution, did 
not establish administrative principles, but only stated that the railways were to be 
organised as a federal administration. The railways' role in performing state activities 
was not debated during the discussions leading to the establishment of the relevant Art. 
87 of the Basic Law (Wilhehni 1963: 429).
 ^ BA B108-285541 - 23 November 1949. The majority of the committee, however, 
favoured a solution that would appoint the Director as chairman of the administrative 
board without having membership status or the right to vote (BA B108 - 28541, 
commentary by Adolf Sarter, no date).
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The proposed law in the version of 6 October 1948 suggested that the 
Reichsbahn®, following the provisions of the 1937 and 1939 railway laws, was to 
be established as a special property (Sondervermogeii) without its own legal 
personality (§ 1,2).^ The Reichsbahn was to be directed by political priorities in 
transport, economic and financial policy. The transport minister was to give 
'common directions' to the future Reichsbahn in order to secure 'co-ordination' 
with other modes of transport (§4). Furthermore, the minister was to approve all 
major investments over DM 1 million, line closures, changes to technical 
equipment and new acquisitions. The administrative board was to consist of 
four members of the Economic Council ( Wirtschaftsrat), of the Lander Council, 
of the administrations of the Common Economic Area, of the trade unions and 
of business associations respectively. These members were to act in the interest 
of 'the German people, the German economy and the Deutsche Reichsbahn' (§5). 
Despite the requirement to cover its own expenditure, the Reichsbahn had to 
fulfil 'commonweal' principles (§15(1)). Furthermore, only a close organisational 
and regulatory distance between federal minister and operator would safeguard 
co-ordination between the modes of transport and would prevent the emergence 
of a 'state within a state'.^^ It was argued that the opportunity for political
® In June 1949, the military governors in the western zones banned the continuation of the 
term 'Deutsche Reichsbahn'. This did not apply to East Germany, where the Reichsbahn 
title continued until its unification with the Deutsche Bundesbahn in 1994.
9 BA B121 /434  - 20 May 1949.
BA B121/434 - 20 May 1949. The notion of 'state within the state' was widely used in 
pohtical discourse across all political parties in the post-war period. The notion was 
based on the claim that big business had acted too autonomously during the inter-war 
period. Furthermore, it was argued that during the recession following the 1929 crash big 
business had contributed to the rise of National Socialism. As a consequence, most
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intervention had to be provided for and that the nature of the regulatory 
relationship had to be congruent with the overall nature of the state.
In contrast to these domain-oriented proposals, taking as reference point the 
laws of 1937 and 1939, other actors referred to the regulatory regime established 
in 1924. For example, the Reichsbahn, while acknowledging that the transport 
minister should be responsible for overall economic, finance, construction, 
investment and personnel policy, proposed that operational success could be 
achieved best if a General Director under the guidance of an adrniriistrative 
board was responsible for operational issues. This would also prevent 
'politicisation' and 'bureaucratisation'.^^ Particular criticism was directed at the 
suggestion that the Director of the 'Administration for Transport' should head 
the administrative board.^^ The demand for an enhanced autonomous status 
was formulated in a pamphlet called 'Why Bundesbahn Crisis?', which called for 
a far-ranging limitation of the road haulage industry's commercial activities and 
a 'liberalisation' of the Bundesbahn from financial and operational obligations.^^ 
Similar demands were made by the main railway union, the Gewerkschaft der 
Eisenbahner Deutschlands (GdED). The over-proportional representation of 
members from the federal government and public administration on the 
administrative board in contrast to representatives from business and trade
parties argued that 'laissez-faire capitalism' had failed and that elements of public control 
over economic activity had to be established (see NiclauC 1998: 27-72).
BA BIOS/28533 - 25 September 1949.
12 BA BIOS/28559 - 13 October 1949.
1  ^ Bundestag-Archive; Deutsche Bundesbahn (1949) Warum Bundesbahn Krise? Bin 
Beitrag der Deutschen Bundesbahn zum Problem Schiene - StraBe, Offenbach. The 
publication of this report was suppressed by Seebohm, the transport minister.
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unions was criticised. The GdED proposed that the administrative board should 
be constituted of four members from parliament, the Lander, business and trade 
unions respectively. Finally, the administrative board would elect its own 
president.^4
There were therefore two sources of isomorphism in the railway domain, both 
domain-oriented in being purely focused on the railways and not applying 
broad recipes from other domains. There was no substantial involvement of 
international actors. In terms of available 'policy recipes' neither international 
experiences nor domestic ordo-liberal ideas stressing the primacy of competition 
on the market were considered.
Following the passing of the Basic Law, all responsibilities for transport were 
transferred to the new federal transport ministry.^^ Furthermore, the US High 
Commission requested an analysis by non-German experts of the organisational 
and economic situation of the 'Bundesbahn' in September 1949. The Federal 
transport minister, Hans-Christoph Seebohm, called for additional reports by an 
expert commission (named the 'Allgemeine Ausschuti') and by the advisory 
(transport)-Academic Council.
The legislative process was initiated by the government of North Rhine- 
Westphalia (NRW). While directly copying ninety per cent of the Administration 
for Transport's draft proposal, it rejected the draft's provision that compliance
bA  B 108/28559 - 30 May 1949. 
15 BA B136/1500 - 26 April 1950.
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with political guidelines should be among the regulatory obligations of the 
operator.l^ Instead, the NRW proposal emphasised the importance of a 
commercial orientation of the operator and of operational autonomy along the 
lines of the 1924 regulatory regime for the 'Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft'. 
Overall control over the activities of a collegiate executive was to rest with an 
adrniriistrative board, consisting of representatives from the Bundestag, the 
Bundesrat, trade unions and business (Die Welt, 13 October 1 9 4 9 ) The role of 
the minister was to be 'reduced' to 'classical sovereign tasks'
These proposals were criticised by the Transport Ministry and the railway 
operator. The Ministry argued that the NRW suggestions amounted to an 
'impossible proposal' due to their lack of possibilities for pohtical intervention 
and ministerial means to co-ordinate the various modes of transport. The senior 
Transport ministry official Hufnagel attacked the proposals for their distrust of 
the transport minister, claiming that one should assume 'that ministers would 
act in a trustworthy manner, given their roles as state organs'.^^ The Bundesbahn 
criticised the suggestion of establishing a collegiate executive, doubting whether
BA B108/28541 - 23 November 1949. NRW's interest can be explained by its 
geographical position as the industrial core of West Germany, and thus reliance on the 
railways, and by political reasons in that premier, Karl Arnold, was a key Christian 
Democrat opponent of the Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. The main actor behind the 
NRW draft was, however, a senior NRW official and SPD member Brandt.
BA B136/1500 - 14 October 1949. Arnold pubhcised his proposal in a speech to the 
Bundesrat on 9 December 1949.
BA B108/28541 - no date, 'Stellungnahme zum Entwurf eines Gesetzes iiber die 
Deutsche Bundesbahn von Nordrhein-Westfalen'. The 'classical sovereign tasks' included 
mainly supervisory functions.
BA B121/434 - 5 March 1950.
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such a body would have sufficient 'potency' (Durchschlagskraff). It was feared 
that the suggested autonomous status of the Bundesbahn would lead to a 
weakening of the federal government's responsibility for maintaining its 
property. Paul Schulz-Kiesow, a prominent transport academic, claimed that the 
realisation of NRW's proposals would expose the Bundesbahn, the road haulage 
undertakings and the inland shipping operators to the 'free market economy', 
leading to a 'struggle between all, which without government intervention, will 
lead to the collapse of all three modes of tran sp o rt'.T h e  railway expert Adolf 
Sarter similarly claimed that the NRW proposals gave 'free licence to unhindered 
competition, in particular with regard to rates'.
Seebohm stressed that the NRW proposals were incompatible with the 
constitutional provision of Art. 87 of the Basic Law defining the federal railways 
as part of the federal administration. Requesting an investigation by the Justice 
Ministry into the implications of Art. 87, Seebohm argued that due to the Basic 
Law's provisions, the Bundesbahn could not be established as a federal 
independent administration with its own legal personality on the lines of the 
'Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft' of 1924. He argued that 'according to the 
Basic Law, the Bundesbahn is subordinate to me in all its functions and my 
power of direction is limited in no way'.^^ It was even 'doubtful, whether the 
Bundesbahn can be established as a special property or whether it has to [...] be 
set up as a purely fiscal undertaking'. In any case, the administrative board of
20 BA BIOS/28533 - 7 February 1950.
21 BA B108/28541 - no date, 'Sarter iiber Gesetzesvorlage NRW'.
22 BA B108/28533 - 9 November 1949. Letter of Seebohm to the Minister of Justice, 
Thomas Dehler (FDP).
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the Bundesbahn could 'not live its own Hfe, but has to be, at least, under the 
chairmanship of the federal minister or state secretary'.^^
The Justice Ministry confirmed Seebohm's claims to some extent. It concluded 
that the Basic Law established that the railways should be organised at the 
federal rather than Lander level. While Art. 87 did not specify the organisational 
form the 'federal administration' should take, the possibility of exerting 
considerable ministerial influence had to be ensured. A railway operator 
organised on the principles of the 1924 provisions or as advocated by NRW 
would violate the Basic Law's intentions.^"^ This view was challenged by two 
railway experts (and Bundesbahn officials), Haustein and Mayer, who argued 
that the Basic Law's 'constitutional fathers' had merely intended to demarcate 
federal from Lander competencies, thus allowing for any form of organisational 
arrangement - ranging from full ministerial control to autonomy i^zwischen 
Regie und Autonom ié) (Haustein and Mayer 1950). Haustein claimed that the 
Ministry of Justice's report was 'without doubt illogical and contradictory', 
supporting at the same time considerable operational autonomy and substantial 
ministerial control.^^
23 BA BIOS/28533 - 9 November 1949.
24 BA B136/1500 -1 9  January 1950. Report on Art. 87 Basic Law by the Federal Minister 
of Justice. This report was used until the 1990s to claim that any major reforms of the 
Bundesbahn's status would require a constitutional amendment. Critics of this argument 
suggested that this interpretation of the Basic Law's provisions was little else than a 
scapegoat to prevent politically undesired consequences (see Fromm 1982)
25 BA B121/878 - 2 March 1950.
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The Ministry of Transport adapted its position to the Justice Ministry's report, 
now claiming that a substantial degree of operational autonomy should be 
provided to ensure commercial viability, while establishing sufficient levers to 
impose political choices, such as employment programmes.^^ The debate 
nevertheless continued and contrasted 'closer ministerial control' views with 
those advocating operational autonomy. The latter view was particularly 
stressed by reports of non-German experts whose contributions had been 
requested by the US military administration. For example, the analysis by the 
consultants 'Coverdale and Colpitts' from New York, requested after demands 
by the Transport Sub-Committee of the Allied High Commission in negotiations 
with the Bundesbahn and the Ministry of Transport on allied credits for the 
Bundesbahn, called for an increased commercialisation of the Bundesbahn. 
While overall control by the minister of transport was supported, commuter and 
freight fares had to be increased, personnel had to be reduced significantly and 
financial obligations placed on the Bundesbahn by the federal government 
should be eliminated.
26 BA B121/434 - 5 March 1950.
22 BA B196/1499 - 25 October 1950. A note by the Bundesbahn suggested that the 
Coverdale and Colpitts report was 'not convincing, because it apphed US assumptions' 
(BA B121/435 - 21 November 1950). In particular, the demand that the Bundesbahn's 
staff should be reduced by 80,000 was critically received by the federal government with 
Seebohm insisting that the report contradicted many of his ministry's policies and that 
from the outset the report had neither been initiated nor supported by his ministry (BA 
BIOS/28536 - 5 September 1950). The US government made any credits for the 
Bundesbahn conditional on the implementation of the report's proposals.
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Similarly, a report by the international experts Ludwig Homberger and Raphael 
Cottier in May 1950 reflected the demands for increased c o m m e r c i a l i s a t i o n . ^ ^  
The extent of ministerial control as envisaged by the federal transport ministry 
was criticised. It was suggested that the Bundesbahn should be granted special 
property status {Sondervermogeii), allowing for the adoption of commercial 
business practices and protecting the operator from interference by day-to-day 
politics, while the interests of the German economy should be safeguarded. The 
executive, headed by three people, was to be supervised by an administrative 
board consisting of 17 members appointed by the federal minister of transport, 
drawing from representatives from business, agriculture, trade unions and the 
Lander. The minister of transport's role was to co-ordinate all modes of transport 
and to control rate-setting. The minister was also to be involved in directing the 
operator in economic matters, including the right to impose policies in order to 
establish a unified transport policy in 'exceptional circumstances'. At the same 
time, the Bundesbahn was told to rationalise its structure, to reduce personnel 
and to increase charges, leading to a transport market where every mode should 
charge according to its true cost.^^
The most influential contribution to the regulatory debate was made by the all- 
German 'Allgemeine AusschuR' in the so-called Nitschmann report.^® The report
Homberger was professor of transport science at the University of Washington. Before 
1933, he had worked for the Reichsbahn. His appointment was suggested by Adenauer. 
Cottier was director at the central office for international railway transport in Geneva.
29 BA B108/28533 - 24 October 1949.
Nitschmann, the committee chairman, was a former president of the railway 
directorate in Hamburg. He chaired a committee consisting of railway experts from the 
Lander, the trade unions and two accountants. Prior to its publication, the report was
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claimed that the extent of autonomy as proposed by the NRW plans was 
unconstitutional.^^ It was argued that the minister should be given sufficient 
regulatory and policy guidance powers as the Bundesbahn was 'the most 
valuable part of the federal property'. Nevertheless, the Bundesbahn was to be 
granted 'independence and flexibility'. In contrast to the Transport Ministry's 
proposals, the report suggested granting the administrative board 'decisive 
influence' on questions of 'common importance' and on 'crucial' individual 
issues. Members were to be drawn from business, the trade unions and the 
Lander. The Bundesbahn's executive was to consist of a general director and two 
deputies in co-operation with the heads of the various departments. It was 
proposed to provide the transport minister with competencies ranging from the 
supervision of the implementation of policy guidelines and control over safety, 
to supervising the modernisation of equipment that reflected 'technical 
developments'. In contrast to the NRW plans, the minister was to be given veto 
power with the federal cabinet acting as the final decision-maker in cases of 
disagreement between minister and adrriirdstrative board. Due to the 
Bundesbahn's 'commonweal' functions, the Bundesbahn was to receive financial 
compensation for loss-making services.
Whereas the last two proposals signified a move towards a compromise solution 
between the two domain-oriented design ideas (the Homberger and Cottier 
report from the 'autonomy' perspective and the 'Allgemeine AusschuR' from the
discussed by the committee members, Seebohm and Frohne from the federal transport 
ministry, and members of the SWDE, and subsequently amended (BA B121/880 - 3 
December 1949).
BA B136/1500 - 8 February 1950.
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'commonweal' view), the suggestions of the Academic Advisory Council to the 
Transport Minister represented a position similar to the Transport Ministry's 
original opinion. It was argued that the adrniriistrative board should have a 'co- 
determining' and 'advisory', but not a 'decisive' function. The federal 
government was to be given a maximum of discretion in its appointments to the 
administrative board, although business and trade unions should account for 
half of this body's membership. The advisory council defined independence as 
being not directly administered by the federal transport minister. As the 
Bundesbahn was part of the federal adrninistration, the transport minister 
should be provided with a substantial number of functions beyond mere 
'supervision', such as policy guidance, influence on business decisions, 
appointments and the 'co-ordination' of the various modes of transport. The 
power to set tariffs was defined as an essential part of national sovereignty.^^
In contrast, business associations demanded a return to the 1924 status. The peak 
industry association, the 'Bundesverband der deutschen Industrie' (BDl) asked 
Adolf Sarter to assess the Bundesbahn's position (Sarter 1949). Sarter advocated 
a return to the regulatory regime of 1924 as 'the men of the DRG used the foreign 
pressure to make the operator fit in the interest of the German economy and 
overall German political interest'. By advocating a strong institutional and 
autonomous status for an administrative board for the railways, he criticised the 
Administration for Transport's proposals for suggesting neither a
'state nor autonomous operation, creating autonomy on the outside, 
but reformulating it into a state-operated railway undertaking on the
32 BA B136/1500 - 22 January 1950.
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inside. The main organ of the undertaking, the administrative board, 
by having the responsible minister as its chairman, is little else than 
an auxiliary tool of government' (Sarter 1949: 28).
There was a shared consensus that transport, and in particular railways, was a 
'special' policy domain where liberalisation was 'inappropriate' due to high fixed 
costs, the inelasticity of supply to changes in demand and the still dominant 
position of the railway operator in the overall transport market (Gutmann et al. 
1964). The various proposals can be categorised into two distinct domestic 
domain-oriented regulatory design approaches. These proposals either offered a 
variation of the Federal ministry of transport's policies or followed more closely 
the line taken by North Rhine-Westphalia. Nevertheless, in most respects, the 
proposals were to a large extent similar. On issues such as the appropriate scope 
of ministerial involvement or the role of the administrative board, the key 
doctrinal difference was between the assumption, first proposed by the 
Administration for Transport, that the railways should follow 'commonweal' 
aims and the assumption, represented in particular by North Rhine-Westphalia, 
that the railways should be organised along 'commercial principles', while 
giving due consideration to the interests of the Germany economy.
Nevertheless, in practice there was little fundamental difference between the 
various approaches, all sharing the basic assumption that the railways should to 
some extent be subservient to political and economic interests, being an essential 
part of the administrative doctrine of ' Daseinsvorsorgé, requiring, as a pamphlet 
from the Ministry of Transport pointed out, political interference for
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'demographic, social, cultural as well as strategic reasons, and the rights of 
citizens [...]' (Most 1954, cf. in Gutmann, Hochstrate and Schlüter 1964).
Organisational Structure
The 1951 Bundesbahn Law established the Deutsche Bundesbahn as a special 
property {Sondervermogeii) that was to some extent legally autonomous: §1 of 
the new law established the operator as a 'special property without legal 
personality with its own economic and accounting independence'. The 
'Sondervermogen' status gave the Bundesbahn budgetary and relative 
operational autonomy, allowing the operator to borrow independently on 
capital markets. It consisted of an executive of four members, appointed by the 
federal transport minister in agreement with the administrative board. The latter 
included 20 members, drawn from four distinct interests, the Lander, business, 
trade unions as well as 'free' appointments by the rninister. The executive's 
independence was limited to operational affairs. The administrative board had 
limited final authority on issues such as economic planning, annual reports, 
borrowing, appointments, rate setting, acquisitions as well as all questions 
regarding technical, operational and organisational changes. The federal 
transport minister was granted the right to veto any decision by the 
administrative board. The following discusses the (limited) debate between the 
Federal ministry of transport and the Bundesrat, the latter building on the 
proposals put forward by North Rhine-Westphalia. It again indicates two 
distinct policy environments which actors used to legitimise their proposals.
The Lander, aiming to limit the federal minister's extent of decisive influence, 
referred broadly to the provisions of the 1924 law, while the Ministry of
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Transport, in particular during the early stages, built on the proposals made by 
the 'Administration for Transport'. There was, nevertheless, a consensus in 
favour of establishing the Bundesbahn as 'Sondervermogeii, representing, a 
'legal status somewhere between an ordinary government department and a 
public corporation, though closer to the former than to the latter' (Ridley 1964: 
185). Moreover, agreement existed on the importance of the Bundesbahn's 
obligation to follow political guidance and its need to operate on commercial 
lines, giving 'due regard' to the interests of the German econom y.D ebates with 
regard to the organisational structure concerned the organisation of the 
executive as well as the composition and competencies of the administrative 
board. Controversy with regard to the organisational structure of the 'agent' (the 
Bundesbahn) concerned mainly administrative-organisational debates such as 
the competencies and composition of the administrative board and the structure 
of the executive. Nevertheless, although these debates focused mainly on 
administrative detail, the different proposals were based on the two sources of 
isomorphism, on the one side, closer ministerial control (collegiate executive, 
advisory administrative board) and, on the other side, wider operational 
discretion ('presidential' executive, administrative board given the 'competence- 
competence').
The Federal ministry of transport promoted the creation of a collegiate executive, 
consisting of three members, drawn from law, business and technology (§7 of 
the draft). Within the government, this position was opposed by the Finance 
Ministry, which preferred a 'presidential' solution. Similarly, the transport
33 BA B136/1501 - 7 June 1950.
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committee of the Bundesrat recommended that the executive should be led by a 
director general, assisted by deputy directors and the heads of individual 
departments (§13 of the Bundesrat draft). This position was shared by the GdED. 
In June 1950, it called for a presidential rather than collegial executive structure. 
It further advocated an administrative board consisting of 18 members, 
providing business, trade unions and the Bundestag with six members 
respectively.^^ A presidential executive as well as a powerful administrative 
board were also advocated by the Bundesbahn management.^^ For example, the 
former president of the Reichsbahn, Busch, argued that 'the railway, like an 
army, cannot cope with a multi-body directorate'.^^
The Transport Minister's original proposals were fully supported only by 
Seebohm's own 'Deutsche Partei'. Given this extent of opposition to the initial 
proposal, a compromise solution was offered: the executive was to consist of 
four members, whose chairman could not to be outvoted.^^ Although the 
transport committee of the Bundestag at first had proposed an executive 
consisting of eleven members, the final structure of the executive represented the 
proposal of the Transport Ministry. This followed the Ministry's indication that 
it supported majoritarian voting in the executive as well as the proposal that the
34 BA BIOS/28533 - 19 June 1950.
35 BA B121/887 - 27 May 1950.
36 BA B108/28537 -18  July 1951.
37 BA B108/28536 - 10 November 1950. In the meantime, both Social Democrats and 
Christian Democrats demanded that one member of the executive, a so-called Social 
Director, should represent and be responsible for social affairs in order to appease the 
trade unions. The unions demanded the implementation of a co-determination regime 
similar to those implemented in the steel and coal sectors.
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general director could implement measures once the support by a qualified 
minority in the executive had been secured.^^
The debate on the competencies and composition of the administrative board 
was motivated by the various political actors' desire to either establish or to 
prevent the establishment of a potential rival to the federal transport ministry. In 
particular, the debate centred on the question whether the administrative board 
should be set up as a political body (this option was named 'small parliament') 
or as an independent body (unabhangiges Gremiuni) whose membership would 
not include federal political actors. A further issue was the extent to which 
competencies were to be delegated and the extent of discretion the 
administrative board should enjoy in deciding its own agenda. The Ministry 
proposed to provide the administrative board with a list of competencies, 
relegating the administrative board to a mainly consultative body. The Finance 
Ministry opposed this proposal, supporting the option of a powerful 
administrative board which would consist of representatives from the federal 
government, the Bundestag and the Bundesrat in order to prevent political 
disagreement before issues entered the Bundestag.^^ This view was rejected by 
the Transport Ministry which argued that the influence of federal ministries 
would be safeguarded by its supervisory and regulatory powers.^^ Rather, in 
key areas, the transport minister should represent the final decision-making 
stage and could give policy guidance.
38 BA B108/28537 - 20 July 1951.
39 BA B136/1501 - 21 July 1950; BA B121/888 - 24 July 1950.
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In contrast, the Bundesrat transport committee suggested that the adrniriistrative 
board should be given overarching competence on all aspects (and the ability to 
decide on issues of its own choosing), the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz. The 
administrative board would represent the main decision-making body and key 
unit of control of the executive's operations. The adrniriistrative board was to 
combine transport, business, financial and federal interests, and should be 
responsible for key decisions, while also supervising the executive. Among its 
decision-making competencies were standard operating procedures, senior 
appointments, line closures, expenditures over DM 1 million and rates and 
charges.'^^ Its membership was to include representatives from the Lander, three 
members from business, one from agriculture, five from the trade unions, three 
from financial interests and three transport interested actors. The federal 
government was accused of being mainly interested in making the executive 
dependent on the federal transport m i n i s t e r A s  a compromise solution, 
mainly to avoid further delay by having to resort to the conciliation committee 
procedure between Bundestag and Bundesrat, the transport ministry offered 
both a decrease in number of members as well as an increase in the 
administrative board's competencies to all matters where the federal minister's 
approval was required.^^
40 BA B136/1501 - 25 July 1950.
4: BA B121/434 - 8 August 1950.
42 BA B136/1502 -18  August 1950.
43 BA B108/28536 - 10 November 1950. This shift was also caused by internal 
government pressure. For example, a note by the Chancellor's Office noted that the 
Transport Ministry had abandoned its 'stubborn insistence' on its own proposals and was 
now willing to compromise on the lines of a stronger administrative board (BA 
B136/1503 - 14 February 1951).
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The final outcome reflected a compromise position between the two domain- 
oriented proposals. It reflected to a large extent the overarching consensus on the 
'appropriate' role of the railway operator. While the 'special property' status 
offered the Bundesbahn some extent of operational autonomy, its actions were 
nevertheless closely controlled by political actors. Furthermore, the debate with 
regard to the composition and competencies of the administrative board could 
be interpreted not only in terms of increased Bundesbahn autonomy, but also in 
an attempt by the Lander to establish their representation at the core of decision­
making at the expense of the federal ministry. In contrast to the UK 
'socialisation' of the railways, the regulatory objective to provide for 'efficiency' 
was of little concern to decision-makers. Instead, prime attention was paid to the 
issue of control, both in terms of federal-intergovernmental relations and in 
terms of state-operator relations.
The allocation of regulatory authority
There was a shared consensus that the federal minister of transport should be 
responsible for ensuring the Bundesbahn's compliance to political 'guidelines' 
and for executing 'sovereign tasks' (hoheitliche Befugnissè). The 1951 law 
required the minister to ensure that the Bundesbahn would take account of 
priorities concerning transport, economic, financial and social policy. More 
importantly, the minister was given the task to co-ordinate all modes of 
transport. Furthermore, rninisterial regulatory powers included the imposition 
of 'common policy directions' {allgemeine Anordnungen), veto powers for 
decisions concerning internal organisational matters, economic planning, annual 
reports and issues with larger financial implications. At the same time, the
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Bundesbahn was given regulatory objectives, including the obligation to operate 
along commercial lines, to safeguard the perceived interests of the German 
economy and to cover its own expenditures. Full financial independence was 
granted for the 'application of commercial principles', the production of an 
economic plan and an annual report and the right to borrow independently on 
capital markets. This independence was, however, balanced by the 
Bundesbahn's dependence on political decisions with regard to rate-setting, 
personnel and social policy.
Again, the debate on the allocation and extent of regulatory powers of the 
transport minister drew on the two domain-oriented proposals. In April 1950, 
the Transport ministry argued that the Bundesbahn had 'to serve the German 
people and the German economy as a federally owned transport agency'.'^ 
Therefore, appropriate regulatory powers were necessary, such as the ability to 
impose political imperatives with regard to financial, social, economic and 
transport policy. The Ministry claimed that the regulatory powers of the minister 
were legitimised by the constitutional provision of Art. 65 of the Basic Law. This 
clause, establishing, amongst others, the principle of ministerial responsibility, 
formed the basis of the ministerial demands for substantial regulatory powers. It 
was stated that the ministry's key task was to establish an 'equilibrium' between 
the various modes of transport."^^ Although direct intervention and guidance in 
operational activities were to be avoided, the public importance of the 
Bundesbahn necessitated that in some cases ministers needed to be involved in
44 BA B136/1500 - 26 April 1950.
45 BA B136/1501 - 7 June 1950.
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individual policy issues and that certain issues were decided with the consent of 
the federal transport minister in co-operation with the finance minister.^^ 
Finally, Seebohm also argued that regulation was important as the Bundesbahn 
would otherwise exploit its market power and destroy its small-scale 
competitors in the road haulage industry.^^
This proposed degree of regulatory power contrasted sharply with the NRW 
proposals where the minister was not given any authority to enforce the 
Bundesbahn's compliance to government policies. Furthermore, neither finance 
nor transport minister were to be involved in formulating the annual business 
plan, a power both ministers had under the 1924 law. The Bundesbahn argued 
that the NRW plans would not sufficiently represent the operator's status as 
federal property. As federal property, the Bundesbahn argued that its primary 
role was to fulfil the demands for transport services according to 'commonweal' 
principles and political g u i d e l i n e s . ^ ^
The debate concerning regulatory powers centred mainly on the ministerial right 
to intervene on individual policy issues. The railway expert Kittel stressed that 
the extent of supervision should be minimised and concerned with operational 
safety. Furthermore, it should not be exercised by the transport ministry. The 
Bundesrat transport committee argued that the minister should be given the 
power to issue 'common policy directions' only. This view was also shared by 
the reports by the railway experts Homberger and Cottier as well as by the
46 BA B136/1501 - 7 June 1950.
47 BA B136/1501 - 25 July 1950.
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consultants Coverdale and C o l p i t t s . T h e  Bundesrat transport committee 
proposed to give the federal minister powers to enforce the operator's 
compliance to political directions, the right to give 'common policy directions' as 
well as the requirement of ministerial consent to economic policy, annual reports 
and decisions made by the administrative board. The committee argued that the 
proposed extent of ministerial regulatory powers would contravene the 
administrative board's position as main source of supervision and guidance.^® 
However, it was conceded that in terms of ministerial authority, the NRW plan 
provided for too little, while the proposals of the academic advisory council 
provided for too much. Most appropriate, in the opinion of the Bundesrat's 
transport committee, was an arrangement following the suggestions of the 
'Allgemeine AusschuR'. This granted the minister the right to consent to the 
annual business plan and report. The minister should have the limited right to 
give 'common policy directions' and the Bundesbahn was to be forced to comply 
with political guidance.^^ The view that the Ministry's proposals allowed for too 
much ministerial power was shared by the main parties with the exception of 
Seebohm's national-conservative 'Deutsche Partei'.S im ilarly , the Chancellor's 
Office objected to the Transport Ministry's proposals, arguing that the suggested 
powers were too strong and should be limited to the power to give 'common 
policy directions'.
48 BA B121/880 - 20 December 1949.
49 BA B136/1501 - 21 July 1950.
50 BA B136/1502 - 18 August 1950.
51 BA B121/887 - 7 June 1950.
52 BA B136/1502 - 25 November 1950. The 'Deutsche Partei' had 17 representatives in the 
first Bundestag, gaining 4.2 per cent in the first federal election in 1949.
192
In contrast, the Transport Ministry claimed that the proposed scope of powers 
was necessary as the notion of 'common policy direction' was already being 
applied under the law of the Unified Economic Area and its vague wording had 
caused difficulties between the minister and the Bundesbahn management.^^ 
Ministerial regulatory control was to be restrained and therefore not limitless or 
arbitrary. Any ministerial guidance was restricted to the achievement of three 
goals, the enforcement of political priorities, the co-ordination of the interests of 
the various modes of transport and the realisation of regulatory powers with 
regard to the appropriate conduct of operations and the technological 
development of the railway service.^"^
The final compromise limited ministerial involvement to 'common ministerial 
directions' (§14). Nevertheless, the minister was granted the right to enforce 
'political imperatives' (so-called Grundsatze der PolitiR), in particular with 
regard to transport, business, finance and social policy, the 'ability' to 'co­
ordinate' the various means of transport in order to establish 'harmony', to 
maintain safety and to ensure adaptation to evolving technological 
developments. The federal government would decide in cases of disagreement 
between the minister of transport and the administrative board. At the same 
time, the Lander obtained considerable veto-powers over railway policy with 
regard to organisational re-arrangements, rates, timetables, line closures and 
senior appointments (§43). These powers of veto and delay were, however, not
BR 615/50 - 3 April 1950. This view was also expressed in inter-ministerial 
negotiations in June 1950 (CAB B121/887 - 7 June 1950).
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matched with financial responsibilities (Dernbach 1995: 124; also Fromm 1969). 
The Bundesbahn's regulatory objectives included the duty to balance its budget 
(§28(1)), to administer the railways according to commercial principles and to 
protect the interests of the Germany economy (§4(1)).
Debates concerning the allocation of regulatory authority was limited, with the 
sole exception of the proposals by NRW. There was a wide consensus on the 
'appropriate' regulatory functions of the minister. The debate on key issues, in 
particular on 'common policy directions' resembled those in the UK. However, 
in contrast to the UK, there were no other regulatory bodies (such as the 
transport tribunal) which checked or reduced ministerial powers (with the 
partial exception of the administrative board which could be regarded as an 
internal regulator). The regulatory objective was to safeguard the Bundesbahn's 
'commonweal' function, very much in contrast to the UK where the safeguarding 
of 'efficiency' was the key concern.
Non-commercial objectives
All actors agreed that rate-setting was one of the key political levers to conduct 
economic policy. The 'Allgemeine Eisenbahngesetz', which established the 
obligations for 'public transport', stated that the aim of the rate policy was to 
have 'a common and economically acceptable rate for all railways and to 
accommodate it according to the demands of transport, the economy and the 
modes of t ra nspor t ' . The  regulation and control of transport charges was
54 BA B108/28536 -10  November 1950.
55 Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz, 29 March 1951.
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regarded as a 'sovereign task' which was a 'natural' part of the federal transport 
minister's brief. The existing rate structure reflected the previous market 
dominance of the rail operator, allowing for cross-subsidisation of local 
passenger services by long-distance freight operations. The increasing challenge 
of the road haulage industry had progressively undermined the cross­
subsidisation mechanism, leading to restrictive regulatory arrangements with 
regard to road transport in the pre-War period: in 1930 parity between road and 
rail charges as well as restrictive licensing were imposed, leading to a cartel-like 
arrangement in the road haulage industry (Dernbach 1995:122-3). The following 
describes the policy debate which centred mainly on the extent of exposure of 
the government's budgetary resources to the operator's demands for 
compensation for politically demanded non-commercial services, the 
mechanisms for compensation payments and the need to safeguard against 
'unjustified' claims by the Bundesbahn.
The Bundesbahn's regulatory objectives included the requirement to 'serve' the 
Germany people and economy. This requirement was implemented mainly via 
politically manipulated tariff-levels. At the same time, the provisions for 
financial compensation of the Bundesbahn for losses incurred for the 
performance of 'commonweal' functions were of crucial importance to the 
federal budget, the extent of 'commercial' operations as well as relations to other 
modes of transport. For example, the Bundesrat transport committee argued that 
'the Bundesbahn has via its traditional commonweal function been obliged to 
adapt its rates according to economic needs'. Due to changing market conditions.
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however, the Bundesbahn had to be protected from financial damage incurred 
by the imposition of non-commercial policies.^^
Moreover, the rate-setting issue affected the extent of discretion with which the 
Bundesbahn should exercise its functions. In particular, the Finance Ministry 
was concerned with the likely impact on federal finances if an automatic right to 
financial compensation for loss-making public services was granted. As a 
consequence, the Federal finance ministry demanded close control of the 
Bundesbahn's operational conduct and threatened to demand joint regulatory 
authority, if 'commonweal functions' were to receive automatic financial 
compensation. In contrast, the Transport Ministry and the Bundesbahn both 
pointed out that the proposed clauses, requiring a review by the cabinet on the 
impact of measures on the Bundesbahn's finances when deciding on rate levels, 
represented a mere moral obligation.^^
Whereas the Finance Ministry urged that the autonomy of the operator should 
be strongly limited and provided for a high degree of discretion for ministers to 
decide on financial compensation, NRW's proposals granted the Bundesbahn a 
substantial degree of autonomy. Its proposals amounted, in the eyes of critics, to 
the 'abolition of the rate setting authority {Tarifhohei^ of the federal transport 
minister and the federal government [...] freeing the Bundesbahn's leadership of 
any duty to maximise e c o n o m y N R W ' s  plans suggested that the
56 BA B121/434 - 8 August 1950.
57 BA B121/887 - 14 June 1950.
58 BA B121/880 - 21 December 1949. Hufnagel also warned that an interest in 
maintaining the financial viability of the operator should not lead to an outcome which
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Bundesbahn's executive and administrative board could alter rates 
autonomously if the impact was limited to two milHon DM annually per 
individual measure. Any upward change in rates put forward by the 
Bundesbahn and then vetoed by the government would require a financial 
subsidy to balance the loss in income. In cases where the federal government 
demanded rate changes, the Bundesbahn had to be compensated for any 
negative impact arising from these measures .Should  the Bundestag approve 
these additional expenditures, then the rate changes should be enacted. These 
proposals were widely criticised for their extent of delegation and agent 
discretion, not only by the federal government, but also by other Lander in the 
Bundesrat. While the Transport Ministry proposed that the Bundesbahn should 
be given the right to object to the imposition of any loss-making rate changes,^® 
the Bundesrat transport committee argued that the Bundesbahn should be given 
the right to be compensated in order not to be financially damaged by political 
decisions with rate changes requiring ministerial consent.^^ The Chancellor's 
Office took a similar line, claiming that it was necessary that the government, 
when imposing loss-making duties on the Bundesbahn, should question first 
whether it would compensate the Bundesbahn or whether it should impose 
these policies in the first place.^^ Nevertheless, the 'official' government line was 
to give the Bundesbahn the right to question rate-setting measures that would
would give the Bundesbahn management a 'comfortable cushion {Faulenzer- und 
Ruhekissen) to rest on' (BA B121/434 - 5 March 1950).
59 BA B121/434 -1 7  March 1950; BA B121/880 - 21 December 1949.
60 BA B136/1502 - 25 November 1950.
61 BA B121/880 - 2 March 1950.
62 BA B136/1502 - 25 November 1950.
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lead to financial losses, leaving the cabinet to decide whether any compensation 
should be paid.
In contrast, the Bundestag transport committee, arguing that the government's 
position was insufficient, recommended that the Bundesbahn should also be 
able to question 'other measures' beyond those of rate setting which the 
government wished to impose.^^ It was the duty of the federal government to 
compensate the operator for any losses incurred following these requests.^ As 
before, the Finance Minister was strongly opposed to such proposals, claiming 
that it was necessary to protect the federal budget from unpredictable demands 
and to participate in the determination of the Bundesbahn's business strategies 
as otherwise the Bundesbahn would have full discretion in determining which 
policy measures it regarded as loss-making,^^
The final outcome allowed rate measures to be imposed against the 
Bundesbahn's intentions (§28). While the Bundesbahn was granted a right to 
compensation, this right was curtailed by political decisions: on the one hand, 
any compensation depended on the severity of its financial impact and whether 
an annual profit had been achieved, on the other hand, the federal government 
was to decide on the amount of compensation to be paid (see also Fromm 1971).
At the same time, a regulatory regime was devised for the road haulage sector, 
which, after the end of the Second World War, had been left unregulated.
63 BA BIOS/28537 - 5 December 1950.
64 BA B136/1503 -14  February 1951.
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Following pressure from the Bundesbahn, the federal goverrunent established a 
structure that resembled the pre-Second World War arrangements of 1936.^^ It 
represented an attempt to safeguard the Bundesbahn's (and the existing road 
haulage undertakings') status by restricting market access via licences, by 
allocating new licences only if a 'public transport need' could be established, by 
linking road haulage to railway rates and by establishing the 'federal authority 
for long-distance road haulage transport' {Bundesanstalt fiir Giiterfemverkehi). 
The latter represented an 'officialisation' of the pre-war self-organised cartel 
(Laaser 1987:14, also Diekmann 1989).^^
The issue of rate-setting highHghts the importance attributed by the federal 
government to secure tools to steer economic and regional policy, despite a clear 
awareness of the potential costs of such a policy. The interest in restricting the 
operator's discretion in financial affairs was due to the wish to rninimise the risk 
of financial liability on the federal budget. Furthermore, the veto-power of the 
Lander further minimised the commercial autonomy of the operator. Therefore, 
rather than the protection of the railway operator itself, the policy on non­
commercial services was shaped by an interest to maintain political 
constituencies by miriimising operational discretion in service delivery, while 
shifting the financial consequences for these services to the operator.
65 BA B108/28545 - 5 March 1951.
66 In 1936, a unified road haulage charge was established at the same level of railway 
rates. Later, a 'self-regulatory' organisation, the 'Reichskraftwagenbetriebsverband' was 
established to control the implementation of the unified charging regime by taking over 
the responsibility for billing and payments.
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The impact of institutional factors
DiMaggio and Powell's claim (1991a: 70) that among the sources of isomorphism 
is a search by policy-makers for models they regard as more successful or 
legitimate. In the case of the 1951 Bundesbahn-Law, these 'legitimate' models 
were either the model established in the form of the Deutsche Reichsbahn 
Gesellschaft in 1924 or the model of close ministerial and political control as 
practised by the National Socialist government after 1933 and formally after 
1939. Despite the conflict between these two 'policy environments', there was a 
shared consensus that the new regulatory regime was to maintain the railways' 
traditional 'commonweal' function rather than to enhance 'efficiency' as in the 
case of the UK.
The final outcome represented a compromise between the two sources of 
'national tradition' in the domestic policy domain. Much attention was paid to 
the appropriate organisational distance between minister and railway operator 
as well as constraining the organisational strength of the operator in terms of the 
debates on establishing a director general and the competencies of the 
administrative board. In contrast to the UK public corporation approach, the 
German regulatory approach did not rely on informal understandings between 
public corporation chairman and relevant minister, but established an extensive 
and formalised catalogue of competencies.^^ There was a marked absence of 
'paradigm-oriented' isomorphism, either in terms of domestic ordo-liberal
'Güterverkehrsànderungsgesetz' of 2 September 1949.
This does not deny the importance and frequent occurrence of informal pohtical 
pressure.
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discourse, or in terms of a stronger emphasis of the US military government on 
institutional design.
The insulation o f the regulatory space from coercive pressures 
Despite the political authority of the allied powers over the German 
administration, in particular prior to 1955, these did not exert a decisive 
influence on the railways. While at the early stages of policy deliberation the US 
administration demanded a more commercial orientation of the Bundesbahn 
and tighter limits to ministerial powers of intervention, the formulation of the 
regulatory regime was to a large extent a domestic process. This can be 
explained by the absence of any financial interests via reparation demands of the 
allied powers and the desire to delegate the administration of the economic 
activities in the allied zones to German actors in order to encourage a rapid 
return of economic activities. This would also limit the allied financial 
commitment for the reconstruction of (West) Germany. Furthermore, even when 
international proposals existed, especially the report by Coverdale and Colpitts, 
these proposals focused mainly on the financial regime of the Bundesbahn rather 
than the overall regulatory structure. Most proposed measures were non- 
controversial for German administrators.
The insulation o f the political-administrative nexus in the regulatory space 
The domestic domain orientation of proposals was facilitated by the insulation 
of the regulatory space from non-domain actors. The competing proposals were 
used to legitimise the self-interest of the Lander, aiming to minimise the federal 
minister's powers, while maintaining control over the Bundesbahn via
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membership of the administrative board.^^ Due to their institutional veto-power 
via the Bundesrat as well their prior existence vis-à-vis the federal government, 
the Lander were able to regain considerable decision-making power which they 
had lost following the 'nationalisation' of the Reichsbahn in 1920.
In contrast, the federal government, especially the Transport Ministry under 
Seebohm, was interested in maximising control over the railway operator for 
regional and social reasons and rnmimising discretion and potential financial 
liability. A further incentive to minimise the commercial autonomy of the 
operator was the desire to avoid staff reductions at a time of potential political, 
social and economic volatility.
While the debate between the Lander and the federal government on the 
domain-orientation of the regulatory reform can be understood in terms of their 
constitutional position, the regulatory reform can be regarded as an outcome of 
the insulation of the regulatory space from non-transport actors. The key debates 
had already been conducted by actors in a closed policy community which had 
co-operated across political-administrative and societal lines, formulating and 
deliberating policies before the establishment of the Administration of 
Transport, in the Adrninistration's deliberative committee, in political
Their lack of interest in commercial efficiency was also evident in their criticism of the 
'Reichsbahn' in the immediate post-war period. The Economic Committee of the Lander 
Council condemned the railways' business conduct for not fulfilling its expected 
compensatory roles during business cycle downturns. Instead of investing in new assets 
or repairs to locomotives and roUing stock, the Reichsbahn was accused of having been 
over-cautious with its orders and of having asked manufacturers to delay their deliveries 
{Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 June 1949).
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committees of the Reichsbahn and in Bundestag and Bundesrat committees. 
Other actors did not feature in these negotiations and were only involved (such 
as the Finance Ministry) where their institutional competence was affected. 
There was therefore no involvement of the Economics Ministry, which at the 
time was promoting the so-called 'social market' model. Arguably, the different 
schools promoting a 'social market economy', ranging from ordo-Hberal pro­
competition views to arguments emphasising the importance of social welfare, 
did not offer a clear policy recipe which could have been directly applied to a 
pohcy domain.
The insulation o f the regulatory space from societal pressures 
Accounts stressing the importance of societal actors in the formulation of 
regulatory regimes have difficulty in explaining regulatory choices in the 
railways in post-Second World War Germany. The Bundesbahn's initial 
demands, to be given operational autonomy along the lines of the 1924 model, 
were not fulfilled. While business associations were successful in maintaining 
'political control' over rate setting, they were less successful in their demands 
concerning the organisational obligations of the Bundesbahn and their demands 
for a more autonomous Bundesbahn, proposing a substantial business influence 
via the administrative board. Similarly, trade union demands were 
accommodated by the cross-party support for the institution of a 'Social 
D i rec to rC ru c ia l ly ,  these 'private interests' not only acted in a 'private' 
capacity in advancing their own position, but were also drawn upon as 'public' 
actors in the deliberation process. Thus, former railway officials were used as
See footnote 36.
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'experts' in the influential 'Allgemeine Ausschufi'. Furthermore, the transport 
academic consensus on the 'particularity' of the railways as a state activity 
facilitated the insulation of the policy domain. The introduction of competition 
was seen as violating the 'organic' relationship between state and operator. 
There was, therefore, among societal actors, not only a consensus on domain- 
oriented reforms (thus, a continuation of low transport charges for freight), but 
also a far-reaching membership of societal actors inside the regulatory space.
Conclusion
The case of the 1951 Bundesbahn law offers a surprising case of lack of coercive 
influence (and lack of interest by the allied powers). Regulatory design ideas 
were purely domestic and domain-oriented. The absence of either international 
or domestic paradigm-oriented proposals has been explained by the 
unchallenged insulation of both the political-administrative nexus and of the 
societal actors in the regulatory space. This insulation prevented the 
introduction of 'international' or alternative, such as ordo-liberal, domestic ideas 
at the alternative generation and agenda setting stages.
This case provides an example of a choice between two domestic domain- 
oriented sources of isomorphism, differing in the terms of their 'tradition' as 
their reference point. The insulation of both societal as well as political - 
administrative actors in the regulatory space was crucial for the selection of 
design ideas. All actors agreed that the railways were a sector 'deserving' 
political control and which should not be exposed to competitive market forces. 
The combination of societal as well as political and administrative actors can be 
understood as a tightly knit policy community which elaborated on proposals
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for the regulation of the federal railways prior to the setting up of the 
Administration for Transport and was in continuous interaction, both in political 
process via the Bundesrat and Bundestag committees, and also in committees of 
the Bundesbahn. The insulation of this policy domain was unchallenged.^^ The 
shared consensus on the 'commonweal' and 'servant' functions of the railways 
was sustained not only by the self-interest of political and economic actors, 
wishing to please constituencies with regional and structural 'benefits' via low 
transport rates and railway connections, but also by the then dominant academic
consensus.
This case therefore differs remarkably from the history of the competition law on 
competitive practices of 1957.
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Section IV: Regulatory Reform and Forms of Privatisation
Privatisation became one of the key themes to describe the policies and politics 
of public sector reform during the 1980s and 1990s. So-called 'New Right' 
advocates regarded privatisation as the key to better government at less cost. A 
'privatised agent' was said to offer substantial efficiency and productivity gains, 
being able to compete in a market which had supposedly become increasingly 
'globalised' and 'informatised'. While privatisation has been broadly defined as 
the 'introduction of private ownership into trading enterprises previously 
owned by governments' (Hood 1994: 37), the actual practice of privatisation 
varied in both meaning and form. Four broad types can be distinguished:
(1) organisational privatisation; an alteration in the legal status of the 
undertaking, but not its ownership status;
(2) the sale of the operator;
(3) service provision transferred to the private sector and the 'withdrawal of the 
state' (so-called 'deinstitutionalisation', Dunleavy 1991: 228-30);
(4) service delivery undertaken by the private sector controlled by various 
mechanisms such as competitive tendering, contracting out, franchising or 
voucher schemes.
In Britain and Germany, a 'privatisation' of the railway sector was initiated in the 
early 1990s. However, while in Britain 'privatisation' involved a combination of 
(2) and (4), in the German case 'privatisation' followed (1) and (4). Both countries 
were headed by right-of-centre governments. The regulatory space of the 
railway domain in both countries was under challenge from numerous sources.
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Europeanisation - both in terms of initiatives by the European Commission as 
well as reform attempts in other European countries (particularly Sweden) - 
encouraged organisational and regulatory change (Denkhaus 1997; Knill and 
Lehmkuhl 1998). Despite being one of the original common policy areas under 
the Treaty of Rome, European legislation had, prior to the 1980s, little impact on 
the national level. Nevertheless, the Commission's approach had been to 
demand greater commercial autonomy for the operators via the introduction of 
pubhc service contracts. Following a ruling of the European Court of Justice in 
1986, condemning the Council for its inaction after a complaint by the European 
Parliament, the European Commission took a more active, liberalising role in 
transport pohcy. In the wake of the Single Market initiative, the Council passed, 
on the initiative of the European Commission's Transport DC VII under Karel 
van Miert, Directive 91/440 EEC which called for the operational autonomy of 
the railway operators, the separation of the infrastructure from service 
operations at least in accounting terms, open access for international 
undertakings (defined as joint ventures between operators from more than one 
member state and any company transporting goods across borders by both rail 
and road), the introduction of track access charges and the demand for a sound 
financial basis for rail operators. Of further crucial importance for the 
organisation of 'public services' was Council Regulation 1893/91, which altered 
Regulation 1191/69, calhng for the elimination of public sector obligations 
except for regional and local passenger transport and requiring the purchase of 
public services by contractual agreement by the 'relevant authority' (Magiera 
1993).^ The impact of 'Europe' on national railway policy has been analysed by
 ^ In other transport sectors, the Commission's role in the hberalisation of domestic
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Knill and Lehmkuhl (1998). They argue that in the case of the UK, European 
legislation provided additional legitimisation, while in the German case, 
' Europeanisation' is claimed to have provided additional legitimisation, a 
conceptual framework for organisational reform and also a means to limit 
potential opposition. Thus, they conclude that the Directive is one example of 
integration by 'support building'. In contrast, Ira Denkhaus (1997) has 
highUghted the role of the European Commission as 'policy diffuser' of the 
vertical separation model. The following two chapters allow a re-examination of 
these claims relating to the importance of 'coercive forces'.
In terms of insulation of the regulatory space from societal actors, various 
changes occurred. There was an increasing concern with environmental 
pollution and traffic congestion (both politically as well as in terms of 'popular 
concern') which encouraged pohtical actors to consider policies encouraging a 
modal shift from road to rail transport. At the same time, the financial and 
operational performance of the railway operators in both countries had 
weakened their institutional status. During the whole post-war period, the 
market position of the two railway operators had declined:
markets was more prominent. In the field of road haulage a policy eliminating 
restrictions on cabotage was launched in 1998 and fully completed by 1998. The 
hberalisation of road haulage markets can be regarded as one incentive to reform 
nahonal railway regulation, given their competition for freight traffic (see Sitter et al. 
1999; Héritier 1997, Schmidt 1998: 273-300).
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Freight m arket share (in per cent)
Germany Britain
year rail road rail road
1965 38.6 17.9 20.8 57.5
1970 36.8 17.7 18.4 62.5
1975 31.1 25.2 17.9 65.7
1980 30.0 29.0 10.3 53.1
1985 28.8 33.6 8.0 55.1
1990 24.4 39.9 7.3 62.1
1993 23.2 41.0 6.6 64.0
sties Great Britain, Statistisches Bundesamt).^
In the overall passenger market, official estimates suggest that the Deutsche 
Bundesbahn's market share in long distance passenger market decreased from 16 
per cent in 1960 to 6 per cent in 1990.^ In Britain, there was a similar decline from 
14 per cent in 1960 to a share of 6 per cent in 1990. The market share of car 
transport increased in the same period in Britain from 49 per cent to 86 per cent. 
At the same time the German financial performance worsened continuously, 
despite financial subsidies, DM 54bn in total from 1975 to 1990, yet the annual 
deficit increased from DM 4.4bn to DM 5bn. Long term debt had reached DM 
50bn with armual interest payments amounting to DM 3bn (Link 1994: 251-2). 
The situation with British Rail was different. In contrast to other European 
railways, British Rail's financial position improved during the 1980s despite 
reductions in public subsidies. However, major losses were recorded again in the 
early 1990s, peaking in the financial year 1992/93 with losses amounting to 
£183.4 milhon.
 ^ Official statistics for the British case were amended in 1986 for all data from 1983. 
Previous publications note that the freight market share of the road sector was 58% (1980) 
and 60% (1985). This decline was due to the increase in water and pipeline transport.
 ^ No official German data is published to show modal shifts in transport except for 
'organised' modes of transport which exclude the use of individual means of transport.
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Furthermore, there was also a change in the 'intellectual climate'. Besides the 
'bandwagoning' of the 'privatisation' idea, which became increasingly acceptable 
as a policy instrument applicable to the railways following experiences in other 
domains, there was, within the transport domain, a change in the perception of 
the importance of infrastructure. A modern infrastructure was increasingly 
regarded as the most effective tool for effectively achieving the aims of national 
policy-makers, such as the reduction of accidents, pollution, congestion and 
energy consumption, while also promoting mobility. Furthermore, there was a 
growing academic consensus that the traditional role of the state in the provision 
of railway services was no longer appropriate: the traditional tools of national 
transport policy - entry and price controls - seemed to conflict with the general 
move towards greater market liberalisation (Baum 1992). Nevertheless, the 
ability to implement these policy measures was made possible only by the major 
technological innovations in information technology (Denkhaus 1997).
There were therefore considerable pressures on national actors in the railway 
domain. The following two chapters provide an analysis of the two 
'privatisation' experiences and the design of regulatory regimes for the post­
privatisation period. While the British railway privatisation involved the transfer 
of the fragmented undertakings to the private sector, in Germany, the railway 
operator was kept integrated and established as a private law undertaking in 
public ownership.
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Chapter Seven 
'Regulation by Competition' as switchman for the traffic of 
regulatory design ideas in Britain
The philosophy o f the A ct was competition
IUK22
The United Kingdom is said to have pioneered the introduction of competition 
into previously monopolistic industries. The case of the privatisation of British 
Raü has been regarded as the culmination of the 'privatisation experience' in 
Britain, given, in comparison with other railway reforms across Europe, the 
extraordinary fragmentation of the privatised industry. An analysis of the 
regulation of the privatised British railways is, however, not only valuable for 
the history of British privatisations or for comparative transport studies. In 
contrast to other privatisation accounts which highlight the 'state capacity' of a 
British government, in particular institutional features such as majoritarian 
government and the absence of constitutional and institutional veto-points as 
key variables for explaining far-reaching reforms in comparative perspective 
(e.g. Grande and Schneider 1991), the case of British Rail offers an example of a 
weak government implementing an extensive regulatory reform.
The British railway privatisation offers a case of a 'paradigm-oriented' regulatory 
reform. It also allows for the evaluation of the three institutional mechanisms 
and their impact on regulatory design ideas and policy instrument selection. 
First, the regulatory space, as already noted above, was operating within the 
scope of European legislation. Second, the existence of privatisation and 
regulation experiences allowed administrative and political actors to draw on
211
design ideas and experiences. Third, the private sector had become more 
sophisticated and interested in 'privatised' utiHties. Furthermore, the 1980s saw 
the emergence of new bus companies following the deregulation of the bus 
industry with the 1985 Transport Act (Glaister, et al. 1998: 40-2). At the same 
time, British Raü had the reputation for being extremely difficult to reform due 
to the strength of the raüway unions.
This chapter sets out the context of railway privatisation in Britain, then 
discusses the emergence of paradigm-oriented regulatory ideas and then 
assesses the development and implementation of the 'hardwired' regulatory 
regime. In particular, it highlights the importance of paradigm-oriented reform 
ideas, emphasising the importance of competition which in the course of the 
implementation process were in some cases facilitated, for example the 
privatisation of Railtrack, while in other issues, the doctrine was compromised, 
for example in the decision to 'moderate' competition.
Setting the context
Throughout the 1980s, when the Conservative government under Margaret 
Thatcher undertook major privatisation programmes, British Rail 'remained the 
hard nut to crack'. On the one hand, this was due to political reasons. Margaret 
Thatcher, despite her hostility towards public transport, and British Rail in 
particular, 'was always suspicious of one or two privatisations, the Post Office 
for instance, and the railways were another. She felt the unions were so 
entrenched and that we could have strikes and people not being able to get to
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work'.^ On the other hand, there were administrative reasons, because of the 
perceived inherent loss-making of politically-sensitive railway services, 'we had 
not really got then to the point of seriously turning our minds to creating 
structures which could combine privatisation with subsidy requirement'.^
Until the late 1980s, the main initiatives were carried forward and developed by 
British Rail itself. The general hostile attitude of the Thatcher government, in 
particular following the critical 1983 Serpell Report, initiated due to the failure of 
British Rail to meet its Public Sector Obligation (PSD) targets because of the 
recession 1979-81, led to a reduction in PSO payments by 25 per cent in real 
terms between 1983 and 1986.  ^Under the 1983 policy, set by the then Transport 
Secretary, Nicholas Ridley, British Rail was required to achieve an operating 
profit of five per cent in its freight business by 1988 and to break even in its 
parcels and catering businesses. The PSO grant was further reduced by an 
additional 25 per cent for the period 1986/7 -1988/90, with the requirement that 
the Intercity business was to become ineligible for any public money after 
March 1988 (Dodgson 1994: 233). Despite these reductions in subsidies, Chris 
Nash argues that the government's policy of setting clear and transparent 
objectives provided British Rail with a far more formal and secure framework 
(Nash 1988).
4 lUKlO.
5 IUK12
 ^The PSO was established under the 1974 Act and defined the services imposed on BR 
by the government for which they received a block grant.
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British Rail itself, under its then chairman Robert Reid, launched a major internal 
reform programme, making non-core businesses more autonomous and 
implementing internal organisational changes (Gourvish 1990). The so-called 
'sectorisation' below the Board level led to a separation of BR's core businesses - 
Intercity, Network SouthEast (pre-1986 London & South East), Provincial, 
Freight and Parcels - with the intended goal of making BR 'business-led' rather 
than 'production-led' (Gourvish 1990:118). Throughout the 1980s, BR's economic 
performance improved, productivity increased, property values boomed and the 
three passenger sectors showed substantial growth in real income from 1982 to 
1988. In particular, the InterCity operations achieved the government's objectives 
and improved in real terms by 121 per cent, while the parcels and freight 
businesses remained loss-making.
British Rail's internal policy to make its non-core businesses more autonomous 
was soon followed by the Government's wish to sell these to the private sector, 
while the rail operator had hoped to introduce private capital in the form of joint 
ventures (Gourvish 1990: 136). The newly established British Rail Investment 
Limited (BRIL) acted as a holding company for the assets of the British Transport 
Hotels, Sealink UK, the hovercraft operator Seaspeed and other non-operational 
properties. The hotel, ferry and hovercraft operations were all sold by the end of 
1984. In the engineering sector, competitive tendering for rolling stock 
requirements was introduced in 1983. By 1987, the engineering subsidiary British 
Rail Engineering Limited (BREL) had lost 53 per cent of orders for locomotives 
and coaches to the private sector. BREL was subsequently broken up in 1987 
and, in 1988, sold to management buy-out teams. In 1988, British Rail also 
reported its best results since its formation in 1948. Benefiting from the so-called
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'Lawson-boom', and in particular from its success in property developments, it 
made a surplus of £290.9 million after a loss in 1987 of £82.6 million.^
At the same time, train accidents brought the desolate state of an old-fashioned 
infrastructure to the attention of the public. British Rail suffered from chronic 
underfunding, leading to staff shortages and the failure to install modern 
braking systems throughout the whole network. A report in 1989 by Sir Anthony 
Hidden following the Clapham Junction incident, which had led to the death of 
35 people, concluded that the main reasons for the accident were underpaid, 
overworked and unfit employees, an unwilling and incapable management and 
deferred investment decisions due to fluctuating government spending 
commitments as well as trade union practices which inhibited progressive 
change.
A summer of one-day railway strikes in 1989 led to a deterioration in the 
relationship between government and British Rail's management with the 
government accusing British Rail of being too 'wet' towards the trade unions and 
senior politicians such as Norman Tebbit making renewed calls for the 
privatisation of the railway operator {Financial Times, 13 July 1989). In contrast 
to the increased political hostility towards British Rail, there was a growing 
support for 'public transport' and environmental issues. While the Green Party 
gained a surprising share of the vote in the 1989 European elections, an 
increased number of party motions at the Conservative Party conference called 
for a viable system of public transport. Public opinion polls also suggested a
 ^ In terms of market share, British Rail's role remained marginal: seven per cent in the
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general perception of government failure in the area of public transport 
(Financial Times, 1 October 1990). In addition, there was an increased interest in 
transport infrastructure projects with the Channel Tunnel Project, resulting in an 
doubling of British Rail's capital spending to £1.4bn in 1992/3 according to the 
White Paper on Public Expenditure. The departure of Margaret Thatcher and her 
Transport Secretary, Cecil Parkinson, and their replacement in the Autumn 1990 
by John Major and Malcolm Rifkind seemed to herald a new era for government 
- public transport relations. A new emphasis was given to promoting transport 
by rail, partly to rectify the public perception that the Conservative government 
was against public transport and partly to attract more freight rail transport due 
to the opening of the Channel Tunnel.^
To summarise, BR's policy environment changed over the 1980s with an 
increased emphasis on liberalisation and privatisation. This emphasis, based on 
utility privatisations and bus deregulation of external policy environments was 
also followed by internal changes within BR, both in terms of the sale of non­
core businesses and in terms of internal reforms such as 'sectorisation' which 
offered a potential blueprint for an eventual transfer to the private sector. 
However, these isomorphic pressures which encouraged an increasing 
homogenisation of the regulatory regime for the core activity of British Rail with 
its policy environment were, until the late 1980s, hindered by political (fear of 
strikes) and administrative (problem of subsidy payments) doubts.
The emergence of regulatory ideas 
passenger and eight per cent in the freight market.
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This section considers the discussions concerning the regulation and 
organisation of a privatised British railway system. It discusses the existence of 
domain-oriented proposals, expressed mainly by the Department of Transport 
and British Rail, which both, at first at least, argued for a continuation of the 
reforms British Rail had internally undertaken during the 1980s and early 1990s. 
In contrast, there was the accumulated experience of previous utility 
privatisations in the Treasury and the belief that the creation of a competitive 
structure was preferable to a reliance on post-privatisation regulation.
Interest in a privatisation of British Rail's core businesses emerged in the late 
1980s. Two think tanks, the Centre for Policy Studies and the Adam Smith 
Institute published proposals for a privatised British Rail, the former suggesting 
a return to the 1921 structure, while the latter advocated the setting up of a track 
authority that would lease train paths to competing companies. Official work on 
rail privatisation did not start until the announcement by the then Transport 
Secretary, Paul Channon, at the 1988 Conservative Party Conference that the 
government was looking at the possibility of privatising the railways. Margaret 
Thatcher 'was a little annoyed about this, because she then amended it into an 
idea that [rail privatisation] was floated as a possibility rather than a serious 
proposal'.^ Channon's successor, Cecil Parkinson managed to convince Thatcher 
that he would suggest at the time of the 1989 party conference that the 
government was continuing to look at the possibility of rail privatisation. He 
commissioned his Deputy Secretary, Edward Osmotherly, to write a paper on 
rail privatisation. This report concluded that no viable privatisation option
8 IUK16.
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existed and that the outcome of British Rail's internal organisation should be 
assessed before any further study of privatisation options should be undertaken 
again (Independent on Sunday, 13 January 1 9 9 1 ) .Nevertheless, at the time of 
the 1990 party conference, Thatcher was convinced by Parkinson that there was 
no reason not to privatise British Rail. Parkinson brought his experience of 
electricity privatisation into a 'privatisation-reluctant' Transport department and 
wished to introduce horizontal separation between track and infrastructure into 
the rail industry.^! Thatcher, in contrast, recalls that
'Cecü Parkinson and I considered how to proceed in October 1990. 
Cecil was keen to privatize the separate rail businesses - like 
Intercity, Freight, Network SouthEast. I, for my part, saw attractions 
in the idea of a national Track Authority which would own all the 
track, signalling and stations and then private companies would 
compete to run services. But these were large questions which 
needed careful thought and economic analysis. So I agreed with 
Cecil that a working party involving Treasury and DTI as well as the 
Transport Department be set up to study the issue and report back to 
me' (Margaret Thatcher 1995: 686-7)
9 lUKlO.
10IUK2.
11 lUKlO.
1  ^ '[The Treasury] wanted to interfere with railway privatisation, because they had not 
been allowed to interfere with electricity privatisation. Major was then Chancellor [...]. At 
that time as far as Margaret Thatcher is concerned. Major walked on water, beyond 
reproach. So he said, may we take part in this. [...]' (lUKlO).
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Besides the growing political interest in the privatisation of British Rail, there 
was also a growing administrative interest in applying the knowledge gathered 
in the previous utility privatisation to the railways industry, 'our thoughts on 
how you could privatise things had moved a great deal'.^^ One learning effect 
had been that it was possible to successfully privatise public sector utilities. The 
second learning effect, first applied in the case of electricity, was that 'it is a 
mistake to simply privatise a monopoly and then rely on regulation to make it 
w o r k ' a n d  that 'we could do a lot better if we changed the structure and got 
more competition'.^^
The working group set up under Parkinson consisted of the junior ministers 
Roger Freeman (Transport), Francis Maude (Treasury), John Redwood (DTI) and 
several officials. This group presented a break-up model of rail privatisation 
which split the infrastructure from operations in most of the country, apart for 
the commuter lines into London which were kept integrated.^^ Departmental 
differences, however, meant that these proposals were not taken up.
British Rail played no role at this stage of policy deliberation. Prior to the 
appointment of Malcolm Rifkind in 1990, British Rail, in particular at the 
managerial level, had not been against privatisation per se. It was hoped that a 
privatisation would result in a greater extent of operational independence from
IUK2. 
14 lU K ll. 
13 IUK2. 
16 IUK2.
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the government.^^ At that time, BR was advocating a privatisation as a single 
entity along the lines of the British Gas privatisation.^^ Especially then chairman 
Bob Reid advocated this solution, in addition to opposing any vertical 
separation. The 'official' BR line was to advocate a solution where an operating 
BR core would contract-out most of its tasks.^^ Other BR managers suggested 
that the internal BR reforms should be pushed forward towards privatisation. By 
1990, BR had fully implemented its 'business sector' reorganisation, splitting its 
operations into independent businesses with their own assets. These business 
sectors were to be accountable to the Board as separate profit centres and were to 
be run as companies, with their own subsidiaries being responsible for staff and 
track. To gain access or service, each sector had to negotiate a contract with the 
appropriate subsidiary. It was suggested that the five business sectors - 
Intercity, South East, Regional, Trainload Freight and Railfreight distribution - 
should be sold as five businesses.^O
Within government, various actors approached rail privatisation with different 
agendas and options as to the appropriate regulatory reg im e .T h e  Department 
of Transport, although independently, at first proposed a BR-like solution which 
would leave the InterCity business vertically integrated. In April 1991, Rifkind 
ruled out any option that would separate the ownership of the infrastructure 
from the operation of train services. It was argued that such a split would not be
IUK15.
18IUK4.
19IUK8.
20IUK20.
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operational and would leave the track operator with too much market power. 
Rather, it was proposed to retain, in the private sector, those parts of BR which 
were, like the InterCity business, regarded as successful. Work was undertaken 
to formulate a scheme which would establish a track access pricing regime 
which would be policed by an independent regulatory body {Financial Times, 12 
April 1991).
The Treasury and the DTI disagreed with the option to privatise vertically 
separated rail businesses and the Treasury
'outmanoeuvred [...] Transport, because the Treasury was very 
concerned particularly with InterCity, which after all was a quite 
profitable business, that if they got the infrastructure, in practice 
whatever regulation, they could abuse their monopoly position to 
keep the others off their tracks'.^^
It was the 'Treasury having clear basic principles as to what was important, in 
particular competition, and exploring ways in which it might be done and 
bringing the Department to that view too'.^^ One key concern of the Treasury 
was that a sale of InterCity would cause problems in maximising returns, 'they 
were smarting to an extent over the criticisms that had been levelled against 
them during the other privatisations, that they had sold the jewels for a song'.^^ 
As a consequence, in addition to the separation proposals, the Treasury 
developed the idea to franchise passenger services, which itself reinforced the
Although the Scottish and Welsh Offices were also involved in the process, they were 
mainly concerned to safeguard railway services to rural constituencies.
22 lUKl.
23 lU K ll.
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proposals for a separation of infrastructure and operat ions,Thus,  the Treasury 
view, which developed in a departmental working group and was backed by 
John Redwood at the DTI, was to propose maximum fragmentation of the 
system with different undertakings performing different functions, 'if you could 
have turned the railways into 100 corner-shops, the Treasury would have done 
i t ' . I n  contrast, the Department of Transport
'did not start with a model [but was] driven by a much more 
pragmatic concern [...] which tried to address itself to an industry in 
the transport sector, where [the] top priority was about greater 
efficiency and better services, more responsiveness to that particular 
market [,..]'.^^
During 1991, opinion about the 'appropriate' organisational structure changed 
within the Department of Transport, shifting away from the sale of vertically 
integrated businesses to a separation of track and infrastructure. Given the 
preference to have diverse train operators, the experience in other utility 
privatisations with the splitting-off of services and infrastructure as well as for 
the extent of inter-running on the track
24IUK15.
2  ^Franchising reinforced the separation proposal as vertically integrated businesses were 
regarded as being difficult to franchise. Moreover, the time frames for investment 
decisions of train-operating companies and track operators are different.
2b IUK12. A further Treasury concern was to establish a different financial basis for the 
railways: 'Every year the railways undershot their target. Every year, there were weeks of 
negotiations and arguments with the Treasury in which they ended up getting more 
money. They were not so much in terms of absolute numbers a threat to the Treasury, but 
in terms of time they took. And there was a Treasury judgement; that is worth paying a 
lot of money to get them off our back' (IUK5).
27IUK12.
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'we eventually persuaded ourselves that the least worse of all options 
was a vertical separation. And it took us an awful lot of agonising 
over that and I don't think we were terribly enthusiastic about it, we 
were pretty cautious, it was new territory and [nobody] has done this 
[...] we were heavily conscious, here is a huge national asset, and 
although we are not enthusiasts or sort of anorak-clad trainspotters, 
we do know that railways are a bit suigeneris [...]. After all. Treasury 
and DTI have no responsibilities and they can be devoted to
philosophy and theory and so on, the poor old Department of
Transport was actually responsible for the transport system [...], we 
eventually got to a least worst view of the separation of track - 
operation distinction'.^^
John Major and his Policy Unit, however, proposed a return to the structure of 
the four main rail operators on the lines of the 1921 Railways Act, 'pushing [...] 
for presentational reasons and for reasons of comprehensibility, for a series of 
vertically integrated regional companies ' .However,  these proposals were 
rejected, 'they were starting to play with a kind of nostalgia, why don't we create 
regional vertically integrated companies [...]. This was the moment when
Transport and Treasury did sort of join forces and said, "this is totally
bonkers'".^® The final agreement on an outline for the future organisational 
structure was reached in January 1992, when 'we [...] hacked out something.
28IUK12.
29 IUK23. This development emerged from within the Policy Unit without reference to 
previous proposals and was based mainly on arguments of customer accountability and 
better saleability of privatisation to the public. It was then taken up by John Major.
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which we could put to our rninisters and then collectively to the Prime Minister 
and his colleagues'.^^ In particular the Policy Unit of 10 Downing Street was 
pressing for a decision given the government's intention to place the issue of 
railway privatisation in the Conservative Party's election manifesto.^^ Ministers 
agreed in February 1992 to propose the vertical separation of infrastructure and 
operating companies and a franchising system for unprofitable social services 
and this was signalled (discreetly) in the Conservative's general election 
manifesto.
Thus, the evolution of regulatory ideas suggests a strong ministerial and prime- 
ministerial desire to privatise, but little political direction as to how to privatise.
'[T]here was a tremendous emphasis by ministers [...] that they were 
in the business of privatisation. [...] If you have privatised, you have 
succeeded, would be, I think, the pretty accurate summary. If you 
have privatised and done it quickly, you have succeeded even more. 
And if you have privatised and have done it quickly and made it 
irreversible, you have succeeded even more'.^^
3 0 IUK2.
31 lU K ll.
32 The task for the Policy Unit was 'to stitch together a compromise in some language 
which would get us through a general election campaign without the whole thing 
becoming extremely embarrassing or politically damaging' (IUK23).
33 IUK12. This role of ministers was widely shared. 'Using the particular form of a 
quadripartite parliamentary secretary committee to bash the poUcy out, it was rougher, 
they did not try to sort out their differences, there were a lot of rough edges' (IUK5); 
'[Tjhe role of ministers was essentially in fixing and facilitating, and keeping us to the 
mark' (lUKl).
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This enthusiasm was nevertheless cautioned by a political interest in postponing 
the launch of a rail privatisation policy until after the general election in order 
not to attract controversy and opposition.^^
There was also a rejection of accommodating any arguments made by British 
Rail as 'all these things that had ever been said or promised in the past, I 
exaggerate, had gone wrong'^^; furthermore, there was the perception that BR 
was a 'management nightmare' where 'the tiller was not connected to the 
r u d d e r ' T h u s ,  it was proposed to concentrate management activities on 
particular activities. There was a marked absence of any domain-oriented 
proposals or international perspective. No influence was exercised either by the 
EC-Directive 91/440 or other European reform experiences, 'we were aware of 
what was going on, but nothing influenced us'.^^
At the administrative level, this paradigm-orientation of the reform concepts 
was most dominant. Although the decision to vertically separate operations and 
infrastructure was strongly demanded by the Treasury, this nevertheless 
represented only to some extent a 'victory' of Treasury arguments. More 
important were the collective learning experiences of previous privatisations of
34 IUK14.
3 5 IUK23.
3 6 IUK2.
37 lUK l. The White Paper stated 'In other countries the private sector is actively involved  
in the railways. Already 40% of Japan's railways are private and it is the Japanese 
Government's intention to privatise the remainder. The Swedish Government enables the 
private sector to operate certain railway services through a tendering system. The
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network industries and of contracting-out models. The problems with the post­
privatisation regulation of British Gas were the key to the success of the 
'fragmentation and separation' argument, which was 'at the zenith of popularity 
in the government' at the time of railway privatisation.^^ Furthermore, the 
effects of the British Telecom duopoly review in 1990, which resulted in a major 
rationahsation programme at British Telecom, seemed to confirm the view that 
efficiency and performance could be enhanced by introducing competition. The 
idea that competition was essential for any industry to behave efficiently and the 
view that a structural solution was advantageous in contrast to post­
privatisation regulation were crucial in the development of the regulatory 
regime, 'the real drive was "let's get as much competition into this environment 
as we possibly can'".^^
Organisational Structure
While the debates prior to the general election had led to a relative commitment 
to a vertical separation and therefore a domestic paradigm-oriented choice, the 
post-election period was characterised by remaining uncertainty. This 
uncertainty was caused by the decline of the Conservatives' parliamentary 
majority and the government's overall unpopularity as well as by the 
uncertainty about the timing of the next general election and the wish to 
hardwire the new regulatory regime prior to the election. This political
privately owned American freight railways have been successful and profitable over the 
past ten years' (Department of Transport 1992a: 2; para. 7).
38 IUK4.
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uncertainty expressed itself in the search for solutions which would, on the one 
hand, safeguard existing services and, on the other hand, make reversal too 
costly. The following discusses the organisational structure, in particular the 
establishment and sale of the infrastructure provider, Railtrack.
Following the election, the new Transport Secretary John MacGregor re­
considered all possible organisational solutions, as 'it was quite a strong 
manifesto commitment. In fact, it was properly spelled out more strongly in the 
manifesto than was t h e r e ' .H e  obtained cabinet agreement on the broad outline 
which had been suggested in the manifesto. A White Paper, called 'New 
Opportunities for the Railways' was published in July 1992 and set a rather 
vague framework for the future organisation of British Rail (Department of 
Transport 1992a; Glaister and Travers 1993). '[T]he White Paper was almost a 
target for getting agreement in government, a means if you like, for getting 
agreement quickly .Exis ting  track and signalling assets were to be vested in 
Railtrack, which itself was to be a new part of British Rail. BR was supposed to 
be the overarching owner up to the point of sale with two subordinate 
operations responsible for services and infrastructure Railtrack, as part of BR, 
was not only supposed to be responsible for the operation and maintenance of 
the infrastructure, but also for train-control and timetabling. The White Paper
IUK2. Similarly: '[...] the wish, if we were going to do it, to do it on a basis that made 
sense and a willingness to try out new ideas hke franchising and to spHt it up that you 
had various forms of regulation' (lUK ll).
4 0 IUK14.
4 1 IUK14.
42 A solution which would have been, at this initial stage, not very dissimilar to the 
outcome in Germany.
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stated that the Government 'would like to see the private sector owning as much 
as possible of the railway. Power will therefore be taken to allow the future 
privatisation of all BR track and operations' (Department of Transport 1992a: 4; 
para. 18; Department of Transport 1994). Railtrack was to sell train paths to 25 
passenger franchisees, bidding for the lowest subsidy, for the provision of 
specified passenger arrangements and to open access providers. The freight and 
parcel operators were to be organised into four companies (Trainload Freight, 
Freightliner, Rail Express and Red Star) and sold directly to the private sector 
(Department of Transport 1992a: 11-2; para. 45-55). The White Paper suggested 
vesting BR's rolling stock and related traction equipment into three leasing 
companies which would lease equipment to the train operating companies. 
Instead of the previous system of a public sector obligation deficit grant, subsidy 
under the 'new' regime was channelled via the passenger franchising 
mechanism. Freight services were also eligible for subsidy; these were allocated 
by the Department of Transport.
The White Paper showed that the Government approached the issue of rail 
privatisation with great caution, especially given the then deteriorating 
economic climate. It contained little detail on how privatisation was to be 
achieved, on the way the franchises were to be offered or on the subject of track 
access charges. Nor did a time frame exist. Until February 1993, no further 
departmental guideline on either the track access regime or on the actual charges 
was published. The uncertainty was also reflected in the drafting of the 
legislation.
'If you looked at the way the White Paper, July 1992, treated
Railtrack, very very much in terms of "Railtrack continues as part of
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BR for the foreseeable future", generally tentatively moving into that 
direction of the final outcome. Although there was a commitment in 
there to some sort of track-operation split, it was pretty cautious. We 
were, of course, sensible enough in drafting the legislation to create 
sufficient flexibility and to do it in such a way that we allowed for all 
possibilities; hence when you look at the legislation, the accusation 
that it was too clever by half, no mention of the word Railtrack in 
any of the legislation, nothing of that and very deliberately too, 
because we tried to keep open a lot of options that the legislation left 
us a lot of scope.
External advisors and British Rail were allowed to take part in decision-making 
only after the pubHcation of the White Paper. In fact, British Rail 'did not even 
see a draft of the White Paper', while in the preparation of the Bill the 
government 'did not take any notice of what we said'.'^ The House of Commons 
Select Committee on Transport condemned the strong emphasis given to the 
promotion of competition in the White Paper. Under the chairmanship of 
Conservative backbencher and railway enthusiast Robert Adley, the Committee 
recommended that severe restraints should be placed on open access for 
passenger operators and vertical integration should be allowed for in the
IUK12. Similarly: 'We were writing it down, we were dreaming it up one evening and 
writing it down the next evening, in one particular case, w e were writing it down one 
morning and dreaming it up that evening as it were' (IUK2).
4 4 IUK4.
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franchising process (House of Commons 1992) The Transport Secretary 
MacGregor, stated publicly that he expected that the process would take ten 
years, indicating the Department of Transport's problems to find a compromise 
between the explicit commitment to competition and finding attractive terms of 
access which would not lead to an increased burden on public expenditures 
(Financial Times, 18 July 1992).
While the regulatory design ideas of vertical separation and competition had 
dominated policy deliberation stages, uncertainty rather than design ideas were 
crucial for the privatisation of Railtrack. Originally, in the White Paper, priority 
had been given to the transfer of train services to the private sector. Only after 
that process had been completed, would Railtrack follow (Poole 1996). Before the 
election, serious consideration had been given to a possible splitting up of the 
infrastructure operator in order to allow for yardstick competition. 'I think at the 
time, it was a fairly close run thing frankly. There was no knock-down argument 
in either direction, in my view, it would have been perfectly possible to have 
two or three railtracks'.^^ These arguments, proposed by the Treasury, were 
defeated by the Department of Transport on grounds of practicability, problems 
in splitting up the network, and complexity in terms of additional contractual
^  The evidence given by the business associations also indicated that the government's 
proposals were received with considerable scepticism. The primary demand of business 
associations was an increase in transport infrastructure spending. When Adley died, the 
government no longer faced a potential policy entrepreneur who might have organised 
Conservative backbench MP opposition.
4 6 IUK12.
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relationships which would have been necessary to de v i s e T h e  initial plan to 
have Railtrack as part of BR was abandoned because of the perception that BR's 
chairman Bob Reid was fundamentally opposed to the government's 
privatisation plans and attempted, together with BR's senior management, to 
obstruct and delay the process in the hope of 'surviving' until the arrival of a 
Labour-led government. As a consequence, policy-makers decided in early 1994 
under John MacGregor as Secretary of State
'that the only way we were going to get it, was actually to establish 
Railtrack as a wedge against BR and it was for that reason that we 
brought the other Bob [Horton] as chairman designate of Railtrack, 
vice-chairman of BR, and the timetable for splitting it off from BR as 
a separate government owned company in 1995 with flotation to 
follow a year later
Besides the 'stuff BR' argument, other political motives supported the separation 
of Railtrack and subsequent privatisation. One reason was that it would become 
increasingly difficult to franchise train-operating companies close to an election 
if 'the infrastructure is still owned by the state, because the potential operator 
would see huge political risks ' .Fur thermore ,  to overcome problems in 
executing the franchising process (see below), it was found necessary to provide 
privatisation with additional credibility as a privatised Railtrack with its 
separate identity could help to drive the privatisation process. Although a
^  'The reason that we didn't have several [raUtracks] was that the safety card was played 
rigour hard, if you have infrastructure companies which have to got to hand over trains 
between each other causes problems' (IUK2).
JUKI. 'Everyone knew that Bob Horton and Bob Reid did not get on. [...] The 
Department knew that they did not get on when the appointment was made' (IUK21).
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memorandum by the Chancellor of Exchequer, Kenneth Clarke, was leaked 
which argued that privatisation of Railtrack would provide necessary revenues 
for tax cuts, this motive was less crucial as the Treasury was mainly interested in 
animating the whole process, '[i]f you are dealing with another department who 
don't want to do something, you've got to find a ground where you can fight on, 
which is uniquely yours, and it is a Treasury sense, "we want the revenue", they 
can't say, "No, you don't"
In November 1994, Brian Mawhinney, the newly appointed Transport Secretary, 
announced that the Government intended to privatise Railtrack within the 
lifetime of the sitting ParUament, At the 1995 Conservative Party conference, the 
next Transport Secretary, Sir George Young, confirmed that Railtrack was to be 
floated in the spring of 1996. While the Labour Party attempted unsuccessfully 
to destabilise the whole selling process, the main conflict emerged between 
Railtrack and the Treasury and the Department of Transport on the level of debts 
inherited from British Rail. Railtrack wanted the whole £1.5bn debt to be written 
off, while the Treasury and Department of Transport showed little sympathy to 
Railtrack's case. A compromise deal left Railtrack with a debt of £586 miUion (a 
net debt write-off of £869 million). In order to facilitate the share issue, 
retrospective dividends were promised.
The main sources of Raütrack's revenue were the access charges levied on train 
operators and the receipts from the leases for stations and depots. Although it 
did not receive direct subsidies from the government, it was highly dependent
49 IUK2.
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on the subsidy paid to the franchised passenger train operators, which in turn 
had to pay access charges to Railtrack. This channelling of subsidies reflected the 
perception that infrastructure supply should be demand-driven. It was stressed 
that a supply-driven system should not be introduced where Railtrack would 
have been the direct recipient of the subsidies. However, a possibility for direct 
government subsidy did exist as 'the Government is also ready to provide direct 
support for infrastructure investment projects which, although not earning an 
adequate rate of return, provide a satisfactory cost/benefit return when wider 
benefits are considered' (Department of Transport 1992a: 10; para. 43). 
Concerning the level and structure of charges, ministerial guidance encouraged 
the regulator to adopt the regime established as the basis for Railtrack's vesting. 
This allowed Railtrack to set charges which after 2-3 years would recover its 
operating expenses plus a set of depreciation charges derived from the cost of 
modern equivalent assets needed to meet the expected future level of demand 
plan and an eight per cent real rate of return in the depreciated value of the 
assets. The first rail regulator, John Swift, argued that charges should be rebased 
in 1995/96, reducing charges for franchised passenger services by eight per cent 
compared to the levels in 1994/5 (ORR 1995a). From 1996/97 track access 
charges fell annually by two per cent in real terms. Furthermore, the rail 
regulator also announced that Railtrack should adopt a 'single tiU' business so 
that, similar to airport practice, revenue gains from property and other ancillary 
activities had to be set against Raütrack's costs when track access charges were 
calculated.
50 IUK2.
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The privatisation of Railtrack presented a clear expression of 'paradigm-oriented' 
design ideas in that vertical separation was one of the key 'lessons' drawn from 
previous utility privatisation and regulation exercises. However, its 
implementation was less a result of detailed planning and administrative and 
poHtical argument, but rather a strategic choice in the face of perceived BR 
resistance, problems in the franchising process and the 'need' to make the reform 
irreversible before the next general election, leading to the decision to sell 100 
per cent of Railtrack shares rather than a partial sale (National Audit Office 
1998a: 5-9). The
'Railways Act was drafted with a view to Railtrack remaining in the 
public sector. When it was privatised, fairly hurriedly, I think it 
became apparent after that, that we did not have enough strings to 
pull to ensure that, for example, Railtrack was investing 
sufficiently'.^^
Furthermore, the structuring of subsidies via the franchises rather than the 
infrastructure was an attempt to reduce uncertainty in being able to specify
IUK19. In January 1997, John Swift condemned Raütrack's investment record of under­
investment by £700 million as 'wholly unacceptable' {Financial Times, 20 January 1997). 
In May 1997, Swift argued that his tools to monitor Raütrack's investment record were 
insufficient and that output measures were missing. He proposed an addition to 
Raütrack's hcence that placed a 'general duty' on Raütrack to invest into and maintain the 
infrastructure, giving the regulator the power to intervene should Raütrack faü to meet 
its commitments. Although Raütrack at first resisted these proposals, it consented to 
Swift's proposals, fearing both the outcome of a MMC review and ministerial 
intervention in the case of non-agreement. Controversy about Raütrack's investment 
record and performance continued and became one of the key concerns of Tom Winsor 
when appointed as raÜ regulator in July 1999 (see also National Audit Office 1998a: 30-1).
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certain rninirnum services by contracts for political reasons and the operator had 
to be subsidised into a strong position vis-à-vis the infrastructure operator.^^
A further part of the aim to fragment the railway industry and induce 
competition was to establish three separate rolling stock companies, so-called 
Roscos. In order to speed up the privatisation process, the rolling stock 
companies were sold by the Department of Transport at the earliest possible 
moment.^^ Given the political and public hostility to the process, and therefore 
high political risk attached to the purchase of the Roscos, the bidding process 
collapsed after several large banks and leasing companies pulled out of the 
bidding process at the last moment.^'^ Because 'something which was never 
successfully solved [inside government] was the regulation of the Roscos [...], 
they are not regulated'^^: they had no licences, no obligations concerning
52 IUK2.
55 The maintenance companies had been sold previously by a vendor unit set up at 
British Rail.
5^  ^ IUK18. Following the commitment in the White Paper not to sell two Roscos to one 
undertaking, the Rosco 'Porterbrook' was not sold to the highest bidder and fellow Rosco, 
'Angel', but to a management buy-out group for £55 million less. The Roscos later 
obtained critical public attention for their high resale values which led to large profits for 
their original owners. The National Audit Office criticised the sale of the Roscos, arguing 
that the Department of Transport should have obtained at least £700 million more 
(achieving a total sale value of £2.9 billion rather than the actual £2.2 biUion). The failure 
to insert sell-on profit-sharing clauses into the sale contracts attracted particular criticism 
(National Audit Office 1998b).
55 IUK6. '[. •] Even worse was the scandal of the rolling-stock companies, sold in 1996. As 
the franchising process for train operators was only just starting, the government 
guaranteed 80% of the rolling stock firms' lease-income. But only inside managers 
understood that the unregulated leasing firms would therefore generate mountains of 
cash. They also knew that cautious BR engineers had overestimated the cost of 
maintenance, the firms' chief operating expense' {TheEconomist, 3 July 1999; p. 68).
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modernisation and investinent existed, nor were commitments placed on the 
Roscos regarding their conduct in the negotiations with the successful franchise 
bidders at the second letting period of the franchises.^^
In addition to structural means to implement and 'hardwire' the new 
organisational structure, especially the sale of Railtrack as an independent entity, 
personnel decisions were made to facilitate the credibility of the new regulatory 
regime. Reid's replacement at BR was John Welsby, previously BR's chief 
executive, who had to commit BR into fully supporting the process of 
privatisation as a condition for his appointment.^^
In conclusion, the selection of principles for the organisational structure shows, 
with its emphasis on 'regulation by competition' principles, a strong paradigm- 
orientation. The justification for vertical separation was based on previous 
domestic utility privatisations rather than either the principles of Council 
Directive 91/440 or other international experiences in the railway domain. 
However, despite the dominance of these design ideas, the actual hardwiring of 
the regime reflected the political and administrative need to signal commitment
In January 1998, the Labour government asked the then rail regulator, John Swift, to 
investigate possibilities of regulating the Roscos. In his report, the argument that the 
three firms had market power was dismissed. The rail regulator regarded the 
establishment of a formal regulatory regime as unnecessary and advocated the 
introduction of a voluntary 'code of practice' with regard to the marketing of surplus 
rolling stock, more flexible leasing contracts and their negotiation behaviour for the next 
franchising round. The Labour government's 'White Paper on Integrated Transport' of 
July 1998 followed these proposals.
57 lUKl; IUK21.
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by making reversal for a future Labour government too costly and by reducing 
the opportunities for the British Rail executive to delay the process.
Allocation of regulatory authority
This section discusses the establishment of the Office of the Rail Regulator, its 
functions and regulatory objectives. It also considers the continuing role of the 
Railway Inspectorate. It highlights the importance of the 'competition' doctrine 
due to the dominance of paradigm-oriented proposals. While so-called 
'passenger network benefits' (such as through-ticketing) were protected, the 
dominance of the competition doctrine was reflected in policies such as the 
setting of regulatory objectives for the regulator.
To reduce uncertainty and complexity, the rail privatisation legislation was 
formulated with the previous utility privatisations as well as emerging case law 
in mind. Thus, similar to the experience of the other utility regulators, a 
personalised regulatory body was established. In contrast to previous 
privatisation programmes, the first rail regulator, John Swift, was appointed in a 
'shadow' function prior to the passing of the Act. The duties of the rail regulator 
were set out in section four of the Railways Act, ranging from protection of rail 
user interests, the promotion of the railway network in terms of economy, 
efficiency and competition and through-ticketing. These objectives also reflected 
the aims and ideas of the Conservative government with their priority on
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economy and efficiency, 'it was very much a tenet of Thatcherite and Majorité 
theology that competition always worked to the benefit of the consumer
The debate between the Department of Transport and the Treasury whether to 
combine the functions of the Rail Regulator and the Franchising Director focused 
on the importance of an independent authority promoting competition. 
Originally, it had been intended to combine both regulator and franchising 
tasks, placing the regulatory functions as independent statutory duties and the 
franchising functions under a 'power of direction'. While the Department of 
Transport was advocating a unified office in order to reduce the complexity and 
numbers of regulatory relationships and to prevent, despite the theoretical 
difference between regulation and franchise supervision, an overlap in the 
exercise of the two functions and thus confusion. The Treasury, however, vetoed 
these proposals, fearing that a unified office would lead to a conflict between the 
goals of promoting competition and the responsibility for purchasing railway 
services. A regulator-cum-franchising director could potentially mute 
competition in order to reduce franchising subsidies. This argument was won by 
the Treasury in a meeting of cabinet ministers.^^
lUK l. 'I think the law is absolute clear. The analogy is with competition, a DTI 
competition pohcy' (IUK5). In contrast. The Railways Act has got this long list of 
statutory duties, which is very long, is not set out in any ordered way, which enables the 
regulator to pick and choose, and to a large extent the duties are actually conflicting. [...] 
So you have a regulator who can virtually set his own agenda' (1UK4). The statutory 
functions were set out in Section 4(1) of the Railways Act 1993.
59 iu k 1; 1UK2;1UK12.
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Transport ministers and civil servants disliked the degree of independence that 
was granted to the rail regulator as the regulator's decisions on track access 
charges (stated in the Railways Act 1993, sections 17-22) would indirectly affect 
the level of subsidies necessary to pay the franchises. Although 'he as a regulator 
is - ought to be pretty well independent from goverrunent',^^ a clause was 
inserted into the Act that the rail regulator was required to take into account any 
guidance given to him by the Secretary of State until 31 December 1996 
(Railtrack Act 1993, section 4(5a)). This was regarded as far enough ahead to 
ensure that the government's objectives could be implemented, while also 
reducing the risk that an incoming Labour government could utilise this pohcy 
handle.^^ At the same time, great care was taken to maximise the discretion of 
the rail regulator,^^ In practice, the 'guidance clause' had no effect on the rail 
regulator.^^ A second 'precaution' was to insert a statutory requirement that the 
regulator had, in his decisions, to take account of the effect of his decisions on 
the financial position of the Franchising Director (Railways Act 1993: section 4 
(5c)).
The rail regulator issued licences to railway operators and, in co-operation with 
the Health and Safety Executive, validated the safety record of the operator. It 
was also possible to impose conditions concerning policing, the environment.
60IUK12.
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62 In contrast to a formulation such as 'in accordance with', which would offer the 
government in cases of judicial review greater scope to overrule the regulator, the chosen 
formula 'to take account o f required the regulator merely to consider the government's 
objectives.
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insurance requirements and through-ticketing (ORR 1996). Contracts were 
enforced by the parties involved, using normal legal procedures, rather than by 
the rail regulator. Following the spHt between rail regulator and franchising 
director, the rail regulator had no authority in the field of passenger fares, this 
competence falling under the competence of the franchising director. It was also 
the function of the regulator to decide whether any closure may occur and 
whether to attach any conditions to it, although it was possible to launch an 
appeal to the Secretary of State (Railways Act 1993: sections 37-50). Tom Winsor, 
appointed as rail regulator in 1999 and during the privatisation process 
seconded to the Office of the Rail Regulator, argued that the powers of the Rail 
Regulator were more extensive than those in other utilities, stressing the 
regulator's powers to approve or block access contracts to the railway 
infrastructure and to amend, unlike other utility regulators, the central 
commercial contracts for the industry. A further power was the absence of the 
right of industry actors to appeal to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
(MMC) in case of disagreement with the regulator's price control reviews. In 
contrast to other utilities, the price control regime was exercised via the access 
contracts and not the licences.^ While regulatory powers were originally lacking 
in the enforcement of Raütrack's obligation to invest in the infrastructure (see 
footnote 51), in the control of Raütrack's disposal of land assets and in the 
benchmarking of Raütrack's spending behaviour, the regulator was given 
decisive powers to tackle anti-competitive and exclusionary behaviour (Winsor
IUK9; This view was also expressed by John Swift at an LSE Regulation Seminar in 
January 1997.
^  The ordinary licence amendment procedure would provide for an appeal mechanism  
to the MMC.
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1996,1997). This strengthened formal independence and extended powers of the 
rail regulator was, however, not a result of poHtical interests further aiming to 
insulate the regulatory regime from future poHtical interference, but were 
developed within the shadow regulatory authority itseH, relying on considerable 
regulatory expertise and experience in other utiHties.
Despite the formal autonomy, the independence of the rail regulator was 
chaUenged in January 1995, when an ORR consultation document on the future 
arrangement for the sale of rail tickets caused ministerial intervention. The rail 
regulator had proposed that the fuU range of railway tickets could only be sold 
at 300 stations, two further options were only added after the regulator's 
advisors intervened.^^ The then Transport Secretary, Mawhinney, rejected any 
proposal which suggested a reduction in the number of stations offering 
through-ticketing, although he later had to acknowledge his impotence in the 
face of the regulator's institutional status. Nevertheless, given widespread 
opposition, the regulator withdrew the proposals in March 1995.
In sum, the rail regulator was established to ensure that competition would be 
introduced into the network. Thus, his functions built on the experiences with 
other utiHty regulators where originally competition had only been a secondary 
objective. Furthermore, in appointing with John Swift a prominent competition 
lawyer, whose views on the benefits of competition were regarded to be similar 
to those prevalent under the Conservative administration, a further step was
65 IUK18.
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taken to ensure that 'competition' was hardwired into the institutional design, 
despite the political decision (discussed below) to 'moderate' competition.
In terms of social regulation, the White Paper stated that the Health & Safety 
Commission was to arrange an examination of the implications on health and 
safety issues due to privatisation. Railtrack and the individual operators were 
given the prime duty to guarantee the safe operation of the system. The role and 
function of the Railway Inspectorate was not altered (Department of Transport 
1992a: 17-8; para. 76-84). At the outset of the policy deliberations, it was argued 
that the safety issue was potentially among the biggest threats to the reform 
process, 'the biggest threat that we thought to the policy was that there would be 
a convincing argument that we could not maintain safety under the regime'. 
Thus, early consultations were started with the Health & Safety Executive and 
the Railway Inspectorate and a system was designed that found mutual 
agreement. It was decided, following a proposal from the Health and Safety 
Executive, that Railtrack should be given a role in safety provision, given its 
control over the key safety instruments in the railways, signalling and the 
control of traffic.^^ Opposition to this model emerged mainly from BR which 
argued that under this system the HSE would escape from its own 
responsibilities and, more fundamentally, questioned how safety could be 
delegated to a profit-oriented business such as the privatised Railtrack. Instead it 
was suggested to set up an independent safety agency, similar to British aviation 
regulation which is exercised by the Civil Aviation Authority. However, this
661UKI2.
242
argument was dismissed by the Government. The decisions to adopt the HSE's 
recommendations with regard to the regulation of health and safety shows the 
intention to reduce complexity in the institutional design of regulatory regimes.
Thus, in terms of economic regulation, the leading design idea was to introduce 
a competition authority into the sector which would facilitate competition on 
track and whose motivation was not potentially moderated by franchising 
considerations. The establishment of a regulator on the lines of other utility 
regulators, drawing on existing statutes and case law, provides a further 
example for the paradigm-oriented nature of the regulatory regime. As 
discussed below, this competition on track principle, hardwired as a statutory 
objective, contradicted the aim to reduce subsidy payments via the franchising 
process.
Non-commercial objectives
This section concerns the establishment of the Franchising Director and the shift 
of policy priorities towards advocating a moderation of competition. It discusses 
in particular the conflict of the dominant 'regulation by competition' design 
ideas with the political need to safeguard train services and the need to attract 
private interest in the passenger franchises.
Franchising Director
Relationships between the train operating companies were vested in the 
Franchising Director and the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF),
This hierarchical approach, where the superior authority controls the respective
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which via its franchise agreements defined minimum services. OPRAF 
controlled fares and booked train paths for its franchises in advance on known 
terms. Once the decision had been taken to separately organise the franchising 
and regulatory functions, problems emerged in the allocation of tasks.^®
'Actually they cocked it up. [...] It is crazy to have the rail regulator 
and the franchising director both regulating the passenger railway. 
[...] John Swift had taken the job as rail regulator thinking that a 
major part of the job was to look after the interests of consumers. But 
in practice the consumer interests were with the franchising director. 
And that became more clear with the passage of the Bill, because a 
clause was added concerning fares which put obligation on the 
franchising director to control fares. [...] It is an exclusive power. So 
effectively the rail regulator had no say on fares, except to be 
consulted. Which he resented.
As a result of the organisational, but incomplete functional split, there was an 
amount of overlap in jurisdiction between the two offices, especially with 
regards to 'network benefits'. While the rail regulator regulated licenses, the 
franchising director set prices and regulated via the contractual detail of the 
franchising contract. In most areas, it was agreed that the rail regulator would 
take the 'lead function'. The main initial task of the franchising director was to 
define rail passenger franchises (undertaken by British Rail) and sell them to 
train operating companies using a competitive tendering procedure. Given the
subordinate level, was caUed 'Cascade model' 
68 IUK4.
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charges for station and track access, prospective operators bid for the lowest 
subsidy, paid from a budget fixed beforehand by the government, for which 
they would be willing to operate the services as defined in the franchise 
agreement. To reduce complexity, the various services were separated along the 
lines of British Rail's organisational divisions. The Passenger Service 
Requirement was at the core of the franchising agreement, comprising two 
components: a minimum level of services to be provided and certain mandatory 
service characteristics - such as train frequency, stations to be served, first and 
last trains, peak train capacity requirements and fares regulation (Railways Act 
1993: sections 5 and 136(7)). Further responsibilities were the promotion of 
investment, the improvement of services and the development of arrangements 
which guarantee certain network benefits. In this respect, the 1993 Railways Act 
represented the continued search for the 'right' approach for combining subsidy 
for the provision of particular railway services with increasing commercial 
pressure which was first attempted in the 1968 Transport Act (Beesley 1996; 
Foster 1971).
As principal statutory objectives, the franchising director was required to let the 
franchises as rapidly as reasonably possible and to improve the quality of 
railway services. Furthermore, John Major set the target to franchise 50 per cent 
of all services by April 1996. In contrast to the rail regulator, who, by statute, 
could only be given 'guidance' which had to be taken into account, the 
franchising director can be given instructions and guidance. Thus, the
69IUK21.
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franchising director was given limited autonomy, mainly because of his control 
over the spending of public money.
'I always remember the first day we all sat around the table over at 
Marsham Street and with the Permanent Secretary and various 
others. This was a get-to-know-you. The Regulator had been saying, 
I had a look at the Bill and I am not absolutely sure about the powers 
and certain modifications should be there and so on and so on. The 
Franchising Director said, Roger Salmon said, that is all very well for 
you John Swift, I do not even have a job description. The answer that 
came back was very telling, [...] "You are here only to do what you 
are told [...], [OPRAF] are nothing more like agents of government, 
they are there to discharge government policy
The function of OPRAF and the Franchising Director were thus threefold. First, 
it was a convenient tool to 'shift blame'. As OPRAF performed functions which 
the Department of Transport could have similarly exercised, the Department 
'wanted to make the decisions, and wanted [OPRAF] to have the responsibility 
for anything that went wrong. And that was o v ert'.S e co n d , a specialised 
agency was perceived to be able to concentrate more expertise than a usual 
government department. Third, the increase of distance between franchising 
activity and transport ministers was regarded as essential to de-politicise the 
process, and thus boost private sector confidence and reduce the potential
IUK4. Other accounts refer to the Department of Transport response as 'You wiU do 
what you are told (formally or informally) as is the convention for an officer subject to 
instruction'. This view  was not shared by ministers.
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impact of political interests, 'you needed to set up a framework which would re­
assure the private sector that it could safely invest and not have all of its plans 
forever messed about and destroyed by the poHtical imperative of the day'7^.
The franchising process evolved slowly and only gathered confidence after the 
first round of franchises had been let7^ The design of the franchises was 
exercised within Whitehall. Although potential bidders, such as bus companies, 
were used to test various ideas about franchising in terms of size, risk profiles 
and financial requirements, the proposed franchising agreements were not 
shaped by private interests, 'because, frankly, companies do not take you 
seriously until something real is being offered for sale in a serious manner rather 
than people from Whitehall asking theoretical questions about what they might 
be interested in'. '^  ^ In the formulation of the approach towards franchising, 
substantial tensions emerged between the Department of Transport, which 
aimed to foUow the political imperative to franchise as 'reasonably practicable' 
within the given timetable, and the Franchising Director, Roger Salmon. Salmon 
paid considerable attention to building a commercially-oriented 'flat' 
organisation unlike a ministerial department and resisted political and 
administrative pressures to speed up the franchising process, but as 'he was not 
a politician in any sense, if he thought something should be done, it had to be
72IUK15.
73 British Rail was initially not allowed to bid for services itself. This exclusion was later 
lifted, but after discussions between the Department of Transport, which was not keen to 
allow BR to compete for the franchises, and BR, the latter voluntarily consented to refrain 
from bidding.
74 IUK12. Private interests had initially proposed franchising periods as long as 50 years. 
This option was not considered by Whitehall.
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done, he would not [...] change his mind just to suit politicians'7^ Besides the
lack of private interest in the franchises, there were also problems on the
administrative level with regard to access agreements, inter-operator 
agreements, the ticketing settlement system and the performance incentive 
regime. The belief that OPRAF was not delivering on the timetable led the 
Department to set up various working and steering groups to promote the 
franchising process. In the end, OPRAF succeeded in franchising all services 
before the general election in 1997;
'It is like so many of these projects, those who are charged with 
monitoring and oversight think that time spent in perpetration is 
potentially time lost and have a linear view of these processes, 
whereas practitioners have a skewed view on how it will proceed. 
They were right [...]. It is standard bureaucratic sort of relationship
where the pursuit of the secondary body by the parent is what it is
all about'
In addition to the problems in the franchising process, there was also strong 
political pressure on the Franchising Director, mainly due to unease among 
Conservative backbenchers and fear of political damage from a reduction in 
service levels or increased rail charges. Brian Mawhinney's imperative was to 
secure quick tangible benefits to the passenger.^ Due to the political sensitivity 
of rail privatisation, Mawhinney placed great emphasis on weighing the costs on 
electoral popularity with the theoretical benefits of the 'pure competition model'.
75IUK18.
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Furthermore, 'John Major believed [...] that under the privatised railways 
everything must be shown to be better than under the nationalised railways.'^® 
The Conservative government pledged higher subsidies for privatised 
companies than were available in the public sector and restricted price increases 
after rises of 22 per cent in the last ten years of public ownership.
In May 1995, Salmon and Mawhinney announced a regime of capping fares for 
commuter fares around London and other cities, for season tickets and other 
standard class fares. This announcement followed the imposition of minimum 
timetables for passenger trains as well as the setting of standards on reliability 
and punctuality.^^ The extent of fare curbs - increases were not to exceed 
inflation for three years with rises for the following four years restricted to RPI-1 
- went much further than envisaged by the Franchising Director. Mawhinney 
intervened, not only on the level of price capping, but also on the scope of prices 
which were supposed to be controlled. OPRAF and BR had to find a 
compromise solution.^^ In general, however,
'[he] did not interfere, the sort of thing that was more difficult was to 
write and re-write press releases over and over again late at night. 
[...] [MJinisters are hyper-sensitive about anything that might hit the
77IUK13, IUK2.
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79 While these measures were driven pohtically, they were regarded as essential and had 
been part of the administrative agenda of the Department of Transport prior to 
Mawhirmey's appointment.
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press, you write the press releases now and decide on the policy 
afterwards. He was doing just that'.®^
Similar pressure was placed on the Franchising Director with regard to the 
proposed subsidy removal from over-night services from London to the Scottish 
Highlands. Following considerable political pressure, Salmon was forced to 
continue the provision of public money for the continuation of the service.
In December 1995, the rail privatisation process suffered a further (if limited) 
setback when the Court of Appeal ruled that the Franchising Director had not 
fully complied with the requirements for protecting the level of train services. 
'Save our Railways', the main anti-privatisation group sponsored by rail unions 
and local authorities, had launched a case arguing that Salmon had ignored 
instructions given to him under John MacGregor that forced him to base future 
service levels on existing levels. The last Conservative Transport Secretary, Sir 
George Young, subsequently rewrote the rules concerning the minimum 
acceptable level of services which passenger train operating companies had to 
offer, adopting the politically least costly way. The Franchising Director was also 
criticised in a National Audit Office report for failing to establish criteria for 
service alterations before awarding any of the franchises. The Franchising 
Director responded by arguing that he had been told by the government to give 
priority to the sale of the operators rather than the details of the regime 
(Financial Times, 29 October 1996).
The m oderation o f com petition
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The White Paper had stated that the Government wished to encourage 
liberalisation in network access (Department of Transport 1992a: 13; para 56-61). 
It was suggested that the rail regulator was to oversee an open access regime 
based on efficiency, competition and non-discrimination. Furthermore, it was 
also made clear that subsidy would be channelled via the franchises and would 
not be used to reduce access charges. The problem for policy-makers was 
therefore to balance the objective of promoting on-rail competition and 
containing the amount of subsidy paid through the franchising system. The 
Department of Transport persuaded the Treasury that it was possible to 'cherry 
pick' services that would undermine the financial performance of certain 
operators if open access was granted. As a consequence, it was agreed to 
'moderate' competition during the first complete round of franchising, '[i]n the 
environment we were in, we just reaUsed that this was the price we were having 
to pay, if we were going to make p rogress '.T hus, in contrast to a commitment 
to competition which had been expressed in a 1992 document on the franchising 
process (Department of Transport 1992b), ministerial guidance was issued in 
1993 that competition should be moderated (Department of Transport 1993).^  ^
This measure not only reflected analytical considerations but also the 
'franchising reaHty', 'whether he had given guidance or not, the reahty of selling
82IUK2.
8  ^ 'The arrangement for gaining access should be structured to achieve the orderly and 
safe transfer to the private sector [...]. The Government recognises the potential tension 
between Uberalising access for private sector operators and successfully franchising 
British Rail's existing passenger services. This means that to the extent that it is necessary 
to ensure the success of the first generation of franchises, on-track competition between 
operators of passenger services may have to be moderated for a limited and specified 
period' (Department of Transport 1993: section 1.2).
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franchises, was that you had to moderate competition'.^ The rail regulator 
allowed 'proposals for exclusivity' to be considered as long as they were 
regarded as derogation from a fully open access regime and were supplemented 
by specific principles which should ensure the operator's responsiveness to 
customer demand. As a consequence, limits were placed on Railtrack's abüity to 
make open access paths available where these were likely to affect the 
incumbent franchisee's revenues negatively, thus excluding any possibüity for 
introducing open access in passenger services until at least April 1999.
In contrast, restrictions on competition did not hold in the freight sector where 
access charges were settled in negotiations and approved by the rail regulator, at 
least covering avoidable cost and not being above the so-called 'standalone cost' 
which would be incurred by a notional efficient competitor (Department of 
Transport 1993: 21; ORR 1995b). As in the passenger sector, in the sale of the 
freight operations the original intention to introduce competition into the freight 
rail sector was muted by a lack of market interest: businesses were sold to one 
operator, English, Wales & Scottish, owned by the US railways operator 
Wisconsin. However, in the meantime, competition emerged in various niche 
markets.
The treatment of non-commercial objectives, starting with the political 
imperative that no services were to be cut, led to a muting of the original 
Treasury's 'competition' philosophy. The Conservative MPs' scepticism of the 
pohcy, 'there were quite a large element of people who needed to be convinced,
84IUK21.
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[...]. I would not describe the proposal of railway privatisation as being the best 
thing since sliced bread',®^ the negative reporting of the media and bad publicity 
which reflected and reinforced hostile public opinion, led not only to a 
worsening market interest in the BR businesses, but also to an increased 
willingness to search for political compromises in order to miriimise the political 
risk in terms of electoral impact. The original philosophy of the Act was 
therefore watered down, such as in the example of the 'moderation of 
competition' clause and the price-capping decisions. At the same time, the 
decisions made with regard to the non-commercial objectives reveal an attempt 
to rriinirnise the poHtical uncertainty of agency drift by establishing the 
franchising director as a 'creature of government' rather than a fully independent 
body. Delegation was exercised by shifting responsibiHty to both the Office of 
the Rail Regulator and to the Franchising Director who were largely responsible 
for setting up the detailed regulatory and contractual framework in which the 
privatised industry was to operate.
The impact of institutional factors
Due to the dominance of paradigm-oriented design ideas, the original emphasis 
of the regulatory regime was to maximise the possibilities for introducing 
competition. In contrast, other potential, more domain-oriented, priorities such 
as the promotion of the viability of the operator or the launch of a 'strategic 
transport poHcy' were not considered. One key assumption was to deal with a 
declining sector with fewer pubHc resources.^^ On the one hand, this was 
evident in treating infrastructure as a demand-driven commodity. On the other
85IUK6.
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hand, this was also reflected in fixing to a large extent Railtrack's track access 
income and by not providing incentives for expanding railway services (see The 
Economist, 3 July 1999: 67-70); similarly, as discussed below, the franchise 
agreements were designed to safeguard services rather than to facilitate 
expansion (Bradshaw 1998: 190). Despite compromises such as 'moderation of 
competition' and a process driven more by political need than full administrative 
planning, pressures for paradigm-oriented isomorphism, exemplified by the 
'regulation by competition' doctrine, drew from previous British utility 
privatisations.
'AU proposals were based very much around this whole thrust on 
competition. They had made mistakes in the past privatisations, they 
were not going to do the mistake this time. There were going to be 
oodles of competition built into the system and it has been done in 
the end'.^^
Insulation o f the regulatory space from  coercive forces
According to KniU and Lehmkuhl (1998) the existence of European legislation in 
the form of 91/440 had at least a legitimating influence on the British reform 
process. WhUe the Directive was helpful in that it showed that railway reform 
'was not simply a British political obsession of the Conservative Party',^® the 
impact on existing regulatory design ideas was negUgible, even in terms of 
legitimising the choice of regulatory instruments. The European Commission's 
proposals were 'principally concerned with international traffic, which to us in
86IUK21.
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England, in the days before the Channel Tunnel, was complete irrelevance'.^^ 
Furthermore, there was the perception of British leadership in the (then) 
Community, 'We dragged Community policy, and more importantly, practice 
behind us, emd if you look at the state of Community policies on railways, they 
are effectively UK policy two years l a t e r T h e  existence of European legislation 
was 'used as pieces for illustration to support a particular view which was held 
an y w a y S im ila rly , while there was some documentation about other reform 
experiences, the main sources of conceptual thinking drew on domestic 
experiences of utility privatisations and not with reform experiences of, in terms 
of privatisation and regulatory policy, 'backward' states or reforms to railways. 
Thus, while
'the European position was an extra [...] comfort, [...] there was 
nothing to be learnt from them [other European countries] except 
some of the difficulties of having rail in a nationaHsed set-up. [...] So 
we were really out there pioneering. There was nothing to be learnt 
from the others in that context'.
Insulation o f the political-adm inistrative nexus o f the regulatory space 
At first sight, the extent of regulatory reform in contrast with European railway 
reforms, could be explained in terms of institutional structure. It could be 
claimed that the majoritarian character of British politics explains the lack of 
consultation with trade unions and the lack of any need for compromise.
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However, given a slim parliamentary majority, leadership battles and splits 
within the Conservative Party and, in the railway privatisation case, pubhc and 
media hostiHty, difficulties in maintaining the pace of the franchising process 
and increasing concern among Conservative backbench MPs, the regulatory 
reform was a 'Whitehall-sustained exercise'^^ in which poHtical choices were 
driven more by the political and institutional weakness of the government. Thus, 
the overriding poHtical imperative was to finaHse the regulatory regime within 
the lifetime of one parHament and make the organisational reform 'irreversible' 
so that a future parHament, possibly led by the Labour Party, then fuUy opposed 
to railway privatisation and advocating pubHc-private partnerships, could not 
reverse the reforms. Similarly, the Secretary of State's instruction to franchise as 
soon as 'reasonably practicable' within a set timetable was placed above 
considerations of 'theoretical purity' or maximisation of sale revenues, for 
example in the case of the rolling stock companies or Railtrack.
Nevertheless, despite this poHtical incentives, the overriding paradigm- 
orientation, i.e. the principle underlying the key regulatory instruments, was less 
a result of poHtical choices, 'the role of ministers was essentiaUy in fixing and 
facilitating and keeping us [civil servants] up to the mark',^"  ^but an outcome of 
the dominance of the Treasury, and more importantly,^^ administrative 
experiences gained from utiHty privatisations during the 1980s and, in the case 
of the franchises, of the existence of private bus companies as likely rail
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operators, following bus 'deregulation' during the 1980s. The crucial source of 
'learning' was the institutional mechanism of 'lateral transfer' in the British civil 
service system which allowed civil servants experienced in privatisation 
exercises to be 'shuttled' into the railway domain (see Hood 1996). This also 
reduced the domain-oriented position of the Department of Transport by 
facihtating the transfer of 'privatisation-experienced' officials into the 
Department.
Insulation o f the regulatory space from  societal forces
The process of British railway privatisation in 1990s was marked by a limited 
role of societal interests. British Rail's role was largely marginaHsed, and was 
only taken into consideration on technical issues. Suggestions to maintain a 
vertically integrated railway system, relying on extensive contracting-out, either 
as a single undertaking or as five separate businesses, were dismissed. In fact, 
the setting up of Railtrack as a separate government-owned company and its 
subsequent privatisation were pohcy measures taken by officials in order to 
break the perceived resistance of British Rail and to provide the privatisation 
pohcy with new momentum m the face of lacking private sector demand for 
franchises. While there was early consultation on the franchises, the hmited 
interest of the private sector, and more cruciaUy, the lack of interest in the 
contractual detail in the franchising agreement indicates that private sector 
interests did not dominate the franchising process.
'Most of these things are treated as an intellectual exercise rather than something that 
you get terribly upset about [...]' (IUK19).
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Trade unions had, except for their support for the 'Save Our Railways' campaign 
group, no influence on the selection of policy instruments. The Department of 
Transport did not have a single negotiation with the unions. The threat of strikes 
had also declined, first, because 'the RMT was a fairly broken union by then. The 
signalmen's dispute [of summer 1994] had to happen - it was the last wave of the 
dinosaur's tail'.^^ Second, the government's underwriting of BR pensions 
'guaranteed that people did not lose out'.^^ Similarly, the role of private 
merchant banks and law firms, while crucial in developing technical detail, were 
directed by administrative actors: 'We weren't well served by our merchant 
bankers, [...], earlier on, who should have driven us much more, so what we then 
set up was the weekly project control g ro u p '.'E x p e rts ', in contrast to the 
German case of 'privatisation' discussed in the following chapter, also played 
only a minor role. Although some commentators have stressed the role of 
Christopher Foster as advisor to the Department of Transport as well as his 
influence exercised by his book on 'Privatisation, Public Ownership and the 
Regulation of Natural Monopoly', his appointment followed the completion of 
the first drafts to the White Paper following the general election of 1992. Civil
% lUKl.
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98 lUKl. The National Audit Office investigated the dual role of the Department's 
financial advisers, SBC Warburg, as advisers on a partial or 100 per cent sale of Railtrack 
and as 'global co-ordinator'. The suggestion that SBC Warburg might have had a financial 
incentive to bias its advice on a Railtrack sale was rejected by the Department, pointing to 
other advisers, and the bank itself, which claimed that its reputation was more important 
than 'short term financial benefit' (see National Audit Office 1998a: 9-10).
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servants remained the key influence on the formulation and selection of 
regulatory instruments.^^
Thus, while poHtical and administrative actors reHed on societal actors, 
mcluding British Rail as weU as commercial law firms and merchant banks, in 
terms of technical information, the relations within the regulatory space were 
dominated by civil servants. It was their experience and choices which 
determined the original selection of regulatory instruments.
Conclusion
This chapter argues that the paradigm-oriented regulatory reform of the British 
railways can be explained by the 'lateral transfer' within the British poHtical- 
administrative nexus, allowing for lesson-drawing across domains and 
facüitating a transfer of personnel into the railway privatisation domain. This 
'lateral transfer' mechanism facüitated the dominant paradigm-oriented 
isomorphism observable in the privatisation debates. As a consequence, it was 
the policy environment of domestic privatised utiHties which was regarded as 
legitimate, while the appHcabüity or desirabiHty of international railway reform 
models was rejected. This chapter claims that 'Europeanisation' either in terms of 
legislation or, as a horizontal effect, experiences in other states was of negligible 
importance for explaining the choice of regulatory instruments. Similarly, the 
privatisation of British Rail can neither be explained as a 'trade union smashing'
JUKI, IUK5,1UK6, IUK12, IUK15. This view contrasts with Foster's pubHshed views, 
where he diagnoses a decline in the advisory capacity of the civil service (Foster 1998, 
Foster and Plowden 1996, see also Knill 1999).
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policy nor as an attempt to win over political constituencies of dissatisfied 
railway users.
While the paradigm-orientation of regulatory design ideas was facüitated by the 
administrative structure, thus acting as (paraphrasing Max Weber) 'switchmen' 
who determined the tracks along which the action was pushed by the dynamics 
of political and administrative interests, it was the institutional weakness of the 
Conservative government and therefore the need to 'hardwire' policy 
instruments perceived as irreversible which explains the institutional 
hardwiring of, for example, a privatised Raütrack, the faüure to regulate the 
Roscos or the introduction of a 'moderation of competition' clause.
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Chapter Eight
Domain-oriented Isomorphism and Institutional 
Compromise in Germany
This was ju s t a compromise, to do 
the pure philosophy was 
im possible. You are n o t living  in a 
reality-free world.
ID12
In comparison to Britain, efforts in (West) Germany to 'roll back the state' are 
said to have been relatively modest during the 1980s. However, the context of 
increasing Europeanisation as a result of the Single European Market and the 
impact of unification were seen by many to herald a period of substantial public 
sector reform in Germany. Indeed, the 'privatisation' of the former public 
monopolies in railways, telecommunications and postal services seems to 
suggest that Germany, in terms of privatisation and deregulation themes, was 
'catching up' during the 1990s (see Benz and Goetz 1996: 5-14). The following 
account of regulatory reform in railways offers analytical insight into processes 
of isomorphism given the presence of both paradigm-orientated sources, as part 
of the rise of the international privatisation environment, but also in terms of 
domain-orientation, given the increasing interest of European and non- 
European states in regulatory reform in the railway domain.
This chapter seeks to answer why the German railway 'privatisation case' was 
dominated by domain-oriented isomorphism. The German case provides an 
example of organisational privatisation. In terms of European influences, the
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German transport sector was particularly exposed to the liberalisation policies of 
the European Commission, Attempts to maintain control over the road haulage 
market, for example by introducing road tolls while, at the same time, reducing 
national lorry taxes, were ruled out by the European Commission and 
subsequently by the European Court of Justice. Similarly, the German 
government's attempts to 'harmonise' vehicle taxes at the German level across 
the Community failed to gain support from either the European Conunission or 
any other member state. Nevertheless, the German initiative to impose road 
charges at the European level resulted in the creation of the so-called 'Euro- 
Vignette'. Similarly, in the railway sector, the German government did not 
support Council Directive 91/440, arguing that it did not want to impose 
constitutional changes via European legislation.^ Nevertheless, once the 
privatisation law had been passed, Germany and the UK were the first of the 
then EC member states that had implemented the Directive; both countries went 
further in their reforms than required.
As in the previous chapters, first the context of the regulatory reform and then 
the emergence of regulatory ideas are discussed. In particular, the domain- 
oriented nature of proposals is highlighted. Then the analysis considers the 
'hardwiring' of the regulatory regime, while the conclusion claims that European 
legislation had only Httle influence on the conceptual development of the post­
privatisation regime in the German railways. Instead, it is argued that while 
experiences from other reforms in the railway reform were gathered, these were
^ID l.
262
rather used as 'non-lessons' (as lessons in how not to proceed) instead of being 
directly translated into the German context.
Setting the context
Due to its long-term financial decline, a growing consensus among poHtical 
parties and social groups emerged in the mid-1980s that more than just 
incremental change was necessary to provide the 'Deutsche Bundesbahn' with a 
stable and secure financial future. Reforms during the 1980s attempted to make 
the Bundesbahn 'more commercial' without attempting to amend the provisions 
of the Basic Law. In 1982, the then Social Democrat/Liberal coaHüon passed a 
law which granted the management of the Bundesbahn more autonomy and 
commercial discretion, selecting Reiner Gohlke, a former IBM manager, as chief 
executive of the Bundesbahn. The continuously rising debt burden (from DM 
13.5bn in 1970 to DM 36bn in 1982) motivated the succeeding Christian 
Democrat/Liberal government to search further for poHcies offering financial 
consoHdation. In November 1983, the government decided that the railway 
budget should be frozen at the same level until 1987 (a practice already 
undertaken by previous governments since 1979). The so-called 'principles for 
the consoHdation of the DB' offered more investment in infrastructure 
modernisation, but also demanded rationaHsation in terms of organisation and 
personnel, increases in productivity and a reduction in the deficit. Although an 
accounting separation into commercial, 'commonweal' (local passenger 
transport) and state tasks (infrastructure) was demanded, an outright separation 
of infrastructure and operation was regarded in terms of 'railway-poHtical goals 
not worthy of being implemented' {Deutsche Bundesbahn, issue 12/1983). While 
the Bundesbahn achieved more positive results, poHtical opposition indicated
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resistance to any further reforms. The then Bavarian premier Franz Joseph 
Strauss (CSU) attacked the federal government's decisions, claiming that the 
current railway pohcy was as dominated by financial considerations as the 
previous government's. Future pohcies should consider both the fiscal interest of 
the federal government in commercial profitabiHty as well as pubhc interests, 
particularly regional and planning aspects. While the federal government 
claimed that its 1983 measures would be successful in limiting further increases 
in cumulated debts, the opposition Social Democrats (SPD), demanded a 
transformation of the Bundesbahn into a pubhc undertaking, a separation of the 
accounts for the various Bundesbahn operations, a strengthening of the 
supervisory board's competencies and a transfer of responsibhity for 
infrastructure to the federal government (BT 10/3009). Given the diversity of 
opinions both within the government and between government and opposition 
as weU as the history of failed reform attempts, the federal Ministry of Transport 
showed httle enthusiasm to launch another reform initiative, 'he said that he 
would do anything in order not to do it'.^
After 1987, when Jürgen Warnke became Minister of Transport, various 
initiatives were taken, ah aiming to consohdate the Bundesbahn's financial 
position and to enhance its competitiveness.^ In spring 1987, the Federation of 
German Industry (BDI), advocated a three-way spht in the Bundesbahn's 
operations, into state-owned infrastructure, state-financed social services and 
commercial operations, whhe the DB itself should become a more flexible public
2ID12.
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sector organisation. Similar proposals were made by the SPD, not only 
demanding an organisational separation, but also the cancellation of all debts 
(by transferring them to the federal budget). The Bundesbahn's administrative 
board should be renamed 'supervisory board' and include employee and Lander 
representatives. The Green Party made similar proposals.
In March 1988, the Transport Minister asked a parliamentary group of CDU and 
FDP members to produce recommendations for a reform of the railways. The 
group recommended a transfer of all debts incurred prior to 1972 (so-called 
'A ltschuldeii - 'long-standing debts') to the federal budget, a separation of the 
Bundesbahn in infrastructure tasks (with the state taking over financial 
responsibility), subsidised regional passenger services and other commercial 
operations. The Bundesbahn was to pay track access charges. Further 
recommendations were a closer co-operation between the Lander and the federal 
government and a more 'business-like' organisational structure of the 
Bundesbahn.
While the Lander voiced their concern about the effects of a railway reform on 
the provision of regional services, the SPD issued legislative proposals in the 
Bundestag, demanding that infrastructure issues should be decided by 
parliament, the latter deciding on five-year plans (so-called 'Bedarfsplane') 
instead of the existing traditional administrative planning procedures. 
Furthermore, profitable and non-profitable businesses should be separated, 
while the federal government was to take full responsibility for the provision of
 ^ This also followed personnel changes in the railways unit m the Federal transport
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the infrastructure. The Bundesbahn was to be fully compensated for politically- 
demanded non-commercial operations.
At the same time, the Deutsche Bundesbahn was working on its own internal 
reform programme. A working group was established in the late 1980s which 
developed a so-called 'divisionalisation' plan (similar to, but not read across 
from BR's sectorisation programme). According to the group's proposals, 
autonomous units operating as separate businesses were to be established, 
leading to contractual arrangements and the setting up of internal pricing 
mechanisms. These reform proposals were supposed to create an effective and 
efficient organisational structure for the Deutsche Bundesbahn without 
requiring amendments (and therefore a two-thirds majority in both the 
Bundestag and the Bundesrat) to the Basic Law.^
In January 1989, a meeting between Chancellor Helmut Kohl, the Finance 
Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg and the Transport Minister Jürgen Wamke, set the 
agenda for future government policy on railways: DB was to be relieved of all its 
'long-standing debts' that had been inherited from the post-war reconstruction 
period. Furthermore, the federal government should contribute to the costs of 
the provision of infrastructure and an independent commission was to be 
established to formulate reform proposals in greater detail. In the meantime, DB 
was to prepare cost accounting practices for a separation of its operations. The 
Cabinet agreed to these proposals and also initiated policies such as the 
introduction of road tolls for heavy freight lorries paralleled by a vehicle tax
ministry.
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reduction (as noted above), a policy of prioritising investment into rail over road 
infrastructure and a policy to facilitate 'combined traffic' between various modes 
of transport.
Following German unification in 1990, the Deutsche Reichsbahn (DR), the 
former East German operator, was brought into the remit of the Commission. 
The desolate state of the Reichsbahn added to the pressures for immediate 
reform as its whole infrastructure and rolling stock required extensive 
modernisation. Furthermore, the total number of DR staff had been held at an 
artificially inflated rate during the era of the communist regime (see Fromm 
1991: 70-3). Moreover, the political desire to unify the Reichsbahn with the 
Bundesbahn added to the factors favouring organisational change.
To conclude, approaches to reform the Bundesbahn were being developed 
during the 1980s. These did not seriously consider a 'privatisation' of the 
operator, as the possibility of a constitutional amendment was regarded as low. 
The main emphasis rested on the need to reduce the (future) financial burden of 
the Bundesbahn on the federal budget and to be more competitive on the 
transport market. This domain-orientation was encouraged by the lack of a 
German 'privatisation environment' (in contrast to the UK) which could have 
exerted pressures of isomorphism.
The emergence of regulatory ideas
4 iD4.
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This section accounts for the estabHshment of the independent commission and 
its dehberations. The Commission, the so-called 'Regierungskommission 
Bimdesbahn' was set up in 1989 to achieve (or fail to achieve) a 'technocratic' 
consensus across poHtical and societal actors. This Commission was designed on 
the lines of a 'Royal Commission' and adopted the 'Japanese style' of pubHc 
sector - and railway - reforms.^
The Railway Commission was mandated to search for options that would 
increase the railways' market share and would require less money from the 
taxpayer. The main poUtical interest rested with the second objective. Options 
were to be considered which would provide the Bundesbahn, in the face of 
increasing financial Habihties, with a competitive and viable basis 'under 
transport policy, regional planning and environmental as well as economical 
and fiscal aspects' (Regierungskommission 1991: 4; SaRmannshausen 1995). 
Furthermore, the Commission was asked to define the range and extent of 
services and products which could be competitive in the long term both in terms 
of quahty as well as in price. Particular emphasis was to be paid to issues such as 
commercially viable services, socially 'necessary', but unprofitable services, and
 ^The reforms of the Japan National Railways (JNR) were first proposed by the 'Second 
Rincho', a 'shingikai', or commission, on administrative reform, being set up under the 
Nakasone government. The details of the railway reform were elaborated by a specific 
'Commission to Supervise the RehabUitation of JNR', which was set up in June 1983. As in 
the German case, the JNR suffered from an accumulated debt burden and a pohtical lack 
of interest in reform as a dechne in rural votes due to line closures would undermine the 
already dwindling support of the governing LDP. Moreover, trade unions were opposed 
to reductions in the work force. For the Japanese system of commissions or 'shingikai', see 
Schwartz (1998). I am most grateful to Katsuya Hirose for enlightening me on Japanese 
reforms.
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the appropriate form of organisation and distribution of authority for regional 
passenger rail transport (Regierungskommission 1991: 4). To reflect a wide 
spectrum of political and societal interests, the Commission consisted of two 
academics, three representatives from business, four politicians and two trade 
union representatives. The Commission was chaired by Günther 
SaRmannshausen, a former private sector chief executive who later became 
chairman of the privatised operator's supervisory board.
The setting up of the Commission reflected the desire to integrate all political 
and societal opinions prior to any political debate. To some extent, its function 
was therefore to reduce political decision-making costs by attempting to solve 
potential policy conflicts at an early stage by creating a technocratic consensus; 
'first tie them all in and then say, we want to go down this road'.^ More 
importantly, however, was the genuine uncertainty about potential options and 
the likelihood of success. 'In general, at the early stages of the Commission's 
work, the main view was, oh Lord, another commission already. And at the 
beginning of the job, it was really not clear what would happen at the end and 
what would come out at the end'.^ Despite the federal Ministry of Transport's (or 
rather its railways unit's) strong support for a railway reform, 'there was no 
complete idea of what was supposed to be done [...] there was nothing modelled 
beforehand; the Commission did not have, as often occurs when a Commission 
is set up, some form of psychological predisposition'.^ Indeed, 'we never
6 iD8.
7 iD8.
8 iD8.
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believed that we would achieve anything with the Railway Commission'.^ 
Moreover, a political desire existed to postpone any decision concerning the 
future of the railways beyond the 1990 election (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 21 
December 1991).
Despite the Commission's independent status which was to allow it to consider 
various reform options free of political constraints,
'the Commission worked for the government. And the government 
did not want an analysis whether its policies were correct, but 
wanted an analysis of what the railways were doing wrong and 
what the railways could do better. In that respect, the mandate was 
incomplete'.
The Transport Ministry 'always tried to steer it a bit without making it too 
obvious', ideas were developed by members of the Commission in discussion 
with the Transport ministry and then were agreed upon by the Commission's 
members collectively.^^ Moreover, '[t]he report did not emerge in a completely 
empty political space, there were numerous conversations with the responsible 
people of the Bundesbahn and [with politicians]'.^^
9 ID12.
10ID4.
ID12.
1  ^ID ll. Safimarmshausen pointed out that 'any major reform required the consent of aU 
cabinet members. Therefore, I informed the inter-departmental committee of the affected 
ministries on a permanent basis and brought their suggestions into the work of the 
Commission; at the same time the transport spokespeople of the parties and the chairman
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Outside the Commission and the Transport Ministry, little interest was 
expressed in conceptual issues of railway privatisation, given also the absence of 
a domestic privatisation programme. Lessons were therefore drawn from other 
railway reforms in other countries and from European legislation.
'1 looked at Sweden, I looked at Japan, I went to Holland and I 
looked at all this, then we thought about it, and the 440 clearly 
showed the way to an opening of the European market. That's where 
we said, this is the right approach. And then we tried, after thinking 
about it, to analyse what a market should look like, to give it a try'.^^
Experiences from Japan were drawn with regard to procedural aspects and the 
treatment of debts and personnel reorganisation. The reforms in Sweden, the 
early stages of the reforms in Britain, and discussions in Austria and Switzerland 
were analysed. However, there was no direct adaptation from these 
international domain-based sources. It was decided that it was not 'desirable' for 
any of these experiences to be transposed to the German railway system, in 
particular with regard to the organisation of the infrastructure in relation to the 
operation of transport services. Despite the attractions of the Swedish model of 
separation of infrastructure and operations, 'We did not like it, because the state 
is involved in the track. We don't see this as good, and it is a problem in Sweden
of the transport committee of the Bundestag were informed and prepared for the 
legislative process' (SaBmannshausen 1995: 48).
ID12. The Commission received a report on international railway reform experiences 
from its member Professor Gerd Aberle. 'The Commission did not travel to these 
countries. Also because the chairman said, "We are not here to do some tourism, but to 
work" [...] But they [the examples] had some influence' (IDS).
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that the bureaucracy owns the track and a commercially oriented company 
undertakes the services; this does not work'.^^
A further element was the existence of EC Directive 91/440 despite the original 
opposition of the govemment.^^ The Directive did not directly affect the German 
reform debate, but acted as a parallel movement at another policy level which 
offered encouragement and legitimisation to the German reform attempts.^^ 
Thus, a 'German approach' was sought which adopted other experiences to a 
limited extent. There was a sense of "'we do everything better than the others" 
and when something was done somewhere else in a similar way, then it was 
said, "yes it is the same over here" and if it did not fit, then it would be 
ignored'.
Discussions inside the Railway Commission soon brought agreement that a clear 
separation between commercial and state responsibilities was desirable. Thus, 
the existing regulatory objective that the Bundesbahn was to be managed 'like' a
IDS. Similarly: 'The [track operator], the publicly-owned bit, which has to be run by the 
state with the aim that for two years debts mount up, and every two years debts have to 
be relieved. And then there is the SJ, the transport operator, which hves in luxury, which 
regards this [arrangement] as very nice and has positive results. Then w e said, w e could 
do this too, of course, but we do not want to' (ID ll).
15 ID2.
IDI. Thus, '[the] emergence of Directive 91/40 did not directly have anything to do 
with the work of the Commission, but it acted as a catalyst, because the same ideas were 
used [...]' (1D8). '[The 91/440] practically came parallel. We never looked at it. We never 
had contact with Brussels because of 91/440' (IDS). Also, 'of course one looked at this 
Directive of 91, but as a pohtician I have to say, w e did not accept it as a policy objective, 
but were of the opinion that something substantial had to happen [...]. If this was in tune 
with Europe, then this could only be convenient for us' (IDIO).
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commercial undertaking was to be abandoned (§28 of the former 
Bundesbahngesetz). More controversially discussed was the question whether a 
constitutional amendment should be proposed and whether such a reform was 
feasible in political terms given the two-thirds majority requirements for 
constitutional amendments. Especially after the Reichsbahn was brought into the 
remit of the Commission, the consensus turned towards advocating a proposal 
that would include a constitutional amendment in order to estabHsh the all- 
German railways as a limited company. This was signalled in an interim 
report.^®
Members of the Commission sought solutions to rnmiinise the possibility of 
political control; 'if you want to bring in these kind of tilings, then you want to 
put it into a form that makes sure that it maintains a certain behaviour and does 
certain things and that a certain pressure is exerted by this formal structure, then 
this was only possible by choosing the limited company m o d e l'.O th e r  private 
law solutions, such as the limited liability company (GmbH) were rejected as 
only the limited company law 'defines precisely the responsibilities of the 
management and supervisory boards. And this seemed very important to us, 
because, in the past, there was the tendency to intervene for pohtical reasons'.
1 7 ID4.
1  ^ The view  that the establishment of a private law operator required a constitutional 
amendment was confirmed in 1991, when the Federal President refused to sign a law 
which w ould have allowed air control to be undertaken by private law operators as it 
violated constitutional provisions (see Riedel and Schmidt 1991).
19ID12.
20 IDS.
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Most controversially discussed were personnel issues and the extent of 
separation of the infrastructure from operations. With regard to personnel, the 
key concern was to obtain the trade unions' consent to a sharp reduction in the 
work force, especially among Reichsbahn staff, and to find a solution for 
combining the civil service status of most Bundesbahn staff with a private law 
undertaking. As a consequence, the Commission's proposals were opposed by 
the representative of the civil service trade union. With regard to the separation 
of infrastructure and services, an overall agreement existed that the railways 
should be treated similarly to road transport, 'the background was that there was 
to be a competitive equaHty between the different modes of transport. In road 
traffic there is also no connection between transport undertakings and 
in fras tru c tu re '.A s a preliminary result, the Commission argued the case not 
only for an accounting, but also for an organisational separation. However, 'the 
[Bundesbahn] tried to stop the separation between infrastructure and operations' 
and attempted to convince members of the Commission that any organisational 
separation was not f e a s i b l e . 2 2
The Commission recommended that the German railways were to be unified as 
a limited company under the ownership of the federal government. The railway
21 IDS.
22 IDS. On the issue of vertical separation, the Bundesbahn tried to influence members 
that an institutional solution, the setting up of an independent infrastructure provider, 
would be detrimental to the railways' operational performance. As a result, advocates of 
a complete vertical separation faced increasing opposition: 'This was especially difficult 
with a member from industry. That was particularly difficult, because he had a huge 
electric railway at home. [...] That is how politics is' (IDS). However, the Bundesbahn was 
not against a vertical separation of functions within its organisation per se, 'this was a 
development which had been coming for a long time and had been prepared for' (ID3).
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operator was to be relieved of its debts and to be allowed to strategically and 
organisationally concentrate on the most promising operational activities. Public 
service ('commonweal') tasks were to be provided according to contracts with 
regional or Lander authorities (thus implementing European legislation). The 
Lander were provided with financial compensation for their newly acquired 
tasks. It was argued that responsibility for the infrastructure should be given to 
the new 'German Railways' limited company, organised, however, as a separate 
part of the business. While the Commission advocated an immediate 
organisational and accounting separation of operational and infrastructure 
activities, the option of an institutional separation was 'to be kept open' 
(Regierungskommission 1991:17).
Apart from personnel and the separation of infrastructure and services,
'all other issues were clearly harmony-inducing. When it came to 
making the railways debt-free, then everyone shouted, 'Hooray', of 
course, the debts are going to be paid by the taxpayer. When it came 
to devaluing the whole property value, then nobody would say 
anything against that either. [...] Régionalisation of local passenger 
transport as a public service operation, the principle of ordering 
these services, nobody was against that in principle. [...] It was very 
important to us that this "black box" disappeared, [the Bundesbahn] 
had always argued that they were good, but that they had to provide 
too many public service obligations. That was a "black box". 
Therefore, it was an important step to say that the railway cannot 
excuse itself anymore, bids are put out, they say this costs so and so 
much and we also allow third actors to bid, this is very important as
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a regulatory device as nobody can sufficiently control the costs 
externally'.^
Apart from the conceptual work undertaken by the Commission in conjunction 
with the Transport Ministry, there was little involvement of other actors. The 
Deutsche Bundesbahn, especially after Heinz Dürr had been chosen by Helmut 
Kohl to become chief executive of the Bundesbahn, and subsequently also of the 
Reichsbahn, actively advocated a 'privatisation' which would reduce public 
sector 'duties'. The main reform proposals advocated by the Commission were 
domain-oriented, driven in particular by the representatives on the Commission 
as well as the absence of domestic privatisation experiences in other sectors. 
While there was no direct 'reading across' from other railway experiences or 
from the content of European legislation, these were nevertheless used to draw 
lessons, building on the assumption that the railways should become a 
commercial transport undertaking, 'our original thought was that the 
Bundesbahn, as any other transport undertaking, has to offer a service which is 
purchased by a customer
The Commission established a political and societal consensus on the principles 
of reform among the transport poHcy community. There was initially little 
pohtical interest in the Commission's activities. In fact, the results of the 
Commission came to many as a surprise, even within the Transport Ministry, 
'they failed to notice the results, even the principle policy unit
23 IDS. 
24ID12.
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\G rundsatzabteilun^ missed out on it co m p le te ly N ev erth e less , on 15 
February 1992 the Cabinet agreed that the ideas to reform the railways should be 
developed further, that fair competition between modes of transport 
infrastructures was to be estabUshed, that the competitiveness of the 
Bundesbahn was to be secured, that a merger with the Reichsbahn as a limited 
company would be initiated as soon as possible and, finally, that the status of 
employees as weU as the provision of essential public services was to be 
safeguarded (see Reinhardt 1995: 80).
The creation of a Commission represented a well-established attempt to 
overcome both internal government as weU as overall political conflict. By 
setting it into a technocratic-domain-oriented context, the potential for 
pohticisation of the railway issue was reduced. Furthermore, it also re-asserted 
the position of already existing members of the regulatory space and closed off 
experiences from other contexts. However, the search for domain-oriented 
reforms allowed for considerable 'lesson-drawing' from other European reform 
experiences, while the impact of European legislation was not decisive.
Organisational Structure
This section is concerned with the 'hardwiring' of the organisational structure 
which closely followed the proposals developed by the Commission. In 
particular, the Ministry of Transport used the Commission's financial 
calculations to advocate a substantial regulatory reform. The following 
discussion reveals the domain-oriented nature of organisational structure:
25ID12.
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debates were dominated by the need to obtain agreement between institutional 
actors, which was reflected, for example, in the Lander's demand for continuing 
majority ownership in the infrastructure operator.
On 1 January 1994, the Deutsche Bundesbahn and the Deutsche Reichsbahn 
were merged to form the Deutsche Bahn AG and established as a limited 
company operating under private law, following the provisions of the amended 
Art. 87e of the Basic Law. The federal government remained the sole shareholder 
for an undetermined period. Initially, the Deutsche Bahn was separated into four 
internal business sectors: infrastructure, long-distance passenger traffic, regional 
passenger traffic and freight traffic (§2(1) and §25 Deutsche Bahn 
Gründungsgesetz).^^ The second stage of the railway reform was formally 
introduced on 1 January 1999 with the infrastructure, the two passenger and the 
freight businesses becoming independent limited companies; furthermore a 
limited company, responsible for stations was also established. The core 
organisation of the Deutsche Bahn took the form of a holding company, being 
the sole owner of the companies' shares. After a further unspecified period, a 
third stage, the abolition of the Holding, was indicated in the legislation. In a 
previous draft form, it had been intended that the Holding should be dissolved 
after a period of five years. The final wording represented a compromise 
between the demands for faster separation among CDU and FDP 
parliamentarians and SPD and trade union opposition to any solution involving
The provision to split the passenger traffic operations into two businesses for regional 
and long-distance traffic was introduced at the last stage of the legislative process due to 
Lander demands, which had been expressed first by local authority associations (BT 
12/6269:134).
278
the institutional separation of the infrastructure provider from service 
operations; 'there was this thought that we set up a holding with subsidiaries 
underneath. Following that, take the holding away; but then there was this 
ideological m u d d le '.T h e  Deutsche Bahn was to develop plans for its further 
development. It used this discretion to establish a strong holding organisation 
that 'has still strong opportunities to exert influence on the various limited 
co m p an ies '.T h is  was strongly criticised by the academic advisory council, 
accusing the federal government of not having paid sufficient attention to the 
Deutsche Bahn's behaviour, fearing that the strong position of the holding 
would lead to discrirninatory behaviour against third parties and cross­
subsidisation (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat 1997).
'What the Bahn thinks about this is obvious. What kind of 
entrepreneur would voluntarily do something like this? It is, of 
course, a huge advantage for the Bahn to keep it aU together. But it is 
going this way and the federal government has two interests: on the 
one hand, it wants to encourage competition on the infrastructure, 
but on the other hand, it has to be careful too, so that the Bahn,
IDI2. A Cabinet memorandum indicated the Transport Ministry's argument that a 
compromise solution was necessary for reasons of practicability, given the 'required 
political consensus, a restructuring process proceeding by gradual steps' would lead to 
'substantially reduced friction costs and losses' (Kabinettssache Datenblatt 12/12074-05, 6 
June 1992: 31 in Lehmkuhl and Herr 1994: 636 (footnote 6)).
ID3. Officially, the Deutsche Bahn argued that a strong control was necessary in order 
to safeguard synergy effects and to support the aim of 'steering, co-ordination and 
control', while the subsidiaries were responsible for their financial performance. The 
chairman of the Holding was also at the same time chairmcm of the supervisory boards of 
the subsidiaries (Deutsche Bahn 1997).
29 ID4, id s .
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which it owns 100 per cent, is not over-stretched. This is why [the 
Ministry] originally agreed to this compromise'.^®
This organisational outcome followed earHer debates with regard to the 
appropriate legal status of the various railway businesses, in particular with 
regard to infrastructure. Financial forecasts by the Railway Commission 
estabhshed a cross-party consensus on the necessity of action. The Commission 
argued that without organisational reform, the annual deficit of the two German 
operators would increase to DM 42bn. The cumulated losses of the railway 
operators would amount to DM 266bn for the period between 1991 and 2000 
with the federal government's cumulated financial burden increasing to DM 
417bn for the same period. Thus, the main political imperative was to find a 
solution to the 'fear that the railway would become uncontrollable in its financial 
demands. This was the central [motivation]. [...] Not because of insight, [...] but 
because of pure fear that the budget would break a p a r t 'F o llo w in g  the 
Commission's proposals to establish the railway operator as a limited company 
under federal ownership, separated into three sectors (infrastructure, passenger 
and freight traffic), the Transport Ministry presented five different models to 
Cabinet. All options accommodated the political will to merge Bundesbahn and 
Reichsbahn, that non-discriminatory access to the infrastructure should be 
guaranteed and that the federal government would take on the 'long-standing 
debts' (Juhtz 1998: 61). The various models suggested (Handelsblatt, 13 April 
1992):
30 IDS.
31 IDS.
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• the creation of three 'special properties' (Sondervermogeii) for passenger 
traffic, freight traffic and infrastructure; it was calculated that this option would 
lead to losses of DM 82,6bn by 2002, requiring federal government subsidies 
amounting to 476.7bn DM;
• the estabHshment of a 'special property' for infrastructure operations and a 
'limited company' for operations; it was claimed that such a poHcy would lead to 
a loss of DM 25.4bn, requiring a financial subsidy of DM 437.9bn;
• the transfer of all activities to a limited company;
• the setting up of a holding company and two subsidiaries for operations and 
infrastructure; it was argued that this option would lead to DM 4.8bn 
operational profits by 2002, reducing the amount of federal contributions by DM 
lOSbn (to DM 405.5bn) in contrast to a continuation of the status quo;
• the estabHshment of two autonomous limited companies for track and 
operations.
The Transport Ministry argued that the option of a holding company consisting 
of two subsidiaries was the most preferable, offering both profit-orientation and 
synergy-effects. However, any reform had to be preceded by an elimination of 
debts (to be financed by the sale of non-essential property) and of other pubHc 
sector burdens (Die Tageszeitung, 22 April 1992; Jobst 1995: 29). Transport 
speciaHsts of the CDU and FDP parHamentary groups demanded an immediate 
institutional separation of infrastructure and services, and the setting up of three 
separate limited companies for passenger and freight transport and 
infrastructure provision. A 'holding' should only be regarded as a medium-term 
solution, as the 'real' aim was to run the three businesses independently. Much
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importance was placed on network access and the introduction of contractual 
relations for local and regional services.
In contrast, Heinz Dürr, chairman of the Bundesbahn and the Reichsbahn, 
opposed any option that would have set up a legally separate infrastructure 
organisation. Separation was only to be undertaken within the organisation of 
the railway operator in terms of accounting and internal organisational 
arrangements.^^ The railway operator argued that a close relationship between 
the track and services within a framework of an all-German railway undertaking 
was necessary. As a limited company, it was claimed, an operating benefit of 
DM 6bn could be achieved by 2000. Dürr also demanded the right to sell and 
manage non-essential property, opposing therefore the Ministry's intentions to 
organise a sale of these properties as a means of debt reduction {Frankfurter 
Rundschau, 22 April 1992). Similarly, the SPD and the trade unions, while in 
general supporting the reforms, opposed an institutional separation of track and 
services and argued that the federal government, given its role with roads and 
inland waterways, was responsible for the railway infrastructure. The SPD 
argued that the key to a 'railway revival' was an European Community-wide 
'level playing field' in terms of track access costs rather than an organisational 
reform. The largest railway union, the Gewerkschaft der Eisenbahner 
Deutschlands (GdED), unlike the civil service union, backed the reform 
initiatives, hoping that successful reforms would end its continuous decline in
The operator advocated that under a broad framework structure, four separate units 
were to be established along the lines of track, freight traffic, passenger traffic and 
property management {Rheinische Post, 22 April 1992). The Commission chairman.
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membership. More importantly, it gave the GdED the opportunity to obtain fuU 
co-determination status and therefore gain full autonomy from the larger public 
sector union, the ÔTV (Gewerkschaft Offentliche Dienste, Transport und 
Verkehr) (Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 19 March 1992),^^
The key argument with regard to the organisational structure concerned the 
legal status of the infrastructure operator. There were two central motives which 
encouraged a 'safeguarding' of the political interest. First, the argument that 
infrastructure had to be perceived as part of the German administrative principle 
of 'Daseinsvorsorge', obligating the state to provide essential services in order to 
enhance the economic weU-being of its subjects. Second, the Lander in particular 
regarded the provision of infrastructure in their own territories as part of their 
economic weU-being:
'the infrastructure of the railways and the services offered by the 
Bundesbahn always had a strong impact on regional development 
and planning. Areas connected to the main lines have developed 
better in the past than others [...]. They feared that a purely private 
railway would only operate between major conurbations and would 
neglect marginal areas. Or the railway would come along and 
blackmaU a Land by saying "weU, dear Land, if you want some
Safimannshausen, also opposed a fuU separation of the infrastructure and the services 
into separate undertakings.
The civil service union as well as the locomotive drivers' union opposed any 
privatisation, proposing the establishing of an autonomous public law body. A  
'protectionist' view  in respect of civil service rights is provided by Laschefelder (1993). A 
potential further reason for the GdED's accommodating position was the already
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service, then you have to give us money." This is a position the 
Lander did not want to be in. [...]. The Lander would never have 
consented to a solution that would have pushed public responsibility 
{Staatsverantwortlichkeit) too far away'.^^
The Transport Ministry, in contrast, argued that any 'administrative' solution for 
the organisation of the infrastructure provider would lead to bureaucratic inertia 
rather than entrepreneurial flexibility, claiming that 'if it was operated as [the 
opposition] demanded, then we would have a situation like the butter 
mountains in the EC which are caused by subsidies. If we subsidise the track, we 
will get track mountains. Loads of track, but nobody uses it'.^^ Furthermore, as 
the core of railway operations, the infrastructure was to be managed 
commercially, because the other (private law) undertakings depended on its 
performance.^^ In addition, the federal government's responsibility for the 
railway infrastructure would be maintained regardless of ownership status via 
the law regarding infrastructure modernisation {Bundesschienenwege- 
ausbaugesetz, Art. 6; Para 135 Eisenbahimeuordnungsgesetè)?'^ The final 
compromise gave the infrastructure operator a private law status as a subsidiary 
of the Deutsche Bahn holding. For the Transport Ministry the most important 
aspect was 'that [we] got away from the idea to make the infrastructure a
competitive situation in the transport sector; the absence of monopoly rents (in contrast, 
for example to telecommunications) made it less difficult to accept liberalisation.
34 ID4.
35 ID12.
36 IDS.
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bureaucracy. They wanted to create a public law body, [...] to stick civil servants 
in there, something which [the Ministry] regarded as completely wrong' 
However, the Lander and the opposition parties ensured the constitutional 
hardwiring of a provision which determined the federal government's 
permanent majority ownership of the track operator. Furthermore, any sale of 
shares in the infrastructure undertaking required the consent of the Lander via 
legislation passed with Bundesrat approval (§ 2 Gesetz zur Gründimg einer 
Deutschen Bahn Aktiengesellschaft (law estabHshing a Deutsche Bahn limited 
company)).
Besides the 'protection' granted to the railway operator and the institutional 
blockage of any more far-reaching proposals, there was also a strong interest in 
establishing the financial health of the Bahn, allowing it to start an extensive 
modernisation programme, in particular in terms of its rolling stock. Thus, the 
federal government consented to a restructuring of the railways' debts and a 
devaluation of the asset value. Initially, it had been planned that the debt burden 
would be served by a long-term credit financed programme via a newly 
established institution, the Bundeseisenbahnveimogen ('railway property')."^^ 
The transfer of all existing debt to the 'Bundeseisenbahnvermogen' allowed the
This law established the legal equaHty between rail and road infrastructure, clarified 
the state's responsibHity for the rail network and provided a legal basis for the Bundestag 
to decide on the infrastructure planning programme.
38ID12.
39 'It is clear already that the Lander will never consent to any sale. This is not an 
ideological issue, this unites them aU' (IDS).
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Deutsche Bahn to begin its operations debt-free, similar to the organisational 
solution adopted in Japan where a similar institutional construction dealt with 
debts and with safeguarding the social security of former civil servants 
Finance Minister Theo Waigel, linking (and forced by the Lander to link) the 
railways' reforms to the simultaneous debate on the future of federal financial 
equalisation policies, opposed the creation of a 'shadow budget' and demanded 
that debts should be relieved directly by raising additional charges (Lehmkuhl 
1996: 78)42
In its 'Federal Consolidation Programme', the Finance Ministry argued that the 
federal government should no longer be financially involved in regional
49 The 'Bundeseisenbahnvermogen' rather than the federal budget serviced the railways' 
debts. The BEV was also granted Limited borrowing powers. From 1996, any new railway 
deficit was to be serviced by Deutsche Bahn funds.
44 In addition to its role in servicing the debt burden, the Bundeseisenbahnvermogen 
(BEV) was also assigned the role as guarantor for social benefits to former civil servants. 
To maintain their financial position, the BEV provided additional payments to the civil 
servants above the market rates paid and set (unsupervised) by the Deutsche Beihn. 
Pension payments were also provided by the BEV. To be able to transfer to the Deutsche 
Bahn, former civil servants either had to leave the service, 'take leave' or were possibly 
even compulsory assigned by the BEV (Art. 143a (1) Basic Law). Earlier drafts had 
applied these conditions to aU former Deutsche Bundesbahn employees (Fromm 1994: 
194). The law establishing the BEV provided for the possibility that this body could be 
abolished after 2004 with its tasks being transferred to either the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt, 
the Ministry of Transport or the Federal Debt Administration 
(Bundesschuldenverwaltung).
42 'Another factor was that the Finance Minister wanted to combine this with the reform 
to the federal finance. This is had to do with Maastricht and the question to what extent 
such shadow budgets exist or do not exist, continue or not continue. Then he tried in an 
unfair way to blame us that the mineral oil tax was increased by 16 Pfennigs. This was 
blamed on the railway reform, but no, that was not the railway reform, that was his 
Maastricht idea, but they did not like to hear that' (1D12).
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transport operations and that future funding was to be obtained by raising 
mineral oil taxes. In contrast, the Transport Ministry was more interested in 
gradually imposing road charges (Lehmkuhl and Herr 1994: 637-8).'^  ^ To some 
extent, the position of the German Finance Ministry, with its aim to minimise 
future financial burdens, was similar to that of the UK Treasury. The Finance 
Ministry 'wanted a solution that would have stopped, with the first day of the 
railway reform, aU financial commitments of the s ta te '.H o w ev er, unlike the 
Treasury, the German Finance Ministry, or indeed other ministries, showed little 
interest in conceptual issues with regard to a reformed regulatory regime. The 
Finance Ministry's arguments on future transport funding proved extremely 
unpopular with the SPD, the Lander, the trade unions and the Transport 
ministry. Only after Matthias Wissmann, who 'had more of the political 
environment behind him '^ had replaced Günther Krause as transport minister 
in June 1993, could this inter-govemmental and inter-institutional conflict be 
resolved. It was decided to raise mineral oil and diesel fuel taxes by 19 and seven 
Pfennigs per litre respectively from 1 January 1994. This was a consequence of 
substantial opposition to the imposition of road tolls at a level regarded as 
politically impossible given the numerous forthcoming elections in 1994.
Similar controversy occurred with regard to the method of financing future 
infrastructure programmes. The Finance Ministry opposed the proposal 
whereby the federal government would have had to pay for the construction 
and the extension of infrastructure, while the Bahn was to pay back the
43 IDS. 
4 4 ID12.
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depreciation costs interest-free. The Transport Ministry overruled the Finance 
Ministry's objections, stressing that otherwise any proposal would be vetoed in 
the legislative process,^^ Nevertheless, in the final legislation the obligation of 
the federal government to provide funds was limited by stressing that the extent 
of the federal government's responsibüity for infrastructure was subject to the 
availability of federal budgetary resources (Lehmkuhl 1996: 79)."^ ^
The revaluation of the railways' assets represented a further financial 'present'. 
In a politically motivated act, the asset value of the railway property was 
underestimated in order to promote the (initial) financial viability of the 
Deutsche Bahn. In the Commission, a revaluation had been 'brought up by the 
academics, and [it] was also demanded by the Bahn, and it also fell on fertile 
ground [in the Transport Ministry]. The asset value of the Bahn was hopelessly 
high, if one had calculated it properly before, the Bahn would have been 
bankrupt a decade The Commission proposed that the asset value should
be estimated at DM 53bn, instead of the official DM llObn 
(Regierungskommission 1991: 19). However, the asset value was further 
reduced:
45 ID8.
46 'Nevertheless, w e managed to comer them [the Finance Ministry] with our 
calculations, they no longer knew what to say. They tried aU possible avenues, even  
going so far as to sending some people from the Finance Ministry to the Bundestag to stir 
up some opposition parliamentarians to stop this, but it didn't work.' (1D12).
4 7 ID12.
48 IDS. 'One had to start every session of the Commission with a reminder why certain 
things did not exist and that they did not exist. [The Bundesbahn] did not even have a 
proper accounting system. People always thought that they had and even the
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'to an absolutely incomprehensible extent. They have [devalued] the 
most modem and expensive parts of the infrastructure [...] 453 
kilometres which cost DM 16bn originally. The whole asset value of 
the Deutsche Bundesbahn plus Reichsbahn and all ICE trains and the 
like was only estimated to be DM 25bn in total'
This 'present' provided the track operator with the advantage that its 
amortisation rates were decreased significantly, reducing the necessary interest 
payments, thus potentially allowing more resources to be used for investments. 
In particular, the strong position of Heinz Dürr, as the Chancellor's choice as 
chief executive, led to this 'political present' of both eliininating the debt burden 
and devaluing the asset value which, in the view of the Deutsche Bahn, 'really 
was done in a perfect way'.^^
The choice of organisational structure reveals the domain-oriented nature of the 
German railway reforms. The foundations of these choices were laid in the final 
report of the Commission, whose members had been selected according to their 
expertise in the policy domain. This domain-orientation was particularly visible 
in the debate concerning the organisational distance between service and 
infrastructure businesses. The 'success' of the argument that the synergy effects 
of a holding-type structure would be more substantial than the expected benefits 
of a fully autonomous network operator indicates the dominance of 'railway'
[Bundesbahn] executive always acted as if they had one, because they did not know that 
they hadn't' (ID12, emphasis added).
49 id 5 .
50 ID3.
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arguments. Furthermore, it was attempted, partly as a result of the strong 
position of the railway operator (given in particular the selection of Heinz Dürr 
by Chancellor Helmut Kohl) to make the future Deutsche Bahn 'fit' for future 
competition by enhancing its competitive position. Mainly political 
considerations shaped the final choices of the organisational structure. Thus, the 
Lander were able to exploit their institutional veto power in the Bundesrat 
(together with the federal government's need to obtain the votes of the SPD for 
amending the Basic Law to change the organisational status of the rail operator) 
and established a 'stronger' Deutsche Bahn than was intended by the Transport 
Ministry. Similarly, the provision that the infrastructure was to be in permanent 
majority federal ownership was due to the Lander's interest in limiting the 
discretion of a 'private law' actor, given the restricted opportunities for 
exercising control over the management under the limited company law 
provisions.
The allocation of regulatory authority
The following discusses the distribution of regulatory competencies in the 'post­
privatisation' regime. It highlights the shift from self-regulation to a more 
hierarchical arrangement in safety regulation. However, while an independent 
agency was created for safety and investment assessment matters, there was a 
conscious choice not to consider the establishment of an economic regulator to 
monitor track access. This section considers the continuing role of the federal 
government, then illustrates the establishment of the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt and 
finally discusses the regime governing infrastructure access.
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The Basic Law's provisions in Art. 87 stated that railway administration 
remained the responsibility of the federal government (the 'Bund'). 
Administration in this context was defined as the supervision of the legality of 
service and infrastructure operators (BT 12/5015: 7). As the federal government 
remained sole owner of the Deutsche Bahn it was able to directly, if discreetly, 
influence the rail operator's management,
TOO per cent of the shares are with the federal government. This 
grants the owner influence, as an owner has influence [...] I think this 
goes on permanently. [...] That goes straight to the executive level, 
[...] one can see this when certain formulations have changed when 
they are pubhshed or otherwise are held back until the election [in 
September 1998]. I think this is natural how it works at the 
moment'.
However, other accounts suggested that the Deutsche Bahn resisted any 
'requests' by the federal government, justifying this stance with its private law 
status, '[i]t is not as if it is just necessary to give a signal from Borm, [...] that 
would be nice. It would be nice, but it is good that things are the way they are'.^^ 
The main regulatory tool, besides informal direction, was the federal allocation 
of financial support for infrastructure projects. In contrast, the Lander via their 
pubhc service contracts could control the behaviour of the Deutsche Bahn 
directly for the delivery of regional serv icesS im ilarly , the Lander's relations
5: ID3.
1D8. 'In many things one has to discuss issues, and in many cases, the railway say, that 
is our responsibility' (IDS). Also 1D2.
In the autumn of 1998, the Deutsche Bahn suggested a reduction in a number of so- 
called InterRegio services (long distance non-high speed), pointing to the availability of
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with the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt extended to the supervision of planning 
procedures and federal grant expenditures to enhance the railway infrastructure, 
'it is an illegitimate interference of the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt in an 
area of responsibility of the Deutsche Bahn, if the discussion extends 
to issues such as the design of stations, to ensure that resources are 
used economically, that customers like going there, that it looks nice 
and therefore people use railways. This is where the Eisenbahn- 
Bundesamt interferes too much and says this is too expensive, this 
has to be cheaper. Although they do not carry any entrepreneurial 
responsibility for their decisions'.
The Commission did not consider the issue of regulation. However, it was 
decided from the outset that no specific sectoral economic regulator was to be 
established, 'because we know how this is abused politically; [...] that there is 
always someone trying somewhere to start meddling with and steer a company 
[...] by state influences'.^^ Besides this attempt to curb any possibility to 
'pohtically meddle' with the future rail operator, it was argued that a sectoral 
regulator would be open to capture by the industry,
'we do not believe in sectoral regulation. [...] Special regulators 
always have their dangers, [...] we need a competition authority 
which approaches transport in the same way as any other economic
alternative regional (i.e. Lander supported) services. The Lander succeeded in 
negotiating a reduction in the amount of service cuts. The Lander nevertheless criticised 
the lack of formal authority to enforce the continuation of these services {JDer 
Tagesspiegel, 27 December 1998).
5 4 ID4.
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activity too. [...] Experience suggests that with such regulators, in 
banking, in the insurance sector for a long time, they have protected 
the insurance companies and when the Cartel Office came and 
complained they always said "the insurance sector is really different" 
[...]'.56
As part of the federal administration, an executive and regulatory agency, the 
Eisenbahn-Bundesamt, was estabHshed. Its task was to carry out regulatory 
supervision which previously had been exercised by the Deutsche Bundesbahn 
itself. The Eisenbahn-Bundesamt was therefore regarded as the inheritor of 
sovereign authority within the railway sector and therefore took on traditional 
supervisory functions. It was constituted as an organisationally autonomous 
' Bundesoberbehôrdé under the direction of the Ministry of Transport, 
representing both a regulatory as well as an authorising body for the federal 
railways and for foreign operators who operated in Germany (§55(1) 
Allgemeines Eisenbahngesetz). 'It is subject to guidance as it is not a real 
regulator. It is only a decision-making body in the case of disagreement'.^^
The establishment of the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt represented a further 'regulatory 
bargain' between the Transport Ministry and the Deutsche Bahn as the latter had 
originally proposed a continuation of the previous self-regulatory approach. 
However, the Transport Ministry rejected any continuing self-regulation where 
'they sat in a room and someone said, "Fritz, I will do this Uke this now" and
55 ID12. 
56ID5.
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Fritz said, "Yes, I will put a stamp on this'".^^ Nevertheless, the Deutsche Bahn 
had considerable influence on the establishment of the new authority. Following 
Durr's veto against any appointment of a lawyer as president of the Eisenbahn- 
Bundesamt, the former head of the construction department in the Deutsche 
Bundesbahn, Stuchley, was chosen as P resid en t.D esp ite  this attempt at 
inmiinising 'relational distance', relationships formahsed over time as 'former 
colleagues [in the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt] suddenly reahsed what kind of 
powers they have which they then also wanted to exercise without thinking 
about their former collegiality'.^^ Similarly, 'four years ago things might have 
been clarified with a phone-call, now [the Deutsche Bahn] wants an 
administrative act [originaren Verwaltungsak^P^
The Eisenbahn-Bundesamt was responsible for network planning procedures, 
the supervision of operations, including technical aspects such as construction 
works, Hcensing of both services and infrastructure operations and further 
regulatory functions according to secondary legislation. A further role was to act 
as an arbiter if no agreement could be reached between two parties in terms of 
access or connection to other services, its key concerns being those of technical 
conditions of access, capacity constraints and of terms of agreement. Thus, the
57 IDS.
58 ID12.
59jd1.
50 ID3. Similarly, 'They are the real railway-people. [...] They are the ones who teU [...] the 
railway how to really run a railway. They really enjoy doing this. They are very attentive' 
(ID12). The notion of 'relational distance' defines the degree of intimacy between 
regulator and regulatee. It influences the conditions in which law is used to order social 
relations and to enforce law (see Hood etal. 1999: 60-5; Black 1976).
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Eisenbahn-Bundesamt had both legal and technical supervisory functions.^^ It 
had no political role similar to those of UK utility regulators, 'it is never 
represented in political negotiations, it is only an executing agency of federal 
p o l i c i e s T h e  aim was to establish a subordinate body to the Ministry of 
Transport on the same line as the 'Bundesamter' for air transport and shipping, 
thus establishing a congruence in the supervision structures among these modes 
of transport, again indicating the domain-oriented nature of the railway reforms.
In remarkable contrast to the wide-ranging control functions, the railway law 
lacked legal provisions granting the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt enforcement powers. 
The Federal Administrative Court (the Bundesverwaltungsgerichf) ruled in 
October 1994 that the clause assigning control functions should also be regarded 
as the legal basis for the enforcement of legal obligations,^ as the Court 
regarded the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt as the relevant body to fulfil the traditional 
role of an executive authority. The Court argued that otherwise the 
establishment of the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt would have been meaningless
6: ID9.
These regulatory functions were carried out to the extent to which they applied to 
'federal railways' and non-German operators. Rather than defining the term 'federal 
railways' as concerning all cross-regional and long-distance traffic, the government 
overruled Bimdesrat demands and set a definition which was based on mere ownership 
criteria - a 'federal railway' was any part of the Deutsche Bahn in which the federal 
government owned more than half of the shares. An administrative court clarified that 
the term federal railways' apphed in a functional sense in that the federal competence 
extended to all areas where in some respect the operations both in terms of services and 
infrastructure were affected (Schmidt-ACmann and Rohl 1994).
63ID4.
64 §3(5) Gesetz über die Eisenbahnverkehrsverwaltung des Bundes and §(3) AUgemeines 
Eisenbahngesetz.
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(Studenroth 1996: 110-1). Other legal opinions claimed that the lawmakers had 
forgotten that the organisational privatisation of the Deutsche Bahn meant that 
the traditional self-regulatory approach was no longer applicable (Grupp 1996: 
595; Blümel and Kiihlwetter 1996: 297-316). More important, however, was the 
decision to provide the privatised operator with a non-restrictive regulatory 
framework. Based on this framework, the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt claimed to have 
adopted a 'co-operative negotiation'-based enforcement strategy.
Competition issues fell under the joint competence of the Federal Cartel Office 
and the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt. Access to the infrastructure was supervised by 
the Federal Cartel Office with regard to legal competition issues, with the 
Eisenbahn-Bundesamt concentrating on technical-railway related issues. In 
accordance with EC Directive 91/440, the rail network had to be opened to 
cross-border traffic and to international groupings between railway operators. 
The German regulatory framework went beyond these provisions and opened 
the infrastructure to international groupings, cross-border traffic and non­
domestic operators in so far as they were based in either the EU or EFT A and 
have introduced open-access provisions themselves (§14, Allgemeines 
Eisenbahngesetz). It was argued, in particular by the Deutsche Bahn itself, that 
the monopoly position of the infrastructure provider could be best controlled 
within the company, while its autonomous character would give it sufficient 
interest to fill the network rather than to protect fellow subsidiaries, 'the 
guardian is the commercial interest of the [Deutsche Bahn] [...] 1 want to have 
the network filled up'.^^
6 5 IDIO.
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In contrast to the UK, conditions for access had to be published and prices to be 
made pubHcly available, with the amount of technical and operational 
conditions kept at a minimum. At first, the federal government intended that in 
cases of competing bids for a particular train path, negotiations were to be held 
in the first instance by the parties themselves under the supervision of the 
Federal Cartel Office. However, the Lander, eager to prevent a 'competition' 
authority being granted too many competencies, succeeded with their argument 
that the issues at stake were of a technical nature and therefore it would be more 
'appropriate' to delegate this task to the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (BT 12/5015: 19; 
BT12/6298:139). Only in cases of non-agreement was the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt 
to investigate access agreements and prevent discriminatory practice in terms of 
technical aspects, capacity constraints and the appropriateness of the assessment 
criteria; 'here is pure competition, the role of the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt has been 
pushed into the background 'H ow ever, this 'pure competition' was limited by 
the Lander's successful intervention to protect and promote regular ('vertaktete') 
regional rail services. In the final negotiations between the Chancellor, 
intervening at the final stage to obtain agreement on the overall reform, and the 
prime ministers of the Lander, it was agreed that in order to promote these 
services, they should be privileged under the terms of the access regime vis-à-vis 
bids of less regular, but potentially more lucrative national or international 
services.
66ID9.
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Access to the infrastructure was specifically defined in the so-called 'Railway 
Infrastructure Usage Regulation', passed in 1997 after a two-year negotiation 
period. The Deutsche Bahn as well as 'independent' rail operators were opposed 
to the track-access regulation, particularly with regard to open-access provisions, 
granting subsidiaries of foreign undertakings (or the undertaking's own cross- 
border services) access to the German network despite the lack of a mutual 
open-access regime. Further criticism was focused on the clause regulating the 
application duration for the booking of train paths. The eight-month period 
restricted the possibility of setting up new (in particular freight) services, thus 
protecting the position of the Deutsche Bahn's regular freight operations.^^
The first price access regime published by the Deutsche Bahn in July 1994 (soon 
revised in January 1995) was also regarded as an attempt to support its own 
position. In addition to giving an advantage to operators of regular ('vertaktete') 
services, discounts were available both on the quantity and duration of the 
specific contract. The interest of the infrastructure operator in offering these 
discounts could only be explained as an attempt to cross-subsidise operations of
ID9. Furthermore, '[t]he whole thing can be regarded as a closed shop, because you 
caimot turn it - by using rain-dances or oracle-men - from a company Deutsche Bahn into 
an infrastructure company and a service company overnight, which then also competes 
in a fair and non-discriminatory way against third parties which immediately emerge. 
[...][T]he other thing is high track access prices. [Y]ou have to pay DM 6 per kilometre 
and then also, in addition, for guides, electricity and any of the other charity works of the 
infrastructure operator [...]. But given the kind of investment costs applied for, then DM 6 
is credible, beyond good and evü' (ID8).
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other Deutsche Bahn subsidiaries (Aberle and Brenner 1996: 55).^  ^At first these 
discounts amounted to ten per cent, but were reduced to five per cent in January 
1995, combined with an average reduction by nine per cent. Moreover, the 
Lander negotiated a kilometre price of DM 5 for additional regional services.^^ 
In the late summer of 1998, a new pricing regime for track access, based on an 
energy pricing model, was introduced.^®
In sum, the regulatory regime reHed on the belief that commercial incentives 
were sufficient to constrain any monopolistic behaviour by the infrastructure 
operator. The creation of an independent regulatory agency was actively ruled 
out. The encouragement of competition did not emerge as a central issue in the
Quantity discounts offered considerable benefits to the Deutsche Bahn as the quantity 
(train kilometres) was cumulated on a federal and not a regional basis, thus giving a clear 
cost advantage to the Deutsche Bahn as the sole operator of country-wide services.
'[T]his was a tragedy. Although a proposal should have come from the Bahn and from 
the federal government on how to attract additional services, which do not cost that 
much [...], this was all down to the Lander [...]. Five DM is still too high a sum for 
marginal costs. But that again was an example that the transport policy of the federal 
government is mainly a financial policy, the sole intention was that the Lander had to pay 
back as much as possible [of the federal subsidies]' (ID4).
This system set up a two-part tariff for large customers' based on a fixed sum for the 
overall access to the infrastructure and variable track costs for individual train 
kilometres, and a one-part tariff for smaller operations, consisting of variable track access 
charges for particular train paths at a higher level. This system ehminated to some extent 
the ability to price-discriminate via quantitative discounts, although the threshold for 
qualifying for the two-part tariff was set at a relatively high number of services. For an 
extensive (and positive) discussion on the change in pricing regime, see Aberle (1998), 
Haase (1998), Knieps (1998) and Schwalbach (1998). This system was challenged by (rail 
freight) competitors, leading to the opening of an official investigation by the Federal 
Cartel Office (encouraged by the European Commission) into alleged discriminatory
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policy debate; thus, in contrast to the UK, competition (and regulation by 
competition) was not regarded as the key to higher 'efficiency'. Instead prime 
importance was attached to the notion of increased commercial autonomy. The 
Eisenbahn-Bundesamt was not an economic regulator; its conception was a 'read 
across' from similar, technical-supervisory, bodies in other modes of transport. 
Nevertheless, given the ownership status of the Deutsche Bahn and the 
contractual relationships for regional services, considerable control could still be 
exercised by the 'principals'. At the same time, in order to enhance the 
competitive viability of the Deutsche Bahn, the operator was granted substantial 
autonomy to develop its own mechanisms for internal control and pricing 
processes as well as track access prices. Thus, far from learning from other 
privatisation experiences in other policy domains such as telecommunications, 
German regulatory reforms in the railways sector indicate that domain-specific 
policies were implemented.^^
Non-commercial objectives
This section discusses the shift of subsidised 'public service' provision to the 
Lander level. On the one hand, this transfer of policy competencies provides an 
example of an attempt to increase financial responsibility and transparency and 
the need for federal side-payments to obtain the consent of the Lander. On the 
other hand, the régionalisation of regional transport policy also intended to alter 
transport policy rather than represent a mere 'financial' interest, 'what was of
practice with regard to infrastructure access {Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitimg, 12 October 
1999).
In the later case of telecommunications, the German federal government installed an 
independent regulatory authority.
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primary importance to us was to build, develop a system where one can clearly 
say, "rail goes here and bus goes there"'7^
According to the pre-privatisation framework, the federal government carried 
the financial responsibüity for the loss-making system of regional passenger rail 
transport, while the Lander, regional and local authorities maintained crucial 
veto-positions regarding line closures, being able to at least postpone closure- 
decisions. After 1976, dissatisfaction with the existing poHcy-arrangements 
emerged following attempts by the federal government and the Bundesbahn to 
estabhsh a 'commercially optimal service' by reducing the amount of services to 
a core network. It was also proposed to regionaHse local services. These plans 
were vetoed by the Lander and local authorities, leading the federal government 
to freeze all payments to the Bundesbahn, although the Lander still 'managed' to 
prevent substantial line closures (Kuchenbecker and Speck 1998). Nevertheless, 
Hne closures were obtained by a poUcy of so-called 'cold rationalisation', in 
which the Bundesbahn demanded financial compensation from the Lander or 
the communes if the services were to be maintained or modernised. The decline 
of regional services was further faciHtated by the Bundesbahn's poHcy to make 
unprofitable services even more 'unattractive' by running services down, 
offering poor connections and reduced services. Dissatisfaction with the state of 
regional passenger services had targeted the lack of clearly assigned legal 
responsibihties which led to constant tension and blame-shifting between the 
federal government, the Lander, local authorities and the railway operator (Klein
72ID12.
301
1992). By the early 1990s, the Lander and local authorities had become advocates 
of a régionalisation of the policy competence for regional passenger transport.
The Lander succeeded in overcoming the federal government's initial intentions 
to restrict the scope of regionaHsation to the railway domain, demanding instead 
that they were given all competencies in the area of public regional transport. 
The issue of régionalisation was also enthusiastically embraced by the Ministry 
of Transport:
'we developed this trick that we said that regional raü passenger 
services are run by the Lander according to our rules, we give them 
the money so that they purchase what they want. If they order 
services, then everything is fine. If they do not, then, by not 
purchasing services, the Lander are closing these services as a 
consequence'.^^
Following the provisions of Art. 143a of the Basic Law, the responsibilities for 
planning, operation and finance for the whole regional passenger transport 
sector was transferred to Lander as of 1 January 1996.^^ According to Art. 106 of 
the Basic Law, the Lander obtained specific tax revenues from the federal 
government to finance these services which they allocated either via competitive 
tendering or by immediately assigning services to a single operator. The issue of 
finance soon developed into the most controversial issue of the whole reform 
process. At the outset, the federal government was not willing to offer more than
73ID12.
74 Regional railway services were defined as services where the main demand was in 
urban, suburban or regional areas. These services could be defined as not operating on a
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DM 7.7bn for the provision of regional services, equalling the amount of 
payments the federal government had made for the provision of regional 
services prior to the reform. The Lander demanded DM 14bn, arguing that 
'regional services had been operated in a way that was far from being modem 
and attractive, [...] The Lander said, it costs much more to do it properly. [...] 
This costs DM 14bn. Although, this number was purely in v en ted '.G iv en  their 
threat to veto the whole reform process in the Bundesrat, the Lander 'were able 
to blackmail the federal govemment'^^ and obtained an annual subsidy of DM 
12bn, the sum was increased from 1998 according to the increase in tax revenue, 
following the agreement that mineral oil tax revenues were to be shared between 
the federal government and the Lander. As a further concession, the federal 
government granted the Lander a delay in the reduction of subsidy paid under 
the 'Gemeindeverkehrsfinanzierungsgesetz' (GVFG). Overall, the level of 
subsidy fell from DM 6.28bn in 1996 to DM 3.28m in the following years. In 
addition, the federal government was obliged to provide 20 per cent of its 
investment in infrastructure for the regional passenger network.^ In general, the 
shift of the financial subsidy mechanism from GVFG to mineral oü tax revenues
service beyond 50 km or where the whole journey did not take longer than one hour (§2 
Gesetz zur Regionahsierung des offentJichen Personennahverkehrs).
ID4. This sum included the existing DM 7.7bn payment, DM 2bn for uncovered 
deficits, DM 1.1.bn for necessary modernisation, DM 1.5bn for modernisation in East 
Germany specifically and DM l.Sbn for increased costs.
76ID3.
77 This clause led subsequently to disputes between the federal government and the 
Lander. The federal government argued that any investment in infrastructure which was, 
even partly, used for regional services was to fall under the 20 per cent rule. In contrast, 
the Lander argued that they should be given 20 per cent of the planned expenditure. The
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allowed the Lander a far higher degree of flexibility for the use of finance than 
under the previous framework; 'the Lander can use the monies at will. There is 
no control. This was another mistake [...]. [The Lander] established proper 
railway administrations. That was not i n t e n d e d ' .W h i l e  the financial 
responsibility remained with the federal government, the financial issue has 
become rather a question of federal redistribution than direct subsidy.^^
In the case of régionalisation, regulatory reform provided the financial 
'principal', the federal government, with a clearer allocation of responsibilities by 
establishing a framework which shifted the responsibility for line closures and 
other policy decisions to the Lander. The Transport Ministry had hoped that this 
would lead to a 'small, but high quality' regional passenger network. However
final agreement established that 5 per cent of all investment was to be allocated to 
regional projects in co-operation with the Lander (ID4).
78 IDS.
79 Untü 1999, the regionaHsation of raü passenger transport led to an increase of raü 
services. The Lander established a range of transport dehvery mechanisms, ranging from 
centralised authorities (Bavaria) to decentralised transport authorities with or without 
local government influence (North Rhine-WestphaHa, Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse). 
However, dissatisfaction was widespread. The Deutsche Bahn complained that the 
relevant authorities punished the Deutsche Bahn in the bidding process for perceived 
neglect in the past and 'the wish to make change visible' (IDT). It was complained that the 
monetary carrot' was used to demand particular services and that performance 
measurement schemes had been estabHshed ad hoc. Furthermore, it was argued that the 
Deutsche Bahn was at a disadvantage in comparison to low-cost international bidders or 
bidders owned by the local authorities themselves (IDT, IDIO). The Lander were stÜI 
unhappy with the non-transparent cost structure of the Deutsche Bahn, relying on the 
bidding process to reduce the subsidy demands of the Deutsche Bahn (ID4). On the basis 
of an analysis, required by the regionaHsation law, on whether the amount of federal 
financial subsidies required adjustment, the federal government argued that the Lander
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the Lander succeeded in increasing the amount of services, given the federal 
subsidies. Furthermore, by providing for the possibility for competitive 
tendering, the discretion of the Deutsche Bahn to 'hide' costs was reduced. 
Régionalisation developed as an interest of the Lander and was not driven by 
the railway operator which had shown little interest in regional transport and 
had concentrated its resources on the development of high-speed long-distance 
traffic. Only after competitive tendering was introduced, did the Deutsche 
Bahn's interest in regional traffic develop and major investment in rolling stock 
was imdertaken.^^ The increases in railway services suggests, however, an 
interest in transport by the Lander beyond a mere interest in gaining additional 
financial resources.
The impact of institutional factors
The organisational privatisation of the German railways was domain-oriented. 
This domain-oriented isomorphism was already reflected in the government's 
mandate to the Commission. Furthermore, rather than drawing on experiences 
from the international 'privatisation bandwagon', the experiences from other 
railway reforms across Western Europe and Japan were assessed and, in some 
cases, similar instruments were selected, although no direct 'read across' 
occurred. Similar to the UK, the separation of the infrastructure from service 
operations was promoted. Unlike the UK, where this proposal was advanced as 
a result of past utility privatisation experiences to introduce competition by 
minirnising the monopoly element, in Germany, separation within the
had been given too high subsidies and that the annual increase of subsidy payments 
should be reduced (1D8; also Herr and Lehmkuhl 1997; Lehmann 1999:164-82).
80ID7.
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undertaking had been a long-held idea and was motivated by the perception 
that separation would increase financial transparency and cost reduction via the 
so-called 'limited company effect' and inter-modal competition rather than the 
behef in competition per se. Furthermore, 'privatisation' as such was never a 
political imperative. The main political interest was a reduction of the financial 
burden. Although not a 'new issue', the urgency for dealing with the 
Bundesbahn's financial decline was reinforced by unification and the poHtical 
demand to merge the Bundesbahn and the Reichsbahn as soon as possible. In 
addition to these regulatory ideas, the organisational structure, in particular the 
debt-free start of the Deutsche Bahn as a limited company and the revaluation of 
its assets indicate that the reforms were targeted mainly at making the railway 
operator more commercialised and competitive inter-modally rather than 
importing and hardwiring a regime prioritising competition within the sector.^^ 
The conscious rejection of paradigm-oriented sources of isomorphism was 
noticeable in the establishment of the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt which was 
modelled on other transport-specific authorities in the German administrative 
landscape, but was not given legal-economic competition competencies.
In terms of the specific timing of the railway reform, the impact of unification, 
with the need to deal with the Reichsbahn and the increasing financial 
constraints on the federal budget, was crucial to estabhshing and sustaining the 
basic poHtical interest and consensus on the principles of the railway reform. The 
financial 'chaUenge' as such was an old issue. In 1972, after reform attempts had
For example, the lobbying efforts by a merchant bank, advertising its expertise m 
selling shares of publicly owned companies were regarded as 'irrelevant' as such a policy 
was not 'what we are intending to do' (ID2).
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been stalled by the then Transport Minister Georg Leber (under a Social- 
Democrat/Liberal coalition), it had already been argued that the unwillingness 
to reform was based on an 'overall puzzlement in the Department on what 
possible measures to adopt'. Only by changing the bureaucratic organisation and 
procedures of the Bundesbahn and the pubHc law status of its employees would 
a reform be worthwhile.®^ Given the anticipated opposition of the Bundesbahn 
and the trade unions, no further major initiatives were undertaken. Thus, rather 
than the worsening financial situation itself, it was the two issues emerging from 
unification - the merger with the Reichsbahn and the increased financial 
demands on the federal budget - which sustained the political interest in a 
railway reform and allowed institutional veto-points to be overcome.
The insulation o f the regulatory space from  coercive pressures 
Previous accounts of the German railway reform have emphasised the 
importance of ' Europeanisation'. Three kinds of impact have been stressed by 
Knill and Lehmkuhl (1998) in their analysis of the impact of Directive 91/440. 
They distinguish its role as providing additional legitimation, offering a 
conceptual framework for solving domestic problems and limiting the resources 
of potential opposition. Knill and Lehmkuhl claim that the Directive provides a 
good case of legal integration via 'support building' rather than 'top-down 
implementation'. In contrast, it is argued here that while liberaHsation of 
European transport policies may have reduced the 'acceptability' of arguments 
opposing privatisation and relatively open access to the infrastructure, the 
impact of European legislation was not substantial. Similarly, the role of the
Corroborated by ID12.
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Commission as a 'policy diffuser' using the case of Sweden as the prime 
example, as stressed by Denkhaus (1997), was not reflected in the interviews. 
While there was an awareness of European legislation and also a recognition 
that it pointed to vertical separation of track and operations, the debate was 
dominated by domestic actors using their analysis of international reforms in the 
policy domain. Thus, international 'lesson-drawing' took place, but instead of 
exerting pressures to force the German railway regulatory regime to resemble 
any of these international examples, there was a formal analysis of these 
experiences at the domestic level which was then translated into national 
legislation.
Insulation o f the political-adm inistrative nexus in  the regulatory space 
The need to obtain the consent of multiple actors shaped the lines of poHtical 
confHct and therefore also the final form of regulatory regime. The provisions of 
the Basic Law required the federal government to seek agreement with the 
opposition parties, mainly the Social Democrats, and the Lander. The railway 
reform was not merely concerned about the re-arrangement of the relationship 
between a single principal (the federal government) and its agent (the railways), 
but also about the relationship between two principals, in which the Lander 
could exploit their constitutional veto-position to obtain additional and more 
'flexible' resources, in order to take full control over regional passenger services. 
As part of this 'regulatory bargain' the federal government was (formally) 
'released' of its involvement in dealing with line closures. The existence of 
multiple veto-points, ranging from parHamentary opposition and coaHtion 
restraints, the threat of a Lander veto via the Bundesrat and trade union 
demands, ensured that not only had consent to be 'bought off in negotiations
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but also that rather than Hberahsation, the safeguarding of the interests of these 
institutionahsed actors was the main political priority. To overcome these 
hurdles, a traditional 'German' problem-solving approach was chosen: by setting 
up a technocratic Commission the stages of problem-definition and of 
alternative generation were de-politicised.
However, while institutional veto-positions were crucial for explaining the 
membership of actors inside the regulatory space, these were not decisive for the 
selection of regulatory instruments. Besides the Commission and the work inside 
the Transport Ministry, there were no alternative sources in the domestic process 
proposing rival conceptual ideas nor were there any alternative domestic 
privatisation experiences to draw upon. Therefore, the privatisation process and 
railway poHcy overall continued to be dominated by 'railway-minded' actors, in 
particular within the Commission; 'who works for the railways or in their 
supervision, is somewhat motivated to do good things to the railway mode of 
t r a n sp o r t ' .T h e  Commission's membership, selected to achieve consensus 
among societal and party-poHtical actors before the politicisation of the process, 
was domain-oriented, consisting of transport-related trade unions, transport 
academics and transport-interested politicians (one being a former federal 
transport minister, Wemer DoUinger). This domain-orientation was further 
facilitated by 'information' provided for the Commission by the Bundesbahn and 
the Transport Ministry. Finally, the domain-orientation was also evident in post­
privatisation personnel change (which was also noticeable pre-privatisation) 
with the SPD spokesperson on railways, Klaus Daubertshauser, and the former
83ID9.
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head of the Transport Ministry's railway unit, Peter Reinhardt, moving to the 
Deutsche Bahn as chairmen for regional passenger services and for property and 
stations respectively.
Insulation o f the regulatory space from  societal actors
Arguably, the account of the domestic domain-oriented isomorphism of the 
regulatory regime change could be interpreted as a result of straightforward 
'producer' capture. Unlike in the UK, the railway operator, the Deutsche 
Bundesbahn, was part of all key decisions, given in particular the decisive role 
played by the Chancellor's choice of chief executive, Heinz Dürr, whose 
independent financial standing further advanced his political position. 
Furthermore, 'what came out of it [the reform process] that was pretty close to 
the opinion of the joint executive of the Bundesbahn and the Reichsbahn'.^ In 
addition, in the past, proposals
'somehow had all been prepared by the Bundesbahn. That is always 
the same "What to you think about how the future should look ", the 
government asks the railways. The railways deliver something. "Yes, 
that looks nice, we can use that somehow". That is how it works in 
practice. This happened for decades and also here, with the 
Commission, it was required that we delivered our proposals. And 
these were taken up. I do not want to say that they blindly.... But 
they went beyond our own expectations.'®^
®4id3.
ID3. Similarly, the financial 'presents' were less a success of 'capture', but that 'was a 
benefit of the federal goverrunent[...]. They accommodated us. We did not do it ourselves' 
(ID3).
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Nevertheless, the Bundesbahn was dependent on the interests of poHtical and 
bureaucratic actors. For example, the decision to separate the various businesses 
within the framework of a holding company did not merely reflect the interest of 
the Deutsche Bahn. It was, more importantly, a poHtical compromise between 
the Social Democrats and the Lander on the one side, wishing to maintain 
influence over the infrastructure operator, and the federal government on the 
other side, demanding the setting-up of a private law organisation. Furthermore, 
the setting-up of the Eisenbahn-Bundesamt took place despite initial opposition 
by the railway operator. Similarly, the regionaHsation of regional transport was 
driven by intergovernmental considerations.
Other actors, while making proposals and submissions, were less important in 
terms of exerting isomorphic pressures. The trade unions' role was crucial in that 
they offered support to regulatory reform once employment terms had been 
safeguarded. Furthermore, as argued above, the railway unions also profited 
from regulatory reform, first in terms of the hope of protecting their membership 
basis and, second, to obtain autonomy from the main pubHc sector trade union. 
At the same time, the role of the academic advisory committee to the transport 
ministry and the membership of two transport academics on the Commission 
highHghts the crucial importance played by 'experts' in the poHcy domain.
In sum, it was a combination of technocratic actors, drawn from the 
administrative, poHtical and societal spheres, which was crucial for the selection 
of regulatory instruments and thus the domain-oriented isomorphic nature of 
reform. The sharing of responsibihties of both pubHc as weU as societal actors in 
the regulatory space was particularly evident in the agenda setting role of the
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Railway Commission. It was the Commission's decision, based on near 
unanimous support, to advocate constitutional alterations and not merely 
incremental change which allowed the Ministry of Transport to further promote 
the 'privatisation' of the unified German railway operators. The institutional 
setting, with its multiple veto-points, promoted the domain-oriented 
membership and also domain-oriented suggestions. Moreover, the 
Commission's membership was selected to obtain (or even fail to obtain) 
consensus across party and societal actors. Furthermore, on transport, there was 
a relative poHtical consensus with the question of state involvement in the 
infrastructure's modernisation mainly being one of degree and where the 
rhetoric of the need of a modal shift from road to rail was shared across all 
parties.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that the case of regulatory reform of German railways in 
the 1990s provides an example of domain-oriented isomorphism. Experiences 
were drawn from changes in the domain-environment, thus from railway 
reforms in other countries, rather than, as in the case of the British railway 
privatisation, from the poHcy environment of national utiHty reforms. 
International lessons were drawn and interpreted, but there was no direct 
import of poHcies. It has also been argued that coercive pressures were not of 
crucial importance. Instead, it was a mixture between the poHtical- 
administrative nexus and societal, in particular academic actors, which selected 
poHcy proposals and shaped the design of regulatory instruments, 'participants 
are obviously the railways, the executive of the railways, then transport 
poHticians, but the transport academics' voice is influential, too. The discussion
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takes place in this triangle'.®^ It has also been shown that the institutional veto- 
position of the Lander forced substantial side-payments and compromises.®^ 
Nevertheless, the design ideas that were selected reflected a domain-orientation, 
which was domestic in its analysis and choices, but was informed by 
international experience.
®6 ID3.
'Then comes the legislative process and you never know what will happen there, when 
all the committees which have something to say and the other dear old friends, they 
begin to meddle around with the thing, you are permanently forced to make 
compromises and if you are unlucky, not much remains at the end. The highhght surely 
was in the Bundesrat where the Lander had the chance to blackmail the federal 
government into giving more money to the Lander' (ID12).
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Section V: Conclusion
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Chapter Nine 
Conclusion
Having completed the journey across the empirical case studies of major reforms 
in railway regulation in Britain and Germany, this conclusion draws the findings 
together and assesses the wider implications of this study. It has been argued 
that an institutional approach, stressing membership and relationships within 
the regulatory space, is valuable for explaining regulatory change. In particular, 
the concept of isomorphism -  the bounded homogenisation of a unit's 
organisational form with other units in its policy environment -  has been 
utilised to stress the importance of regulatory design ideas and their sources. 
Three institutional factors, the insulation of the regulatory space from coercive 
pressures, the insulation of the political-administrative nexus in the regulatory 
space as well as the insulation of the regulatory space from societal actors, have 
been examined with regard to their impact on whether regulatory reforms were 
domain- or paradigm-oriented. This study claims that the differentiation 
between paradigm- and domain-oriented isomorphism and the examination of 
the impact of three specific institutional factors offer for a useful step forwards 
towards establishing what institutions matter for what outcomes. This 
conclusion compares the empirical findings and relates these to the wider 
analytical framework. It questions whether there has been a common, cross­
national or a persistent national 'track' in railway regulation in Britain and 
Germany. It also discusses the concept of isomorphism and assesses the 
explanatory value of the three institutional factors. Finally, given the study's 
concern with regulatory regimes, it considers the contribution of this study to 
wider debates regarding the concept of the 'regulatory state'.
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The Findings: On Different Tracks?
This section brings together and compares the findings of the individual 
chapters. It compares the experiences in both states across time and questions 
whether it is possible to speak of a common or a national 'track' in railway 
regulation. It argues that in all cases, policy-makers, far from moving along 
increasingly common or national trajectories that determined policy solutions, 
had a choice between multiple approaches available in the policy environment.
Arguably, the inter-war period provides a case of narrowing differences in 
regulatory approaches in the two countries. From different starting points - an 
oligopohstic private railway industry in Britain and fragmented, partly state- 
owned, partly privately-owned railway industry in Germany - railway 
regulation was 'nationalised', m terms of the establishment of national ministries 
of transport. Witte (1932) claims that these tendencies represented a convergence 
of approaches - from commercial towards greater state regulation (Britain) and 
from state administration towards greater delegation to provide for increased 
commercial flexibility (Germany). It has been argued that beyond this form of 
'nationahsation', there was little convergence. In Britain, four regional 
monopoHes were established, while, in Germany, a formally autonomous 
operator under Reich ownership was formed. The formal shift in regulatory 
approaches was based on different motivations and policy environments. The 
British examples, the 1919 Ministry of Transport Act and the 1921 Railways Act, 
represented cases of domain-oriented isomorphism following the rejection of the 
initial, more paradigm-oriented alternatives, which stressed the role of railways 
as part of a broad post-war reconstruction poHcy. In the German case, the
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regulatory regime for the Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft (DRG) represented a 
domain-oriented compromise between the domestic domain-oriented and 
backward-looking policy environment (represented by the German Reich's 
government), and the domain-oriented international policy environment, 
represented by the two railway experts Gaston Leverve and William Acworth, 
who demanded a more commercial orientation of the railway operator.
Similarly, the regulatory reforms in the immediate post-Second World War 
period reveals superficial convergence. In both countries, the operators were 
organised as state-owned monopohes with a national transport ministry acting 
as regulatory authority. However, the empirical analysis indicates that the 
regulatory regimes differed substantially in both their degree of formality and 
their objectives. In Britain, reliance was placed on informal relations between the 
minister and the chairman of the pubHc corporation. The need to maximise 
delegation and commercial orientation was emphasised. This requirement was 
furthered by an additional institution, the Transport Tribunal, that was to 
provide another safeguard against ministerial intervention. The 'sociaHsation' of 
the railways was to enhance the efficiency of the operator. In Germany, in 
contrast, regulatory debates were concerned with domestic considerations at the 
federal and the Lander level on how to maximise their respective leverage over 
the economic behaviour of the railway operator to safeguard the traditional 
'commonweal' function of the railway operator. In contrast to the British 
approach, the regime reHed on a formal aUocation of roles and competencies.
The privatisation cases of the 1990s also provide examples of a joint term 
divided by different poHcy assumptions and design ideas. In Britain, the
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regulatory regime was based on previous utility regulations with the explicit aim 
to introduce competition into the sector. In contrast, in Germany, privatisation 
meant a continuation of public ownership under a private law form with the 
explicit objective to increase the competitiveness of the railway operator.
Thus, while superficially it could be claimed that there was convergence of 
regulatory systems in all three time periods, a closer analysis of the sources of 
regulatory design ideas and the forms of change reveals substantial differences. 
At the same time, an analysis of the national cases over time, examined in terms 
of continuation of organisational form, 'ideas' and dominant decision-making 
patterns, reveals no distinct 'national track'. In terms of organisational form, 
Britain experienced a privately owned oligopolistic market prior to the First 
World War, regional private monopolies in the inter-war period, a single, 
publicly owned monopoly following the Second World War and a fragmentation 
into separate private undertakings in the 'age' of privatisation. The German case 
provides a larger degree of continuity in terms of ownership (in all time periods, 
the railways were in federal ownership), but less in terms of organisational 
structure: the study examined cases of formal autonomy in the inter-war period, 
limited operational autonomy after the Second World War and a unified private 
law undertaking after 'privatisation'.
Continuities are also identifiable at the 'ideational' level. In the British case, there 
was a persisting assumption that the railways should operate on commercial 
lines and that organisational and regulatory reforms were to provide for an 
economically viable operator. In contrast, the assumption that railways were to 
provide commonweal functions in the perceived interest of the German
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economy dominated regulatory debates in all three time periods under 
investigation. A regulatory regime was to safeguard these functions; for 
example, the assumption (in the 1990s) that infrastructure provision belonged to 
the German state's key activities resulted in the 'hardwiring' of permanent 
federal majority ownership of the infrastructure operator in the constitution. 
Nevertheless, the discussion in the individual chapters has shown that rather 
than near-automatic policy continuation, there was, often substantial, 
contestation and competition between regulatory design ideas, drawing on 
various sources of isomorphism. Furthermore, despite these differences, similar 
proposals were made in both countries, for example, the establishment of 
'corporatist' undertakings under the administration of business, trade union and 
political interests was suggested after the First World War.
In terms of recurring decision-making patterns, Germany's federal structure as 
well as quasi-corporatist decision-making patterns led to a repeated generation 
of similar conflict cleavages. This allowed for membership in the regulatory 
space of societal actors, such as the railway operator, business and trade union 
associations as well as 'experts', which were usually drawn from the railway or 
transport academic community. In the British case, it has often been argued that 
the majoritarian and unitary character of British government facilitates rapid 
policy change. For example, Morrisey and Steinmo (1987) found that tax policy 
in Britain has been shaped by 'adversarial politics'. This study's cases provide 
examples of weak rather than strong governments, leading, in the 1921 Railways 
Act, to corporatist and bureaucratic decision-making patterns with little party- 
political input. Only the British privatisation case revealed party-political 
considerations: nevertheless, instead of the 'adversarial politics' assumption that
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parties in government please or harm specific constituencies, in this case it was 
the desire to make policy reversal by future governments as difficult as possible. 
In contrast to the assumptions of the 'adversarial party government' hypothesis 
for extensive policy change, it was the weak position of the Conservative 
government which induced the demand for rapid, extensive and 'irreversible' 
policy change in order to 'hardwire' the new regulatory regime. Nevertheless, 
while decision-making rules provided opportunity structures for actors, they, at 
best, facilitated, but did not explain the selection of particular regulatory 
instruments in terms of their paradigm-or domain-orientation.
In sum, this study has neither found conclusive evidence for inter-temporal 
convergence nor for national persistence as explanatory factors for the selection 
of domain- or paradigm-oriented regulatory instruments. The next section 
assesses the value of the concept of isomorphism and the impact of the three 
institutional factors. However, these findings face certain limitations. First, only 
the stages of policy formulation and alternative generation are examined. It 
therefore does not consider the performance of the regulated industries, nor does 
it attempt to evaluate and 'benchmark' regulatory regimes. Secondly, this study 
is limited in its focus on two states. Despite increasing the number of 
observations by taking a historical perspective, the findings would have greater 
weight if the study had considered further European states and / or other utility 
sectors. Nevertheless, the study of a 'sector close to the state' in two major West 
European countries allows the analysis to draw some wider conclusions. 
Thirdly, the nature of these findings does not offer law-Hke generalisations as 
demanded by Przeworski and Teune (1970: 4). They claim that social science 
research should lead to explanations in terms of general laws. It is doubtful
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whether (social) scientific studies can establish laws rather than aspire to the 
disproving of hypotheses or the establishment of a theory. This study did not 
aim to establish law-Uke generalisations, but sought to evaluate the significance 
of various institutional factors and to compare their impact on the orientation of 
the regulatory regime. An assessment of these more detailed institutional factors, 
rather than establishing broad claims concerning persistence and diversity, 
provides more information towards addressing the question of 'do institutions 
matter'. Such a comparison allows for an assessment of the strength and 
weaknesses of the particular institutional factors and thus enables an evaluation 
of different institutionalist perspectives.
Isomorphism and institutional factors
The analysis of the various cases of regulatory change has stressed the 
importance of an institutional approach. This section discusses the contribution 
of isomorphism to the analysis of institutional design. It further considers the 
value of the three institutional factors and questions whether any wider 
generalisations of the impact of these factors on the 'transport' of regulatory 
design ideas can be made.
Among the study's central claims is that isomorphism - constraining pressures 
which force one unit to resemble other units in its policy environment - can be 
differentiated in terms of domain- and paradigm-orientation. Thus, policy 
domains are exposed, not to a single, but to multiple policy environments which 
provide different, often contradicting legitimating sources of policy design ideas 
and standards of reference, allowing actors 'to try to act upon these design 
prescriptions' (Goodin 1996: 36).
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The cases examined in this study stressed the significance of rival policy 
environments offering diverse regulatory design ideas. Different actors argued 
for diverse and contesting ideas as to the 'appropriate' regulatory regime for the 
railways. In the case of the 1920s, there were rival conceptions inside the British 
government as to the role of the railways in the period of post-war 
reconstruction. In the German case, debates as to the orientation of the 
regulatory regime focused on the German government's attempts to secure 
political influence on the operator against more commercially-oriented demands 
of the two international railway experts.
Similarly, in the German 'privatisation' case of the 1990s, the policy environment 
of international railway reforms was considered and investigated in detail, 
policy-makers, however, decided that the reforms should not directly draw on 
international sources. In the British privatisation experience, officials dismissed 
the relevance of domain-oriented sources, both domestically and internationally. 
Paradigm-oriented reforms, based on domestic models of utility regulation were 
introduced. In the post-Second World War period, contesting regulatory design 
ideas referred to different sets of legitimating sources, for example, in the 
German case, the controversy between models based on the 1924 DRG approach 
or on the 1937 Reichsbahn law.
The notion of institutional isomorphism focuses on the sources of decision­
making. By stressing processes of isomorphism, it is argued that decisions with 
regard to regulatory instruments are not based on extensive and comprehensive 
calculations as to the precise impact of any particular measure. Neither is the
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selection of regulatory instruments based on extensive competition and 'tests' of 
rival concepts. Instead, choices concerning regulatory instruments involve 
bounded searches for attractive policy templates offered by various policy 
environments which can be transposed in the particular policy domain. These 
provide legitimacy and a standard of reference to a variety of actors which 
advocate their application in the policy domain. The selection of regulatory 
instruments therefore reflects an institutional process in which actors' searches 
for applicable policy instruments refer to standards of appropriateness, 
acceptability, feasibility and legitimacy instead of relying on an exhaustive 
analysis of aU possibilities. By claiming that there are numerous sources of 
isomorphism, which can be aligned according to their domain- and paradigm- 
orientation, this study has argued that organisational forms -  such as regulatory 
instruments -  are not merely embedded in one policy environment. A regulatory 
space is exposed to numerous, often overlapping policy environments which 
offer differing, often competing sets of 'legitimate' policy instruments.
The concept of isomorphism also highlights the importance of institutional 
factors which facilitate or constrain processes of increasing homogenisation of 
organisational forms. This study has focused on the impact of three institutional 
factors on the degree of insulation of the regulatory space:
'the critical question for the analyst of the European regulatory scene 
is not to assume "capture", but rather to understand the nature of this 
shared space; the rules of admission, the relations between occupants 
and the variations introduced by differences in markets and issue 
arenas' (Hancher and Moran 1989: 276).
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In order to counter the criticism that such an approach leads to 'theoretical 
pluralism' and fails to generate general claims (see Prosser 1999: 205), three 
institutional factors were analysed according to their impact on the selection of 
regulatory design ideas by facilitating the exposure to different policy 
environments. These factors define the extent of insulation of the regulatory 
space from various policy environments.
The insulation o f the regulatory space from  coercive pressures 
It has been argued that coercive pressures encourage isomorphism due to direct 
and indirect effects of higher legal and political orders. These coercive pressures 
are said to facilitate a homogenisation of organisational forms and public 
policies across levels of government. This study has examined cases where the 
extent of coercive pressures could be assumed to be high, thus the insulation of 
the regulatory space was limited. These cases included war-time defeat, non­
domestic control over the national administration and, in the more recent cases, 
the impact of supranational law and the so-called 'Europeanisation' of 
policymaking.
In terms of Europeanisation, little evidence was found to suggest a crucial role of 
European legislation in shaping regulatory choice beyond providing additional 
support for positions already held at the domestic level. In both the British and 
German privatisation cases, legislation went beyond the requirements of 
Community law. At the same time, the European Commission did not play an 
entrepreneurial role in the reform experiences. The railway domain therefore 
contrasts with telecommunications where there has been an increasing 
convergence of forms of regulation, at least partly driven by supranational
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actors. Susarme Schmidt has pointed to various reasons why the appHcation of 
Art. 90(3) TEU by the European Commission was successful in 
telecommunications (in contrast to energy), stressing in particular the political 
and institutional environment and 'policy climate' (Schmidt 1998). In contrast to 
telecommunications, the European Commission's railway poHcies could not rely 
on international actors, changing technology and a merging of markets and 
sectors to facüitate liberalisation. Similarly, the existence of other European 
reform experiences was also not of major importance. While reports on these 
reforms existed in Britain, they did not affect any of the domestic choices, which 
were informed by the domestic experience of utility regulation. Equally in 
Germany, despite elaborate studies -  not only in the European, but also in the 
Japanese context -  these were mainly used to legitimise existing positions.
Moreover, the two cases of wartime defeat did not lead to an imposition of a 
different regulatory regime on Germany. Despite contemporary claims to the 
contrary, the case of the 1924 law establishing the 'Deutsche Reichsbahn 
Gesellschaft' represented to a large extent an accommodation of the German 
government's position and an allied (in particular, British) interest in a 'Hght- 
handed' approach (by imposing sanctions and close supervision only in the case 
of non-payments) as well as a recognition of an already occurring domestic 
poUcy tendency towards greater operational autonomy. In addition, it 
strengthened those German actors, who also advocated a more commercial 
orientation of the regulatory regime.
This study's examination of potential examples of direct imposition of regulatory 
design ideas and the Europeanisation of the regulatory space found httle
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evidence to argue that this factor was decisive, moderating considerably the 
claims made by previous studies of the impact of ' Europeanisation' on national 
railway regulation (Knill and Lehmkuhl 1998, Denkhaus 1997). Instead, this 
finding lends considerable support to historical institutionalist claims of the 
dominance of national adaptation to new, and arguably, common challenges 
rather than radical change and increasing uniformity of policies across states 
(see Kitschelt e t al. 1999).
The insulation o f the political-adm inistrative nexus in  the regulatory space 
As one key aspect of the 'architecture of the state', the political-administrative 
nexus is said to have a substantial impact on policy development by generating 
different patterns of bureaucrat and ministerial career structures. In chapter two, 
it was argued that a high degree of insulation, allowing for the development of 
long-term relationships, was likely to lead to domain-oriented isomorphism. In 
contrast, limited insulation was argued to facilitate the introduction of 
paradigm-oriented and/or international regulatory design ideas.
The two privatisation examples offer substantial evidence for the impact of this 
institutional factor. The 'lateral transfer' mechanism, as identified by Christopher 
Hood (1996), provided the key variable for explaining the adoption of the British 
utility privatisation experiences. Actors from within the civil service with 
considerable privatisation experience were brought into the railway domain. At 
the same time, the dominance of the Treasury further facilitated the introduction 
of domestic paradigm-oriented ideas into the regulatory space. In contrast, the 
German case provided an example of domain-orientation. There was little 
influence from non-domain actors in the choice of regulatory instruments; it was
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the Railway Unit within the Federal ministry of transport which promoted the 
proposals of the Railway Commission. Crucially, the Railway Commission's 
membership drew solely from the transport domain. These findings highlight 
the crucial role of the civil service in both countries. In the German case, this 
confirms the traditional importance attached to civil servants and close academic 
advisers for defining and preparing (administrative) policy reforms in Germany 
(Knill 1999). Christoph Knill has contrasted the German pattern with the United 
Kingdom's administrative system and its role in administrative and policy 
reforms. He claims that these relied mainly on actors outside the civil service. In 
this study, the British privatisation case does not confirm his argument, instead 
the regulatory space seemed more insulated from "non-govemmentaT policy 
actors than in the German case. Rather than 'innovation from outside' (Krdll 
1999:133, see also Foster 1998,1996) by political leadership and inspiration from 
think-tanks, the British railway privatisation case provides an example of a 
'Whitehall-sustained exercise' in the face of a lack of 'innovation' or even 
enthusiasm from the outside.
The British 1919 Ministry of Transport Act provided an example for a lack of 
insulation of the political administrative nexus in the regulatory space. In this 
case, paradigm-oriented proposals were developed by a small group of (future) 
transport ministry officials with a military and railway background. These 
officials, led by Geddes and, at the time, supported by Lloyd George, regarded 
the railways as crucial for economic development, representing a key part of an 
overall programme of active reconstruction policies. However, as the Ministry 
was new to the domain itself and because other departments, in particular the 
Treasury, asserted their role in the domain, more actors increasingly entered the
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regulatory space. This decline in the insulation of the regulatory space led to a 
contestation of regulatory design ideas and finally the rejection of the original 
policy proposals. Thus, the lack of insulation allowed for the introduction of 
competing regulatory design ideas to the existing paradigm-oriented 
perspective.
The various cases examined in this study indicate the critical importance of the 
political-administrative nexus in the regulatory space. The composition of the 
membership of the regulatory space depends on the composition of the political 
administrative nexus, which defines the D ienstw issen and Fachwissen of the 
bureaucratic actors, facilitating the access of policy actors from particular policy 
environments to the regulatory space.
The insulation o f the regulatory space from  societal actors
The importance of membership in the regulatory space has been highlighted by 
most 'regulatory theories', ranging from industry capture approaches in the 
Stiglerian tradition to Wilson's interest group typology based on the distribution 
of costs and benefits across affected groups (J.Q. Wilson 1990). Similarly, 
institutionalist accounts highlight the importance of societal actors, whose 
pressure and direction of pressure is shaped by the institutional access to the 
regulatory space in particular and policy-making in general (Hall 1986).
Previous chapters show that a 'capture' approach has difficulty in explaining 
both the origins of regulatory change and also the selection of regulatory design 
ideas. The impact of the railways on industries and other users leads to a broad 
distribution of regulatory costs and benefits and thus does not provide the
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railways with a monopoly membership inside the regulatory space. With the 
exception of the 1921 Railways Act, British railway operator(s) did not play a 
significant role in the formulation and selection of regulatory design ideas. For 
example, in the British privatisation case, the feeling that British Rail (BR) was 
exploiting its information asymmetries in order to frustrate reform policies, led 
to a policy of disempowering BR by estabHshing Railtrack. The British 
privatisation case was unique in its rejection of domain-oriented actors and their 
concepts; legitimate' sources for regulatory design ideas were provided from 
within Whitehall's interpretation of utüity regulation.
The analysis of regulatory reform in Germany highlighted the importance of 
institutionalised membership in the regulatory space. In Britain, 'experts' did not 
play any major role in the three examined cases (even at a time of widespread 
privatisation where the importance of think tanks, consultants and investment 
banks has been stressed and a decline of the advice capacity of the civil service 
has been diagnosed). In contrast, in Germany the institutionaUsed position of the 
'Academic Advisory Council' provided influential (transport) academic views in 
both post-1945 cases. This influence of experts was facilitated by Germany's 
political institutional environment. In order to overcome institutional veto- 
points, it was attempted to establish an expert-based technocratic consensus. In 
the German 'privatisation' case, the role of the operator was also of crucial 
importance. This influence, however, was based less on the ability of the 
operator to capture the reform process than the selection of the operator's new 
chief executive by Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Quasi-corporatist decision-making 
patterns, involving business, railway and, sometimes, trade union interests, 
were, however, not only unique to the German case. The British 1921 Railways
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Act similarly represents a case of an insulated regulatory space granting the 
peak railway and business associations relatively exclusive access to decision­
making. Nevertheless, in general, societal actors were not as crucial in 
developing regulatory regimes as assumed by original capture approaches, with 
the influence of societal actors remaining dependent on the acceptance by 
political-administrative actors.
The study's findings with regard to the impact of the institutional factors on 
processes of isomorphism can be summarised as follows:
• The impact of coercive forces on the choice between domain- or paradigm- 
oriented sources of isomorphism was limited. Even in cases of relatively limited 
insulation from 'coercive pressures', domestic institutional arrangements were 
powerful enough to shape and control change. Thus, rather than seeing the 
direct importation of international models into a regulatory space, the selection 
of regulatory instruments was mainly shaped by considerations based on 
domestic policy environments. At the same time, the nature of coercive 
pressures allowed domestic actors a considerable scope for discretion, in the 
'privatisation' cases, for example, the nature of the European Directive 91/440 
allowed for sufficient scope for national variation in the transposition process.
• Societal actors did not play as significant a role as predicted by estabHshed 
capture approaches. A Stigler-type capture by the railway operator could not be 
established in any of the case studies. As predicted by the notion of regulatory 
space, institutional access to and membership of the regulatory space was crucial 
for explaining the impact of societal actors. While the operator was in some cases
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more influential than in others, for example, the Bundesbahn in comparison to 
British Rail in the 'privatisation' cases, the extent of involvement depended on 
political and administrative decisions. The German cases, in particular, also 
highlight the importance given to 'experts' in terms of providing the intellectual 
foundation for dominant regulatory design ideas.
• The role of the poHtical-administrative nexus was crucial for the selection of 
regulatory design ideas. The pohtical-administrative nexus shaped the nature of 
the regulatory space and offered incentives and direction to societal actors. 
Furthermore, political decision-making structures allocated membership roles 
and provided veto-positions.
• The more insulated the membership of the regulatory space, granting 
exclusive membership to peak societal interests, academic advisers and domain- 
based civil servants, the less likely is paradigm-oriented isomorphism, while not 
excluding international sources.
Regulation, Institutions and the Regulatory State
In numerous publications, Giandomenico Majone has argued that the last two 
decades have seen the rise of a regulatory state. Multiple causes for this shift 
from a 'positive' to a 'negative' state have been identified. These range from a 
change in policy preferences towards prioritising 'economic efficiency' (Majone 
1996b), the rational behaviour of bureaucrats in airning to maximise their 
influence over policy-content at a time of budgetary constraint and 'fiscal stress' 
(Majone 1994) to a broader cultural and societal shift towards an 'audit society' 
(Power 1997). It is claimed that such a 'rise' of a regulatory state has been
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noticeable in particular with regard to three areas; first, the end to direct service 
delivery by the state, second, the creation of free standing regulatory offices and, 
third, a higher degree of (legal) formality between policy actors. This final 
section considers these claims in the light of the findings of this study. It assesses 
the implications of this study's historical and institutional perspective and then 
discusses whether the alleged shift towards the 'regulatory state' represents a 
shift towards policy stability.
Despite claims that 'regulation is the new border between the state and 
industry', representing the 'battleground' on how the economy should be run 
(Veljanovski 1991: 4), regulation itself as well as regulatory relations have been 
shaped by legal, political and cultural traditions. The historical chapters show 
that the regulation of the railways was a recurring and significant 'battleground' 
for competing regulatory design ideas since the mid-19th century. In aU three 
time periods under examination in this study, perceived problems and 
subsequent debates were conducted with regard to the 'appropriate' regulatory 
design in the key areas of organisational structure, regulatory powers and 
'public services'. These reflected administrative arguments concerning the extent 
of delegation and operator discretion, the scope of regulatory oversight and 
control as well as the recognition of the interests of specific constituencies. 
Debates concerning the degree of monopoly and commercial pressure, the 
nature of 'efficiency', the nature and scope of regulation and of 'public services' 
continue and are likely to persist.
Despite the evidence of the historical importance of regulation and regulatory 
debates, it has been argued that the shift towards the 'regulatory state' during
332
the 1980s and 1990s is unique in following the US model of free-standing 
regulatory agencies. Such a claim relies on a particular interpretation of 
Selznick's definition of regulation as 'sustained and focused control exercised by 
a public agency over activities that are valued by the community' (Selznick 1985: 
363). While such a definition allows for a broad interpretation of regulation, it 
does not necessitate the establishment of free-standing regulatory agencies. The 
epigraph to chapter five (discussing the British 1947 socialisation) showed that if 
one includes ministerial departments as 'public agencies', the period of the 
'positive state' was as much a period of the regulatory state as was the period of 
privatisation in the end of the 20th century.
Nevertheless, if one were to test the hypothesis of the rise of a 'regulatory state' 
by pointing to the increasing use of US-style free-standing agencies, then the 
evidence of the privatisation cases provides little evidence to support the notion 
of a 'rise' of a 'regulatory state'. The comparative analysis of the privatisation 
period shows that regulation is not a universally accepted concept. The German 
regulatory debate has a strong bias against the setting up of independent sector- 
based regulatory agencies, while the importance of an unchallenged position of 
the Federal Cartel Office continues to be stressed. In the German case, the 
absence of a free-standing regulator in the railway domain was also paralleled in 
the approach taken with regard to the Hberalisation of electricity supply. This 
contrasted with the telecommunications domain, where the estabHshment of an 
independent regulatory authority remained contested and was regarded as an, 
at best, temporary exception. In contrast, in Britain, once the example of 
telecommunications had been established (following the opposition of the 
competition authority, the Office of Fair Trading, to take on the responsibüity for
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telecommunications), the creation of regulatory 'watchdogs' became one key 
tenet of the British regulation template for pubhc utilities, extending to the 
lottery, financial services and food safety.
In addition to this absence of structural congruence, there was also little 
'ideational' agreement as to the proper purpose of regulation. In Germany, the 
notion of regulation has not enjoyed growing usage. Instead, the activities of the 
Eisenbahn-Bundesamt were widely described as 'supervision', which places this 
office into the tradition of historical -  they were already part of the 1838 Prussian 
railway law - oversight authorities as part of so-called 'sovereign' (hoheitlichê) 
functions. In contrast, in Britain, regulation was a substitute and promoter of 
'competition' with, in the later cases of utility privatisation, structural reforms 
being prioritised over ex post regulation. Furthermore, the emphasis given to 
'competition' as regulatory objective during the 1990s in British utüity regulation 
contrasted sharply with the regulatory objective of the early 1920s that 
'competition was wasteful'.
In sum, the interpretation of appropriate regulatory instruments did not only 
vary over time; across countries, regulation has been interpreted in different 
ways. Given these variations in contemporary regulation as weU as the 
importance attached to regulation and regulatory design in previous decades, 
the claim of an emergence of a 'regulatory state' does not offer any major 
content. At the same time the history of raüway regulation in both countries 
following the period under examination in this study also suggests the 
continuation of 'old style' political involvement. Ministers in both countries 
wielded substantial influence, in the UK, foUowing the election of the Labour
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government, regulatory independence was limited and constrained as well as 
regulators replaced^, in Germany, a change in government led to the predictable, 
although delayed sacking of the CDU-appointed railway chief executive 
Johannes Ludewig in October 1999. Equally the behaviour of train operating 
companies and infrastructure providers in both countries (especially following 
accidents) did not evade pubhc attention and therefore also pohtical attention- 
seeking, criticism and intervention. Poor performance in terms of punctuahty, 
timetabling chaos as weU as severe accidents led to calls for aboHshing the 
fragmented nature of the British industry, while in Germany, calls were made to 
fuUy separate the provision of infrastructure from the Deutsche Bahn and to 
estabhsh an economic regulatory authority. Thus far from representing a 'new' 
form of control of economic activities, current methods of regulation represent 
similarly contested poHcy instruments as those in the past leading to recurring 
debates.
The claim that the reform of regulatory instruments should be understood as a 
process of isomorphism -  where poHcy-makers select between competing 
sources of legitimacy, based on the distinction between domain- and paradigm- 
oriented pohcy environments -  also supports the prediction that regulatory 
regimes are inherently unstable. Different pohcy environments exert often 
competing legitimating sources for regulatory design ideas. As already noted 
above, institutional approaches have stressed that institutional change and 
reform is constrained by institutional embeddedness and a 'logic of
 ^ John Swift expressed the claim that regulatory independence was constrained by the 
intentions of the government of the day. A former telecommunications regulator at a LSE 
seminar shared this view  (November 1998).
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appropriateness' (March and Olsen 1989). Similarly, Robert Goodin asserts that a 
'well-designed institution [...] is both internally consistent and externally in 
harmony with the rest of the social order in which it is set' (Goodin 1996:34).
In a social environment which offers competing sources for isomorphism, an 
institution which fulfils Goodin's 'goodness of fit' criteria with regard to one 
pohcy environment is likely to be incongruent with another pohcy environment. 
Thus, while regulatory regimes are to some extent embedded into their wider 
institutional pohcy environment, this embeddedness is by no means 
deterministic and rephcating but diverse and often contradicting. Instead, how 
and why particular regulatory instruments draw on specific pohcy 
environments is a matter of choice by actors within the regulatory space. 
Membership in the regulatory space is facihtated by institutional factors which 
connect the regulatory space to different pohcy environments. Any choice of 
regulatory instruments represents a rejection of one source of legitimisation, 
leading to tension with regard to the 'legitimacy' and 'appropriateness' of the 
selected regulatory instruments.
Conclusion
It has been argued that viewing regulatory change as a process of isomorphism - 
the growing homogenisation of a regulatory regime with regimes in one of its 
pohcy environments -  provides a perspective for ancdysing the formulation and 
selection of regulatory instruments which moves beyond broad institutional 
claims that 'institutions matter'. The study has shown that the extent of 
insulation of a regulatory space to isomorphic pressures matters. In particular, 
three institutional factors have been examined and their impact of the extent of
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domain- or paradigm-orientation of regulatory reform assessed. It has been 
argued that the nature of regulatory reform could be best explained by the 
organisation of the political-administrative nexus rather than by the openness of 
the regulatory space to coercive pressures or the influence of societal actors.
In the tight of the findings which neither reported convergence across countries 
nor clear patterns of persistence as well as the claim that pressures of 
isomorphism can be differentiated, this study has implications for debates 
concerning the 'regulatory state'. It has been argued that the proclamations as to 
the emergence of the regulatory state in the last two decades should be regarded 
with considerable caution. Regulation is far from a newly emerging policy issue, 
regulatory debates concerning organisational structure, extent of regulatory 
authority and the provision of non-commercial 'public services' have been part 
of the history of the railways since its emergence as new mode of transport. 
More importantly, regulation does not offer a unifying set of organisational 
principles, nor is regulation interpreted in similar ways at similar times across 
countries. Finally, stressing that isomorphism can be distinguished in its 
domain- and paradigm orientation and that reforms are based on a contest 
between various templates emerging from different policy environments further 
points to the potential instability of a regulatory regime.
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Appendix I 
Interviews
United Kingdom
lUKl
IUK2
IUK3
IUK4
IUK5
IUK6
IUK7
IUK8
IUK9
lUKlO
lUKll
IUK12
IUK13
IUK14
IUK15
IUK16
IUK17
IUK18
IUK19
IUK20
IUK21
IUK22
IUK23
15/9/97
18/9/97
19/9/97
14/10/97
16/10/97
16/10/97
9/10/97
20/10/97
22/10/97
28/10/97
29/10/97
12/11/97
14/1/98
15/1/98
21/1/98
25/1/98
26/1/98
18/3/98
26/3/98
26/3/98
4/4/98
30/10/98
2/6/99
Former Senior Official, Department of Transport
Senior Official, Treasury
Transport Journalist
Senior Officials, British Rail
Former Advisor, Department of Transport
Senior Politician, formerly Department of Transport
Senior Official, Office of Passenger Railway Franchising
Former Senior Offical, British Rail
Senior Offical, Office of the Rail Regulator
Senior Politician, formerly Department of Transport
Senior Official, formerly Treasury
Senior Official, Department of the Environment,
Transport and the Regions
Senior Politician, formerly Department of Transport 
Senior Politician, formerly Department of Transport 
Senior Consultant
Senior Politician, formerly Department of Transport 
(telephone interview)
Former Senior Official, Office of the Rail Regulator 
Transport Journalist
Official, Department of the Environment, Transport and 
the Regions
Former Senior BR official 
Former Senior Official, OPRAF 
Transport Academic 
Former Advisor to 10 Downing Street
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Germany
IDl 26/6/97 Former Senior Official, Eisenbahn-Bundesamt, Bonn
ID2 27/6/97 Senior Official, Ministry of Transport, Bonn
ID3 24/4/98 Senior Officials, Deutsche Bahn, Berlin
ID4 12/5/98 Senior Official, Ministry of Transport, Agriculture and
Viticulture, Rhineland-Palatinate, Mainz 
ID5 13/5/98 Transport Economist
ID6 12/5/98 Senior Official, Bundeseisenbahnvermogen,
Frankfurt/M.
1D7 27/5/98 Senior Officials, Deutsche Bahn, Frankfurt/M.
1D8 28/5/98 Senior Official, Ministry of Transport, Bonn,
1D9 2/6/98 Senior Officials, Eisenbahn-Bundesamt, Bonn.
IDIO 17/6/98 Senior Official, Deutsche Bahn, BerHn
ID ll 3/7/98 Member of Bundestag, member of Transport Committee.
1D12 15/12/98 Former Senior Official, Ministry of Transport, Bonn.
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Appendix 2
This appendix aims to provide an overview of the evolution of railway regulation in 
Britain and Germany during the 19th century. In both countries the emergence of the 
railways as a new mode of transport for both goods and passengers demanded that 
states should take some form of regulatory action. The scale of the railways, their 
impact on the environment and the development of industry, agriculture and 
population mobility as well as their significance for the military meant that the 
railways attracted political attention from their early beginnings.
This Appendix does not apply the analytical framework of the previous chapters and 
merely wants to sketch the main developments in both countries. In the British case, 
some consideration is also given to railway policy in Ireland and India. While not part 
of the overall argument of this study, this appendix nevertheless allows for a critical 
assessment whether railway regulation has emerged on common, cross-national or 
diverse national tracks. A related claim has been made by Frank Dobbin (1994). He 
argues that a state's political culture is reflected in the state's industrial culture and 
therefore shapes economic policy in biasing the selection of perceived problems and 
also the selection of proposed solutions. The following first discusses the British and 
then the German case, before returning to a concluding discussion which argues that 
in both cases there was a similar conception of problems and, more importantly, little 
evidence to suggest national uniformity over time in regulatory 'solutions'.
Britain
In contrast to the European continent, Britain had delegated most of its state functions 
in the 17th century to individuals and to bodies at the local level. Despite numerous
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mercantilist policies in the later part of the 18th century, there was, following the 
Napoleonic Wars, a deliberate attempt to curtail the state's involvement in economic 
affairs. The main responsibility of the state was perceived to lie in the protection of all 
varieties of property (Harlmg and Mandler 1993; Finer 1952). Until the end of the 18th 
century, pubhc authority remained diffused, being in the hands of a large number of 
relatively independent legal entities or officers. The First Reform Act in 1832 marked 
the partial shift of pohtical power away from the Crown to Parhament and from the 
landed aristocracy to the middle classes, while it also represented a decisive point for 
the relationship between law and administration (Chester 1981; Parris 1969). While the 
legislature dominated the administration, Parhament's involvement in the economy 
was restricted to being the authoriser and constitutor of canal companies and turnpike 
trusts. Given the absence of a professional administrative staff, the expertise in 
emerging technical systems lay purely in the private rather than the pubhc sector. Due 
to the non-existence of pubhc prosecutors or professional judges, there was no judicial 
oversight.
To a large extent, British parhamentary procedures were responsible for the piecemeal 
and unorganised growth of the railway system. Given the absence of a dominant 
executive, Parhament demonstrated its sovereignty by passing at any time any 
legislation on domestic affairs without any regard to consistency. This was reflected in 
the fact that private bihs outnumbered the amount of pubhc acts.^ As railway 
companies required limited habihty status for their shareholders and required the 
granting of the right of way for their tracks with the associated compulsory powers for
 ^ Foster defines this first period of railway regulation as 'Regulation by Parhament' with the 
private acts resembling, to some extent, modern-day hcences (see Prosser 1997: 181-4, Foster 
1992: chapter 1).
341
land purchase, companies needed to obtain a private act of parliament (Foreman-Peck 
and Millward 1994: 16). Early railway acts were drawn from legislation concerning 
privately owned turnpikes and canals, based on the assumption of private ownership 
and competition between different operators on the same track (Cleveland-Stevens 
1915: 11).^ The private acts defined the terms for the planning, construction and 
operation of the entity in question. They were considered individually by Select 
Committees, whose membership was (prior to 1844) biased towards those with a 
vested interest in the particular line. Before 1840, regulation proved to be largely 
ineffective as maximum rates and charges were perceived to be set too high, 
competition did not emerge and no effective enforcement mechanisms of the existing 
statutory obligations were in place.^ Access to members in both Houses of Parhament 
and membership of select committees rather than bureaucratic initiative explains the 
beginning of railway regulation in Britain.
Demands by traders concerning perceived discriminatory pricing by railway 
companies and, as a result of a select committee report in 1839, which had complained 
about monopoHstic behaviour and carteHsation in the industry, and a private member
2 A parhamentary report of 1808 remarked critically that 'instead of the roads of the Kingdom  
being made a great national concern, a number of local trusts are created, under the authority of 
which large sums of money are collected from the pubhc and expended without adequate 
responsibility or control' (in Cleveland-Stevens 1915: 1-2). In 1840, a Select Committee on 
Railway Companies stated that competition represented a 'total misapprehension of the best 
means of providing locomotive power on the railways' (Dobbin 1994:199).
 ^The view that the law might be enforced by administrative means outside the courts was only 
gradually introduced in factory legislation and in education. Furthermore, there was no 
provision for a pubhc prosecutor in English law (Parris 1965: 13-5). In cases brought to court, 
there was a clear judicial bias towards the railways. In cases of an adverse judgement, railway 
companies rehed on new  legislation to 'legalise' their behaviour.
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initiative (the government took no action), a Railway Department, allocated at the 
Board of Trade, was established. The Act stipulated that lines could only be opened 
after the Department being given four weeks' notice and the right to initiate 
inspections.'^ The Department's functions also included the enforcement of legislation 
and the collection and storage of statistics. The parliamentary representation of the 
'railway interest' successfully managed to weaken the Department's capacities. The 
departmental authorities were circumscribed to the protection of safety rather than on 
restricting monopolistic behaviour.^
In 1844, William Gladstone, then President of the Board of Trade, attempted to 
introduce a Bill which would have given the government the opportunity to revise 
fares and charges giving a rate of return over 10 per cent, and the power, after 15 
years, to purchase the particular line. The concerted action by the railway interest 
convinced prime minister Feel to force Gladstone to back down, extending the period 
after which the government could purchase the line and also altering the precise 
purchasing terms in favour of the companies. Thus, in spite of the introduction of so- 
called 'parliamentary trains', providing covered third-class accommodation, 
establishing a minimum speed and setting third-class rates, the 1844 Act represented a 
major victory for the railway companies (Alderman 1973: 17). The Royal Commission
 ^ One of the 'successes' of the railway interest was the provision that no inspector could be 
appointed who had been part of die industry in the previous year, which meant that at the 
beginning the Board was staffed by officers with httle knowledge of the railways.
 ^ The lack of enforcement powers given to the inspectors placed great stress on persuasion 
rather than coercion as regulatory tools. In general, railway regulation benefited from the 
experience gained in factory law and the Poor Law where a system of central supervision and 
inspection had been established (Lubenow 1971). This reflected a shift from a former reliance on
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in 1867, reviewing the provisions of the 1844 Act, concluded that the Act h ad  made 
the operation [of government purchase] more difficult, and indeed almost impractical 
with a due regard to the guarantees it has accorded to the railway companies.'^ The 
regulation of the rate of return led to an over-capitalisation by the companies, 
resulting in non-economical network extensions and to the adoption of expensive 
technology/
The ability to re-design regulatory bodies via parliamentary action led to a rapid 
succession of governmental bodies supposed to regulate the railway companies. The 
Railway Board established by Gladstone in 1844 was quickly abolished in 1845 after 
the railway companies had protested against its operating procedures and prime 
minister Peel had refused to support his own railway administration (Parris 1965: 83- 
8). A further attempt to shift the burden of work from the parliamentary select 
committees during the 'railway mania' to a 'Railway Commission' was made in 1846. 
The Commission was vested with the authority to process all proposals concerning 
construction or amalgamations, to arbitrate and to 'make suggestions' concerning 
railway rates. However, as Parliament failed to provide the Commission with a clear
criminal law, where prosecutions before local justices had been disappointing, to adrninistrative 
regulation (Arthurs 1985:105).
 ^This view  contrasts with the public interest' account provided by McLean and Foster (1992). 
McLean and Foster (1992) do not account sufficiently for the importance of trading and 
agricultural interests, the context of the 'railway mania' at the time and the potential interest of 
the existing companies in regulation to rule out newly emerging competition, and discount the 
long-term self-interest of Peel and Gladstone in a political career, although both continued their 
political careers, with Gladstone showing no further interest in railway issues.
 ^Because of their iron tracks, which allowed for comparatively high average speeds, the British 
railways spent most capital per kilometre of track; also the price paid for expropriation of 
landowners contributed greatly to the costs.
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remit and as the amount of railway bills subsided, opponents of the Commission were 
successful in demanding the abolition of the Commission in 1851 (Cleveland-Stevens 
1915: 152). The absence of any 'state interest' in a coherent railway network was also 
evident in the 1846 Railway Gauge Act: instead of fixing one single gauge size, there 
was a recommendation m favour of the narrow gauge (4ft 8&Mn), while the usage of 
the broad gauge (7ft) was not abandoned (until 1890) and the broad gauge network 
even expanded.
The impact of the Second Reform Act, an increasingly 'radical' Liberal Party, 
strengthened party discipline, the growth of other effective interest representations, 
such as chambers of commerce and trade unions, accompanied a shift in the nature of 
railway regulation towards becoming more legalistic and judicial (Foster 1992: chapter 
2). Foster defines this period as 'Regulation by Commission', following the 
establishment of the Railway Commission in 1873.® Policy initiatives were often 
vetoed and blocked by the adversarial interests and 'progress' often depended on 
accidents. For example, the 1889 Act, which made automatic continuous brakes and 
block-working signalling compulsory, could only be passed in parliament after a 
major accident in 1889, following 15 years of advocacy for this measure which had 
been blocked by the railway companies (Parris 1969:180; Alderman 1973:132). At the 
same time, despite a high level of concentration and informal cartelisation, attempts 
by several companies to amalgamate formally were blocked by business groups 
campaigning with their concern about potential abuse of increased monopoly powers. 
The crucial shift in the power between trading interests and railway companies was 
most visibly represented in the 1894 Railway and Canal Act. The burden of proof for
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the reasonableness of rate increases was shifted from business to the railway 
companies, making it difficult for the railway companies to raise rates (Cain 1973).^
This general account of railway regulation in mainland Britain during the nineteenth 
century provides an indication of the great amount of contestation with which 
regulation expanded. There was little state interest in guiding the development of the 
railway network, nor was there much concern about directing economic development. 
Instead, regulation developed as a combination of accidents, conflicts between 
interests and, to some extent, by the institutional adaptation and learning effects of the 
various railway commissions (Parris 1965).
The following section considers the experience of British railway regulation in Ireland 
and India in order to question whether a 'national' track is visible in the export of 
policies to colonial jurisdictions. In both cases, the dominance of commercial objectives 
was subject to other political considerations, such as the alleviation of economic plight 
or the facilitation of transport links.
In Ireland, the British government, although eager to maintain the assumption that the 
railways should be run by private organisations, recognised that the Irish situation 
required a more 'interventionist' stance (Conroy 1928).^® Ireland had peculiar
 ^ In 1888, a Railway and Canal Commission replaced the previous Commission. Its procedures 
more closely resembled a judicial court than an administrative tribunal.
 ^Prior to the Act, business interests had to prove the 'unreasonableness' of the rate increase.
In Scotland, no 'interventionist' policy was adopted with regard to the railways, in contrast to 
early policies in road budding and the construction of the Caledonian Canal for military 
purposes (Checkland 1983). Appeals for public financial support were unsuccessful, hnes were 
sponsored by wealthy landowners.
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difficulties in attracting private railway capital as its population was decreasing and 
widely dispersed, mineral resources were absent and the application of Westminster 
regulations mainly reflected mainland industry rather than Irish agricultural 
production patterns. Although the idea of state railway construction and management 
was rejected, in 1846, it was decided that the Commissioner of Public Works was to be 
granted the right to make loans to railway undertakings.^^ Following the 1847 famine, 
the government passed a bill that attempted to relieve distress by favourable loan 
terms, advancing £620,000 at a rate of five per cent (later reduced to four per cent) per 
Hne and which fixed the gauge at the (non-English) size of 5ft 3in. Although Irish 
interests demanded nationalisation and additional financial support for the 
construction of an Irish railway system, this was rejected in London in order not to 
give a precedent for mainland policy. Despite these efforts, the extent of railway 
construction was still perceived to be insufficient, thus additional guarantees were 
provided and further amalgamations between companies encouraged. Nevertheless, 
given the poor economic state of Ireland where the poorest regions were not 
connected to the network, the government decided to pass a Light Railway Act in 1889 
as a regional policy tool. This provided for a directly available state guarantee on 
capital returns of three per cent for closely supervised light railway construction (on a 
narrower gauge) which also required a contribution by local authorities. Further 
legislation in 1890 and 1896 was aimed to encourage existing Irish companies to 
extend their networks by facilitating light railway construction. In sum, the Irish 
example shows that the British government, while aiming to maintain the assumption 
of the railways as a private undertaking, used the railways for an active regional 
poHcy to alleviate economic disadvantages. However, rather than involving state
At the time, 500,000 people were on poor relief. The railways were regarded as tool to
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ownership, this involved the safeguarding and facilitating of investment by private 
undertakings.
Railway poHcy in India offers a case for substantial changes in the British approach 
towards organising and regulating a colonial railway.^^ At the time when India was 
under the ultimate control of the Secretary of State for India in London, three 
distinctive phases of railway poHcy can be distinguished, financial guarantees, 
ownership and a dual system of pubHc ownership and financial guarantees.
India was regarded as an important source for raw materials (such as cotton) and 
cheap food as well as an ideal market for finished goods. The politically encouraged 
construction of railways, however, started from the early 1850s onwards. The explicit 
aim was to encourage British capital to invest in railways in India, while placing these 
undertakings under regulatory control, setting route, number, speed and time of train 
services as well as fares and employment conditions and accounts.^^ To attract capital, 
the Indian government offered capital return guarantees in order to acknowledge the 
non-commercial functions of the railways which were used as a means for 
transporting the military as well as to contain famines more effectively. Nevertheless, 
this policy of pubHc involvement met with scepticism from the 'home' government as 
well as from the parHamentary board of control, while the court of directors of the East
facilitate trade as well as employment.
This section draws on Prasad (1960), Thormer (1977), Andrew (1884), Mehta (1927) and 
Jagtiani (1924).
Significantly, this policy was launched as a personal initiative by the then Governor-General 
of India, Lord Dalhousie, who had headed the Railway Board from 1844 until its abolition in 
1845. He was determined to implement poHcies which he had been denied in the British 
domestic domain (he also established the larger 5ft 6in gauge).
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India Company followed the private railway companies' demands in advocating 
capital return guarantees.
During the period 1849-1869, the Indian government guaranteed raüway companies 
for a term of 99 years an interest of five per cent upon their subscribed capital, while 
the amount advanced on the guarantee was to be repaid with the interest from profits 
obtained by the railways above a set minimum rate. The Government was given a 
right to purchase the Hne after 25 or 50 years. The government was granted overall 
supervisory competencies, free mail and postal services as well as reduced rates for 
müitary transport. A so-called Government Director, equipped with veto-powers, was 
allowed to attend all Board of Director meetings. The company could hand the railway 
over to the Government with six month notice. The Indian government therefore 
reheved shareholders of all risks, leading, according to Prasad, to 'extravagantly 
constructed' lines (Prasad 1960: 52).
Following 1869, the Government of India demanded from London the right to 
construct its own 'poHtical' (in contrast to so-called 'commercial') lines as well as to 
purchase the 'guaranteed lines' as this method was claimed to be less costly than a 
poHcy relying on financial guarantees. The government in London granted this right 
until 1874, when it intervened and restricted pubHc construction works to those 
projects which were commerciaUy viable with some exceptions made for those Hnes 
which were constructed to prevent famines. As aU capital had to be raised within 
India itself, the Indian government, driven by financial duress due to the Afghan war 
and urged by the Famine Commission's demand to expand the railway network, was 
forced to re-introduce private enterprise into railway construction. From 1855 to 1924, 
railway provision by private enterprise went hand in hand with further extension of
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public raüway lines. The private undertakings were given new guarantees (at 3.5 per 
cent), the raüways were defined as government property with only the capital being 
supplied by the companies. Thus, companies functioned as agents to work the 
property belonging to the government.
The two 'Empire' examples of Ireland and India provide some evidence that British 
raüway policy differed substantiaUy between the 'home' and colonial territories. This 
indicates that British policy did not foUow a 'nationeü' track or was driven by, to use 
Dobbin's term, an 'industrial paradigm', but was able to adapt according to 
circumstance and environment. In both colonial cases, the perceived need to use the 
raüways for economic, political and military demands, led to a policy which aUowed 
via financial control for substantial government involvement and regulatory control.
Germany
The development of the German raüway system was shaped by the active state 
policies of 39 sovereign, non-parliamentary states, characterised by uneven economic 
development (Lee 1988). As the amount of through traffic was considered to be an 
indicator of a state's economic weU-being, states started, from the early 1840s, to 
promote the development of a raüway system in their territory (Fremdhng 1977a, 
1977b). The perceived need to develop a raüway system often conflicted with financial 
and constitutional structures; thus across German states there was a wide variety in 
organisational and regulatory structures, ranging from private raüways, mixed 
systems to purely state-owned systems.
The only German state which relied on a purely state-owned system was Hanover, driven by 
the absence of private capital and strategic-geographical competition with neighbouring states. 
In contrast, Saxony refused any public involvement (Wühehni 1963: 387).
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From the earliest stages, states took a close interest in the operation of privately-owned 
railway projects. In Bavaria, where several private initiatives were planned, 
'Fundam entalbestim m ungeii (fundamental guidelines) were issued in 1836 in co­
operation with the companies to regulate these 'bodies of public utility' 
{gem einniitzige Anstalteii) on issues such as the raising of capital and inter-company 
and company-state relationships (Ziegler 1996: 32). When private interest in 
promoting railway development declined, the Bavarian state felt obliged to intervene 
by building its own lines as well as purchasing the two existing private lines. Only one 
further railway line was allowed to be constructed and managed by private owners - 
the 'Ostbahn' which was considered as being economically important but whose 
construction by the state proved impossible due to a lack of pubhc resources. The 
Ostbahn' was later taken into state ownership, when the operator's private interests 
conflicted with the regional interests and policy goals of the Bavarian government. 
States perceived the railways as an instrument for regional, financial and social 
policies. Thus, control of the railways by regulation was often considered to be 
insufficient in contrast to full state ownership.
In contrast to Britain, the large German states, in particular Prussia, Saxony and 
Bavaria, had well-established and powerful bureaucracies. They had originated under 
absolutist rule and had turned themselves, in the absence of parliaments, into strong, 
reform-minded bureaucracies (Kocka 1981). Prussia had been in the process of radical 
reform since the military defeats against Napoleon in 1806 (Koselleck 1975). Driven by 
reparation payments and war debts, the civil service embarked on a policy of 
economic liberalism and of rapid industrialisation to prevent a 'French revolution' and 
to replace the old feudal elites. By radically reforming the administration, the
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bureaucracy was supposed to become the 'intelligence of the state' which was to unite 
the reformed Prussia, which, after 1815, included an extensive, but divided territory. 
Prussia's industrial poHcy of radical industriaHsation meant that 'liberaUsm' was 
always abandoned when industrial progress conflicted with existing practices. The 
bureaucracy as a 'technical intelligence' was 'to educate, to financially and technically 
support and to patronise' the private citizen (Koselleck 1975: 617, own translatioii). 
When the construction of railway lines was first proposed, Prussian officials 
responded with considerable scepticism, fearing negative financial consequences for 
the recently expanded network of state toU-roads as well as for postal services. 
However, once France had initiated an active policy of railway expansion, the 
Prussian government also encouraged the construction of the railway system.
Following an Act of 1820, the Prussian state debt had been fixed at a particular level 
with any increase triggering the constitution of a 'reichsstandige Versammlun^ 
(general assembly) (von der Leyden 1914: 3). As liberals hoped to use such an 
assembly for an overall constitutional liberaHsation of the Prussian political system, 
the Prussian government refrained from calling for such a convention. As a 
consequence, Prussia's government relied on private capital and regulation for its 
initial railway poHcy. In 1836 a 'criteria catalogue' was issued (without consultation of 
the private sector), which was followed by the 1838 Prussian Railways Act. The Act 
not only reflected the Prussian government's interest in controlling railway and capital 
market development, but also Junker demands to reduce the pressure on wages by 
curbing railway construction. The 1838 Act provided the operator with exclusive 
rights for operation and rate-setting as well as safeguards that net profits would not 
fall below six per cent and not exceed ten per cent. While the construction of directly 
competing tracks was banned, 'on-track'-competition was allowed. Safety standards
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were set, a Commissioner for every line was established to act as interlocutor between 
state and company and provisions were made which allowed for the subsequent 
purchase of the operator by the state (Dunlavy 1994: 89). The Act was widely criticised 
by the railway industry for its rigidity and private construction only started once a 
construction fund had been established and interest guarantees on capital had been 
introduced. Following the 1848 'revolution', a new Prussian constitution was passed in 
1850 which abolished the limits on state levels, the Prussian minister of commerce, 
von der Heydt, embarked on the construction of state-owned railway lines and also 
initiated a policy of 'creeping state ownership', taking companies which took up 
interest guarantees into state administration, but not ownership. From 1853, a special 
railway duty was raised to gain revenues for further railway shares. Furthermore, the 
railways were seen as a tool to promote the economy by, for example, forcing the 
introduction of a 'one-pfennig' tariff for Silesian coal transport on private and state- 
administered Silesian rail operators. Other goals of the state raüway policy were the 
alleviation of negative consequences of industrialisation and the facilitation of 
industrial development in economically backward regions.
In the following decade there was, among states in North Germany, a shift away from 
state ownership of the raüways and a renewed reliance on private capital. This can be 
explained by the increased liberal representation in state parliaments, (such as Prussia) 
which were given (after 1848) the right to veto budgets, and also the poor state of 
public finances. The Prussian government was forced into promoting direct 
competition between lines and by advocating the construction of rival lines. Prussia 
also sold one raüway operator to a (state-adininistered) private company in order to be 
able to finance its army (Ziegler 1996: 56-93). The Prussian state did not abandon its 
involvement in the raüway sector: Prussia remained owner and administrator of
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numerous lines and was able to weaken established private companies considerably 
by promoting competition, while also fulfilling demands from industry in the Ruhr for 
more and cheaper railway connections.^^
The constitution of the newly created German Reich in 1871 stated that the railways 
were a matter of Reich supervision. Bismarck, convinced of the economic and military 
benefits of the railway system, while also being driven by malpractice within his own 
administration, resulting mainly from the dual role of the Prussian trade ministry as 
regulator of the private railways and administrator of the state railways, attempted to 
bring the railways not only under state control, but also Reich ownership.^^ A 
'nationalisation' was also advocated by commercial interests which criticised the 
extent of rate discrimination across railway hnes. However, the individual states were 
unwilling to hand over their economic tools to the Reich, therefore, only a national 
supervisory authority, the Reichseisenbahnamt, was estabUshed in 1873 (Neumann 
and Freystadt 1876).^^
This pohcy proved advantageous to the Prussian state. It weakened the existing private 
companies and therefore also reduced their resistance to the adoption of the 'one-pfennig' coal 
transport rate due to the companies' requests for financial safeguards. Furthermore, financially 
weak companies were less expensive to take into state ownership. In other North German 
states, such as Saxony, there was a similar move towards advocating more competition and 
encouraging private enterprise. There was, however, only one case of an outright sale of a state 
operator to a private agent.
The constitutional provisions were adopted from the constitution of the 'Norddeutsche Bund' 
which itself had borrowed the wording from the 1848 draft constitution.
Among the Reichsbahnamt's responsibilities were the administration of the railways in 
occupied Alsace (annexed after the 1870-71 war with France), the drafting of legislation which 
would establish the Reich's competencies in railways as well as the provision of a common set 
of rates. The latter endeavour was unsuccessful, while it nevertheless achieved a Germany-wide
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Given this rejection by various states, Prussia embarked on a policy of bringing all 
Prussian railways into state ownership, which was completed by 1885. In general, the 
1870s saw the overall ownership patterns among the German states turn towards 
shifting state-ownership partly because of the private companies' poor financial 
situation during the economic depression of the late 1870s and partly as a response to 
the action taken by Prussia. Until the First World War, Prussia showed little further 
interest in a 'nationalisation' of the railways for three reasons; first, they fulfilled their 
politically desired function in promoting industrial development in previously less 
advanced regions; second, by making railway workers civil servants, it led to a 
'moderation' of 'socialist elements' within the railway staff; and third, and most 
importantly, the substantial surpluses were essential for the provision of social policies 
and reductions in direct taxation.
The case of German railway development shows that there were several forms of 
organisational patterns during the early phase of German (and Prussian) railway 
development. These organisational changes arose mainly for pragmatic financial or 
constitutional reasons, although there was a clear interest in regulating the railway as 
a 'commonweal' operation. The regulatory structure of the sector changed according to 
how the state could best control the railways and enforce its desired policy - the 
control of the economic and social consequences of industrial modernisation. While 
the impact of 'private interests' can be traced in Prussian railway regulation - for 
example. East Elbian racehorses enjoyed special reduced rates and railway workers
adoption of 'rate-councds' between companies and industry (Ziegler 1996: 240-58). It also 
facilitated the co-operation across states on rolling stock for freight.
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were sent on 'holiday' during harvest time - these private interests were only 
successful in so far as they did not contradict the state interest.
Conclusion
In contrast to Dobbin's comparison between France, the United States and Britain, the 
analysis of Germany and Britain provides evidence that railway regulation was, 
especially in the 'formative period', not dissimilar. In both cases, regulation regarded 
the railways as a tumpike-like undertaking with monopoly power, thus in both cases 
competition on track was 'theoretically' allowed, but did not occur in practice. Only in 
later developments did German (and, in particular, Prussian) and British railway 
regulation diverge: on the one hand, the state-led industrialisation in Germany as well 
as federal competition between states meant that the railways soon became to be 
regarded as an economic tool for economic poUcies, while in mainland Britain, pohcy 
was developed by contests between business and railway interests, safety concerns 
and by some form of bureaucratic adjustment and accumulation. This difference 
between pohcy approaches can be seen in the introduction of parhamentary trains in 
Britain, which were mainly concerned with the accommodation and service provided 
for working-class workers, and 'one-pfennig' coal transports across Prussia. However, 
that British railway pohcy and regulation were not culturaUy biased in considering the 
railways only as private undertakings is visible in the case of Ireland and, more 
importantly, India. In both cases, the railways were used for regional and also (in 
India) mihtary goals. Thus, Dobbin's claim that industrial cultures shape the perceived 
problems or the adopted solutions is not supported in these cases. This broad account 
has shown that in either case there was no distinctly national track of pohcy solutions, 
that, in particular at the early stages, pohcy solutions were similar and, more 
importantly, that they responded to similar pohcy problems. Instead, the
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organisational structure of the state (or, in the German case, the non-existence of a 
'central' state) helps to explain the varying interest in the railways as a 'sector close to 
the state', especially at later stages of regulatory developments in the second half of the 
19th century.
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